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ABSTRACT 
This thesis discusses New Zealand's relations with the League of 
Nations from its inception in 1920 to its dissolution in 1946. Begin-
ning with the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, which created the League, the 
study traces the development of New Zealand's relationship with the 
Geneva body from an indifferent, sometimes hostile, Massey Government in 
the early 1920s, to the detached acceptance of the Coates and Forbes 
Governments in the late 1920s and early 1930s, through to the passionate 
support of the Savage Government in the late 1930s. The final chapter 
is devoted to New Zealand's sometimes prickly association with the 
Permanent Mandates Commission, the League body which supervised New 
Zealand's administration of the mandate of Western Samoa. 
The importance of this study lies in its extensive use for the 
first time of government department files covering the whole period of 
New Zealand's involvement with the League. This has revealed that be-
cause New Zealand's external affairs were handled by Britain in the 
main, this relationship with Geneva was trilateral rather than bilate-
ral. Even under Labour, which pursued from 1935 a more independent line 
in League affairs than previous governments, the policies of Britain and 
the Commonwealth continued to exert a powerful influence over New Zea-
land's policy. 
Yet this did not mean that New Zealand governments of the 1920s and 
early 1930s accepted British League policy without question, especially 
where imperial security was concerned. Indeed, one of the main con-
iv 
clusions of this thesis is that while Labour was more outspoken at Gene-
va, it was not the first New Zealand government to take an active in-
terest in League affairs. 
Another point to emerge is that Labour's strong support for the 
League and collective security was not simply an idealistic policy based 
on international morality. Rather it was seen as a practical alterna-
tive to appeasing the Fascist powers. But the Savage Government also 
recognised that there were limitations and thus New Zealand confined its 
views to disputes before the League and it never directly opposed 
Britain in a League vote. 
Yet if policy was determined in Wellington, New Zealand's image at 
Geneva was dictated by the personalities of its representatives to the 
League; the High Commissioners in London. Their activities in the 
Assembly and the Council, and their relations with New Zealand and 
British ministers and officials, are at the heart of the story of New 
Zealand's involvement with the League. They made a vital contribution 
to the development of an independent international identity for New Zea-
land through the League. This was despite the fact that most New Zea-
landers were uninterested in the League and that New Zealand governments 
did not deliberately seek a status separate from the British Empire. 
Thus the real importance of the League was its role as a catalyst for 
New Zealand to begin developing its own foreign policy. 
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PREFACE 
The third and fourth Labour Governments pursued foreign policies 
during the 1970s and 1980s which put New Zealand at odds with several 
major powers. Comparisons have been made with the days of the first 
Labour Government during the late 1930s when New Zealand opposed the 
appeasement policies of the Western democracies in the League of Na-
tions. The generally-accepted view is that the Savage Government was 
the first New Zealand government to develop its own foreign policy, 
while previous governments, content to leave foreign affairs in the 
hands of the British Government, had shown little interest in the 
League. 
There are no systematic studies of New Zealand's role in the League 
comparable with W.J. Hudson's Australia and the League of Nations 
(Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1980) and R. Veatch's Canada and the 
League of Nations(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975). Two 
post-war M.A. theses were written before the relevant government depart-
ment files were available in the archives. Thus H.S. Koplowitz-Kent's 
'New Zealand's Relations With the League of Nations 1919-1939'(Univer-
sity of New Zealand, 1945) and E.F. Jenkin's 'New Zealand and the League 
of Nations 1919 to 1939'(University of New Zealand, 1950) were severely 
limited in their sources. 
There are scattered references to the League in general works on 
New Zealand's external affairs, such as F.L.W. Wood's The New Zealand 
People at War: Political and External Affairs(Wellington: Department of 
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Internal Affairs, 1958) and T.C. Larkin's New Zealand's External Rela-
tions(Wellington: New Zealand Institute of Public Administration, 1962), 
and in political biographies like W.D. Stewart's The Right Honourable 
Sir Francis H.D. Bell PC, GCMG, KC: His Life and Times(Wellington: But-
terworth, 1937) and Keith Sinclair's Walter Nash(Auckland: Auckland Uni-
versity Press, 1976). 
This is not to say that some further insights into New Zealand's 
relations with the League are non-existent. Two detailed studies by 
Mary Boyd 'A Footnote on New Zealand's Attitude to Dominion Status 
1919-21'(Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies. 3.1, Mar 1965) and 
'The Record in Western Samoa to 1945'(In A. Ross(ed). New Zealand's Re-
cord in the Pacific Islands in the Twentieth Century. Auckland: Longman 
Paul, 1969) revealed the important role played by the League in New 
Zealand's administration of Western Samoa. I.C. McGibbon's Blue-water 
Rationale: The Naval Defence of New Zealand 1914-1942(Wellington: De-
partment of Internal Affairs, 1981) discussed the League in the context 
of the development of New Zealand's defence policy in the interwar 
period, as did W.D. McIntyre in a chapter on 'Labour and Collective 
Security' in New Zealand Prepares for War: Defence Policy 1919-39 
(Christchurch: University of Canterbury Press, 1988). Kathryn Peters' 
'New Zealand's Attitudes to the Reform of the League of Nations: The 
Background to the Memorandum to the Secretary-General, 16 July 1936'(New 
Zealand Journal of History. 6.1, Apr 1972) is a valuable study of the 
development of one aspect of Labour's League policy. 
In recent years some research essays and theses, using the richer 
ix 
archival sources now available, have focussed on New Zealand's involve-
ment with the League. B.M. Attwood's 'Apostles of Peace: The New Zea-
land League of Nations Union'(M.Phil. Research Essay, University of 
Auckland, 1979) examined the impact of League supporters in New Zealand. 
Two other theses using these sources have been almost exclusively devot-
ed to the crises which confronted New Zealand at the League during the 
late 1930s. S.M. Skudder's "Bringing It Home': New Zealand Responses to 
the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939'(PhD Thesis, University of Waikato, 
1986) is a very detailed study of New Zealand's position on the civil 
war which includes an extremely thorough analysis of press opinion and 
the role of trade unions and other groups. B.S. Bennett's Canterbury 
M.A. thesis (1988) has been published as New Zealand's Moral Foreign 
Policy 1935-1939: The Promotion of Collective Security Through the 
League of Nations(Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International 
Affairs, 1988) and places the New Zealand stand in the context of 
'alternative' foreign policies elsewhere, notably in Britain. 
Yet what has emerged is an unbalanced and disjointed picture of New 
Zealand's relationship with the League. The period from 1936 to 1939 
has attracted most attention, while the previous sixteen years have been 
all but ignored. The object of this study is to correct the imbalance 
and put Labour's actions at Geneva into the context of New Zealand's 
entire multi-faceted twenty-year association with the League. Far from 
ignoring the League, New Zealand governments from 1920 on found it 
necessary to maintain a close interest in its activities. It was, in-
deed, Massey's Reform Government, not Savage's Labour Government, which 
took the first hesitant steps through the League towards establishing an 
x 
independent international identity for New Zealand. 
I have received considerable assistance over the past four years in 
researching and writing this thesis. I am particularly grateful to 
Professor W. David McIntyre for his patient supervision and helpful ad-
vice. I wish to thank the staffs of the National Archives, the Alexan-
der Turnbull Library, the General Assembly Library, the University of 
Canterbury Library and the University of Auckland Library for their 
tolerance and the unhindered access they provided to their collections. 
I also wish to acknowledge the contributions of Bruce Bennett and Tom 
Larkin. Finally, in recognition of their constant support, I would like 
to dedicate this thesis to my parents, Gerrit and Eefje Chaudron. 
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INTRODUCTION 
THE 1919 PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE 
The League of Nations was the product of the worldwide revulsion 
of war engendered by the slaughter and destruction of the First World 
War. From 1915, private individuals and organisations in Britain and 
the United States studied the problem of establishing some effective ma-
chinery to prevent a repetition of the holocaust. In 1916, United 
States' President Woodrow Wilson gave his backing to the concept of a 
world organisation. In Britain, Lord Robert Cecil, the Minister of 
Blockade, pressed the government to enquire into "various schemes for 
establishing by means of a League of Nations, or other device, some al-
ternative to war as a means of settling international disputes." The 
Entente Powers accepted the League concept in January 1917. A year 
later, Wilson issued his famous Fourteen Points, which constituted the 
war aims of the United States. The last of these points called for a 
general association of nations to be formed under specific covenants for 
the mutual guarantee of the political independence and territorial in-
tegrity of all states. In Britain, the Phillimore Committee was estab-
lished in February 1918, comprising top Foreign Office officials, 
historians and a judge,to prepare recommendations on a scheme for an in-
ternational body. A similar committee was also set up in France. 
By the time the armistice was signed in November 1918, each country 
had formulated its proposals. The French wanted a League to Enforce 
2 
Peace, a body which could implement effective sanctions against an ag-
gressor through an international force. The British proposed only mini-
mal interference with the traditional rights of sovereign states in the 
form of a slight extension of the prewar conference system and practice 
of arbitration. Member-states of the proposed international organisa-
tion would not renounce the right nf war entirely but that right would 
be legally defined. Sanctions would be imposed against a member which 
resorted to illegal war. The American plan was much vaguer, focussing 
primarily on a system of mutual guarantees and general disarmament. 
Should arbitration fail in a dispute, economic sanctions would be 
instituted but military force was to be excluded. It also proposed a 
more elaborate permanent structure than either the British or French en-
visaged. These varied proposals formed the basis of the discussions on 
the League at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. 1 
The New Zealand Government was aware of these developments because 
Prime Minister William Fergusson Massey and his coalition partner, Sir 
Joseph Ward, had been in London for lengthy periods during the previous 
two years as members of the Imperial War Cabinet. There was no indica-
tion, however, that either Massey or Ward was especially interested in 
the League idea. Speaking in England in July 1918, Massey said he did 
not want to discourage the idea of a League, particularly if it would 
prevent war, but the experience of the past four years led him to put 
his faith in military preparedness. 2 In his view, a strong British Em-
pire was a greater guarantor of peace than any League of Nations. In-
deed, Massey's already strong imperialism grew during the war into an 
almost mystical belief in the Empire, the survival of which he was con-
3 
vinced was also essential to New Zealand's existence. 
Massey's patriotism derived in large part from the Protestant 10-
yalism of his native Ulster. Born in Limavady in 1856, Bill Massey came 
from a family of tenant farmers who emigrated to New Zealand in 1870. 
He worked as a ploughman near Ashburton before buying his own small farm 
at Mangere. After a period of involvement in local bodies and farming 
organisations, he was elected to Parliament in 1894, representing Waite-
mata until 1896 and Franklin thereafter. Opposition Whip from 1896, 
Massey became Leader of the Opposition in 1903 and the first Reform Par-
ty Prime Minister in 1912. Always reluctant to delegate responsibility, 
he also took the Lands, Agriculture, Labour, and Industries and Commerce 
portfolios. In 1915 he formed a National Coalition with Ward's Liberals 
which lasted until 1919. The Reform Party was returned in that year and 
Massey remained in office until his death in 1925. 
He was an imposing figure with a violent temper but he was also 
personally popular and respected. Lacking in imagination and limited in 
sympathy, Massey nevertheless possessed the strength of character and 
power of decision to lead the country for thirteen difficult years. 
Yet, it was his inflexible and narrow outlook which was responsible for 
New Zealand's indifferent, almost hostile, reaction to the establishment 
of the League of Nations. 3 
There was almost no reference to the League idea in Parliament. In 
the Legislative Council in October 1918, William Triggs warned it would 
be a fatal mistake for the British Empire to rely on a League of Nations 
4 
rather than its own defence forces to preserve its security.4 A few 
days later, the leader of the Labour Party, Harry Holland, stated that a 
League established while capitalism remained would never be a true com-
1 h f ' 5 monwea t 0 natlons. Only Labour MP James McCombs expressed any hope 
that the peace conference would transform Wilson's League ideal into re-
l ' 6 a lty. As Massey and Ward prepared to leave New Zealand in December 
1918 for the conference, their main ambition was to obtain a share of 
the reparations which Germany and its allies would be forced to pay, and 
7 
to secure control of the German Pacific islands of Samoa and Nauru. 
New Zealand had occupied German Samoa soon after the outbreak of 
the war to prevent German naval raiders in the Pacific from utilizing 
its radio station and Apia harbour. The government declared that Ger-
many should never be allowed to return to the South Pacific and that it 
was in the Dominion's strategic interests, and in the best interests of 
the Samoan people, for Western Samoa, as it became known, to become a 
New Zealand 8 colony. While in London during the war, Massey and 
Ward pressed the British Government to recognise New Zealand's claim to 
Western Samoa d " 'N 9 an ltS lnterest ln auru. Massey's colonial ambitions 
in regard to the former had much to do with considerations of national 
prestige but the claim to the latter was based purely on economic con-
siderations. Nauru was an important source of super-phosphate, vital to 
the Dominion's expanding agricultural sector. As early as 1915, 
Massey enquired whether New Zealand might be given control of this re-
source after the war, even though Australian troops had occupied the is-
10 land. 
5 
The matter became more urgent after the British Government agreed 
in 1917 not to oppose Japanese claims to the German islands in the North 
Pacific. Massey and the Australian Prime Minister, William Morris 
Hughes, who was also keen to annex Nauru, secured British acceptance 
that none of the territories conquered by the Dominions would be 
returned to Germany. British Prime Minister David Lloyd George supported 
the claims of New Zealand, Australia and South AfrJca, 11 but he faced 
strong opposition from the Americans. Wilson made it plain that 
he would not countenance such annexations, insisting that these colonies 
should be put under some form of international administration. When 
told by Lloyd George that Britain could not guarantee that the Domin-
ions' claims to the colonies would be accepted, Australia and South 
Africa joined Canada in demanding separate representation at the peace 
conference, so that they could present their own case on the colonial 
question. Hughes was especially angry that Lloyd George had not con-
I d h .. h f h .. 12 su te t e Dom~n~ons on t e terms 0 t e arm~st~ce. 
Lloyd George was prepared to let the Dominions discuss the line the 
British delegation would take at the peace conference but the demand for 
separate Dominion . I' 13 representat~on came as an unwe come surpr~se. 
The Canadian Prime Minister, Sir Robert Borden, first raised the ques-
tion of Canadian representation in October 1918. Lloyd George proposed 
one Dominion representative on the British delegation but there was dis-
agreement on how this representative should be 14 selected. South 
Africa's Defence Minister, Jan Christiaan Smuts, supported a panel sys-
tern with each Dominion leader serving on the delegation in rotation. 
Hughes insisted that no one would represent Australia but himself. New 
6 
Zealand caused difficulties because Massey demanded that both he 
and Ward should attend, a claim Lloyd George and Borden dismissed as 
15 
absurd. At the preliminary Allied conference in December 1918, it was 
agreed that each Great Power would send five delegates to the peace con-
ference, and that the Dominions and India could attend as additional 
members of the British delegation when questions directly affecting them 
were discussed. This gave the Dominions an advantage over the smaller 
Allied Powers, in that they would participate in the discussions as mem-
bers of a Great Power delegation, not as outsiders. 
Borden and Hughes were still not satisfied. At the Imperial 
War Cabinet meeting on 31 December 1918, they argued that not only 
should the British delegation represent the Empire by including a Domin-
ion representative as the fifth member, but the Dominions should sep-
arately be accorded the same status as Belgium and the other small 
Allied countries. As a result, the British delegation became the Brit-
ish Empire Delegation and the British Government requested separate rep-
resentation for the Dominions. The Americans and the French resisted 
the idea because they did not wish to upset the smaller powers and they 
did not regard the Dominions as independent states. They suspected the 
British 
Lloyd 
request was a ploy simply to increase British representation. 
16 George persisted and eventually agreement was reached. Along 
with the other small powers, Canada, Australia, South Africa and 
India were each given the right to send two delegates to Paris but New 
Zealand was granted only one. This did not entitle them to a vote sep-
17 
arate from the British Empire Delegation, however. Although the 
awarding of an extra seat to Belgium and Serbia at the last minute badly 
7 
stung Dominion pride, all things considered, the Dominions had been re-
18 
markably successful. 
Because Massey was away from London during this period, New Zealand 
had little to do with the representation issue. Indeed, it was not un-
til he and Ward reached England in the middle of January 1919, that they 
learned New Zealand had not received equal treatment with the other Dom-
inions. Both would have preferred a single British Empire Delegation 
but now that the Dominions were to have separate representation they 
were angered by New Zealand's inferior status. They believed the Domin-
ion had been discriminated against simply because its representatives 
could not arrive soon enough to defend New Zealand's interests. 19 
Though they took the matter up with Lloyd George, the allocation remain-
ed the 20 same. Ward still accompanied Massey to Paris but as a member 
f h B ' , hE' D I ' 21 o t e r~t~s mp~re e egat~on. 
The Paris Peace Conference opened on 18 January 1919. Thirty-two 
states were represented but most played only a minor role. Massey later 
conceded that while New Zealand's reduced representation had been a 
"slap in the face which was unexpected and undeserved", it turned out to 
be of little consequence because the Plenary Conference had been 
22 
a farce. Even their membership of the British Empire Delegation did 
nothing to guarantee the Dominions a more substantial role in the pro-
ceedings, h h f h ' P' M" 23 muc to t e annoyance 0 t e~r r~me ~n~sters. Important 
decisions were made in the Council of Ten, a continuation of the wartime 
Supreme Allied Council, comprising the leaders and foreign ministers of 
24 
the five Great Powers. 
8 
As members of the British Empire Delegation, the Dominion represen-
tatives were appointed to the principal commissions established to con-
sider particular aspects of the draft peace treaty. Massey became an 
alternate British representative on the Responsibility of the Authors of 
the War and the Enforcement of Penalties Commission, which studied the 
question of war guilt and investigated war crimes. He served as 
President of h C . . lAS b .. 25 t e r~m~na cts u -comm~ss~on. Determined that vin-
dictiveness should not govern the Commission's work, he told Lloyd 
George that he was less interested in determining who was guilty, than 
ensuring that "justice should be administered without fear or favour.,,26 
Sir Ernest Pollock, the British Solicitor-General and Massey's col-
legue on the Commission, later commended him for producing "the suc-
cinct, yet sufficient and accurate table of crimes that forms part of 
our completed 27 report." But while Massey was satisfied with the re-
port, he was 28 doubtful whether it would be acted upon. In fact, the 
work of the Commission can be regarded as so much wasted effort. Its 
members worked without any lead from the Great Powers or any indication 
how its recommendations would be implemented. The final report was 
formally put before the conference but by that time the opportunity of 
29 
apprehending the wanted Germans had passed. 
On the insistence of the American delegation, the task of drafting 
the Covenant of the League of Nations was given priority over all other 
business at the conference. Massey believed this arrangement was re-
sponsible for the slow progress of the conference, describing the meth-
ods adopted as "most unbusinesslike".30 He told Minister of Lands David 
9 
H. Guthrie: "Personally, I think it would have been better had the Con-
ference begun with the discussion of the actual peace terms rather than 
take up so much time with such matters as the League of Nations.,,31 The 
New Zealanders were anxious to recover some of the £100 million which 
the war had cost the Dominion. But the Reparations Commission was, 
according to Massey, a "fiasco". He was not sure if New Zealand would 
even get the £20 million he had asked for, believing British interests 
were being subordinated to W· 1 ' . fl 32 ~ son s ~n uence. Massey plainly had 
little regard for the American President and he was not going to let 
Wilson deprive the Dominion of the German colonies it wanted. 
The Council of Ten began discussing the future of the German colo-
nies on 24 January 1919. Wilson would have preferred to address the 
situation in Europe first and leave the colonies to the League of Na-
tions, but the British thought the latter problem could easily be dis-
d f f · 33 pose 0 ~rst. In any case, they wanted what was a contentious issue 
for the Dominions out of the 34 way. Frankly contemptuous of the 
Dominions for trying to thwart his plans for the colonies, Wilson was at 
first reluctant to allow them to present their own cases to the Council 
but he relented under pressure from Lloyd George and French Premier 
Georges 35 Clemenceau. Hughes spoke first on New Guinea, then Smuts on 
South-West Africa, and then it was Massey's turn. 
He began by tracing the recent history of Western Samoa, noting how 
Germany's presence there threatened New Zealand's security. Massey de-
clared that unless the territory was granted to the Dominion, it would 
remain a threat. He claimed that while Maoris, Cook Islanders and 
10 
Fijians had volunteered to fight for the British Empire, this had not 
occurred in the German colonies. He asserted further that he had re-
ceived letters from Western Samoa pleading that New Zealand not allow 
the Germans to return. He did not believe any form of joint control of 
the territories by the Dominions and the League of Nations would 
succeed and that, in view of New Zealand's great sacrifice during the 
. 36 
war, It should be allowed to annex Western Samoa. 
There followed a week of acrimonious discussion which at times 
threatened to disrupt the conference. Wilson was unconvinced by the 
Dominions' arguments, declaring the strategic argument, in particular, 
to be irrelevant because the League would prevent the situation they 
feared. He reiterated his opposition to annexation, arguing that a 
League mandate was in the territories' best interests. Hughes and 
Massey were outraged that Wilson thought the Dominions unfit to govern 
the colonies. Addressing the Council of Ten on 28 January 1919, Massey 
pointed to the similarity between the Maori and the Samoans. He 
declared that even under a mandate system, New Zealand's treatment of 
its Polynesian people could 37 not have been any better. Comparing a 
mandate to a leasehold, he said: "No individual would put the same ener-
gy into a leasehold as into a freehold. It would be the same with gov-
ernments." Massey asked Wilson whether the United States would have 
welcomed the placing of the uncolonised American territories to the west 
under mandate following the War of Independence. Stung into defence, 
Wilson dismissed Massey's argument by stating there was no historical 
precedent for the work now in hand. 38 
11 
The dispute came to a head on 30 January 1919. Angered by the re-
fusal of Massey and Hughes to give up their demands for annexation, Wil-
son accused them of issu~ng an ultimatum to the conference. Massey de-
nied the accusation hurriply and eventually he and Hughes were persuaded 
by the other British Empire delegates to accept a compromise proposal. 
Three classes of mandate were proposed, of which the third, or 'C' 
class, ld d h 1 · f h D .. 39 wou accomo ate t e calms 0 t e omlnlons. Under the draft 
terms, it was envisaged that a 'C' mandate would incur minimal interfer-
ence from the 40 League, thus amounting to annexation in all but name. 
The proposal was put before the conference's Mandates Commission, but 
Japan's insistence that the mandatories should not be able to place re-
strictions on immigration to, and residency in, the 'C' mandates, proved 
an insurmountable obstacle. The problem of defining the terms of the 
'C' mandates was deferred until the establishment of the League Council 
in January 1920. 41 
Wilson may have been satisfied that the trustee principle had been 
generally accepted and the League would supervise the mandated territo-
ries, but he could not get around the fact that the draft had virtually 
d d h 1 · h D " 42 conce e t e co onles to t e omlnlons . Massey certainly thought the 
arrangement . f 43 satls actory. The British proposal for the distribution 
of the mandates was not formally accepted by the leaders of the Great 
Powers, the so-called Council of Four, until early May 1919 but there 
was little doubt that Western Samoa would be allocated to New Zealand. 
But a question mark still hung over Nauru. The solution proposed by 
Massey and the British Colonial Secretary, Lord Milner, was a mandate 
held by the British Empire, in which the administration of the island 
12 
would be shared by Australia, New Zealand and Britain. This unique 
44 
arrangement was accepted by the Council of Four on 7 May 1919. Con-
sidering that New Zealand's claim to Nauru was the weakest, it was a 
significant achievement for Massey. 
While Massey was protecting New Zealand's political and economic 
interests, the League of Nations Commission had been drafting the Cove-
nant. Apart from some concern about how Article 8 on disarmament might 
affect the British Empire,45 the Commission's work engendered little in-
terest among the New Zealand delegates. On his arrival in England in 
January 1919, Massey admitted he had not given much thought to the idea 
of separate representation for the Dominions at the League but he de-
clared that if the other Dominions demanded such representation, 
New Zealand 46 would do the same. This statement typifies the New Zea-
land attitude to the League. Massey was content to follow the lead of 
h h D .. 47 t e ot er omlnlons. 
As the senior and most independently-minded Dominion, Canada was to 
the forefront in pushing for separate Dominion membership. The first 
draft of the Covenant, prepared by Lord Robert Cecil in January 1919, 
had excluded the Dominions from the League. They were regarded as less 
than independent states by the other powers and the British were reluc-
tant to abandon the principle of the unity of the Empire. 48 Under pres-
sure from the Canadians and South Africans, Cecil included a clause re-
cognising the Dominions' right to membership. The British proposals were 
combined with those of David Hunter Miller, the American delegation's 
legal adviser, forming the basis of the discussions of the League of 
13 
Nations Commission in February 1919. Despite Wilson's reservations 
about their status, the right of the Dominions to separate and equal 
b h · f h L d b h C . . 49 mem ers lp 0 t e eague was accepte y t e ornrnlSSlon. 
On 7 February 1919, the Japanese delegate proposed an amendment to 
the draft Covenant which profoundly affected the British Empire. Baron 
Makino wanted a clause guaranteeing racial equality inserted in Wilson's 
Article 21 on religious freedom. It would bind all League members to 
accord to alien nationals within their territories "equal and just 
treatment in every respect, making no distinction either in law or fact 
on account f h · . l' ,,50 o t elr race or natlona lty. The clause was an expres-
sion of the Japanese desire to be treated as equals by the Western 
Powers. It was also motivated by deep resentment of the discrimination 
Japanese migrants had suffered in the United States, Canada and Austra-
lia, and the policy of excluding Asian immigration by these countries. 
Hughes and Massey would not agree to it unless their right to administer 
immigration policy as they chose was guaranteed. When the Japanese re-
fused this rider, Hughes was convinced the clause was a direct challenge 
to the 'White Australia' policy and refused to accept it. Unwilling to 
allow the League to interfere in New Zealand's own restrictive irnrnigra-
tion policy, Massey also rejected the clause. Because the question was 
so divisive, raising issues neither the Americans nor the British wished 
51 
to address, Article 21 was abandoned altogether. 
At a British Empire Delegation meeting in April 1919, Borden asked 
whether the Dominions were entitled to be elected to the Council, or 
executive body, of the League. The Covenant appeared to exclude them 
14 
since the Council would be composed of "States which are Members of the 
League", and the Dominions were not strictly states. When the British 
asked the Americans to replace the word "states" in the Covenant with 
the words "members of the League", they refused. Miller told Cecil that 
not only would the small powers resent any of the four seats allocated 
to them being occupied by the colonies of the Great Powers but that the 
Great Powers themselves would be reluctant to allow the smaller powers 
any seats at all if "of those four at any given time New Zealand and the 
Philippines might be two." In the event, Wilson was not prepared to 
make an issue of the British request and the wording was changed. Even 
so, Borden obtained a written assurance from Wilson, Lloyd George and 
Clemenceau, on 6 May 1919, that the Dominions could become members of 
h C . 1 52 t e ounCl. A similar situation arose over whether the Dominions 
could be members of the International Labour Organisation, one of the 
League's most important subsidiary bodies, and be elected to its Govern-
ing Body. Again it was Borden who overcame American opposition to se-
cure the recognition of Dominion rights. 53 
When the final text of the Covenant was laid before the conference 
on 28 April 1919, Massey thought it far from perfect. While supporting 
the League in principle, he believed the political millenium was not 
within reach and that it was "to the British Commonwealth of Nations we 
must look to maintain peace." Ward was more optimistic. He thought the 
League would 54 be a great force for the pacification of the world. In 
fact, he believed Germany should become a member as soon as it had dis-
armed. Writing to Lloyd George on 2 June 1919, Ward said the League was 
an insurance scheme for the future peace of the world and that if 
15 
Germany was admitted, it would reduce the danger of it falling to Bol-
shevism. For the same reason, he advised against making the terms of 
55 
the Peace Treaty too harsh. 
The Covenant Of the League formed an integral part of the peace 
treaties. Under the Treaty of Versailles, signed on 28 June 1919, the 
British plenipotentiaries signed not simply for Britain but on behalf of 
the British Empire. Below them, inset from the margin and listed ac-
cording to seniority, the Dominion Prime Ministers and the representa-
tive of India signed for their own countries. This curious formula was 
constitutionally ambivalent because the Dominions were already committed 
b h B ' , hE' , ,56 y t e rltls mplre slgnatorles. What is more, this unique arrange-
ment was embodied in the Covenant, which came into force with the Treaty 
of Versailles on 10 January 1920. Thus, for the first twelve years of 
the League's existence, the Dominions were listed individually as 
members, yet they were also strangely subordinate to the state known as 
the British Empire. 
Massey certainly did not believe the Dominions' constitutional 
position had changed because of their separate signature of the peace 
treaty and membership of the League. He told Parliament in October 
1919: "We signed it not as independent nations in the ordinary sense of 
the term. We signed it as the representatives of the self-governing na-
, 'h' hE' 'd ' , hE' ,,57 tlons Wlt In t e mplre; we slgne It as partners In t e mplre .•. 
This view gave a useful weapon to Wilson's political opponents in 
the United States when the Peace Treaty was sent to Congress for ratifi-
, 58 
catlon. It was claimed that by giving the Dominions and India sepa-
rate membership of the League, the British Empire had gained six 
16 
votes in the Assembly while the United States and other members would 
have only one vote. 
In fact, this was a red herring because, as Wilson acknowledged, 
the unanimity rule in both the Assembly and the Council meant the one 
vote of the United States constituted an "absolute veto".59 But Wil-
son's opponents noted that if the United States and a member of the 
British Empire became involved in a dispute, under Article 15 of 
the Covenant the two could not vote on the Assembly's recommendations, 
which only required a majority, but the other members of the Empire were 
still able to do so. A reservation was proposed which not only would 
have entitled the United States to the same number of votes as the Brit-
ish Empire but, in the event of a dispute, the decision of the League 
would only be binding on the United States if all the other Empire mem-
bers abstained from voting. Concerned by the mounting opposition to the 
treaty in Washington, the special British envoy, Lord Grey, urged his 
h 1 d ·· 60 government to accept t e atter con ltlon. 
When the British Government consulted the Dominions on the matter 
in 61 November 1919, Canada, South Africa and Australia strongly opposed 
any suggestion that the Dominions would not be full and independent mem-
bers of the League. Canada and New Zealand were prepared to agree to 
the reservation on Article 15 if this would ensure ratification of the 
treaty by the United 62 States. But the demand for more American 
votes and the denial of Dominion eligibility for election to the Council 
were regarded by both as a direct challenge to their status in the 
L d . d 63 eague an were reJecte. It is interesting that while New Zealand 
17 
had not actively sought that status, Massey would not abandon it simply 
to appease the United States. Without Dominion support, the British 
Government felt unable to accept the American terms. The reservation 
concerning the Dominions was only one of fourteen attached to the treaty 
by the United States but, in an extraordinary chain of events, the Dom-
inions' membership of the League contributed to the American decision in 
March 1920 not to join the organisation. 
There was no question that New Zealand would ratify the Peace Trea-
ty but Massey did not hide his doubts about the League. In Parliament 
in September 1919, he said: 
The League is only in its infancy. It will take time to develop, and 
during that period the League of Nations will require the best brains 
in the world in order to make the necessary amendments and altera-
tions which changing conditions may render necessary. 
He was convinced that a League composed solely of Great Powers was the 
best way to guarantee peace. In his view, the admittance of the small 
powers was a grave mistake which would render the League ineffective. 64 
But, as the subsequent debate in Parliament proved, the League, and New 
Zealand's membership of it, excited almost no interest among New 
Zealanders compared to the Dominion's new responsibility for Western 
65 Samoa and the phosphate resources of Nauru. Harry Holland noted deri-
sively that in Massey's statement Nauru had practically overshadowed the 
66 
whole Peace Treaty. But these were concrete matters which could be 
understood. The concept of the League was too radical and abstract for 
most New Zealanders. It is probable that the government itself had 
little idea what the Dominion's membership involved. Yet it was at the 
League that New Zealand served a kind of apprenticeship towards becoming 
an independent member of the international community. 
18 
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CHAPTER 1 
NEv~ ZEALAND'S FOREIGN POLICY STRUCTURE 
New Zealand did not possess an external affairs department in 1919. 
Three or four people handled the exchange of communications between Lon-
don and Wellington, which constituted the Dominion's extremely limited 
foreign relations. All cables and despatches from the British Govern-
ment intended for the Dominions were directed through the Colonial 
Office. The Secretary of State for the Colonies sent them on to 
the Governor-General (acting in his dual capacity as the representative 
of the Crown and the British Government's agent) who then passed them on 
1 
to the Dominion government. Because New Zealand Prime Ministers re-
garded external affairs as their personal province, the Prime Minister's 
Office handled foreign affairs. No doubt it was considered unnecessary 
to create a separate department when the amount of work was so small. 
Under this system, if there was a request from the British Government 
for the New Zealand Government's opinion on any matter, it might 
take days or even weeks for a reply to be sent after allowing time for 
decoding, encoding and ministerial consideration. 
The Prime Minister's Office consisted of the Prime Minister's Pri-
vate Secretary, Frank David Thomson, and a couple of clerical and secre-
tarial staff. An independent, forthright character, who had Massey's 
complete confidence, Thomson joined the Education Department in 1895. 
He became private secretary to Prime Minister Richard Seddon in 1901, 
24 
and served as chief private secretary to Prime Ministers Bill Massey, 
Sir Francis Bell and Gordon Coates until 1926. Thomson was also Secre-
tary to the Cabinet and Clerk of the Executive Council. 2 
The possibility that the Dominions would, as separate members, con-
duct their relations directly with the League of Nations greatly 
concerned the British Government. In January 1920, it suggested 
that all communications between the Dominions and the League should be 
directed through the British Cabinet Secretariat to avoid the danger of 
expressing "divergent and even incompatible attitudes" on issues before 
the 3 League. While the other Dominions rejected the suggestion,4 New 
Zealand welcomed it. Massey saw any change in the system of communica-
tions as a threat to the imperial relationship, and thus the Colonial 
Office remained the clearing house for New Zealand's communications with 
the League, except for correspondence with the International Labour 
O . . 5 rganlsatlon. 
The system never worked satisfactorily for there were continual 
complaints from officials, ministers and the High Commissioner in London 
about misdirected 6 documents. The Minister of External Affairs, Sir 
Francis Bell, moved to end this confusion in February 1925 by directing 
that all communications with the League were in future to be direct, and 
that correspondence from Geneva to Wellington was to be addressed to the 
Prime Minister rather than the Governor-General,7 
In spite of this move to streamline the system, it is unlikely 
League matters received the full consideration they deserved. From 1922 
25 
the Colonial Office sent a greater volume of cables and despatches in an 
attempt to keep the Dominion governments abreast of imperial and 
international affairs, but it is doubtful whether this was of any great 
assistance 8 to them. As the Governor-General, Lord Jellicoe, observed, 
Massey simply did not have the time to acquaint himself fully with their 
9 
contents. Even in 1923, it was apparent that the government's machi-
nery in this area was inadequate but Massey always resisted the reforms 
required to improve the situation. 
In Wellington, all League communications were received from Govern-
ment House by the Department of Internal Affairs, which then distributed 
them to the appropriate departments. This procedure made co-ordination 
of policy difficult, if not impossible. The Department of External 
Affairs had been established in 1919 to administer New Zealand's mandate 
of Western Samoa. Sir James Allen, who became the first Minister of Ex-
ternal Affairs, intended the new department to take charge of all of the 
Dominion's external relations, including League affairs. 10 In February 
1920, he secured Attorney-General Bell's support for his plan to reform 
the existing system of communication with London by centralising every-
thing within External Affairs. 11 While Massey apparently balked at the 
idea of a New Zealand Foreign Office,12 he was persuaded that the cor-
respondence with the League should be handled by one department. In 
September 1921, Cabinet gave approval for External Affairs to act in 
that . 13 capac~ty. In view of the concurrent confusion over the channel 
of communication with the League, it is not surprising that the depart-
ment failed in its co-ordinating role. 14 Though Bell continued to press 
the department's case, he was unable to impress upon Massey the serious-
26 
f h . . 15 ness 0 t e sltuatlon. 
The problem remained unresolved until 1926 when Gordon Coates crea-
ted the Prime Minister's Department, which took over all the functions 
related to foreign affairs from External Affairs and the Prime Minis-
ter's Office. 16 Coates had little knowledge of, or interest in, 
New Zealand's external affairs but as Prime Minister he recognised it 
was important to be kept informed on the subject, and that the existing 
system was . d 17 lna equate. Thomson was appointed Permanent Head of the 
department on 1 April 1926 and Carl August Berendsen was recruited by 
Thomson to head the department's Imperial Affairs Section. 
Appointed Imperial Affairs Officer on 21 June 1926, Berendsen was a 
hardworking and extremely able man. He was born in Sydney in 1890 to a 
family in reduced circumstances. The family moved to New Zealand around 
the turn of the century. Joining the Education Department in 1906, 
Berendsen gained a LLM studying part-time at Victoria University. After 
serving with the New Zealand Expeditionary Force which occupied German 
Samoa in 1914, he returned to the civil service and transferred to the 
Labour Department in 1917. Called up again, he was in the army in Eng-
land when the armistice came. Rejoining the Labour Department on his 
return to New Zealand, Berendsen rose to the second rank before his 
appointment to the Prime Minister's Department. Forceful, dogmatic and 
voluble in character, and a prima donna by nature, he was admirably 
suited to his new position which required him, though only an adviser, 
to formulate New Zealand's foreign policy. On Thomson's death in 1935, 
18 Berendsen became Permanent Head. 
27 
Carl Berendsen 
Endowed with a staff of three and a back room in Parliament Build-
ings, the Imperial Affairs Section was faced with a formidable task. It 
was to deal with all the Prime Minister's correspondence relating to 
treaties, general questions of defence policy, the League of Nations, 
and the secret despatches, cables and Committee of Imperial Defence 
papers received from the British Government. For the first time someone 
in the government was reading and analysing the papers sent by Britain 
and the League, instead of simply filing them away. The section was 
28 
also to act as a clearing house for correspondence with the Governor-
G 1 d h 'h C " 'L d 19 enera an t e Hlg ommlSSloner In on on. 
The expansion of the Prime Minister's Office to include an Imperial 
Affairs Section was an acknowledgement that New Zealand's foreign 
affairs were of sufficient importance to merit greater government atten-
tion but it also indicated Coates' determination to retain prime minis-
terial control over their direction. In 1928 he consolidated his con-
trol by taking over the External Affairs portfolio and appointing 
Berendsen as Secretary of External Affairs, a position he held concur-
rently with that of Imperial Affairs Officer. 20 Ironically, it was 
Berendsen's very capability, coupled with his reluctance to delegate re-
sponsibility, which ensured New Zealand would not establish a profes-
sional foreign affairs department until 1943. 21 
The reforms of Coates' administration improved the efficiency and 
depth of New Zealand's governmental foreign policy machinery but they 
were also limited. This is evidenced by the meagre resources allocated 
to the Prime Minister's Department and the ad hoc nature of the depart-
mentIs links with External Affairs. There was no overall plan to expand 
the Dominion's international position or even to participate more ac-
, 1 ' h d ' , f hE' If' l' 22 tlve y In t e etermlnatlon 0 t e mplre s orelgn po lCY. The prin-
ciple of economy remained the foremost concern of the New Zealand Gov-
ernment, both in cost and effort. 
As a member of the League of Nations, New Zealand was expected to 
send a delegation to the annual Assembly at Geneva. Because the Domin-
29 
ion was a League mandatory, it was also required to present an annual 
report to the Permanent Mandates Commission. In common with other coun-
tries distant from Geneva, such representation was a problem. It was 
expensive to send a delegation from New Zealand and impracticable for 
Cabinet ministers and government officials to be absent from the 
country for several months each year to attend a forum the government 
was frankly indifferent to. Thus, the choice of the High Commissioner 
in London as New Zealand's representative was made on the basis that his 
proximity to Geneva reduced the expense of the Dominion's representa-
tion. 
The very expediency of the appointment was to be a constant source 
of frustration to the High Commissioners. They were expected to 
represent the Dominion at an important international organisation but 
were given insufficient resources to do so adequately. Indeed, during 
the 1920s and early 1930s, the High Commissioners were usually poorly 
informed by Wellington and kept on a tight budget. Sir James Allen, 
High Commissioner from 1920 until 1926, found his salary insufficient to 
cover the expenses of his position and he had to supplement his income 
from his , 23 prlvate means. The government took a rather narrow view of 
the High Commissioner's role. In 1926 Coates said that what New Zea-
land wanted for a High Commissioner was a man who would be serviceable 
in trade and marketing, and make a reasonable showing on the social 
'd 24 Sl e. The High Commissioners were keen, however, for the government 
to utilize them as the official channel of communication between Wel-
lington and 25 London. But successive Prime Ministers preferred to 
communicate directly with the British Government. As a result, the High 
30 
Commissioners' involvement in the Dominion's foreign affairs was 
l ' , d 26 Imlte . 
It says much for the government's regard for the High Commission-
errs Office that in 1921 Allen had personally to request the League Sec-
retary-General to send him copies of the League documents sent to New 
Zealand because he would not otherwise have seen them. He complained to 
Bell that he was not even given copies of the government's replies to 
h L ., 27 t e eague communications. The situation was patently ridiculous. In 
1922 Allen was faced with the task of representing New Zealand at the 
League on the mandate question without even seeing a copy of the govern-
mentis 28 annual report on Western Samoa. 
Despite his initial support for directing New Zealand's communica-
tions through the British Cabinet Secretariat, the difficulties which 
resulted led Allen to extract a promise from Massey, in 1921, to use his 
office as the channel between Wellington and Geneva. 29 The new system 
never worked 30 satisfactorily and was abandoned in May 1922. Although 
communications with the League now passed through the Governor-General 
and the Colonial Office, Massey gave instructions that the High Commis-
sioner was to receive a copy of all correspondence; an arrangement Allen 
31 
was prepared to accept. 
The great distance from Geneva meant that League documents some-
times did not reach New Zealand in time for the government to consider 
them fully before the Assembly opened. In November 1929, Berendsen com-
plained to J.V. Wilson, a New Zealander working in the Secretary-Gene-
31 
ral's Office, that it sometimes took four months for documents to 
arrive, with the replies requested within a month of the date of 
. 32 
rece~pt. Because of the difficulties with communications, the New 
Zealand delegate was forced, on more than one occasion, to abstain from 
voting as he had not received any instructions from Wellington. 33 It 
34 
was a problem which was never wholly overcome. The High Commissioners 
found their isolation from New Zealand a real handicap at Geneva. Be-
fore 1930, the government rarely briefed the High Commissioner on mat-
ters which were on the Assembly's agenda. Sir Thomas Wilford, High Com-
missioner from 1930 to 1933, complained to Minister of Finance William 
Downie Stewart, who visited London in September 1932, that he had little 
idea of New 35 Zealand opinion on many of the questions he voted upon. 
Wilford was grateful for the free hand which the government accorded him 
at Geneva but he would have welcomed more direction from Wellington. 36 
The High Commissioners' difficulties with the government over their 
role as First Delegate to the League were not confined to ensuring they 
were kept properly informed. Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, they 
were critical of the government's refusal to recognise the inadequacy of 
New Zealand's delegation to the Assembly. New Zealand was entitled to 
send three delegates to Geneva but it was more usual for the High Com-
missioner alone to represent the Dominion there. At twenty-two of the 
twenty-nine sessions of the Assembly New Zealand attended between 1920 
and 1946, the delegation consisted of the High Commissioner and a few 
staff from his office. The High Commissioner's English Private Secre-
tary, Charles A. Knowles, attended all but one of the sessions of the 
Assembly, often acting as a delegate. In fact, Knowles was de facto 
32 
head of the New Zealand delegation to the last Assembly in 1946 in the 
absence of the High Commissioner. The High Commission Librarian, Cyril 
B. Burdekin, represented the Dominion at four Assemblies between 1923 
and 1931. From 1935 until 1939, the High Commissioner's Economic Advi-
ser, Dr Richard M. Campbell, often represented New Zealand at Geneva. 
The secretarial duties during the period 1920 to 1939 were shared by 
Misses E.M. Hannam and J.R. McKenzie. They occasionally acted as dele-
gates also. If nothing else, New Zealand's Assembly delegations were 
h . d b k bl .. 37 c aracterlse y a remar a e contlnulty. 
While the other Dominions included high officials and senior parl-
iamentarians in their delegations as a matter of course, New Zealand 
did so only occasionally. In 1922 and 1926, Bell took advantage of his 
private visits to Europe to attend the Assembly. Acting as his secre-
tary, and a member of the delegation, on these occasions were Edward 
O. Mousley and James S. Hunter, respectively. As Minister of External 
Affairs, Bell recognised the importance of maintaining good relations 
with the League, especially the Permanent Mandates Commission. For this 
reason, he found it useful to send the Secretary of External Affairs, 
James D. Gray, to Geneva in 1925. 38 Three years later, Samoan affairs 
were again responsible for the appointment of a second delegate when the 
recently-retired Administrator of Western Samoa, Sir George Richardson, 
went to Geneva to explain New Zealand's actions during the Mau distur-
bances in the islands. 39 
The situation improved slightly after Labour came to power in 1935. 
At the September 1936 Assembly, William Jordan, High Commissioner from 
33 
1936 until 1951, led a delegation which included his predecessor, Sir 
James Parr, Berendsen, and the Lia~on Officer for Foreign Affairs in 
London, Sir Cecil Day. The following year, the Minister of Labour, 
Hubert T. Armstrong, and the Minister of Finance's secretary, Dr William 
B. Sutch, accompanied Jordan to the May Assembly. In 1946, George R. 
Laking, Second Secretary in the Department of External Affairs, served 
on the delegation to the last Assembly. 
New Zealand's election to the Council in 1936 did not, however, 
prompt the government to boost the Dominion's representation at Geneva. 
Of the eleven Council sessions New Zealand attended between 1936 and 
1939, the delegation consisted of Jordan and his staff on nine occa-
sions. The Minister of Finance, Walter Nash, joined the delegation to 
the January 1937 session and Armstrong attended the May 1937 session. 
While South Africa, Canada and the Irish Free State had permanent repre-
sentatives at Geneva by this time, Jordan believed the workload was in-
sufficient for New Zealand to follow suit. 40 
The fact that New Zealand's delegation to the Assembly was often 
comparable to those of underdeveloped states like Liberia and Persia 
embarrassed Allen and Parr. They believed the Dominion's prestige would 
inevitably suffer if it was not represented on the Assembly Committees 
by prominent New Zealanders. 41 After his visit to Geneva in 1925, Gray 
thought the delegation should include at least one MP, preferably a Cab-
inet minister. 42 In 1927, Parr sought unsuccessfully to have Sir Robert 
Heaton Rhodes, the Deputy Leader of the Legislative Council, appointed 
43 
as a delegate. The League of Nations Union also pressed Coates to 
34 
appoint two people from New Zealand, one of whom should be a woman, to 
h L d 1 . 44 t e eague e egat~on. Commenting on the situation in 1925, Wilson 
told Bell: "It seems a pity that on half the [League] Committees N.Z. 
should have to be represented by Sir James' secretary - an admirable 
fellow, but he has never been in N.Z.,,45 
A solution offered by Wilson and the High Commissioners was to en-
list the services of distinguished New Zealanders resident in Britain or 
46 
visiting Europe. But as Berendsen explained to Wilson in August 1928, 
the government feared that people appointed from outside official cir-
cles would pursue independent initiatives which were inconsistent with 
its views. 47 The government was not always of this opinion, however. 
In 1922, Massey appointed a British Conservative MP, Sir Arthur Steel-
MaHland,48 49 as a member of the delegation to the Third Assembly. The 
appointment of British politicians to Dominion delegations was not un-
precedented because Lord Robert Cecil had been a member of the South 
50 
African delegation since 1920. Although the arrangement was apparent-
ly satisfactory, Steel-Maitland's unavailability the following year put 
d h . 51 an en to t e exper~ment. In 1929, however, a New Zealand educa-
tionist visiting Geneva, Miss Phoebe Myers, was asked by Parr to join 
52 
the delegation to the Assembly. 
In a report to the Secretary-General after visiting New Zealand in 
1934/1935, Wilson stated that the weakest point in the Dominion's rela-
tionship with the League was i~ defective representation at the Assem-
bly. When he had discussed the question with the Prime Minister, Wilson 
was told that a lack of personnel and money, and the travelling time in-
35 
volved, made it unlikely this situation would change. Although he urged 
Berendsen to attend the Assembly, Wilson believed it was unlikely he 
would do so because Berendsen was the only experienced person in 
his department. Wilson noted that the Dominion's poor record in 
this area meant there was no one in the Cabinet or the House of Repre-
sentatives who could speak of Geneva with first-hand knowledge. 
Of the three High Commissioners who had represented New Zealand there, 
only Allen had returned home for good. Wilson was convinced this was a 
significant factor behind the general lack of interest in the League 
53 
among New Zealanders. 
The High Commissioners took their position as head of New Zealand's 
League delegation very seriously for, despite the difficulties, it en-
hanced their status. But they were unhappy that they could be deprived 
of this position when a visiting Cabinet minister was appointed to the 
delegation. Allen told Coates in March 1926 that the High Commissioner 
should always be First Delegate unless the Prime Minister himself at-
54 
tended. The issue came to a head later that year when Bell insisted 
on acting as First Delegate to the Seventh Assembly. Sir James Parr, 
High Commissioner from 1926 until 1929 and again from 1934 to 1936, was 
sufficiently annoyed to consider not accompanying Bell to Geneva, but 
his displeasure went no further than requesting Coates to resolve the 
matter when he came to London for the Imperial Conference in October 
1926. 55 In fact, it was not until a decade later that a similar situa-
tion arose again. When two Cabinet ministers joined the delegations to 
the Council and the Assembly in 1937, Jordan insisted on remaining First 
Delegate. 
36 
Interestingly, Allen threatened not to attend the Assembly in 1924 
during a dispute over the appointment of a second delegate. He had ad-
vised Wellington in July 1924 that Lord Robert Cecil wanted to become a 
b f h Z 1 d d 1 . 56 mem er 0 t e New ea an e egat~on. A change of government in South 
Africa and the defeat of the British Conservative Government had depriv-
ed Cecil of the opportunity of representing either country at the Assem-
bly. That Massey even considered Cecil's appointment is extraordinary 
since Cecil's passionate support of the League was totally at variance 
with the government's indifference. 57 Perhaps Massey believed Cecil's 
prestige and experience would bolster the Dominion's image at Geneva 
since he told the Colonial Secretary to inform Cecil that his offer of 
58 
assistance had been accepted. 
Allen was furious that Massey should have used the Colonial 
Office, instead of his office, to transmit the invitation, and he imme-
diately requested the Colonial Office not to inform Cecil of Massey's 
59 
answer. In a forthright cable, Allen reminded Massey that this proce-
dure had not been used in Steel-Maitland's case and he declared that he 
would not serve as New Zealand's delegate to the League if he, or any 
other delegate, was not appointed directly by the New Zealand Govern-
60 
ment. Massey's purpose in using the Secretary of State as the medium 
of communication in this instance was probably to give the British Gov-
ernment the opportunity to object to the invitation if it so desired. 
But Allen seems to have regarded Massey's deference as a denegation of 
New Zealand's independent membership of the League. Indeed, it was be-
cause Allen's objection raised all kinds of questions relating to the 
Dominion's constitutional relationship with Britain, that Bell recom-
37 
mended the invitation to Cecil be withdrawn. 61 Allen went to Geneva 
without assistance. 
The small size of the New Zealand delegation created its own prob-
lems. Such a meagre delegation could not hope to attend all the meet-
ings of the six Assembly Committees, even when the High Commissioner's 
staff substituted for him on some of them. The High Commissioners found 
they were in no position to seek, or hold, important posts at the 
League. In 1922, Allen was forced to give up his position on the 
League's budgetary watchdog, the Supervisory Commission, because of his 
heavy 62 workload. The New Zealand First Delegate was rarely considered 
for the prestigious position of Committee chairman, which carried with 
it the title of Vice-President of the Assembly. Parr stated in 1929 
that although his seniority entitled him to a chairmanship, he was pass-
ed over because New Zealand had such a sparse attendance record and made 
such a poor showing in comparison to other members. He noted bitterly 
that the successful candidate from the Irish Free State had never at-
tended the Assembly before and had "no superior qualification to 
my own except that his country sends a large and influential delega-
tion.,,63 
Four years later, Wilford had to decline the offer of a chairman-
ship because he simply did not have the staff to allow him to attend 
. 64 
every meet~ng. The problem was not confined to the Assembly Commit-
tees. During most sessions special committees were established to study 
various issues which were before the League. Because of New Zealand's 
poor reputation, Wilson stated that the League Secretariat tended to 
38 
forget the Dominion when drawing up the lists of committee members. 65 
The High Commissioners also found the League delegation's tight 
budget irksome. When Coates queried a request in 1928 for the delega-
tion's expenses to be increased to £500 to cover the cost of an addi-
tional delegate, Parr pointed out that his delegation's expenses were 
but a small proportion of those incurred by the other Dominions. 66 Com-
plaining about the inadequate nature of New Zealand's League representa-
tion to the new Prime Minister, Sir Joseph Ward, in January 1929, Parr 
noted that the cost of the delegation had been £453/13/- the previous 
year. This comprised the travelling expenses and subsistence allowances 
of Parr, Richardson and four High Commission staff. By comparison, the 
Irish delegation cost £740 and the South African delegation cost 
£1,300. 67 68 Parr's complaint fell on deaf ears. The position became 
even more acute when the economic depression caused the government to 
retrench. As an economy measure in 1932, the delegation of Wilford, 
Knowles and a secretary only arrived in Geneva the evening before the 
Assembly 69 opened. Two years later, Parr commented acidly that while 
the smallness of New Zealand's delegation had grave disadvantages, "it 
70 does make for economy." 
It is clear that by the late 1920s the High Commissioner's Office 
was straining to cope with the increasing workload. In May 1930, 
Wilford told the Prime Minister: 
Since the Imperial Conference of 1926, this office has certainly be-
come the New Zealand branch of the Foreign Office, and I think you 
will have to decide in the near future to provide some capable man to 
help the High Commissioner in matters dealing with foreign affairs, 
so that he may get some time to attend to office routine busi-
ness ... 71 
39 
Wilford proposed that Knowles should become his foreign affairs assis-
tant, taking charge of the flood of documentation from the League and 
Whitehall. 72 It is likely Knowles had already assumed some responsibil-
ity in this area but because the government did not act on Wilford's re-
quest, the arrangement was not formalised. 
The High Commissioners found attending the Assembly an onerous 
task. During the Tenth Assembly, Parr wrote: " ••• 1 am hopelessly over-
worked in being the sole representative for my country here. I shall be 
fortunate if I escape a breakdown during the present Session here, so 
many and manifold are the engagements to which I have to give attention 
73 
every week." The activities connected with the Assembly were not the 
High Commissioners' only concern. They still had to deal with the 
ordinary High Commission business while they were in Geneva. 74 In addi-
tion, the High Commissioners were often required to represent the Domin-
ion at other League and non-League conferences and meetings. 
In 1929, Parr found it difficult to attend the Conference on Amend-
ing the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice because 
it was held in Geneva at the same time as the Assembly.75 During the 
early months of 1930, Wilford had little time to deal with other matters 
because he was occupied with the London Naval Conference, meetings of 
the Committee of Imperial Defence and the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty Confer-
ence.
76 He was thus unable to attend the Conference on the Codifica-
tion of International Law at The Hague in 77 March. Similarly in 
1931, Knowles warned Berendsen that because the Disarmament Conference 
would be held during the period from the end of March to July 1932, 
40 
which was the High Commissioner's busiest season in Britain, his 
office might not be able 78 to afford the staff for Geneva. In the 
event, Wilford was forced to divide his time between the Disarmament 
Conference, the Special Assembly, the Economic Conference at Lausanne 
and his . 79 duties ln London. As a result, New Zealand was unable to be 
represented on the Technical Commissions of the Disarmament Confer-
80 
ence. It was probably vexation rather than pride which prompted Wil-
ford's remark that "in no other High Commissioner's office in London are 
81 
such varied duties undertaken by so small a staff." 
The problems described above demonstrate the reluctance of New Zea-
land governments to accept the full implications of the Dominion's tran-
sition from autonomy to independence in respect of external relations 
during the 1920s and early 1930s. Although the High Commissioner's 
position had not altered significantly in theory, in practice he was 
privy to much of the information received by the government in Welling-
ton, and as its representative at the League and other international 
gatherings, he had become New Zealand's Ambassador in Europe. That suc-
cessive governments refused to fully recognise this change by not ac-
cording the High Commission the resources it required did not alter that 
fact. 
Yet, the position of the High Commissioner was but one example of 
how the apparently unchanging facade of New Zealand's governmental 
structure belied the Dominion's growing involvement in the direction of 
its own external affairs. The government's handling of these affairs 
changed significantly, from the undisciplined methods dictated by an ad 
41 
hoc governmental organisation, to a more efficient system co-ordinated 
by one department under the direction of a knowledgeable and effective 
official. But while New Zealand's membership of the League was, 
to a significant extent, responsible for these developments, the 
government's interest in the activities at Geneva was fitful. New Zea-
land saw only unwelcome obligations arising from its membership. 
Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, its representatives' efforts were 
directed at keeping those obligations to a minimum by urging the League 
to practise the same virtues the government itself practised; econ-
omy and caution. 
42 
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CHAPTER 2 
SIR JAMES ALLEN AT THE LEAGUE, 1920-1926 
When the New Zealand delegation arrived in Geneva in November 1920, 
the League of Nations was still a novel concept. The First Assembly 
opened in makeshift premises amidst uncertainty and doubt. The attitude 
of the Great Powers towards the Assembly was unpromising and the size of 
the New Zealand delegation, one of the smallest of the forty-one dele-
gations present, reflected the Dominion's own doubts about the useful-
ness of the League. While most of the delegates wore the customary 
black, the New Zealand representatives preferred light grey lounge suits 
to emphasize their democratic outlook. 1 
The delegation was led by the Dominion's High Commissioner in Lon-
don, Sir James Allen. Bhfbre this appointment, Allen had been Massey's 
deputy. Born in South Australia in 1855, he and his family came 
to New Zealand in 1856. He was educated in England and first entered 
Parliament in 1887, representing Dunedin East until 1890. Returning to 
the House two years later, Allen held the Bruce seat until his resigna-
tion in 1920. He was the ablest financial critic on the Opposition ben-
ches and fought Sir Joseph Ward on equal terms. He joined Massey's Cab-
inet in 1912 as Minister of Defence, Finance and Education. As Defence 
Minister in the National Government formed in 1915, and acting Prime 
Minister during the absences of Massey and Ward, Allen was largely re-
sponsible for the success of New Zealand's war effort, although he was 
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Sir James Allen 
not always popular as a result. 
On the Reform Party's return to power in 1919, he retained the De-
fence portfolio, regained Finance and assumed the new portfolio of 
External Affairs. But, because of the strain of his wartime work, 
Allen only agreed to stand in 1919 on the understanding he would retire 
almost at once to become High Commissioner. Stern and reserved in man-
ner, he was a man of high integrity who was unwilling to compromise his 
49 
principles. The latter trait sometimes led him to refuse to withdraw 
from untenable positions, which embarrassed his parliamentary collegues. 
Allen's persistency, even obstinacy, often revealed itself in the Assem-
bly Committees. 2 
Under the Covenant there were three principal organs of the 
League: the Council, Assembly and Secretariat. The Council met for the 
first time on 16 January 1920. It comprised four permanent members and 
four members elected for three-year terms. The permanent seats were 
held by the Great Powers; the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan. 
They were joined by Germany in 1926 and the Soviet Union in 1934. The 
number of permanent seats fluctuated over the life of the League. Japan 
and Germany resigned in 1933, Italy resigned four years later and the 
Soviet Union was expelled in 1939. The non-permanent members were 
elected by the Assembly. Their number grew from four in 1920 to eleven 
in 1936. As the executive of the League, the Council acted on behalf of 
the whole body between Assemblies, meeting four times a year. It dealt 
with the numerous questions arising from the postwar treaties, all in-
ternational disputes submitted to the League for settlement, and 
it was to the Council that the various technical agencies of the League 
3 
reported. 
The Assembly was the last of the League's important organs to come 
into existence. From 1921, it met annually in September for a period of 
three to four weeks, although special sessions were sometimes called in 
times of crisis or to settle an important question. The Assembly was 
composed of delegations from all the member-states. Each delegation was 
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entitled to one vote and three representatives. The Assembly exercised 
a general supervision over all the work of the League. It approved the 
budget and was able to scrutinise any aspect of the Council's activi-
ties. While it shared many of the same powers as the Council, the 
Assembly, by its heterogeneous nature, was not a place for critical de-
cisions or vigorous action. It was an international forum in which the 
principles and problems of world affairs were discussed. 4 
The Secretariat began its work in London in 1919. It acted as 
the civil service of the League, drawing its officials from many coun-
tries. It served both the Council and the Assembly by preparing docu-
ments for their sessions, organising the sessions, and supervising the 
execution of the decisions which were made. The importance of the Sec-
retariat derived from the fact that it operated on a permanent basis. 
It served as the link between the other League organs, those organs and 
the member-states, and between 5 the members themselves. Several New 
Zealanders worked for the Secretariat over the years. J.V. Wilson 
served in the Secretary-General's Office for much of the League's life. 
John H. Chapman joined the Financial and Economic Organisation in the 
early 1920s and John B. Condliffe also served in this section from 1931 
until 1937. 6 
Before he left London, the government probably instructed Allen to 
do no more than observe the Assembly proceedings, protect the Dominion's 
interests where necessary, and support the British delegation. The New 
Zealand Government was no less concerned than the British Government to 
prevent embarrassing disputes at the League between the delegates from 
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the British Empire countries. New Zealand had not sought a separate in-
ternational identity and Massey preferred the continuation of the system 
of a British Empire Delegation. 7 At the 1921 Imperial Conference, 
Massey voiced his opposition to separate representation, fearing it 
might result in the members of the Empire voting on opposite sides. He 
hoped any future revision of the Covenant would replace such representa-
tion with a single Empire delegation. Not surprisingly, this suggestion 
received no support from the other Dominion leaders and it was not rais-
d . 8 e agaln. 
Massey regarded Dominion representation at Geneva as an exception 
which he did not wish to see repeated at other international meetings. 9 
The government's view on the subject was expounded by Sir John Salmond, 
who was New Zealand's representative on the British Empire Delegation to 
the Washington Disarmament Conference of 1921/1922. In his report he 
stated: 
The position of the Dominions at Washington was essentially differ-
ent from the position which they occupy at an assembly of the League 
of Nations. By the special and peculiar organisation of that body, 
self-governing colonies are admitted as members in their own right as 
if they were independent States. Although by constitutional and in-
ternational law such colonies are merely constituent portions of the 
Empire to which they belong, they are entitled by express agreement 
to be treated, so far as practicable, as if they were independent. 
But no such principle was recognised at Washington, or exists except 
for the special purposes of the League of Nations. 10 
This statement was greeted with dismay in Canada and South Africa but it 
11 
accurately reflected opinion in New Zealand. 
Because of the government's concern about the possibility of public 
disagreement over issues brought before the League, New Zealand readily 
52 
agreed to a British suggestion that the Empire delegations should 
12 
meet before, and during, the Assembly to discuss the agenda. Allen re-
ported that although they all agreed it was essential to stand together 
on important issues, the Dominions were left a free hand to pursue their 
own interests. Allen exaggerated the value of these meetings, as 
often they did no more than reveal the differences between the Empire 
13 delegates. 
These differences stemmed from a basic disagreement about the role 
of the Dominions in the League. The British acknowledged that the Dom-
inions had the right to voice their opinions on many of the League's ac-
tivities, but on issues which affected the Empire's security it was 
hoped they would unite behind the British delegation. Only New Zealand 
fully supported this view. Canada and South Africa were determined to 
establish their own identities at the League. The Canadians, especial-
ly, were anxious to dispel the widely-held belief that the Dominions 
h d f B · . 14 were mere s a ows 0 rltaln. The Empire delegations thought it wise, 
therefore, not to reveal that they were meeting privately during the 
Assembly. In the event, the Dominions soon demonstrated that they were 
prepared to oppose each other and Britain in the debates and commit-
15 
tees. 
The Empire delegations continued to meet during subsequent Assem-
blies but 16 less frequently than Allen hoped. According to Richard G. 
Casey, the Australian Liason Officer in London, one obstacle in the way 
of active liason was that the delegates were spread over four hotels. 
Another was the atmosphere of formality between the Empire delegations. 
53 
While Casey blamed the British delegation most for "playing gentlemen", 
he also believed the Dominion delegates were reluctant to make the first 
move towards more cordial reciprocity because they did not want to dis-
play their comparative ignorance on the subjects before the Assembly. 
He felt the Dominions would have to have closer contact with the 
Foreign Office so that League questions were not merely a dose to be ad-
ministered each September before the Assembly met. 17 
This concern was not shared by the New Zealand Government. The 
Dominion had no ambition to involve itself as an independent member 
in most of the League's work. If the government preferred to have the 
British Government act on its behalf in all other aspects of the Domin-
ion's external relations, it would have been inconsistent to treat the 
League differently. The British delegate on the Council was regarded as 
. h D .. 1 18 represent~ng t e om~n~ons a so. New Zealand believed the security of 
the Empire was too important to be left in the hands of inexperienced 
Dominion delegates in a strange, and potentially divisive, environment. 
On this issue, the government preferred to act through the British Gov-
ernment to influence proceedings at Geneva rather than utilising its own 
delegation. 
The New Zealand delegation's task was simplified by the exclusion 
of security issues from its purview but there was still a large part of 
the League's work which was not related directly to its peacekeeping 
role. Confident that the Dominion's interests were being safeguarded by 
the British, the Massey Government took little interest in its delega-
tion's activities at the Assembly. The decision on the subjects the 
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delegation should involve itself with was left to Allen. Because it was 
difficult to supervise the delegation from Wellington, he was given con-
siderable lat~itude by the government. But the small size of the dele-
gation was itself a restricting factor. 
The first week of the session was occupied by the general debate. 
Its purpose was to discuss the Council's report on its work during the 
previous year but it was also an opportunity for delegates to speak on 
any subject they chose. On the conclusion of the general debate, the 
Assembly Committees began their work. The six Committees were as 
follows: First(Constitutional and Legal Questions); Second(Technical 
Organisations); Third(Reduction of Armaments); Fourth(Budget and 
Financial Questions); Fifth(General and Humanitarian Questions); and 
Sixth(Political Questions). Their meetings were arranged so that a na-
tional delegation of three representatives could attend them all. 19 As 
New Zealand's only delegate, Allen could not hope to do so. He was 
forced to decide which were within his area of expertise and of interest 
to the government. Allen chose to attend the Second and Fourth Commit-
tees. He attended the others as necessary or appointed a member of his 
staff to substitute for him. 20 
Allen's choice reflected not only his own background in administra-
tion and finance, but also the views of the government which was con-
cerned that the League should not cost its members too much. The Fourth 
Committee was thus the obvious choice because it supervised the finances 
of the League. While the other oommittees decided which areas the 
League should become involved in, the Fourth Committee would, in large 
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measure, determine whether or to what extent these activities would be 
d b 11 ' f d' 21 pursue y contro lng un lng. By his membership of this committee, 
Allen could hope to influence the direction and shape of the League 
during its formative period. 
It would be unfair to describe Allen's preoccupation with economy 
as merely consistent with the New Zealand Government's parsimony regard-
ing the League. He was aware that one of the principal threats to the 
League was not the possibility of failure in its peacekeeping role but 
the suspicion of member-governments that their contributions were being 
, l' d ' ff" 1 22 Utl lse lne lClent y. He reminded his collegues on the Fourth Com-
mittee that they had to defend the League's expenses to their govern-
ments, which were often willing to believe the persistent charges of ex-
23 
travagance and waste. Massey had, on a number of occasions, expressed 
h ' 'b h 1 d 'd 24 lS own misgivlngs a out t e amount New Zea an was requlre to pay. 
A concern of many governments was the system which allocated the 
expenses of the League among its members. The drafters of the Covenant 
had provided that the cost should be borne in the same proportions as 
those d b h ' 1 P 1 U' 25 use y t e Unlversa osta nlon. Because the budget of the 
League was much larger, this system proved to be unfair. Australia paid 
the same amount as France, for example. At the First Assembly, Allen 
26 
requested that the Fourth Committee consider the question urgently. A 
scheme was approved by the Second Assembly which required New Zealand to 
27 pay approximately £12,700, or 1.02% of the annual budget. But the new 
scheme could not become operative until all the members of the Council 
had ratified it. 28 That three members had still not done so two years 
56 
later exasperated Allen, and he took them to task at the 1923 Assembly. 
He declared that it was intolerable that the wishes of the great majori-
ty of the members of the Assembly could be defied in this manner. 29 
Allen firmly believed in the primacy of the Assembly in League affairs 
30 
and it was a theme he referred to often in his speeches. The new sys-
tern, which had been operating on a de facto basis for three years, was 
finally ratified in 1924. 31 
Allen was greatly concerned by the problem of members persistently 
d f I ' h ' 'b' 32 e au tlng on t elr contrl utlons. To ensure that it received ade-
quate funds, the League was forced to inflate the budget to compensate 
for unpaid contributions, which in turn increased every member's contri-
bution. To encourage the defaulters to pay, Allen proposed making the 
list of non-paying members public and depriving them of the right to 
vote in the 33 Assembly. His collegues balked at such harsh measures. 
The subsequent improvement in the world economic climate was reflected 
in the League's financial situation, and by 1924 there was a budgetary 
surplus. Predictably, Allen insisted this should not be used to 
expand the League's functions but go instead towards reducing the con-
'b' f ' b 34 trl utlons 0 ltS mem ers. 
The most far-reaching of Allen's efforts at financial reform began 
at the First Assembly. On the Fourth Committee's behalf, he drew up a 
report on the staff and organisation of the Secretariat, in which he de-
precated the unrestrained expansion which had taken place during 1920 
and recommended an independent investigation of the Secretariat's effic-
, 35 lency. Allen was particularly unhappy that the Secretary-General 
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claimed to be responsible to the Council only, and thus considered it 
unnecessary to submit detailed accounts to the Assembly. A Committee of 
Experts was appointed which recommended that a small body of independent 
advisers should scrutinise the draft budget prepared by the Secretary-
General before it was submitted to the 36 Assembly. As a result, 
the Supervisory Commission was established in 1921 and Allen was ap-
. d f' f' b 37 pOinte as one 0 its lve mem ers. 
The Commission quickly became very important because the Fourth 
Committee 1 1 f 11 d · d' 38 a most a ways 0 owe its recommen atlons. As Vice-Chair-
man of the Commission and a senior member of the Fourth Committee, 
Allen's influence was considerable. 39 He had an important role in the 
preparation of the Financial Regulations which governed every aspect of 
the League's financial ff ' 40 a airs, and were designed to reinforce the 
Assembly's 41 control over them. It was undoubtedly a great disappoint-
ment to Allen when his heavy workload forced him to give up his post on 
42 
the Commission after only one year of his three-year term. 
Allen's 1920 report on the Secretariat closely examined the condi-
tions of the League's employees. Because the Assembly was provided with 
so little information on the staff structure of the League, he insisted 
that the Secretary-General include a detailed list of officials in the 
43 
annual budget. Allen also questioned the method of fixing staff sala-
. 44 
rles. He conceded the majority of League officials were not overpaid 
but he was critical of the salaries and entertainment allowances paid to 
ff ' . 1 45 top 0 lCla s. Citing the fact that the Secretary-General received an 
income which was five times that of the New Zealand Prime Minister, 
58 
Allen tried on several occasions to limit the entertainment allowances 
but only with limited 46 success. The British and European delegates 
were unwilling to make any reductions because their nationals constitut-
ed the 47 majority of the League's employees. The Staff Provident Fund 
established in 1924 owed much to Allen's persistent lobbying but the 
proper Pensions Fund he advocated was not set up until 1930. 48 
The British and Dominion delegates were outspoken advocates of 
economy. Their principal targets were the proposals to extend the 
League's humanitarian and technical services. Allen considered that the 
Fourth Committee had a vital role to weed out those proposals of the 
other committees which were too costly, impracticable, or just incompat-
ible with his vision of what the League was established to achieve. 49 
Inevitably, not all the delegates agreed with Allen. While he was pre-
pared to concede to the majority view in most cases, Allen was angered 
by the tactics of some delegates who used the Assembly debate to rein-
state funds for projects which the Fourth Committee had recommended be 
'1 d ' d 50 curtal e or reJecte . 
/ 
There were occasions when he criticised his coll~gues on the 
Fourth Committee for relying on the Supervisory Commission to make the 
difficult decisions 51 on the budget. Allen also deplored the tendency 
of the Assembly to avoid divisive or complicated subjects by delegating 
them to a committee or holding them over until the next session. 52 He 
was also irritated by the inane procedural debates and the penchant of 
many delegates for long speeches. "Much of the speech-making at 
the League gives an air of unreality to what goes on there," he reported 
59 
in 1922. 53 Allen's impatience with the diplomatic niceties was shared 
by the other Dominion representatives, who gained a reputation for 
plain-speaking 54 at Geneva. But his frustration did not lessen Allen's 
determination to present his views as strongly as possible. It was not 
unusual to find the only dissenting voice in the Fourth Committee was 
that of New Zealand. 
Allen campaigned vigorously against the multiplication of the 
League's functions, although he seldom questioned the usefulness of the 
humanitarian and technical agencies themselves. With the League's role 
as a peacemaker still uncertain, he suggested that the technical work 
alone was justification for the continuation of the organisation. 55 But 
Allen did object to the increasing proportion of the budget devoted to 
work which seemed unworthy of the League's attention. 56 He was also 
wary of proposals which assumed a role for the League he considered be-
longed properly to the governments of the members. His concern was not 
simply that the League might interfere in their domestic affairs but 
that some governments might abdicate their responsibilities in areas 
57 
such as health to a League agency. He doubted also whether the exten-
sion of the League's scope was constitutional under the Covenant. 58 
Allen's vision of the League's purpose was certainly narrower than that 
of many of its advocates but he sincerely believed it was ill-equipped 
to take all the world's problems upon itself. Warning that the League 
was in danger of going into debt, he tried to impress upon his committee 
co11egues the need to restrict the League's activities to a select few, 
b h · 11···· 59 ut 1S was usua y a m1nor1ty op1n1on. 
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The target of Allen's most persistent criticism was the Committee 
on Intellectual co-operation,60 The objectives of the Committee includ-
ed the promotion of international co-operation between teachers, 
scientists and artists. Allen's continued attempts to prevent the 
League from allocating funds to the Committee seems to have been based 
on personal prejudice. He held a very low opinion of the Committee's 
work and he thought 61 it a waste of the League's money. In 1924, he 
told the Assembly that the discussions which had led to the security and 
arbitration agreement known as the Geneva Protocol had done more 
in a few weeks to create an atmosphere of goodwill than intellectual co-
. ld h· . f· f 62 operatlon cou ac leve In l ty years. But if Allen's attacks on the 
Committee were motivated by personal antipathy, his efforts to reduce 
the budget of the International Labour Organisation(ILO) had the full 
approval of his government. 
The attitude of the Massey Government to the ILO was coloured by 
its experience of organised labour in New Zealand. Industrial unrest 
had been rife since the Reform Party carne to power and Massey had fought 
successfully to curb the power of the trade 63 unions. Mindful that an 
organisation with the specific goal of improving working conditions 
throughout the world would only serve to inspire the now cowed unions, 
the government pursued a policy of minimal contact with the ILO. 64 
The principal manifestation of this policy was New Zealand's non-
representation at the annual International Labour Conferences, First 
held in 1919, the conferences were attended by national delegations con-
sisting of worker, employer and government representatives. New Zealand 
61 
had no intention of participating in the conferences but the government 
was prepared to allow the British delegation to act on the Dominion's 
65 behalf. Neither the complaints from the unions and Labour MPs that 
this arrangement was a denial of New Zealand labour's right to be repre-
sented, nor the protests of the Director of the International Labour 
Office, Albert Thomas, that the Dominion was ignoring its obligations 
66 
under the Treaty of Versailles, had any effect. 
The reasons given by the government for its decision were that a 
delegation would be very expensive and in any case New Zealand was the 
. . h ld . d I b I' I . 67 most progress~ve country ~n t e wor ~n regar to a our eg~s at~on. 
Though unconvinced by the latter argument, the Labour Party stated that 
if New Zealand had indeed nothing to learn then surely it had an obliga-
68 
tion to share its experience with the rest of the world. Predictably, 
the government was uninterested in such considerations. Despite contin-
ued pressure from Labour, the Dominion was only represented at two con-
ferences between 1919 69 and 1935. New Zealand was also obliged under 
the Treaty of Versailles to present the recommendations of the confer-
ences to Parliament and debate their ratification. Attorney-General Sir 
Francis Bell interpreted the Dominion's obligation as extending no fur-
ther than tabling the resolutions in Parliament. 70 The ILO was informed 
that as the provisions of the conventions were scarcely applicable to 
71 New Zealand, it was not proposed to do any more. 
The ILO was a prime target of Allen's campaign to reduce expendi-
ture. His first clash with Albert Thomas came in 1920. Thomas was de-
termined to reinforce the autonomy of his organisation and he questioned 
62 
the Assembly's right to examine its finances. Allen was not intimidated 
by the fiery Frenchman and he proceeded to scrutinise the budget after 
admonishing Thomas for the inadequate nature of the information provid-
ed. 72 By refusing to bow to the Director's demands, Allen was determin-
ed to make 73 the ILO accountable to the Assembly. This determination 
was reaffirmed by the inclusion of the Labour Office in the terms of re-
ference of the Committee of Enquiry into the Secretariat. Allen 
remained wary of any attempt by the ILO to reassert its budgetary inde-
74 pendence, but by 1923 the ILO budget was submitted and examined by the 
Fourth Committee in the same way as those of the Secretariat and other 
League bodies. This was a significant achievement because the ILO would 
75 possess a greater degree of autonomy than any other League agency. 
In view of Allen's emphasis on practicality, his opposition to the 
Council's decision in 1920 to establish a Health Committee appears sur-
prising. Although he conceded such an organisation could be more useful 
to New Zealand than some of the other League agencies, he noted that the 
Committee's functions appeared to duplicate those of the Office interna-
tional d'Hygiene publique, based in Paris. 76 With no likelihood of the 
two bodies merging because of American opposition, Allen wanted the Pro-
visional Health Committee restricted to an information-gathering role 
b h · .... 77 ut ~s was a m~nor~ty v~ewpo~nt. In 1923, the Assembly established a 
permanent Health Organisation, the budget of which quickly carne to rival 
those of the other agencies. This rapid growth acutely concerned the 
British and Dominion delegates, who consistently voted against increases 
in 78 the Organisation's budget. Allen warned the government that there 
was a danger of it taking a disproportionate share of the League's 
63 
79 funds. Fortunately, Allen's preoccupation with economy in this case 
was not supported by the majority of delegates and the Health Organisa-
tion became one of the most important and useful of the League agen-
. 80 Cles. 
Allen was unable to achieve everything he desired at the Assembly 
but his influence was by no means negligible. The New Zealand delega-
tion's principal contribution to the League at this time was to help put 
its finances on a sound footing under the control of the Assembly. 
Allen accurately reflected his government's conservatism with its empha-
sis on the practical and the possible. With hindsight he can be faulted 
for failing to look beyond the costs to the benefits of the agencies he 
opposed, but in the first years of its existence the League's future 
seemed very uncertain, and the New Zealand delegation's caution was 
probably justified. 
In view of Allen's determination to restrict the scope of the 
League's activities, it is ironic that a New Zealand delegate was re-
sponsible for raising the slavery issue at the Third Assembly. The call 
by Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland, the British MP on New Zealand's delegation 
to Geneva in 1922, for the League to take action against slavery in 
Africa, led to the establishment of a committee to draft a new Slavery 
C . 81 onventlon. As a member of the committee in 1925, James Gray contri-
buted to the draft convention which was approved by the Assembly the 
82 following year. 
It cannot be said that idealism played a major part in New Zea-
64 
land's activities at the League. Focussing on financial and administra-
tive matters, Allen often did his best to block schemes he considered 
ill-conceived and impracticable. But he did recognise that the League 
must educate world public opinion if it was to have any success in pro-
moting peaceful intercourse between nations. In 1923 he stated in his 
report that "the only really effective weapon which the League possesses 
the power of public 83 opinion." He believed that in order 
to ensure an enlightened public opinion it was important for the Assem-
bly to conduct its business as openly as possible. Thus Allen gave 
strong support to a resolution in 1920 which required the Assembly Com-
mittees to hold most of their meetings in public and to publish their 
. 84 
m~nutes. 
Allen was aware that the League was largely dependent on its member,-
governments to promote its work within their countries. He hoped the 
New Zealand Government would use his reports in this way but he was dis-
. d 85 appo~nte • Indeed, the government did not begin to table these re-
ports in Parliament 86 until 1924, and gave no opportunity for discus-
sion. In November 1924, Allen expressed his unhappiness with the situa-
tion to Gray. "That two of the Reports should have been lost," he said, 
"is only evidence of the carelessness and indifference with which the 
work done at this 87 end is received in New Zealand." Obviously, the 
government's lack of appreciation of Allen's work at Geneva rankled. 
Yet, from Wellington's point of view, the New Zealand delegation's 
activities hardly seemed relevant to the domestic concerns of the gov-
ernment. Until his death in 1925, Massey never exhibited any enthusiasm 
65 
for the League. He did not share the faith of its supporters that 
a new era of peace and international co-operation was heralded by its 
foundation, and he had no intention of fostering such illusions in New 
88 Zealand. It is, perhaps, not too much to suggest that if it had not 
been for the Dominion's mandate of Western Samoa, Massey might have ig-
nored the League altogether, "Mr Massey ..• still thinks that the League 
is utterly useless and our expenditure in relation to it is wasted," 
wrote Bell in December 1922. "With Mr Massey I have only taken the 
argument that we cannot help the expenditure so long as we are a manda-
89 
tory, and he has seen the force of that." 
Massey was sensitive to claims that the League was some form of 
superstate, with the right to determine the policies of its 90 members. 
In 1924, he dismissed charges by the Labour Party that the government's 
actions over state servants' wages contravened the labour clauses of the 
Treaty of Versailles, by stating that he had not signed the treaty to 
give the League Council the right to dictate domestic legislation. 91 He 
was particularly anxious to assure New Zealanders that the Dominion's 
membership of the League did not threaten its ties with the British Em-
pire. He told Parliament in 1921: 
Certainly we joined as an individual nation ... but we joined with the 
object of working not only for our interests, but also of looking 
after the interests of the Empire whenever the occasion may require. 
If I thought for one moment that our joining the League of Nations 
meant weakening the connection between New Zealand and the other 
countries of the Empire and the United Kingdom, I would say at once 
to the Parliament of this country that the time has come for us to 
withdraw from the League of Nations and do our best along with the 
other countries of the Empire. 92 
Statements like that led Labour MP Frederick Bartram to observe: 
The Prime Minister's attitude towards the League of Nations seems to 
me very much the attitude of a man who, not believing in the doc-
66 
trines or tenets of the Church, JOlns that institution and attends 
its services simply because it is an eminently respectable thing to 
do, and good for business .•. To look after our interests; to look 
after our Empire, our family; to get economic pickings for our table; 
our country right or wrong - that seems to be the spirit animating 
the ri~ht honourable gentleman with regard to the League of Na-
tions. 9 
Despite Labour's efforts in Parliament on its behalf, the League remain-
ed a remote and alien body which excited little interest in New Zealand. 
Not surprisingly, Allen saw things differently. As a delegate to 
the Assembly, he carne to appreciate the value of the League and support 
its development. Like so many of his fellow delegates, he was converted 
by the atmosphere of Geneva which tended to broaden their narrowly 
nationalistic views. Because Allen remained in Europe when many of the 
other delegates returned home, the government and public of New Zealand 
were deprived of the opportunity to learn at first-hand about Allen's 
role in the work of the League. The High Commissioner's report to Parl-
. b' f h' I .. 94 lament was no su stltute or t lS persona communlcatlon. 
Allen's isolated position is clearly illustrated by the sharp con-
trast between his active participation in the Assembly and his govern-
mentIs coolness towards the League. New Zealand's initiatives at Geneva 
must be considered to have been primarily the work of Allen himself. It 
was to his credit that Allen's interpretation of his task at Geneva was 
somewhat broader than that of the government. In time, his efforts were 
recognised by the other delegates. Apart from his appointment to the 
Supervisory Commission, Allen was elected a Vice-President of the Spe-
cial Assembly in March 1926. In part, this honour was the natural re-
sult of his lengthy service at the League. Nevertheless, the fact that 
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Gray noted in 1925 that Allen exercised a certain influence at the 
Assembly, indicates that his personal standing at Geneva was quite 
h ' h 95 ~g • 
Allen's achievements should not be exaggerated, however. Some 
perspective is provided by Richard Casey who observed in 1926 that the 
Dominions were regarded in Geneva as "rather voiceless ghosts" of Bri-
tain because their representatives did not entertain or make an effort 
to get to know 96 the other delegates or the press. In New Zealand's 
case, Allen simply did not have the resources to maintain a higher pro-
file at Geneva. This reflected the government's doubts about the League 
and New Zealand's place within it. Yet, even among those Dominions 
which had no qualms about carving out a separate niche for themselves at 
Geneva, their governments' interest in the League was often on the same 
97 level as New Zealand's. 
In fact, the differences in attitude to the League between Allen 
and the government were of degree only. Allen was certainly less in-
clined to condemn the whole organisation because of its inadequacies, 
but he shared Massey's scepticism of the League's competence to maintain 
peace. Both men were adamant that the British Empire must remain the 
guarantor of New Zealand's security. From the government's point of 
view, the League's advocacy of disarmament and international arbitration 
interfered with the Empire's right to pursue its interests as it saw 
fit. New Zealand supported the objects of the League but it was not 
prepared to allow the Empire to surrender its power to a European-domi-
nated organisation to achieve those objects. 
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CHAPTER 3 
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The determination to prevent another war of the scale of the Great 
War was as strong in New Zealand in 1919, as in any other country touch-
ed by the conflict. The problem which confronted world governments was 
how to translate this determination into something tangible. For some 
the establishment of the League of Nations offered the best hope that a 
universally-acceptable formula could be found. The New Zealand Govern-
ment, however, was unconvinced that the League could offer the Dominion 
anything comparable to the security which the British Empire already 
provided. 
The dissension and mistrust which had surrounded the Paris Peace 
Conference only confirmed Massey's view that the League would not be the 
panacea which many hoped. He told Parliament in September 1919: 
We must not allow ourselves to be lulled into a false sense of se-
curity. We must not jump to the conclusion that when we have 
established a League of Nations we have secured the peace of the 
world. We have not. We have only commenced. 
Massey's ideas on how peace might be maintained bore little resemblance 
to Woodrow Wilson's utopian vision. 
If it were only possible for Britain, France, and America to combine, 
and to say to other nations, 'We will not have war again', that would 
be the best guarantee of peace. I know that means keeping up armies 
and navies ..• but, as far as I am able to judge, force cannot be done 
without. If the League of Nations is going to be a success it must 
have force behind it. 1 
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Massey wanted the League to be a continuation of the wartime alliance, a 
'League to Enforce Peace'. 
The Peace Conference had already proved that such a league was out 
of the question. Internationalism fell victim to the exigencies of na-
tional politics. The embryonic League of Nations suffered a significant 
setback when the United States' Senate voted against ratifying the Cove-
nant. The American default merely reinforced the New Zealand Govern-
ment's reservations about the League. Massey said he could not see how 
it could be a success, and the Minister of Defence, Sir James Allen, de-
clared that the League was hardly worth the paper it was written upon. 2 
Despite his doubts, Massey was prepared to give it a chance to 
prove itself. Nevertheless, he and others believed that a league of 
British nations would be more effective as a peacekeeper than the League 
of Nations could ever 3 be. Few conservatives actively opposed the 
League in the House or the Legislative Council. 4 There was an accep-
tance of the organisation, at least in principle, by the majority of 
conservative opinion interested in international affairs, either because 
its apparent tenuousness did not threaten the Empire, or because the 
League might form an adjunct to the Empire in its efforts to preserve 
5 peace. 
support. 
This acceptance was not, however, translated into actual 
During 1920, the League struggled to cope with the numerous and 
complex problems the war had created but it seemed unable to exert much 
influence over international events. In September 1920, Massey told 
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Parliament that New Zealand could not afford to rely on the League for 
its security. He said: " ••• we should not be doing our duty if we ne-
glected our own defence either at the present time or in the years to 
6 
come." Because New Zealand's defence was so intimately tied to that of 
the British Empire, Massey's statement had far-reaching implications. 
He was suggesting that until the League was in a position to intervene 
effectively in international affairs, the Empire was free to pursue its 
own defence arrangements. 
There were some people in New Zealand who were critical of the 
government's policies. At the forefront of this opposition was the 
leadership of the Labour Party. The Parliamentary Labour Party was re-
garded as a significant threat by Massey and other conservatives because 
of its outspoken criticism of the capitalist system, and its socialist 
ideas. Because Labour leaders like Harry Holland, H.T. Armstrong, Peter 
Fraser, W.E. Parry and M.J. Savage had backgrounds in the radical trade 
unions, the party was labelled Bolshevist and extreme. 7 As leader of 
the Parliamentary Party, Holland was, without doubt, Massey's most formid-
able opponent. Caustic in debate and unwilling to court public popular-
ity by compromising his principles, he represented the radical face of 
8 
the Labour Party. While other leaders, such as Fraser, had moderated 
their views by the early 1930s, Holland's image remained that of a dour 
doctrinaire and this did much to hinder acceptance of the Party by the 
majority of New Zealanders. 9 
Labour's policies on the economy and social welfare were shaped 
very much by the realities of the New Zealand situation. But, conscious 
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of its place and role in the international socialist and labour move-
ment, the Party's leaders advocated views on foreign and imperial 
affairs which owed much to overseas socialist sources, including the 
British and European Labour Parties. The New Zealand Party's outlook 
was, therefore, less parochial than that of the conservative parties. 
These influences helped endow the Labour leaders with a distaste for the 
apparently unquestioning loyalty to the Empire displayed by the govern-
ment, and a healthy scepticism of the motives of non-Labour governments 
. B' . 10 In rltaln. 
Labour's efforts to stir the public and the government out of their 
apathy with regard to external affairs were largely centred on the League 
by 1925. Yet, only six years earlier the Party's annual conference was 
as dubious about the League as Massey himself. A manifesto written by 
Holland and Fraser, approved by the 1919 conference, had condemned the 
Treaty of Versailles. It called for a true League of Peoples instead of 
the proposed League of Nations, which was considered to be a mere con-
tinuation of the wartime alliance of capitalist states. The exclusion 
of Germany and the other ex-enemy states from the League only confirmed 
this opinion. Equally damning was the forced disarmament of Germany 
while the other Great Powers were under no obligation to reduce their 
armed forces similarly. Labour feared that future conscripted workers 
would again have to die for reasons unknown to them, or that these con-
script armies would be used to suppress socialism at home or abroad. 
The Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War was a case in point. 
Labour pacifists, led by Walter Nash and Fred Cooke, were especially 
vigorous in their efforts, at the conferences of 1919 and 1920, to in-
clude a call for the abolition of the armed forces in the Party plat-
11 form. 
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The platform finally adopted in 1923 called for the abolition of 
conscription and the restrictive wartime legislation, and the unity of 
all workers in a League of Peoples which would distribute the world's 
resources , bl 12 equlta y. Though Labour did not explicitly support the 
League of Nations in its platform for over a decade, the passionate 
idealism of the 1919 conference was by 1921 being moderated by the real-
ities of international politics. While Holland and Fraser continued to 
support the platform as an 'd 1 13 l ea , the Parliamentary Party carne 
to regard the League, imperfect as it was, as the only means available 
of pursuing Labour's 14 internationalist goals. The government's re-
luctance to honour fully its obligations to the League, reflected in the 
limited, sometimes nonexistent, representation of the Dominion at League 
conferences, was regarded by Labour as a sign of New Zealand's irnrnatur-
ity as a nation. Few New Zealanders were receptive to its message, how-
15 
ever. Even within the Labour Party, interest in foreign affairs and 
the League was very limited. 
Perhaps because of New Zealand's political and cultural homogene-
ity, the voices of dissent were not numerous during the 1920s. Never-
theless, a number of anti-militarist and pacifist organisations, 
such as the National Peace Council, were active by 1922, often closely 
linked to the Labour Party. It was the members of the National Peace 
Council who were mainly responsible for the peace remits at the Labour 
Party conferences during the early 1920s. Led by its pacifist Secre-
tary, Walter Nash, Labour joined with these organisations to organise 
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the No-More-War demonstrations in the main centres in 1922. The newly-
formed League of Nations Union(LNU) also participated in these protests. 
The LNU was founded in Christchurch in May 1922 by the Very Rev. 
Dr James Gibb. The New Zealand body was modelled after the British LNU 
and the two remained closely linked. Sir Francis Bell was the first 
patron and prominent politicians were made honorary officers of 
the organisation. By 1927, there were branches in the four main 
centres and eight other towns, with a membership of approximately 2,500. 
The LNU was not a pacifist group although some of its leaders, like 
Gibb, P.J. O'Regan and R.M. Laing, espoused pacifist beliefs and forged 
close links with pacifist groups during the 1920s, encouraging pacifists 
to join. Rather, it was a heterogenous organisation formed to promote 
League of Nations' internationalism. It was the most influential and 
respectable of the peace groups because it drew its supporters from the 
affluent and the educated. Clergymen and women werewell~epresented. 
Because of its more conservative nature, the LNU did not attract many 
supporters from the labour movement. Fraser and Nash were important 
exceptions. 
From the beginning, the widespread appeal of the LNU undermined its 
effectiveness. Because its leaders tended to be more outspoken and ex-
treme in their views than some sections of the membership, there was al-
ways the possibility that they would express opinions on the LNU's be-
half which could alienate these members. The leadership's criticisms of 
the government during the 1922 Chanak crisis and their loud support for 
disarmament, including calls for the abandonment of the Singapore Naval 
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Base from 1923 and the abolition of compulsory military training, dis-
mayed conservatives within the LNU. As a result, Gibb and his coll~~ues 
were sometimes reluctant to push controversial issues in order to pre-
serve the organisation's fragile unity. 
While the LNU acted as a pressure group, often petitioning and 
sending delegations to the government, its primary objective was to en-
lighten public opinion about the League through education, meetings and 
articles. 
For the LNU world public opinion was to be the supreme arbiter of in-
ternational conflicts, not the League itself. The League was merely 
to be the organ of publicity through which that public opinion was to 
gain the necessary information upon which to base its judge-
ment. 16 
The belief that war could be prevented by the moral judgement of 
an educated public opinion was consistent with contemporary pacifist 
thinking but it conflicted with the sanctions provisions of the Cove-
nant. The LNU considered it undesirable to emphasize these provisions 
because it was not confident that the League could enforce sanctions if 
a conflict arose. But if there was concern that the issue of sanctions 
would raise fundamental questions about the League in the public mind, 
the LNU leadership also reciHsed how potentially divisive the issue could 
be for a membership ranging from pacifists to imperialists. For this 
reason, the LNU shelved the problem during the 1920s. 17 
The idea that because New Zealand was a member of the League it 
should support the greater interests of the international community 
rather than the particular interests of the British Empire, was unac-
ceptable to the great majority of New Zealanders. Nevertheless, Labour 
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MPs propounded that novel belief from 1920. International arbitration 
and disarmament figured prominently in Labour's attacks on the govern-
, f' l' 18 ment s orelgn po lCY. Holland did not share Massey's confidence that 
the best way to serve the interests of world peace was to ensure the 
security and power of the Empire. 
Labour MPs were often critical of the apparent conflict between the 
policies of the Empire and the aims of the League. They charged the 
British Government with paying lip-service to the League's efforts to 
reduce international tension, and Holland decried the foolishness of the 
New Zealand Government for believing these efforts threatened the inte-
grity f h E ' 19 o t e mplre. There is no denying the genuineness of Labour's 
support for the League but these attacks were also a political tactic to 
embarrass the 20 government. In August 1920, David Sullivan and Fraser 
accused the government of neglecting its disarmament obligations under 
the Peace Treaty, arguing that the increase in defence spending showed 
the Dominion had 21 no faith in the League. Early the following year, 
Holland used the prospect of an Imperial Conference to propose an amend-
ment to the Address-in-Reply, requesting that the Dominion's delegates 
support disarmament and the renunciation of all war treaties, including 
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. 22 
First signed in 1902 and renewed for ten years in 1911, the Alli-
ance was considered vital to the maintenance of the Empire's strategic 
position in the Pacific by London and Wellington. 23 But, as a signatory 
of the Covenant, the British Government had agreed, under Article 20, 
not to be a party to such exclusive alliances. The British and Japanese 
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Governments were faced with the choice of either denouncing the Alliance 
or modifying its terms to conform with Article 21 which allowed regional 
understandings. After discussions in June 1920, a joint communication 
was sent to the League the following month advising of their intention 
24 
to modify the Alliance by July 1921. 
The future of the Alliance was at the top of the agenda at the 
Imperial Conference in London in June 1921. Australia and New Zealand 
wanted it renewed but Canada believed the Alliance should be replaced by 
an agreement between all the Pacific powers. The deadlock was broken by 
the American invitation to all powers interested in the Pacific and 
naval affairs to attend a conference in Washington in November 1921. 25 
New Zealand was represented by Sir John Salmond, a Supreme Court judge 
and former Solicitor-General. 26 Three major treaties emerged from Wash-
ington. The Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament restricted the 
capital ship strength of the Great Powers and stopped them from fortify-
ing their Pacific naval bases. The Four-Power Treaty on Insular Pos-
sessions in the Pacific replaced the Anglo-Japanese Alliance with a 
broad agreement which contained no military commitments, while the Nine-
Power Treaty was designed to encourage political and economic stability 
, Ch' 27 ln lna. 
Massey was less than satisfied with the results of the Washington 
Conference. On 18 August 1922, he made his displeasure plain during the 
ratification debate in the House. Massey criticised the Naval Treaty as 
inadequate because auxiliary vessels, submarines and aircraft were ex-
eluded. He clearly thought the Four-Power Treaty was a poor substitute 
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for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Dismissing the League as a body of 
minor states with no power behind it, he reiterated his belief that only 
a combination of nations led by Britain and the United States could en-
force peace. It was left to the Minister of Education, James Parr, to 
28 
exhibit any enthusiasm for the treaty. 
The response of the other political parties and the press was mix-
ed. 29 Liberal Party leader Thomas Wilford was more optimistic than 
Massey. His comments on the League tended to emphasise its role as a 
means of peacefully settling international disputes, instead of resort-
ing to arms. But he was as unwilling as Massey to depend on the League 
for New Zealand's security.30 Thomas Sidey, however, strongly criticis-
ed Massey's pessimism about the prospects for peace, saying the world's 
leaders should back the 31 League. Labour considered the disarmament 
provisions did not go far enough. Holland was critical that the Naval 
Treaty appeared to have been based on financial considerations instead 
of ethical ones. He believed the present League was inadequate and what 
was needed was a League of Peoples which "will not hesitate to use all 
the international force at its command to forbid the occurrence of any 
war in the future.,,32 
Other speakers in the House and the Legislative Council were divid-
ed whether the conference had made a long-term contribution to 33 peace. 
34 Some believed the Washington agreements had superseded the League. But 
the suggestion that the combined efforts of the League and the confer-
ence had made an increase in New Zealand's defence spending unnecessary, 
35 
was not thought worthy of comment. The debate showed the wariness of 
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conservative opinion in New Zealand about the involvement of the 
Empire in international conferences. The suspicion that other states 
could not entirely be trusted not to undermine the power of the Empire, 
coloured the views of the government when the League attempted to build 
on the progress made at Washington a year later. 
The Washington Conference was an important contribution to disarma-
ment but it was not the League's triumph. The League was handicapped 
not only by the non-universality of its membership but by the lack of 
confidence in its utility by those Great Powers which were members. This 
was revealed by the Chanak crisis iri September 1922. A small Allied 
force stationed in the Dardanelles neutral zone was threatened by the 
Turkish forces of Mustapha Kemal Pasha. Responding quickly to the 
British Government's call to the Dominions for assistance, the New Zea-
36 land Government offered to send troops to the area. 
On 19 September 1922, Parliament passed a motion of support for the 
government's . 37 actlon, but LNU leaders Gibb and O'Regan were loudly 
critical of the government for committing New Zealand without Parlia-
mentary authority and without informing the public. They also critic is-
ed the British Government's handling of the affair and urged the refer-
ral of the dispute to the League. This outspokenness was attacked as 
unpatriotic by the government 38 and the press. The Labour Party was 
also unhappy about the government's actions. Holland insisted Parlia-
ment should have discussed the British request because "wars should be 
made by the people of New Zealand." He questioned Britain's motives and 
the importance of the Turkish situation, but when he proposed a motion 
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that the League should become invo1ved,39 Reform and Liberal MPs thought 
the idea ridiculous. Parr declared: 
..• one might just as well suggest that an innocent three-months-01d 
lamb should attempt to discipline a savage wolf as to suggest that 
the League of Nations as at present constituted, without any disci-
plinary force to back its advice or its decisions, is or can possibly 
be an effective weapon to use where Mustapha Pasha is concerned. 40 
Massey agreed, saying he looked to the British league of nations to set-
1 h d · 41 t e t e lspute. In the face of this patriotic fervour, the League 
clearly counted for very little. Certainly, the eventual settlement 
owed nothing to it. 
The League's disarmament and arbitration activities had been 1arge-
1y eclipsed by the initiatives of the Great Powers. This situation 
changed in 1923 when the League attempted a major initiative. The Four-
th Assembly approved the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, which 
attempted to overcome the reluctance of member-states to reduce the 
level of their armaments by combining the principle of disarmament with 
the need for security. It was an ambitious concept and the culmination 
42 
of three years work. 
The Draft Treaty was designed to strengthen the principles of 
mutual assistance of Articles 10 and 16 of the Covenant, and to facili-
tate the application of Article 8 on disarmament. 43 Article 2 of the 
treaty stated that the signatories undertook to assist any other signa-
tory which was attacked, provided that it had carried out the treaty's 
disarmament provisions. In the event of a dispute, the League Council 
was required to define the aggressor within four days and determine the 
measures to be taken against that state. The powers of the Council 
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during the emergency were extensive. It could immediately apply eco-
nomic sanctions, specify which state or states were to supply the 
assistance it required, and the type of assistance to be provided. The 
Council would also control communications, transportation and financial 
matters associated with the operations, and appoint the commander-in-
chief. In effect, these provisions required the signatories to turn 
over control of their national resources to the Council at any time and 
in any circumstances. The Council could also establish demilitarised 
zones and require the aggressor to pay reparations. 
Several members of the League, including Canada, had already ex-
pressed their disagreement with Article 10 of the Covenant, which impli-
ed that in the event of a threat to any member-state all League members, 
no matter how remote from the dispute, were required to . 44 asslst. 
The treaty stipulated that no signatory would be required to assist in 
operations outside their own continent. Signatories were allowed to 
conclude mutual defence agreements among themselves, so long as their 
sole purpose was to carry out the measures of the Draft Treaty and were 
approved by the Council. In the event of aggression, the parties to 
these regional agreements could take action without first obtaining the 
sanction of the Council. 
No state could claim the benefit of the treaty until it had under-
taken to reduce its armaments in accordance with a plan to be drawn up 
by the Council. Each state was to furnish an estimate of the reduction 
it could effect in virtue of the guaranties accorded it, and the 
Council was to draw up a plan on the basis of these estimates. The 
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greatest weakness of the treaty was that no timetable for this process 
was specified. The treaty would remain inoperative until the Council 
had completed this extremely difficult task. Once a government had 
approved the plan it had two years in which to carry out the reduction, 
with five-yearly revisions thereafter. 
The Assembly requested all governments, League members or not, to 
submit observations 45 on the treaty. Though New Zealand chose not to 
reply, preferring to leave the matter in the hands of the British 
46 Government, the Dominion's defence chiefs were not enamoured with the 
treaty. Army commander Major-General E.W.C. Chaytor believed the conti-
nental limitation on the treaty's obligations could mean that in the 
event of an attack by Japan, New Zealand could expect little or no 
assistance. Further, he warned: 
Acceptance of these provisions would make the League of Nations a 
superstate with powers of taxation and of declaring war and would 
mean the breakup of the British Empire since our allegience would be 
transferred from H.M. the King to the Council of the League which 
might even require action against another State of the Empire. 
He was certain no important state would accept the treaty and he sharply 
criticised Lord Robert Cecil for his part in its preparation. He said: 
" .•. one can only wonder that one of H.M. Ministers, who should be work-
ing for the Empire, could have drafted such proposals. To whom does he 
I 
give allegiehce? to His Majesty or to the Council of the 47 League?" 
In Chaytor's mind it was impossible to do both. The Navy's Commodore A. 
F. Beal echoed Chaytor's 48 views. 
Of the twenty-nine replies to the League, eighteen were favourable 
but accompanied by reservations. France and Italy approved of the 
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treaty but the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain rejected it 
outright. Ever since Cecil's initial proposals in 1922, the British 
Government had been concerned about their possible effect on the Empire. 
The Foreign Office, the Service Departments and the Committee of Imperi-
al Defence were critical of the disarmament provisions. There were 
doubts whether every government had the political will to carry out the 
prearranged plans for military co-operation. Most importantly, the 
limitation of the obligation to give assistance to states situated in 
the same part of the world, had significant ramifications for the Em-
pire. Its worldwide spread would necessitate British involvement prac-
tically everywhere. There was also the theoretical possibility that one 
part of the Empire might be involved while the other parts were not. 
The British Government was not prepared to accept such a large increase 
in its obligations or an agreement which threatened the unity of the 
E . 49 mp~re. 
The difficulty of enforcing sanctions had been demonstrated just as 
the treaty was being completed, by the Corfu incident. During August 
1923, an Italian general was murdered in Greece which resulted in the 
occupation of Corfu 50 by Italy. The Greek Government appealed to the 
League under Article 15 of the Covenant but the Council did not inter-
vene. The dispute was eventually resolved but it demonstrated that the 
Council could not be depended upon to address a crisis with resolve and 
unanimity. Indeed, the prospect of implementing sanctions against Italy 
under Article 16 of the Covenant had greatly alarmed the British Govern-
ment. At the Imperial Conference in October 1923, the other delegates 
shared Massey's relief that Article 16 had not been invoked. He believed 
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that it was dangerous and predicted the Article might be responsible for 
escalating a minor d ' , , fl' 51 ~spute ~nto a ser~ous con ~ct. Massey was ob-
viously speaking from an imperial point of view for although New 
Zealand was a small country it never identified itself with the other 
small states in the League. Sir James Allen thought it was probably 
just as well that "any illusions which may have been cherished by some 
of the smaller Powers with regard to the extent to which the League 
could protect them and their territorial integrity by the adoption of 
coercive measures should have been shattered.,,52 
The Imperial Conference met too soon after the 1923 Assembly to 
allow full discussion of the Draft 53 Even there was a Treaty. so, 
clearly little enthusiasm for it. 54 Massey intimated that extension any 
of the sanctions provisions 55 of the Covenant was unacceptable. The 
British ministers said little on the subject and there was no opportuni-
ty for governmental discussion after the conference because of the 
British general election. The change of government in Britain caused 
consideration of the treaty to be put off until April 1924. 
The British Labour Government moved quickly to implement its 
foreign policy, which aimed to enhance international security by creat-
ing a system based upon reconciliation, arbitration and disarmament 
through a revitalised League of Nations. The abandonment of the Singa-
pore Base was the obvious moral gesture which might induce others to 
make similar reductions in their 56 armaments. Massey was unable to 
appreciate such exalted motives and seems to have regarded them as mere 
I , '1 57 po ~t~ca cant. Both he and the Governor-General, Lord Jellicoe, were 
furious that the British Government was prepared to put its faith in the 
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League at the expense of the security of Australia and New Zealand. 58 
Massey had long warned that the League was dangerous because it provided 
an illusion of security which could hinder proper defence prepara-
tions. 59 He therefore took upon himself the task of reminding the Brit-
ish Government where its responsibilities lay. 
In a forthright cable, Massey declared that the British decision 
jeopardised not only New Zealand's security but, by undermining British 
naval supremacy, it also threatened the position of the Empire and 
world peace. The British confidence in the League was given short 
shrift. Massey told British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald: 
You say your 'Government stands for international 
through a strengthened and enlarged League of Nations. ' 
that I must say that if the defence of the Empire is to 
the League of Nations only, then it may turn out to have 
that the League was ever brought into being. 
co-operation 
In reply to 
depend upon 
been a pity 
Massey pointed out that the League had not yet been able to prevent hos-
'I b ,60 ti e acts etween nations. It was to no avail. MacDonald announced 
the abandonment of the Base on 18 March 1924. 61 League supporters in 
New Zealand had reason to expect that the British Government would also 
approve the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance. 
To the New Zealand Government's relief, the British Cabinet reject-
ed the 62 treaty. At the end of May 1924, a draft reply for the League 
was sent to the Dominions for comment. The British Government stated 
that the treaty 
holds out no serious prospect of advantage sufficient to compensate 
the world for the immense complication of international relations 
which it would create, the uncertainty of the practical effect of its 
clauses, and the consequent difficulty of conducting national policy. 
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It did not believe the Council could determine an aggressor within four 
days, even if a definition of what constituted aggression had been in-
cluded in the treaty. Any response to that aggression would necessarily 
be slow and no prearranged plan could possibly cover every contingency. 
Further, the British Government did not believe the League could depend 
on every government to carry out their obligations. It also suggested 
that in order for Britain to fulfil its obligations under the treaty, 
disarmament was out of the question. Indeed, it was probable that an 
increase in armaments would be necessary because of its worldwide 
interests. 
Criticism was also directed at the provision for regional agree-
ments. The British considered this might lead to the reappearence of 
military alliances. There was also the possibility that the parties to 
these agreements might take action which subsequently could not be sup-
ported by the Council. It was suggested that the continental limitation 
on the obligation to assist would create serious problems for the Brit-
ish Empire. If one of its members was involved in a conflict, the other 
members of the Empire could not remain aloof. The British Government 
even implied that Dominion opposition had been a significant factor be-
hind Britain's rejection of the treaty. Lastly, it was thought unde-
sirable for an advisory body like the Council to be invested with such 
. 63 
extenslve powers. 
New Zealand had no difficulty in approving the British draft. 
Massey told MacDonald that the treaty's proposals were futile and a dan-
ger to world peace. He was pleased the Empire had not surrendered its 
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freedom 64 of action to the League. With the approval of the Dominions, 
Britain despatched its formal reply to the League on 5 July 1924. The 
65 Canadian and Australian Governments sent their own replies separately. 
Massey must have hoped that the demise of the Draft Treaty was a 
sign that the British Government's infatuation with the League had end-
ed. He was disappointed. The Home Secretary, Arthur Henderson, 
and the Lord President of the Council, Lord Parmoor, were strong sup-
porters of the League and they were the driving force behind the British 
Government's continued search for a formula to strengthen the 66 League. 
As the principal supporter of the defunct treaty, the French Government 
was also anxious to find a comprehensive security agreement centring on 
the League. In talks between MacDonald and French Premier Edouard 
Herriot in July 1924, it was agreed that security should be linked to 
the limitation of armaments but that the backbone of a new agreement 
b f b ' , 67 must e a system 0 ar ~trat~on. At the Assembly in September 
1924, they proposed a wide extension of the principle of arbitration; 
the signature by all states of the Optional Clause of the 1920 Statute 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice;68 and the calling of a 
general disarmament 69 conference. These proposals formed the basis of 
the Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes which 
the Assembly recommended, on 2 October 1924, be accepted by the members 
70 
of the League. 
The Geneva Protocol, as it became known, was a long and complicated 
document 71 closely tied to the Covenant. The most elaborate provisions 
were in respect to arbitration. The signatories were required to accept 
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Paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, more familiarly known as the Optional 72 Clause. 
This recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court in 
all justiciable disputes, although it was possible for reservations to 
be made. 
The Protocol attempted to tighten the provisions of Article 15 of 
the Covenant. The intention was to close the so-called 'gap' in 
the Covenant by eliminating the right of League members to go to 
war other than in self-defence. As the Covenant stood, if the Council 
was unable to agree unanimously on a settlement to a dispute, a League 
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member could enforce its claim by war without violating the Covenant. 
Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the Protocol were to ensure that all disputes 
were sent to arbitration. If the Council was unable to effect a 
settlement under Article 15 of the Covenant, the disputing parties, or 
the Council, could refer the matter to a Committee of Arbitrators. If 
one of the parties claimed that the dispute arose out of a matter which 
was within its domestic jurisdiction, the Committee was to seek the 
advice of the Permanent Court and abide by that advice. The Committee's 
decision was binding. 
In the event of a dispute, the parties were not allowed to begin 
military preparations. The Council was to monitor the situation and in-
vestigate any infraction. Should hostilities break out as a result of 
such preparations or because a state had refused to submit to arbitra-
tion or carry out the recommendations of an arbitrative body, the Coun-
cil was required to apply sanctions against the aggressor. 
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The sanctions provisions were largely based on Article 16 of the 
Covenant but included elements from the Draft Treaty. A signatory was 
required to implement the economic, financial and military sanctions de-
termined by the Council "in the degree which its geographical position 
and its particular situation as regards armaments allow." If the victim 
of aggression was a party to a separate security agreement, the other 
parties to that agreement could not go to its assistance until the Coun-
cil had agreed to apply sanctions. 
Just as with the Draft Treaty, the Geneva Protocol would not come 
into force until a disarmament plan could be agreed upon. Article 17 of 
the Protocol stipulated that a disarmament conference would open on 15 
June 1925 but only if the majority of the permanent members of the Coun-
cil and ten other League members had ratified the Protocol by 1 May 
1925. This timetable was a reflection of the wave of constructive 
enthusiasm and optimism which inspired the delegates to the Fifth 
Assembly. 
Certainly, among those groups in New Zealand which supported the 
objectives of the League, there was the expectation that disarmament and 
world peace were now attainable goals. The Labour Party reacted en-
thusiastically to the British Government's League-oriented foreign pol-
icy. At the Party conference in April 1924, a resolution of support for 
the British Government's efforts on disarmament was adopted and in 
Parliament MacDonald's initiative received loud praise from the Labour 
74 leaders. The Party once again joined with the peace groups to organ-
ise large-scale anti-war demonstrations in September 1924, which were 
75 
well-supported. 
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Yet, in spite of this activity, the New Zealand 
Government appears to have been caught off-guard by events at Geneva. 
On 13 September 1924, Massey learned that the British delegation 
had proposed that the British Empire should accept the Optional 
76 Clause. The Empire countries had not accepted the Clause when 
they ratified the Statute of the Permanent Court in 1921 because they 
believed it gave the Court greater powers than Article 14 of the Cove-
nant provided for and threatened British belligerent rights at sea. 
Three years on, Allen and the Australian representative were unenthu-
siastic about the British proposal for the same reasons. The British 
legal experts reassured the Dominion delegates that acceptance would be 
accompanied by reservations which excluded disputes which had occurred 
before the date of signature, and future actions in disputes sanctioned 
by the League. Observing that MacDonald had practically committed 
Britain to this course at the Assembly, Allen requested instructions on 
77 
the attitude he was to take. His cable had not contained any advice 
to the government but Bell interpreted it as favouring the British pro-
posal. In a sharply-worded memorandum, he stated that New Zealand could 
not agree to surrender the Empire's maritime belligerent rights simply 
because MacDonald had made some promise. 78 
Sir Francis Henry Dillon Bell was responsible for drafting many of 
the communications with London and thus was probably the architect of 
much of the Massey Government's foreign policy. Born in Nelson in 1851, 
Bell was the son of Sir Francis Dillon Bell who served as a Cabinet 
minister, Speaker of the House, Leader of the Legislative Council and 
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Sir Francis Bell 
New Zealand's Agent-General in London. After studying for the bar in 
England, Bell returned to practise law in Wellington in 1874. He became 
Mayor of Wellington in 1891 and in 1893 he was elected to Parliament for 
Wellington City. Disenchanted with politics, Bell did not stand for re-
election in 1896 but his friendship with Massey led to his appointment 
to the Legislative Council in 1912. As Leader of the Council(1912-1926, 
1927-1928), Attorney-General(1918-1926) and Minister of External Affairs 
(1923-1926), Bell was Massey's closest collegue and his deputy from 
1920. Though as forceful and domineering a character as Massey, 
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succeeding him briefly as Prime Minister in May 1925, Bell had limited 
political ambition, preferring to act behind the scenes. 
Widely regarded as New Zealand's leading constitutional lawyer, he 
grasped political principles as distinct from political interests, and 
provided an intellectual basis for Massey's imperialism. 79 He believed 
the Dominions must be consulted on imperial matters by London but con-
sidered that only the British Government was qualified to conduct the 
Empire's f ' ff' 80 orelgn a alrs. Bell was almost certainly the only member 
of Cabinet who believed the League might have an important role to play 
in the maintenance of peace but he was never able to convince Massey of 
h ' 81 t lS. 
For New Zealand the primary issue raised by the Optional Clause was 
the likely effect of the Permanent Court's jurisdiction upon the 
exercise of British seapower. In wartime the Empire claimed the right 
to blockade enemy ports, to stop and search neutral shipping and confis-
cate their cargoes if it could be proved to be contraband of war. The 
Admiralty feared British rights would be greatly reduced if they were 
subject to the review of a body of foreign jurists, and this view great-
ly influenced the N Z 1 d G 'h' k' 82 ew ea an overnment s t In lng. Massey told 
Allen: " ... this Government will no-t be party to or authorise you to con-
cur in any form of surrender of interpretation of British rights in 
Maritime warfare to a Court constituted of a majority of judges from 
f ' '" 83 orelgn countrles. 
Allen took the offensive at the meeting of the Empire delegates in 
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Geneva on 17 September 1924. He began by expressing his unease with the 
draft Protocol. He argued that it went beyond Article 16 of the Cove-
nant by committing the Empire to use the Royal Navy in a League con-
flict. Allen suggested this might involve the Empire in a war with 
countries with which it had no quarrel. He complained that the British 
Government seemed to be trying to force the hand of the Dominions. He 
accused it of a lack of candour because it had not sent the Foreign 
Office documents on the Optional Clause, written between March and July 
1924 and somewhat unfavourable in their conclusions, until early Septem-
ber 1924. 84 85 New Zealand's attitude annoyed Parmoor and Henderson. 
Parmoor told Allen that the Dominion had clearly not understood the ob-
ject of the British 86 proposals. But Allen privately questioned the 
British motives. "The position is extremely difficult," he told Massey, 
"as the British Government are using every endeavour they can to find 
some formula that can be agreed to by them and the French, and they are 
largely influenced, I fear, by political considerations and a possible 
1 . . G B·· ,,87 e ectlon ln reat rltaln. It appeared likely that the British 
would be prepared to sacrifice imperial unity on this issue to achieve 
their objectives. 
The Dominions were acutely aware that if the British Government 
signed the Protocol, they would be committed also. Allen thus endeav-
oured not only to remove the most offensive parts of the draft Protocol, 
but also to give the Empire more time to agree on a united response. 
He told the Assembly's Third Committee that he had always interpreted 
the obligation under Article 16 to participate in a League-sanctioned 
operation as a moral one. New Zealand was not in favour of making it a 
100 
legal obligation because a moral obligation was more likely to be 
acceptable and effective. Allen also objected to the Japanese amendment 
which would allow the Protocol to cover domestic matters. Australia, 
New Zealand and South Africa were concerned that their restrictive immi-
gration policies might be overturned by the Permanent Court, allowing 
a f1 d f h··· 88 00 0 non-w ~te ~mm~grants. In the event, the Assembly decided 
the amendment . d d' ff' l' d' d' 89 ra~se too many ~ ~cu t~es an reJecte ~t. Perhaps 
Allen's most important contribution was his suggestion that instead of 
recommending the acceptance of the Protocol, the Assembly should merely 
suggest that the League members give the proposal their "earnest consid-
. ,,90 erat~on . On this basis the Dominions could give their assent to the 
resolution of 2 October 1924 because no commitment to the Protocol was 
. 1 d 91 ~nvo ve . 
The attitude of the British delegation may have given the Dominion 
delegates the impression that the British Government was firmly behind 
the Geneva Protocol. This was far from the truth. MacDonald's personal 
commitment to the ideals of disarmament and arbitration was genuine 
enough but he was unhappy that Britain would have to assume a dispropor-
tionate share of the burden of enforcing the Protocol. The Service 
Departments were as hostile to the Protocol as they had been to the 
Draft Treaty. One must seriously question whether the Protocol would 
have been accepted by the British Labour Government in light of the 
divisions in Cabinet d h .. f h D .. 92 an t e oppos~t~on 0 t e om~n~ons. But the 
government fell within a month of the Assembly resolution on the Proto-
col and the problem passed to Stanley Baldwin's Conservative Government. 
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The new British Government faced a dilemma. The Geneva Protocol, 
as it stood, was unacceptable but outright rejection would damage Brit-
ain's relations with France and other European countries. It was 
decided that a decision on the Protocol must be put off until a compre-
hensive 93 review could be made. Informing the League of this decision, 
Baldwin stated that an important factor was the need to secure the 
agreement of the Dominions before taking further action. 94 On 19 Decem-
ber 1924, the British Government suggested a special meeting of the 
Empire P · M" d' h 95 rlme lnlsters to lSCUSS t e matter. Massey was prepared to 
attend but the other Dominion leaders considered such a meeting unneces-
96 
sary. 
The New Zealand Government had already stated on 13 November 1924 
that it could not accept the Optional Clause, principally because of the 
question of belligerent rights. 97 New Zealand also shared the British 
and Australian concern that Egypt might use the Clause to challenge the 
extensive British military presence there, particularly Britain's con-
trol of the Suez 98 Canal. Nearly six weeks later, in a preliminary 
statement of the Dominion's attitude to the Protocol as a whole, Massey 
told Baldwin that it was "mischievous and only possible of effect in 
minor issues between small Nations." He acknowledged that Britain was 
in a difficult position but he believed the Protocol was doomed in any 
case because d · d' . . bl 99 lsagreement over lsarmament was lnevlta e. Yet, the 
New Zealand Government was worried that the British Government might 
still accept a compromise solution on the Protocol. The appointment of 
outspoken League supporter Viscount Cecil of Chelwood to the Cabinet did 
nothing 100 to allay these fears. Massey and Bell considered it vital, 
102 
therefore,to tell the British in the strongest possible terms that the 
Protocol was unacceptable to New Zealand in any form. 
The Dominion made its formal statement on the Geneva Protocol on 6 
January 1925. Massey described the Protocol as "dangerous in its 
effect, crudely and hurridly drafted, and capable of various interpreta-
tions." He restated his objection to the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Permanent Court, arguing that no reservation would safeguard British 
belligerent rights or New Zealand's immigration laws. He then suggested 
that the provision that no nation could assist a victim of aggression 
until the Council gave its authority was ludicrous because it played in-
to the aggressors hands. Massey was also critical of the extension of 
the Council's authority under the Protocol, and he believed the sanc-
tions provisions would require "drastic" amendment. He concluded by 
dismissing the argument that the Empire's decision was required by the 
March 1925 meeting of the Council in order for the League to hold a dis-
armament conference during 1925. Frankly sceptical about disarmament, 
Massey did not consider such a conference was sufficient justification 
for the Empire to be rushed into making an important decision without 
proper consultation. Baldwin was urged to tell the League that the 
British Government would not make its decision until that consultation 
101 had taken place. 
The replies from the other Dominions were in a similar vein. They 
too found compulsory arbitration and the sanctions articles unaccept-
able. But there was also growing concern about the effect of the Proto-
colon the Empire's relations with the United States. 102 The opposition 
103 
of the Dominions and a negative report by the Committee of Imperial 
Defence left the British Cabinet little choice but to reject the Proto-
1 103 co . In early March 1925 a draft of the British reply to the League 
was sent to the Dominions. The New Zealand Government approved of its 
"general and commonsense point of view" but reminded the British Govern-
ment that the Dominion had its own reasons for rejecting the Protocol, 
104 
which the Foreign Secretary could mention at the League if necessary. 
On 12 March 1925, the Foreign Secretary, Austen Chamberlain, 
announced Britain's decision to the League Council. He said the Geneva 
Protocol did not merely complete the Covenant, as it was claimed, but 
altered both its balance and spirit. The emphasis on sanctions moved 
the League from promoting friendly co-operation to preserving peace by 
organising war. Britain did not believe all-embracing instruments like 
the Protocol were the answer to world insecurity. The British Govern-
ment preferred a less ambitious scheme consisting of "special arrange-
ments in order to meet special needs" framed in the spirit of the 
105 Covenant. Although Chamberlain's proposal was short on specifics, it 
was not merely a ploy to counter the anticipated criticism of the Brit-
ish rejection from Europe. The British Government was already engaged 
in discussions with France, Belgium and Germany which eventually produc-
d h L . 106 e t e ocarno treat~es. 
Few people in New Zealand, outside government circles and the LNU, 
knew much about the Geneva Protocol or the reasons for the Dominion's 
rejection of . 107 ~t. Harry Holland was unhappy that the decisions 
had been made by the government without any reference to Parliament. 108 
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Even when Parliament was given the opportunity to discuss the Protocol 
in September 1925, the Prime Minister took little part in the debate. 
In fact, the government seems to have considered it unnecessary to 
defend its decision on the Protocol. There was no point, said Sir James 
109 Parr, when it was already dead. 
This attitude pleased neither the Nationalists nor the Labour 
Party. Nationalist leader George Forbes argued that there must be dis-
cussion of foreign policy so that the government could act with the con-
fidence of the people. Thomas Wilford admitted MPs were ill-informed on 
foreign affairs and he supported a proposal for a Parliamentary Foreign 
Affairs Committee as a means of improving the situation. But while the 
Nationalists took the government to task for not keeping Parliament 
sufficiently informed about its foreign policy, they did not disagree 
with that policy. 
Wilford accepted the government's contention that the Permanent 
Court may have had the power under the Protocol to force New Zealand to 
amend its immigration legislation, and he was as appalled by the 
prospect as Parr. He also agreed that the Protocol would not have been 
effective while the United States, the Soviet Union and Germany remained 
outside the League. Wilford opposed any extension of the Empire's obli-
gat ions under the Covenant and warned that the Dominions would not go to 
war f . 110 to guarantee European rontlers. He was one of several speakers 
who suggested that the Empire should keep its external commitments to a 
minimum. 
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Predictably, the Labour view contrasted sharply with that of the 
conservative parties. During the earlier debate on the Supply Vote for 
the Defence Department, Labour MPs had castigated the government for 
failing to fulfil its disarmament obligations under the Peace Treaty. 
Noting that New Zealand's contribution to the League in 1925 was £9,607, 
W.J. Jordan thought that it seemed contradictory to spend that money on 
promoting peace and at the same time advocate increased spending on 
. f 111 preparlng or war. The debate on the Protocol provided an opportuni-
ty for Labour to express its concern about the prospects for peace and 
disarmament in the wake of that instrument's demise. 
Peter Fraser stated that the Geneva Protocol had contained the only 
practical proposal for disarmament so far and he was disappointed that a 
world disarmament conference would not be held during 1925. He describ-
ed the Protocol as an "international test of sincerity" and he thought 
New Zealand's objections were of the "most spurious nature". Holland 
chided the conservative members for their preoccupation with the Proto-
col's sanctions provisions, saying its main function was the prevention 
of wars not their prosecution. Both men rubbished the suggestion that 
the Permanent Court could have interfered in the Dominion's domestic 
legislation. Fraser said: " ••. the whole tone of the criticism by the 
New Zealand Government is small; rather the product of a pettifogging 
lawyer than of statesmen with a world outlook." 
The Labour leaders strongly defended the former British Government 
during the debate. Holland praised MacDonald's role in the development 
of the Protocol and he speculated that the government's decision to 
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reject it was influenced by the fact that it was the work of a Labour 
government. He noted that while New Zealand had protested against the 
Protocol when the British Labour Party was in power, the government was 
now satisfied to leave the Locarno negotiations completely in the hands 
of Baldwin's Conservative Government. It seemed to him that the Coates 
Government was content to allow Chamberlain to dictate what its views on 
foreign affairs should be. 112 Gordon Coates quickly refuted the 
charge by saying that his government would not automatically support the 
British Government but would offer its opinions on any policy which 
affected the Dominion, and it would agree only if that policy was com-
113 pletely acceptable. 
An acceptable foreign policy for New Zealand was one which placed 
the security of the British Empire first. The League was a complicating 
factor because it introduced the possibility of divided loyalties. 
Massey had warned that the interests of the Empire and the League might 
prove to be incompatible and that the Empire countries might have to 
choose between their loyalty to the Empire and their obligations under 
114 
the Covenant. Thus the League was regarded with suspicion, even hos-
tility, by the New Zealand Government. The collaboration of the British 
Labour Government in the development of the Geneva Protocol seemed to 
justify Massey's fears. He saw the League's quest for water-tight col-
lective security arrangements as a threat because it undermined the spe-
cial defence relationship between Britain and the Dominions. Instru-
ments like the Protocol increased British responsibilities and subordin-
ated imperial independence to the direction of the Council. But the 
League was also a rival because its members were seeking the same 
107 
protection from Britain which the Dominions regarded as their exclusive 
right. Thus, a combination of self-interest, genuine doubt about the 
League's capabilities, and a belief that the League's proper role was 
one of moral leadership only, led New Zealand to reject the Geneva 
Protocol. 
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CHAPTER 4 
'AN IMPERFECT INSTRUMENT', 1925-1928 
New Zealand was pleased that the British had rejected the Geneva 
Protocol, even though it was a serious blow to the League and raised 
questions about Britain's commitment to that body and the peace of 
Europe. But, while the New Zealand Government was unconcerned about its 
international image in the quest to have the Protocol killed, the Brit-
ish Government sought to repair the damage by negotiating an alternative 
and less ambitious scheme with Germany, France and Belgium during 1925. 1 
From the conference at Locarno, Switzerland, in October 1925, 
emerged the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee signed by France, Belgium, Italy, 
Germany and Britain. The Locarno Pact, as it became known, guaranteed 
// 
the inviolJility of the French and Belgian frontiers with Germany. Any 
dispute ~etween the parties was to be referred to the League Council. 
Accompanying the pact were four Arbitration Conventions which provided 
an elaborate system of arbitration, conciliation or resort to the Coun-
'1 2 Cl • If there had been anxieties in Geneva about the negotiations at 
Locarno, they were quickly dispelled when it was seen how closely the 
treaties were linked to 3 the League. Since the agreements would not 
come into force until Germany joined the League, it was hoped Germany 
would soon end its international isolation and take its rightful place 
on the League Council. Yet, the German application to enter the 
League sparked controversy and dissension among its members. It also 
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had important implications for the status of the Dominions within the 
League. 
Germany applied for League membership on 8 February 1926, on the 
understanding that it would be granted a permanent seat on the Council. 4 
By the time the special session of the Assembly convened on 8 March 
1926, the future composition of the Council had become a divisive issue 
because Spain, Brazil and Poland were also claiming permanent seats. 
For a week, the Locarno Powers ignored the Assembly while they met in 
secret to try to resolve the problem. Only the Dominion delegates were 
in the privileged position of being kept fully informed of the negotia-
tions 5 by the Foreign Secretary. But a satisfactory solution could not 
be found and the Assembly was put in the humiliating position of having 
to postpone the German application until September 1926 while a commit-
tee studied the question. 
Austen Chamberlain had only kept the Dominion delegates informed 
during the Assembly because he believed the British delegate on the 
Council also represented the Dominions. 6 It had long been acknowledged 
that the Dominions were as entitled to seek a Council seat as any other 
League member but this had not prevented British delegates from claiming 
to speak on their behalf in the Council. On 9 December 1924, for 
instance, Chamberlain told the Council that he spoke "the mind not of 
one Government only but f f ' 'G ,,7 o ~ve or s~x overnments ••• Canada, 
South Africa and Australia rejected this claim because it threatened 
their 8 status as separate members of the League. For them, the British 
delegate represented the Empire 9 only when they wanted him to do so. 
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New Zealand, however, supported the British claim because it maintained 
that imperial foreign policy was properly the preserve of the British 
Government. 
The possibility that the Dominions might seek a Council seat of 
their own was not seriously considered before 1926. 10 But, annoyed by 
Chamberlain's attitude,ll the Canadian and South African delegates sug-
gested at one of the meetings of the Empire delegates in March 1926 that 
the Dominions should have their own representative on the Council. While 
Allen and the Australian delegate were appalled at the prospect, 
the British delegates were prepared to concede the possibility, even if 
they did not welcome it. 12 Nevertheless, until the number of Council 
seats increased, a Dominion seat was out of the question. 
The plan to reorganise the Council proposed by the League Committee 
two months later eliminated this obstacle. The number of seats was in-
creased from ten to fourteen. Only one of the new seats was permanent 
and it was allocated to Germany. The nine elected members were to sit 
for three years but three of them could be re-elected if the Assembly 
voted in favour with a two-thirds majority. In effect, this provision 
created three semi-permanent seats which were designed to satisfy the 
claims of Poland, Brazil and Spain. Allen opposed this concession be-
cause it undermined the object of the three-year non-eligibility rule 
which went some way towards ensuring all members had an equal chance of 
being elected to the Council. He also believed the lobbying and canvas-
sing which always took place before the election of non-permanent mem-
bers would become more intensive, to the detriment of the democratic 
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13 process. But the New Zealand Government was uninterested and Allen's 
. d 14 concerns were ~gnore • 
When the Assembly opened on 6 September 1926, the delegates quickly 
approved the plan to reorganise the Council and Germany was finally 
admitted as a member. Bell, the New Zealand First Delegate, was 
personally unenthusiastic about German membership because he feared that 
Germany would seek the return of its former colonies, which were now 
League mandates. As a former Minister of External Affairs, Bell was 
concerned lest New Zealand's control of the mandate of Western Samoa 
would be threatened. He wrote: "I voted 'Yes' and meant 'No' on 
the question of admission, but I suppose the world's peace must corne 
before 15 our comfort." But the reorganisation of the Council had not 
been without its casualties. Spain and Brazil resigned their seats in 
protest at failing to secure permanent status. The extra vacancies 
apparently encouraged some of the Dominions seriously to consider stand-
ing for election. 
Bell informed Coates on 9 September 1926 that during the meetings 
of the Empire delegates, he had been surprised to find that South 
Africa, Canada and Australia were in favour of such a move. He had 
warned the other Empire delegates that since it had been Viscount Cecil 
who had proposed the plan to increase the number of Council seats, there 
might be accusations that the British Empire was conspiring to obtain 
another representative on the Council. But this was not Bell's sole 
concern. Coates was told that there was a real danger of an unsympathe-
tic Dominion representative stymying British proposals in the Council. 
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He warned, somewhat prophetically: 
It might be the Irishmen from the Free State who would certainly 
oppose everything that the British representative proposed, or it 
might be the representative of a Labour Government in Australia, Can-
ada, or New Zealand, and again there would be 'Buckley's' chance of 
any co-operation between the British representatives and the Dominion 
representative. 
Bell wanted Coates and the Australian Prime Minister to persuade the 
other Empire delegates to postpone a Dominion candidature until it could 
be discussed at the Imperial Conference the following month. 16 
There is no indication that Coates acted on the request although he 
probably sympathised with Bell's views. In any case, it appeared to be 
too late for New Zealand to do much about the situation. Press reports 
from Geneva stated that it was almost certain that either Canada or the 
Irish Free State would stand for election in the expectation that once a 
seat was secured it would belong to the Dominions on a permanent rota-
. 1 b . 17 tlona aSlS. In an editorial entitled 'Swelled Heads and Great 
Powers', the Evening Post ridiculed the pretentions of the Dominions. 
It said the Dominions should not be foolish enough to believe that the 
compliment of League membership had actually changed their international 
status. Some concern was expressed about the effect on British foreign 
policy if a Dominion was elected to the Council, but the editorial con-
cluded that, because it was so absurd, lithe proposal to make each of the 
Dominions a Great Power in rotation can hardly result in anything more 
dangerous than an explosion of inextinguishable laughter .•• 1118 
In Geneva, the New Zealand delegation saw little humour in the 
situation, however, and hoped the proposed Dominion candidacy would be 
120 
nothing more than a 'kite-flying' 19 exercise. But the Irish Free State 
confirmed its intention to stand, causing a split among the Empire dele-
gates. There was a feeling that if any Dominion was to stand it 
should be Canada because of its seniority. In the event, both the Irish 
Free State and Canada contested the election but they secured few 
20 
votes. Despite the claim that the Irish Free State would have been 
successful if it had obtained the full support of the Empire delegates, 
there is room for doubt on this point because of the novelty of the Dom-
.. I. 21 lnl0n calm. 
Though the Irish were criticised for their tactics, there was no 
question that the League had been put on notice by the action of 
h D .. 22 t e omlnl0ns. There was now general agreement among the Empire dele-
gates that Canada should seek a seat in 1927. 23 W.A. Riddell, the per-
manent Canadian representative at Geneva, believed that Australia and 
New Zealand would support the Canadian bid if they were assured that 
Canada would be willing to receive the views of the other Dominions be-
fore taking action on any question affecting their vital interests. He 
felt that because both Dominions were mandatory powers, they were begin-
ning to realise that the composition of an enlarged Council was of im-
24 portance to them. Undoubtedly there was concern in New Zealand about 
German intentions in relation to the mandates but the government was 
still not convinced a Council seat for the Dominions was desirable. 
This is not to say that Dominion representation was regarded as "danger-
ous beyond expression" as Bell continued to assert. 25 It was acknow-
ledged that the Dominions had a right to such representation and that it 
was probable one of the larger Dominions would seek a seat in the 
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26 future. But Council representation was just one more unwelcome move 
away from the imperial unity New Zealand valued so highly. 
At the 1927 Assembly, Canada's bid for the Council was success-
ful. 27 According to New Zealand's First Delegate, Sir James Parr, who 
had replaced Allen as High Commissioner in London in August 1926, the 
other Dominions had backed Canada on the understanding that it would 
represent them all. He also believed that Australia and New Zealand 
would occupy Council seats . h' 28 ~n t e~r turn. But if the New Zealand 
Government was gratified that there were now two members of the Empire 
on the Council, there was no expectation that the Dominion would 
itself seek a seat in the near future. The government had not altered 
its view that New Zealand had neither the expertise nor the interest to 
follow the lead of the larger Dominions. It remained content to leave 
the Dominion's external affairs in the hands of Britain. 
The New Zealand Free Lance was not impressed with this policy. On 
21 September 1927 it declared: 
As for New Zealand, we are very modest indeed. Our Government does 
not even venture to ask for a turn at a non-permanent seat. This 
humility is no doubt a very becoming attitude, and ought to win us a 
pat on the head from our seniors, but the sad fact is that in actual 
life the only reward the extremely humble person gets is so nicely 
termed in the colloquial tongue a kick on the pants. 29 
This criticism reveals that the question of Dominion representation on 
the Council was much less concerned with the role of the Dominions in 
the League, than with their status within the British Commonwealth. 
The admission of Germany to the League was an important milestone 
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on the road to universality. But the progress towards that goal had not 
been smooth or without casualties during 1926. Brazil's failure to 
secure a permanent Council seat prompted its resignation from the 
League. In addition, rapprochement with the United States was set back 
by its decision not to adhere to the Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice. On 1 September 1926, the signatories of the Sta-
tute convened a conference at Geneva to discuss the reservations attach-
ed by the United States to its application to join the Permanent Court. 
On the request of the British Government, Bell and Parr attended the 
conference of predominantly legal experts. Bell was appointed one of 
the two Vice-Presidents of the conference and a member of the drafting 
committee. 
The principal stumbling-block encountered by the conference was the 
reservation which prevented the Permanent Court from giving an advisory 
opinion on any dispute or question in which the United States claimed an 
interest, without American agreement. Under Article 14 of the Covenant, 
the Council and the Assembly had the right to request an opinion on any 
dispute referred to them. The Council had on numerous occasions used 
these opinions as a guide to its decisions. The American reservation 
not only attacked the heart of the League's arbitrative powers under the 
Covenant but also placed the United States in a more advantageous posi-
tion than the other signatories. Not surprisingly, there was strong 
opposition to the reservation. To overcome the problem, Bell suggested 
that all signatories should adopt this power. He did not believe the 
reservation was sufficiently serious to stand in the way of this 
opportunity to involve the United States in the work of the League. 
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To his great regret, the conference did not explicitly accept the 
reservation but merely offered the assurance that the United States 
would have the same rights as any permanent member of the Council. Bell 
described the conference's reply to the United States as "a mass of 
meaningless words" and he refused to accept any responsibility for it. 
Without the explicit acceptance of the reservation, the United States 
refused to accede and in fact was never to do so during the life of the 
League. Speaking in the New Zealand Legislative Council in July 1927, 
Bell was unrepentant about opposing the British legal experts on 
the question. He believed that if the conference had given in to the 
United States on this point, the Permanent Court would have had the 
chance to become a powerful international Court of Appeal. 30 
Bell's active interest in the League was as exceptional as his 
presence at Geneva in 1926. Foreign affairs, and League affairs in par-
ticular, merited little government attention under Coates. In part, 
this was the result of the Prime Minister's own lack of interest in the 
subject. But it also reflected the stability of the international situ-
ation because Coates' term of office coincided with the most peaceful 
years of the inter-war period. Parliament was largely ignorant about 
the direction of the Dominion's foreign policy. Debates on external 
issues were infrequent and short; no more than half a day during most 
sessions. Preoccupied with domestic problems, the government tended to 
place any external matter on the bottom of the order paper of the House, 
where it invariably became a casualty of the rush to complete business 
at the end of the session. The consideration of some subjects by Par-
liament was sometimes delayed until the following year. 31 
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The criticisms of the League which punctuated Massey's speeches on 
foreign affairs were not made by his successor. Thinly-veiled hostility 
was replaced by a detached acceptance. On 1 September 1926 Coates told 
the House: "This country stands ready to take every step, and to 
afford every encouragement, that may forward the interests of the League 
and the attainment of its ultimate goal, in so far as these do not im-
pair the interests of the British Empire.,,32 It is significant that 
this statement reveals little about the government's policy on the 
League. Labour MPs continued to press for New Zealand representation at 
the annual International Labour Conference but, as Coates explained to 
the Secretary-General, Sir Eric Drummond, in London in 1926, the govern-
ment maintained that 33 the expense was unwarranted. The government's 
replies to the League's requests for opinions on the draft conven-
tions, questionnaires and committee reports, which were sent regularly 
to the Dominion, either stated New Zealand had no comment to make or 
simply associated the Dominion with the replies of the British Govern-
34 
ment. 
The lower profile of the New Zealand delegation to the Assembly 
from 1926, was in part a reflection of the government's attitude. But 
the appointment of Sir Christopher James Parr as Allen's successor was 
also responsible for the change in emphasis of the delegation's activi-
ties. Like Allen, Parr was a former senior Cabinet minister. He was 
born in Cambridge in 1869. Admitted to the Bar in 1890, he practised 
law in Coromandel and Auckland. He was Mayor of Auckland from 1911 to 
1915 and was elected MP for Eden in 1914. Parr was Minister of Educa-
tion from 1920 to 1926 and held the portfolios of Health(1920-1923), 
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Sir James Parr 
Justice and Postmaster-General(1924-1926). On Massey's death, Parr con-
tested the leadership of the Reform Party with Coates. After serving 
one term as High Commissioner, he returned to New Zealand and was 
appointed Leader of the Legislative Council in October 1931. He was 
reappointed High Commissioner in January 1934, serving until August 
1936. 35 
Although he occasionally criticised the League's continually in-
36 
creasing budget, Parr mainly focussed his attention on the League's 
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work in the social sphere. In his report on the Ninth Assembly, 
Parr wrote: "In my judgement, if the League of Nations fulfilled no 
other task, its existence is justified because of what it does in the 
way of world Social 37 Welfare." Indeed, he once suggested that the 
Fourth Committee's call for economy should not prevent the League 
from allocating more funds to its work in h . 38 t ~s area. Parr took 
an active interest in the two League agencies whose establishment Allen 
had strenuously opposed. On the Health Organisation Parr said: "This 
branch of the League's work not only commands respect and confidence, 
but can be accepted without reserve, for it is so catholic in scope that 
every State benefits in one or another direction.,,39 
The work of the Committee on Intellectual Co-operation received 
similar praise 40 from Parr. He believed that one of the League's most 
important roles must be to educate the people of the world, the young in 
particular, about its aims and ideals, in an effort to increase the 
prospects for peace. In the Sixth Committee of the Ninth Assembly, Parr 
claimed that the slow progress of the disarmament discussions was 
attributable to the lack of the right moral attitude. He said moral 
disarmament must come first and that its promotion was the duty of the 
Committee on Intellectual Co-operation. 41 
The areas which Parr involved himself, such as intellectual co-op-
eration, film censorship42 and drug control, were not as contentious as 
those in which Allen had been active as League delegate. This partially 
explains why New Zealand was less prominent in the committees. But it 
also seems clear that Parr's style was less confrontational than Allen's 
and that he was more inclined to follow the lead of the British delega-
. 43 
t~on. 
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Although Parr had been loudly critical of the League before his 
appointment as High Commissioner, he slowly came to respect its achieve-
ments. While he stated in 1927 that too much must not be expected of 
h 11 ' . f· " 44 b h d f h· f . w at was sti an '~mper ect ~nstrument, y teen 0 ~s ~rst term 
in 1929 he was urging the government to take the League more serious-
1 45 y. But Parr proved no more successful in convincing Wellington of 
the League's usefulness than Allen had been. 
The New Zealand Government may not have been interested in much of 
the League's work but the continuing prominence of the disarmament issue 
meant it could not ignore the League altogether. The failure of the 
Geneva Protocol had not weakened the resolve of many of the delegations 
that the League's primary goal should be general disarmament. In fact, 
even as the Locarno conference was about to convene, the Sixth Assembly 
was trying to repair the damage done to the League's prestige by the 
collapse of the Protocol initiative. The forthcoming conference depriv-
ed the Assembly of the opportunity to make a fresh attempt at the whole 
question of international security, but it was understood that disarma-
46 
ment was not on the agenda at Locarno. In a resolution which Allen 
described as no more than a face-saving gesture, the Assembly invited 
the Council to undertake preparatory studies with a view to summoning a 
disarmament conference at 47 some future date. In December 1925, the 
Council established the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Con-
ference, which included League members, the United States and later the 
Soviet Union, to report on the complex technical aspects of the ques-
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tion. But disarmament has always been a political problem rather than a 
technical one. The Council's brief to the Preparatory Commission was a 
diversionary tactic to obscure the fact that the Great Powers did not 
48 possess the political will to tackle the problem of arms control. 
The painfully slow progress of the Commission during 1926 and 1927 
clearly showed the reluctance of the powers to address the issue. 49 
Despite the hope of the Seventh Assembly that the conference might be 
held in 1927, the Commission's report in November 1926 served only to 
confirm that serious obstacles still lay in the path towards this objec-
tive. The New Zealand press was not unduly concerned about the lack of 
progress. The Otago Daily Times said that in order for the work to be 
done properly there should not be undue haste. The New Zealand Herald 
dismissed the League's previous efforts towards disarmament as fruitless 
50 idealism and it applauded the realism of the current approach. 
The New Zealand Government continued to be unreceptive to any dis-
armament initiatives. In November 1925, it declined an invitation from 
the British Government to be represented on the sub-committee of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence which was to consider the proposed disarm-
51 
ament conference. Although the Dominion Government implicitly acknow-
ledged that disarmament was primarily the concern of the British Govern-
ment, there was a strong belief that Britain had already done more to 
limit . h h' 52 ltS armaments t an any ot er major power. Allen told Coates in 
April 1926 that in the event of a disarmament conference, New Zealand 
53 
should oppose any further weakening of the Royal Navy. 
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Coates was keen for the Dominion to make a greater contribution to 
imperial defence. On 23 April 1927, he announced that New Zealand would 
contribute £1 million, in seven or eight annual instalments, towards the 
cost of building the Singapore Naval Base. 54 In Parliament in September 
1927, Coates justified the government's decision with the same argument 
Massey had used seven years before. He said that 
no one could say that the League of Nations is an effective protec-
tion against aggression or against interference with trade, or, in-
deed, with peoples, and it is essential in our own interests that we 
should do our share towards protecting our trade routes and assisting 
Empire defence. 55 
In reply, Opposition leader Harry Holland said the proposal was essen-
tially a war gesture aimed at Japan, and that the salvation of the world 
1 · b ., . 1 56 ay not ln arms races ut ln lnternatlona agreements. Labour MP E.J. 
Howard noted that New Zealand could not expect the rest of the world to 
57 
support the cause of peace if it was not prepared to do so at home. 
The New Zealand Government's attitude was symptomatic of the diffi-
culties the League was facing in its efforts to achieve a secure peace. 
With the Preparatory Commission making little progress, it was suggested 
at the 1927 Assembly that the Geneva Protocol should be revived. The 
British Empire countries had not changed their views on the Protocol and 
58 
opposed the proposal. The 1926 Imperial Conference had reaffirmed the 
decision not to accept compulsory arbitration, and the question of the 
Optional Clause continued to prejudice Britain and the Dominions against 
59 
the Protocol. 
Nevertheless, the Assembly was still anxious to improve the securi-
ty the League offered its members by strengthening the powers of the 
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Covenant. In the Third Committee it was proposed that the Council could 
request member-states to furnish details of the measures they would be 
prepared to take if the League intervened in a dispute. Parr and the 
other Dominion representatives made it clear that their countries would 
not commit themselves to guarantee European frontiers or send military 
forces to support the Council's decision in a European conflict. Parr 
said such guarantees should be of a regional character only and he sup-
ported Chamberlain's statement that Britain would not extend its guaran-
tees beyond those agreed to at Locarno. In the face of this opposition, 
the Committee agreed to amend the proposal so that the Council could on-
ly make a general enquiry to which member-states could reply as 
they saw fit. 60 
Editorial opinion in New Zealand solidly backed the British stand. 
Most newspapers believed Britain had amply demonstrated its commitment 
to the League and disarmament. Until other states responded to the 
British lead, Britain's reluctance to undertake any further arms reduc-
" . . f' d 61 tion or security guarantees was JUSti ie • Yet Parr sounded a 
cautionary note. He told Coates that the British attitude towards dis-
armament was considered distinctly unhelpful at Geneva, and he noted, 
with concern, that there were calls from British pacifists and 'small 
navy' people in the Liberal and Labour Parties for Britain to make some 
gesture to show it was in earnest about disarmament. 62 
The Eighth Assembly's preoccupation with the effectiveness of the 
Covenant was given concrete form by the creation of the Arbitration and 
Security Committee. A parallel body to the Preparatory Commission, the 
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Committee's task was to make disarmament feasible by offering better 
guarantees of security. Instead of amending the Covenant itself, the 
Committee produced conventions which sought to make some of the Cove-
nant's Articles more explicit. It was anticipated that these conven-
tions would act as models for future international treaties. 63 
Reporting on these developments, Parr said the desire to strengthen 
the Covenant was understandable. Nonetheless, he believed the Assem-
bly's concern was premature because the Covenant had not been fully 
64 
utilised in any dispute brought before the League. "The signatures to 
the Peace Treaty were hardly dry," he told Coates, "before some nations 
expressed a desire to amend those Articles of the Covenant designed to 
prevent war, with a view of making them not only more precise, but of 
strengthening several clauses of them. Will the Covenant work? Well, 
it has to be tried." 65 
Among the various proposals which the Assembly considered on the 
security question in 1927 was a Polish resolution which stated that war 
should be renounced as an instrument of national policy, and that the 
settlement of disputes should never be sought except by peaceful means. 
The same ideas were embodied in the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, 
also known as the Pact of Paris or Kellogg-Briand Pact, proposed by the 
United States in April 1928. 66 There was concern in Britain and New 
Zealand that the pact might conflict with the League Covenant and the 
Locarno . 67 treatles. The New Zealand press thought it would have been 
better for the United States to support the League rather than proposing 
yet h · . I 68 anot er lnternatlona treaty. But governments allover the world 
132 
were persuaded by the prospect of greater American involvement in the 
69 quest for peace, and by growing public anti-militarist feeling, to 
sign the pact in Paris on 27 August 1928. 
On the same day, the Governor-General, Coates, and other ministers 
participated 
express the 
in a large public meeting at the Wellington Town Hall to 
70 Dominion's support for the pact. The fact that its sup-
porters included a wide cross-section of New Zealanders reveals that the 
Dominion was not immune to the peace sentiment which was becoming in-
creasingly strong in Europe and the United States. 71 In New Zealand, 
this revulsion against war was fueled by a spate of anti-war novels, 
plays, poetry and memoirs, mostly by former combatants who used stark 
and realistic language to detail the horrors of war. Ernest Hemingway, 
Edmund Blunden and Siegfried Sassoon all refuted the image of patriotic 
glory which still surrounded the Dominion's participation in the First 
World War. Among the most influential were R.C. Sherriff's Journey's 
End and Erich Remarque's All Quiet on the Western Front. The film ver-
sion of the latter was shown to packed houses in cinemas in 1931. 72 
In Parliament, those members who had been consistently opposed to 
the League welcomed the American "gesture of peace".73 Even Allen, the 
principal defender of the League in the Legislative Council, believed 
the moral sanction against aggression embodied in the Pact of Paris was 
a better gurantee against war than the economic and military sanctions 
provided by the 74 Covenant. At the Labour Party conference in April 
1928, the delegates strongly reaffirmed their opposition to militarism 
and the Party's election platform included a statement of its full 
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75 
support for the League and the outlawry of war. The peace groups also 
found their message was gaining wider acceptance. The LNU's popularity 
had suffered because of the vigorous disarmament campaign it began in 
1925. By October 1927, however, it noted that the prospects for the 
organisation 76 had improved greatly. Because of this increasing public 
interest in the questions of peace and disarmament, the Reform Party's 
1928 election manifesto expressed support for the League for the first 
. 77 
tlme. 
But if there was hope that the government would be more sympathetic 
to the League's own security initiatives, that hope was to be unful-
filled. From 1929 New Zealand mounted a determined campaign to scupper 
the plans of the newly re-elected British Labour Government to align the 
foreign and defence policies of the Empire more closely with the ob-
jectives of the League. The differences between New Zealand and Brit-
ain over their interpretations of the Empire's obligations under the 
Covenant became so serious that they threatened to split the Empire 
apart. 
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CHAPTER 5 
NEW ZEALAND BATTLES WITH 
THE SECOND BRITISH LABOUR GOVERNMENT, 
1929-1931 
139 
Wellington greeted the Labour Party's return to power in Britain in 
June 1929 without enthusiasm. The New Zealand Government had every rea-
son to believe the Dominion's relations with the second MacDonald admin-
istration would be as strained as with the first. New Zealand too had a 
new government. The United Party, a coelescence of the remnants of the 
Liberal Party and the Nationalists, had taken office in November 1928 
under the leadership of Sir Joseph Ward. Within a year, however, Ward's 
health had begun to fail and effective power passed to George Forbes, 
who became Prime Minister on 28 May 1930. 
George William Forbes was born in Lyttelton in 1869. Upon leaving 
school, he worked for his father's firm of ironmongers, ship's chandlers 
and hardware merchants. In 1893 he bought a farm at Cheviot and subse-
quently became involved in local body politics. Defeated in his first 
bid for the Hurunui seat in 1902, Forbes was elected as the electorate's 
Liberal MP in 1908. Liberal Party Whip from 1912 to 1925, he became 
leader of the Nationalists in 1925 and deputy-leader of the United Party 
in 1928. In the United Government, Forbes was Minister of Lands and 
Agriculture and de facto head of the Cabinet from October 1929 to May 
1930. A man of apparently "bovine mediocrity", lacking ideas or initia-
140 
tive, his only qualification for Prime Ministerial office was longevity. 
Genial, conciliatory and straight-forward, Forbes was a supervisor ra-
1 
ther than a leader. His views on the role of the Commonwealth in in-
ternational affairs closely resembled those of Massey. It was the very 
narrowness of these views which made him such a formidable adversary to 
the British Labour Government's foreign policy. 
Led by Foreign Secretary Arthur Henderson, the new British Govern-
ment pursued a vigorously pro-League foreign policy.2 There was still 
great optimism in 1929 that the League could preserve peace through a 
system of general arbitration and security agreements linked to the 
Covenant. Largely because of the strong British backing for the Option-
al Clause of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice, the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Dis-
putes, the General Convention to Improve the Means of Preventing War and 
the Convention on Financial Assistance, the League enjoyed a brief hey-
day when it seemed possible that these initiatives would actually come 
into force. But the New Zealand Government viewed these developments 
with suspicion. 
The Dominion had never placed much faith in the League's capacity 
to prevent war. That Bolivia and Paraguay went to war over the Chaco 
region in 1928, despite the Covenant and the Pact of Paris, seemed only 
to confirm New Zealand's doubts. 3 The Dominion Government certainly did 
not share the British Government's conviction that the Pact of Paris 
heralded a new era in international relations. Carl Berendsen, the Im-
perial Affairs Officer, believed the world was still in a dangerous 
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state of turmoil. He declared that 
the most conspicuous feature of international relations even today is 
still as ever DISTRUST, JEALOUSY AND INTRIGUE. This is of course 
particularly so in Europe, and the new world takes too little account 
of it. If war is to be averted in the future more than goodwill is 
required (though there is at present little enough evidence of that) 
- a considerable degree of good fortune will also be necessary. Naked 
self-interest still remains to an important extent the guiding prin-
ciple of international affairs. 4 
Sceptical of the value of the League instruments which Britain was an-
xious to sign,S and convinced that the unity and security of the Empire 
was at stake, the New Zealand Government frequently found itself at odds 
with the British Government between 1929 and 1931. 
The British Government moved quickly to fulfil its pledge to sign 
the Optional Clause. On 22 June 1929, the Dominions were told that 
Britain was considering the reservations which should be attached to its 
acceptance 6 of the Clause. The other Dominions were in favour of sign-
ing the Optional Clause but New Zealand wanted to postpone any decisions 
until the Imperial Conference met the following year. 7 British Prime 
Minister Ramsay MacDonald replied on 1 August 1929 that this was 
out of the question for he hoped to announce Britain's adherance at the 
forthcoming Assembly. 
He proposed that the Clause should be accepted for a term of fif-
teen years with the reservation that the proceedings of the Permanent 
Court should be suspended in respect of any dispute which was being con-
sidered by the League Council. MacDonald did not believe a more expli-
cit reservation was needed because he was confident that all League mem-
bers would fulfil their obligations, and that Britain would not be in-
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volved in a war in the future except in self-defence or in pursuance of 
its obligations under the Covenant. He also stated that reservations on 
domestic matters and inter-imperial disputes were unnecessary because 
the British Government did not consider they were affected by the Clause 
under international law. 8 
In a long memorandum, Berendsen expressed his unhappiness with the 
British handling of an issue he regarded as being of "far too vital im-
portance to be disposed of in any hasty or ill-considered manner." He 
resented MacDonald's efforts to "stampede" the Dominions into a decision 
and he speculated, with some justification, that Britain might be pre-
pared to sign the Optional Clause without Dominion agreement. 9 Berend-
sen complained that the Clause was only the latest example of the inade-
quate or non-existent consultation by the MacDonald administration on 
vital imperial issues. He urged Ward to join with Australian Prime Min-
ister Stanley Bruce to protest against this unacceptable situation. 
Berendsen's views on MacDonald's proposal on the Optional Clause 
were no more positive. He did not believe the reservation would ade-
quately cover the question of belligerent rights at sea, although he 
conceded this was no longer such an important question because of the 
decline of British seapower. Berendsen did not share MacDonald's confi-
dence in a court dominated by European land-based powers acting under an 
international legal system which was still in its infancy. He argued 
that because the definition of self-defence was unclear, Britain could 
not be sure its actions would always secure the approval of the League. 
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He noted in particular that the British military presence along the 
Suez Canal could be a source of difficulty. If Egypt was ever admitted 
to the League, it might request the Permanent Court to rule on the le-
gality of the rights Britain still claimed there. Australia shared this 
concern and Bruce had already demanded that the Egyptian question 
be specifically reserved. 10 Berendsen argued that the failure to cordon 
off League jurisdiction from sensitive military areas would be a tacit 
admission that 'Empire defence' no longer existed. He believed there 
was also a danger that states which were not members of the League or 
the Permanent Court would be affected by actions Britain might take in 
self-defence or in the name of the League. In that case the arbitration 
provisions of the Optional Clause would not apply. In addition, 
he did not agree that it was unnecessary to reserve inter-imperial dis-
putes and he thought it inadvisable for Britain to commit itself to the 
CI f h f · 11 ause or more t an ~ve years. 
These concerns were outlined in New Zealand's reply to London on 10 
August 1929. Ward repeated his request that no action should be 
taken until the matter was properly discussed. He also made it clear 
that New Zealand considered the Dominions had been inadequately consult-
ed by the British Government. 12 New Zealand then sought the support of 
h h D ·· 13 t e ot er om~n~ons. Australia shared New Zealand's concerns but 
Bruce was prepared to sign the Optional Clause at the Assembly, holding 
the question of reservations and ratification over until later. 14 En-
couraged by the Australian attitude, the New Zealand Government advised 
London on 21 August 1929 that the Dominion would not sign the Clause un-
15 der the British formula at the forthcoming Assembly. 
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Anxious to maintain Commonwealth unity on the issue, MacDonald was 
prepared to accept 16 the Australian proposal. But Henderson and Vis-
count Cecil protested against allowing the Dominions to veto British 
policy. Having been persuaded to change his mind, MacDonald told the 
Australian and New Zealand Governments that Britain wanted to sign at 
the Assembly to gain the maximum political effect in order to provide a 
new impetus for disarmament negotiations. He dismissed their objections 
by stating that his government was prepared to take certain risks for 
the sake of peace. There was a hint, however, that Britain might be 
willing to compromise on the reservations question to obtain a joint 
C lh " 17 ommonwea t s~gn~ng. 
While the Australian and New Zealand objections to the British pro-
posals were the most comprehensive, the other Dominions were doubtful 
about some aspects also. The Irish Free State and South Africa were un-
happy that inter-imperial disputes might be excluded from the jurisdic-
tion of the Permanent Court because this implied the Dominions were less 
than independent states. Canada was concerned about the issue of mari-
time belligerent rights and the fifteen-year period of acceptance. 1S 
Faced with the problem of reconciling its commitment to signing the Op-
tional Clause with its strong desire for Commonwealth unity, the British 
Government was keen to secure some sort of agreement at the meeting of 
Dominion representatives and British ministers arranged by the Dominions 
19 Secretary, Lord Passfield, on 27 August 1929. 
There seemed little hope of overcoming Dominion intransigence. 
Canada refused to attend and the representatives of the other Dominions 
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merely repeated their governments' positions. Nevertheless, under con-
siderable British pressure, they agreed to a proposal for their govern-
ments which envisaged a joint Commonwealth signing at the Assembly, 
accompanied by a declaration that there might be further reservations 
before ratification. Parr was not pleased with the arrangement because, 
as he pointed out, once the deed was done there seemed little point in 
discussing it afterwards. But the British had not given up hope that 
f h .. . h h D ., b . . 20 P urt er negot~at~ons m~g t overcome t e om~n~on 0 Ject~ons. arr 
told Ward that it was clear that MacDonald's primary purpose was to im-
prove Britain's image in Europe. He was not convinced, however, that 
MacDonald would receive much of a return on his investment. Australia 
and New Zealand had taken a strong stand at the meeting but Parr warned 
Ward that he should work closely with Bruce to ensure the two Dominions 
21 did not precipitate a split in the Commonwealth at Geneva. 
The results of the London meeting were not well-received in Wel-
lington. In a draft cable for Bruce dated 30 August 1929, Ward noted 
that British acceptance of the Optional Clause would be equivalent to 
acceptance by all the Commonwealth governments and that the abstention 
of Australia and New Zealand would not negate this. But if they signed 
their position might be "irremedially compromised" and ratification 
would be inevitable. New Zealand's greatest objection centred on the 
insufficient time given by Britain for consideration of the question, 
not on the Clause itself. Ward warned that New Zealand might consider 
it necessary to make its position public in order to protect the Domin-
ion's . 22 ~nterests. It had previously been unthinkable that a New Zea-
land government would publicly question the handling of imperial 
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foreign policy but Ward was suggesting that he was prepared to do so in 
this instance. 
But before Ward could send his cable, Bruce accepted the British 
compromise 23 formula. New Zealand's position was now untenable and the 
government accepted the formula also on 31 August 1929. Even so, the 
British Government was left in no doubt that New Zealand disapproved of 
the manner in which the matter had been handled and that it was only the 
Dominion's unwillingness to endanger Commonwealth unity which prevented 
it from continuing to oppose the Clause. New Zealand and Australia 
still insisted, however, that inter-imperial disputes must be reserved 
and the period of acceptance be reduced to five years before they would 
ratify the Clause. 24 
When the Assembly opened on 2 September 1929 the Commonwealth dele-
gates were already discussing the form of the announcement MacDonald 
would make the 25 next day. It was decided that he would announce the 
British acceptance of the Optional Clause and that a declaration was 
being formulated to enable its signature during the Assembly. He would 
also 26 state that the Dominions would follow the same course. The New 
Zealand Government was dismayed to learn that the Dominions were expect-
ed to commit themselves to signing the Clause without even knowing the 
f f h d I . 27 orm 0 t e ec aratl0n. Parr persuaded MacDonald to change the word-
ing of his speech so that instead of stating the Dominions would defin-
itely sign the Clause during the Assembly he would merely express the 
hope that they would do 28 so. 
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MacDonald's announcement on the Optional Clause formed part of a 
29 
wide-ranging speech on disarmament and peace. Parr praised the speech 
as "the most weighty and important which has been made at the Assembly 
in recent years by a British Delegate", but he also thought it lacked 
, b'l' 30 pract~ca ~ ~ty. Within a few days of the British announcement, all 
the 
the 
Dominions 
31 Clause. 
except New Zealand had signalled their intention to sign 
It was not until the final reservations were agreed upon 
that the government relieved Parr from this "invidious" position. 32 
These reservations were that inter-imperial disputes, domestic affairs, 
and disputes where the parties agreed to some other method of peaceful, 
settlement, were to be excluded, and the Permanent Court was to suspend 
proceedings on a dispute for twelve months if it was before the Council. 
33 The term of the Clause was for ten years. 
New Zealand signed the Optional Clause on 19 September 1929, along 
with Britain, South Africa and India. 34 Parr was understandably reliev-
ed that the issue had been resolved. He noted that his signature imme-
diately after that of Henderson favourably impressed the British minis-
terse He was convinced New Zealand's forthright attitude had contributed 
to a satisfactory outcome without damaging its relationship with Brit-
, 35 
a~n. 
The reaction in New Zealand to the acceptance of the Optional 
Clause was mainly favourable. The press agreed on the necessity for re-
servations but believed they did not detract from the value of the Com-
monwealth's dh ' 36 a es~on. The Labour Party and the LNU had strongly sup-
ported the Clause but they were concerned about the secrecy which 
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d d h .. 37 surroun e t e negotlatlons. The government's refusal to explain New 
Zealand's attitude was undoubtedly because it did not wish to reveal the 
seriousness of the Dominion's difference of opinion with Britain. New 
Zealand had condemned the other Dominions' public demonstrations of 
their independence at the cost of imperial unity. Outwardly at least, 
the Dominion Government liked to maintain an image of unwavering devo-
tion to the Commonwealth and the foreign policy of the British Govern-
ment. 
It was this concern with unity and the status of the Dominions 
which largely determined New Zealand's attitude on which Dominion was to 
take Canada's place on the Council in 1930. On 3 September 1929, Parr 
told Wellington that, during a meeting of the Commonwealth delegates at 
Geneva,Australia had declared its intention to seek the seat. Parr sup-
ported the Australian candidature because it was the most senior Domin-
ion after Canada. He noted that the Irish had also staked a claim but 
he hoped they would withdraw on the understanding that the Irish Free 
State would succeed Australia in 1933. 38 The Dominion seat on the Coun-
cil had become a source of pride and an important symbol of the Domin-
ions' status as full members of the international community. If they 
were to retain the seat, it was imperative that the Dominions united be-
hind a single candidate. 
With this object in mind, the Dominion delegates met informally 
three weeks later. Parr was dismayed to find that the Irish Free State 
was unwilling to withdraw in favour of Australia. The Irish said they 
did not like the idea of one Dominion seeming to represent the others. 
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They believed that their standing as an independent nation would attract 
wide support. Parr was quick to remind the other delegates of the 1926 
debacle. "The sight of two of our own people fighting each other would 
be •.. a pleasant spectacle for the other Powers, who would seize the op-
portunity to cut in between us and take the vacant seat with a candidate 
of their own," he said. Pointing out that the group nomination system 
for the Council seats had complete control in the Assembly, Parr believ-
ed the Dominions had as much right as the South Americans or the Little 
Entente to use that system to secure a seat for themselves. The 
Irish still refused to withdraw, however, and the meeting ended in 
39 
stalemate. 
The situation changed in March 1930 with Australia's decision not 
to contest the Council I . 40 e ect~on. On 24 March 1930, the Irish Free 
S k d h h D ·· . d' d 41 tate as e t e ot er om~n~ons to support ~ts can ~ acy. The New 
Zealand Government was favourably inclined but Parr's successor as 
High Commissioner, Thomas Wilford, questioned the suitability of the 
Irish as the Dominions' representative. Reminding Forbes that the Irish 
Free State had not endorsed the Commonwealth's reservations on the Op-
tional Clause, he suggested New Zealand should not commit itself defi-
. I . hI' h 42 n~te y to support~ng t e r~s. Australian Prime Minister J.H. 
Scullin shared Wilford's doubts. He wanted the views of the other Dom-
inions before he was prepared to back the Irish Free State. 43 Forbes 
stated that one of the Dominions must contest the seat. Since neither 
Australia nor South Africa were interested, New Zealand would support 
the Irish Free 44 State. Despite Wilford's reservations, New Zealand 
joined the other Dominions in backing the Irish candidacy in April 
1930. 45 
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Sir Thomas Wilford 
Thomas Mason Wilford became New Zealand High Commissioner in London 
in January 1930. He was born in Wellington in 1870 and was admitted to 
the Bar in 1891 . Elected as the Liberal member for Wellington Suburbs 
in 1896 , Wilford represented Hutt as a Liberal, a Nationalist and then 
a United MP from 1903 until 1930. He served as Mayor of Wellington from 
1910 to 1911. Minister of Justice and Marine in the National Government 
between 1917 and 1919, Wilford succeeded Ward as Liberal leader in 1919. 
Leader of the Opposition until he was forced to resign for health rea-
sons in 1925, he joined the United Government as Minister of Justice and 
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Defence in 1928. Wilford was a man of wit and intellect who was more 
inclined to compromise than "nail his colours to the mast".46 As New 
Zealand's delegate to the Assembly, he never displayed the same sympathy 
for the League as his predecessors. 
It is probable the Dominions assumed that Britain would put its 
considerable influence behind their Council bid as it had done in 1927. 
It came as a shock when in June 1930 Lord Passfield informed them that 
Britain would prefer either China or one of the smaller European states 
to take Canada's place. He argued that a permanent Dominion seat would 
face considerable opposition at Geneva which would probably result in 
the defeat of the Dominion candidature. He suggested there should be 
further discussion among the Commonwealth delegates to the Assembly be-
fore a final decision to seek the seat was made. 47 
Outraged by the implication that the Dominions were merely British 
satellites, the Irish Free State declared it would contest the election 
as an independent member of the League. 48 Forbes told London that New 
Zealand was committed to supporting the Irish and he believed the Domin-
ions had a much greater claim to British backing than China or any other 
49 
state. Wilford was instructed to support the Irish Free State in the 
Council elections at the Eleventh Assembly.50 
The election of the Irish Free State in 1930 established the right 
of the Dominions to occupy a Council seat on a permanent rotational ba-
sis. Yet it had also shown that seniority alone did not determine which 
Dominion would stand. Certainly there was no suggestion that New 
Zealand would seek 51 a seat in the forseeable future. 
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The government 
would have concurred with the Canadian view that Canada should serve a 
second time before New Zealand had served 52 once. Parr noted in 
1929: "It is, of course, impossible for a small country like New Zealand 
to aspire to a seat on the Council. The inconvenience and expense of 
keeping a New Zealand delegate in Europe all the time would be beyond 
our strength." Nonetheless, he thought the position might be different 
if the government could be persuaded that the Dominion's representation 
53 
at Geneva was important and deserved greater resources. 
The British Government was determined to build on the progress made 
by the acceptance of the Optional Clause. On 8 January 1930, the Domin-
ions were advised that consideration was being given to adhering to the 
General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. 54 This 
provided for the settlement of all disputes by compulsory arbitration, 
judicial decision, conciliation or by some combination of these methods. 
By it' comprehensive nature, the General Act 
/ 
constituted the arbitration 
I 
mach:i/nery required to make the Pact of Paris ff ' 55 e ect~ve. The Dominions 
were asked to appoint representatives to the sub-committee of the Com-
mit tee of Imperial D f h ' h d' h ,56 e ence, w ~c was to ~scuss t e quest~on. New 
Zealand made no comment at this stage and Wilford was appointed to the 
, 57 
comm~ttee. On 4 July 1930, the Dominions were told that the British 
would announce their intention to accede to the General Act at the next 
Assembly, with reservations similar to those attached to the Optional 
58 Clause. 
The New Zealand Government replied on 18 July 1930 that an an-
nouncement was inadvisable until the Imperial Conference had fully dis-
cussed the matter in October 1930. Forbes believed the effect of a 
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joint declaration by the Commonwealth would be much greater than a 
declaration by Britain alone. In addition, the government was unhappy 
that the General Act appeared to go beyond the undertaking accepted un-
der the Optional Clause, and that signatories would be compelled to ac-
cept arbitration in a dispute. 59 New Zealand's concerns were shared by 
South Africa and Austra1ia. 60 
The British tried to play down the Dominions' concerns by assuring 
them that if agreement could not be reached at Geneva, the matter would 
be discussed at the Imperial Conference. MacDonald believed New Zea-
land's concerns were adequately covered by the draft reservations. 61 
Forbes was not convinced. The General Act was only one of a number of 
treaties, conventions and amendments to the Covenant which the British 
Government wanted to accept and Forbes was worried that their combined 
effect would create a position comparable to that proposed by the 1924 
Geneva Protoco1. 62 Concerned that the views of the Dominions were being 
overridden and their legitimate concerns ignored in a hurried and i11-
conceived bid to strengthen the League, he told MacDonald that New Zea-
land strongly deprecated Britain's intention to commit itself on such 
63 
vital matters before the Imperial Conference could take place. 
Bowing to Dominion pressure, the British Government decided to take 
no further action on the General Act until it was discussed at the Impe-
rial Conference. At the conference, New Zealand reiterated its objec-
. h b1" b' 11 1 f d' 64 A tlon to teo 19atlon to ar ltrate a c asses 0 lspute. ttorney-
General Sir Thomas Sidey insisted on a specific reservation excluding 
immigration policy from arbitration, but the British argued that this 
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question was covered by the reservation on domestic legislation. 65 In 
the end, it was South Africa and not New Zealand which refused to accede 
to the General 66 Act. Even so, it was only with the greatest reluc-
67 
tance, with Forbes stressing that his government reserved the right to 
reconsider its attitude in five years time,68 that New Zealand joined 
Britain, Australia and India in signing the General Act on 21 May 1931. 
Of all the British initiatives at the 1929 Assembly, the General 
Act was the only one which was ratified. 
Like the General Act, the General Convention to Improve the Means 
of Preventing War began as a model treaty in 1928. 69 Developed by the 
Committee on Arbitration and Security, the model treaties were designed 
as a guide for League members wishing to construct a more extensive sys-
f f d f h h C I ld . d 70 tern 0 sa eguar s 0 peace t an t e ovenant a one cou provl e. The 
model convention was intended to reduce the danger of a dispute escalat-
ing into war by strengthening the powers of the Council under Article 11 
of the Covenant. Parties to the convention were required, in advance, 
to abide by the Council's recommendations, which could include the can-
cellation of mobilization orders, the withdrawal of troops or even the 
cessation of hostilities. At the Tenth Assembly, Henderson proposed 
that it should be developed into a general agreement. The model conven-
tion was sent back to the Committee on Arbitration and Security for dis-
cussion. In light of the fact that under the Pact of Paris recourse to 
war had been outlawed, the apparent necessity for such a convention was, 
as Berendsen pointed out, "a cynical reflection on the bona fides of the 
signatories of the Paris Pact.,,71 
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It was clear from the beginning that the Committee's task would be 
a difficult one. Many League members were reluctant to pledge themselves 
in advance to obey the orders of the Council during a dispute. Questions 
about how the Council was to enforce its orders against a reluctant sig-
natory were raised. Would a system of supervision or even sanctions be 
required to ensure the Council's orders were carried out? The British 
Chiefs of Staff opposed the convention because it gave the Council the 
power to forbid any military or naval preparations. It was suggested 
that an aggressor would be at an advantage because its forces would be 
ready for an attack whereas the intended victim would be prevented from 
strengthening its 72 defences. Because New Zealand's security would be 
in jeopardy if the Royal Navy was prevented from sending a fleet to 
Singapore in anticipation of war, Wilford strongly supported the Admi-
ralty's objections in the Committee of Imperial Defence. 73 
Neither the Committee on Arbitration and Security nor the Eleventh 
Assembly were able to agree on the terms of the convention. The 
problem centred on whether it should contain a rigid formula designed to 
meet every conceivable contingency, or merely make the moral obligation 
of Article 11 a contractual one with no extension of the sanctions of 
Article 16. Wilford was personally against sanctions determined before-
hand without regard to circumstances. He told the Third Committee that 
because the Soviet Union and the United States were not members, 
the League had to be careful to prevent sanctions from becoming a 
double-edged sword. He believed the Council already had sufficient pow-
ers and thus the terms of Article 11 required no further definition. 74 
This view was consistent with New Zealand's attitude that it was unwise 
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and indeed unnecessary to tamper with the Covenant. 
A committee was appointed by the Council to produce a convention 
for submission to the 1931 Assembly. Although completed by mid-May 
1931, New Zealand did not receive a copy of the General Convention until 
two months later. On 8 August 1931, the British Government was told 
that New Zealand was still concerned about the possible effect of the 
convention on the freedom of movement of British forces during a crisis. 
The Dominion was also doubtful whether every member of the League would 
obey the orders of the Council, since there was little probability that 
penalties could be enforced against a recalcitrant state. Should these 
problems be resolved, however, New Zealand agreed with Britain that ra-
tification must be conditional on the implementation of a general dis-
75 
armament treaty. 
The British Government replied that it thought the convention's 
terms did not unduly limit the rights of the Commonwealth and Britain 
did not intend to attach further . 76 reservat~ons. The New Zealand 
Government was not satisfied and Wilford was advised to be cautious at 
the Assembly. Forbes told him that he was not in favour of signing the 
convention, describing it as badly drafted, futile in cases of bad 
faith, and dangerous for the Commonwealth. New Zealand would not take 
any action until Wilford had obtained the views of the other Domin-
. 77 
~ons. 
The General Convention was already being overtaken by events, how-
ever. On 18 September 1931, the Japanese invaded Manchuria and the 
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Council was faced with its greatest crisis to date. Wilford noted that 
the Council's irresolution in a case somewhat analogous to that envisag-
ed by Article 2 of the convention made him wonder whether it was 
worth th ;t . t 78 e paper L was wr~t en upon. Although it was approved by the 
Assembly, Britain did not sign the General Convention. The formation of 
the National Government and the amendments made by the Third Committee 
led Britain to postpone its decision and New Zealand happily did like-
. 79 
w~se. Not surprisingly, the government expressed no regret when the 
British decided in January 1932 not to sign the convention until the re-
suIt of the Disarmament Conference beginning later that year was 
80 known. 
The Optional Clause, the General Act and the General Convention 
were expressions of the League's faith in the power of arbitration to 
prevent disputes escalating into war. It was hoped the security these 
instruments provided would encourage League members to look more favour-
ably on the proposals for disarmament. But Finland told the Preparatory 
Commission for the Disarmament Conference in 1926 that small states 
might find it difficult to accept restrictions on their right to 
build up stocks of armaments unless they could be sure that they could 
obtain immediate supplies of war materiel in an emergency. 
It was probable that in such a case these states would find it be-
yond their financial resources to obtain the necessary supplies. The 
Finnish delegate proposed that financial assistance should be provided 
to states which were the victims of unprovoked aggression, to enable 
them to purchase defence materiel until the League could take action 
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under Article 16. From this proposal developed the Convention on Finan-
cial Assistance, which enabled a League member which was the victim of, 
or was threatened by, aggression to seek loans on the international mar-
ket to pay for defence materiel. These loans would be guaranteed by all 
h · . h . 81 t e slgnatorles to t e conventlon. 
When the convention was submitted to the Assembly in 1929, many of 
the delegates expressed dissatisfaction with its terms. Canada proposed 
that individual governments should approve the loans, not the Council. 
Other delegates believed the loans should be supervised to ensure they 
were used for their intended purpose. Parr opposed both suggestions. 
He argued that the purpose of the convention was to provide prompt in-
ternational assistance, which would be impossible under the Canadian 
proposal. Similarly, it was unreasonable to ask a state under attack 
which wanted to make an immediate purchase of munitions, to wait until 
an international committee decided whether the purchase was legitimate. 
Parr believed the convention would encourage disarmament and he urged 
h .... d . 82 t e government to glve It serlOUS conSl eratlon. 
The British insistence that it should only come into force simul-
taneously with a general disarmament treaty, stymied agreement on the 
convention and it was held over until 1930. 83 In July 1930, Wilford was 
told that New Zealand had no grave objections to the convention but be-
cause of the British reservation there was no need for haste in deciding 
the Dominion's . d 84 attltu e. A revised draft, which included an article 
linking the convention to a disarmament treaty, was adopted by the As-
85 
sembly on 2 October 1930. Britain, Australia and the Irish Free State 
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signed the Convention on Financial Assistance but, because its implemen-
tation depended on the outcome of the Disarmament Conference, Forbes ad-
vised Wilford that New Zealand would not sign in the meantime. 86 Since 
the government was not optimistic about the conference's prospects for 
success, there can be little doubt that Forbes did not expect the con-
vention to be put into effect. 
The Convention on Financial Assistance, the General Act and 
the General Convention were designed to clarify, define and enhance the 
effectiveness of the Covenant. But from 1920 there had been numerous 
calls to amend the Covenant itself in order to achieve the same object. 
These attempts had largely failed because the members of the League were 
wary of either defining their obligations too explicitly or unduly re-
stricting the League's powers. Following their signature of the Pact of 
Paris, however, the League members realised that the Covenant had to be 
amended to resolve a serious inconsistency between the two instruments. 
Under the Pact of Paris the signatories voluntarily renounced war as an 
instrument of national policy. Yet the Covenant permitted recourse to 
war as an ultimate means of settling international disputes in certain 
circumstances; the so-called 'gap' which the Geneva Protocol had at-
tempted to close. 
At the Tenth Assembly the British delegation proposed amendments to 
Articles 12, 13 and 15 eliminate the right of 87 A to recourse to war. 
Committee of Eleven was established to study how the Covenant could be 
brought into harmony with the Pact of Paris. In its report, which was 
circulated to League members in March 1930, the Committee backed the 
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British amendments but also proposed two more. It urged that Article 15 
should be amended to allow arbitration in circumstances where no mili-
tary clash had occurred, and that the Council should be allowed to seek 
the opinion of the Permanent Court on points of law relating to a dis-
pute. 
The British Government believed that most of the differences be-
tween its proposals and those of the Committee were of detail only. 
Wellington was told that Britain objected only to the amendment which 
allowed the Council to ask for an advisory opinion from the Permanent 
Court, as this would prevent the United States from acceding to the 
Statute 88 of the Court. The New Zealand Government thought the Commit-
tee's recommendations went much further than the British Government 
allowed. Forbes declared that the amendments were an unexpected advance 
on the provisions of the General Act, the Covenant, the Pact of Paris 
and the Optional Clause. It appeared that every member of the League 
would in future be involved in every conflict that arose. 89 The British 
tried to reassure 90 Forbes but he said New Zealand was not convinced 
that amending the Covenant was necessary or desirable. 91 
A compromise formula was produced at the Assembly in September 1930 
but it still did not satisfy all the delegates. It was decided to hold 
the question over until the following year. 92 New Zealand found the 
compromise amendments more acceptable because they either omitted or re-
drafted the proposals of the Committee of Eleven which the government 
had found objectionable. The following month, Sidey told the Imperial 
Conference that New Zealand still believed some extension of the 
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League's power to impose sanctions was involved but the Dominion was 
prepared to accept the compromise formula if the rest of the Commonweal-
th agreed 93 to do so. The conference was reluctant to make a decision 
on 
this 
the amendments until the Assembly had agreed on their final form but 
94 prospect seemed remote. It was obvious that the whole question 
of amending the Covenant had raised enormous difficulties. The Twelfth 
. 95 Assembly flnally abandoned the attempt and the proposals were shelved. 
But the serious problems which were to confront the League over the next 
few years made it almost inevitable that the question would be raised 
again. 
It is ironic that the British insistence that the implementation of 
the amendments to the Covenant, the General Convention to Improve the 
Means of Preventing War and the Convention on Financial Assistance 
should be dependent on the success of the Disarmament Conference, proved 
to be their fatal weakness. The withdrawal of Germany from the confer-
ence in 1933 not only dashed hopes for a general disarmament treaty but 
made dead letters of the conventions and the amendments also. The great 
expectations for disarmament and a secure peace which had been generated 
by the initiatives of the British delegation at the 1929 Assembly were 
shattered by economic depression and rampant nationalism. 
The campaign mounted by New Zealand against the League policy of 
the British Labour Government proved that the Dominion Government would 
go to some lengths to oppose anything it perceived as damaging to the 
interests of the Commonwealth. Although one could argue that New Zea-
land's objections, combined with those of the other Dominions, persuaded 
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Britain to add further conditions to its acceptance of the Optional 
Clause, one must acknowledge that the Dominion was not prepared to break 
with the Commonwealth on this or other League issues when the final de-
cision had to be made. As R.F. Holland h~s suggested, the very strate-
gic vulnerability which made New Zealand oppose unqualified League arb i-
tration so strenuously, also made it impossible for the Dominion to 
k . d d . . h 96 sta e out an In epen ent posltlon on t e matter. 
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CHAPTER 6 
'PLAYING IN THE AIR WITH THE ANGELS', 
1930-1935 
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The New Zealand Government believed the British Labour Government 
was unwise to conduct its foreign policy on the assumption that the 
marked improvement in international relations of the late 1920s would 
continue uninterrupted. Concerned about the decline of the Common-
wealth's defence capabilities, Forbes stated in 1930 that the possibili-
ty of international complications could not be ignored, and that a rapid 
deterioration in the world situation was still likely.1 Within a year, 
events had confirmed the accuracy of his warning. By 1931, the econo-
mies of most countries were seriously debilitated by the financial de-
pression and their governments were preoccupied with the immense domes-
tic problems the economic crisis had created. It was precisely at this 
time, when the members of the international community were becoming less 
receptive to the ideal of internationalism, that the League faced its 
most serious challenge to date in the Manchurian crisis. 
On the night of 18 September 1931, Japanese troops attacked Chinese 
forces in Manchuria and quickly seized the provincial capital of Muk-
2 den. Japan had long coveted Manchuria and had extensive interests 
there but it is most probable that the government did not authorise the 
army's action. With military and ultra-nationalist groups undermining 
its authority, however, the Japanese Government could not prevent the 
army from occupying the whole of southern Manchuria by the end of the 
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year. Responding to the Chinese appeal to the League under Article 11 
of the Covenant, the Council called on Japan to withdraw but the Japan-
ese asserted their right to defend their interests. Frustrated by 
Japanese obduracy but unwilling to contemplate sanctions, the Council 
appointed a Commission of Enquiry led by Lord Lytton, on 10 December 
1931, to investigate the dispute. The Council's face-saving and 
delaying tactic could not, however, wholly disguise its impotency in the 
face of an aggressive Great Power. 3 
New Zealand was preoccupied with a political crisis at home when 
the fighting broke out in Manchuria. The United Government had proved 
ineffectual in trying to cope with the worsening economic crisis and had 
agreed to form a coalition with the Reform Party to stave off political 
defeat. On 18 September 1931, the new National Government was announced 
with Forbes as Prime Minister and Coates as his deputy. A general elec-
tion was planned for December 1931. In the midst of these political and 
economic troubles, the majority of New Zealanders were uninterested in 
the Manchurian dispute. Few had more than a superficial knowledge of 
the Far 4 East. Indeed, it was the initial dearth of information about 
the conflict which determined New Zealand's low-key reaction to the con-
flict. 
In London, the dispute was also initially overshadowed by domestic 
political and economic problems. But even as it became apparent during 
October 1931 that the Manchurian situation was becoming a serious test 
of the League's authority, the British Government followed a policy of 
caution. It was particularly anxious that the League should take no 
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action which might lead to hostilities, the brunt of which would be 
borne by the Royal Navy. Because Japan possessed overwhelming naval su-
periority in the northern Pacific, the British were in no position to 
oppose the Japanese militarily and there was no confidence that the 
Americans would provide more than moral support. In any case, there was 
considerable sympathy for Japan in British political and commercial 
. I 5 Clrc es. 
The New Zealand Government was informed but not consulted on Brit-
ish policy in regard to the crisis~ There can be no doubt, however, that 
Forbes was aware of British weakness in the Far East and the necessity 
for avoiding the risk of conflict with Japan. The government realised 
that despite the considerable damage it would do to the prestige of the 
7 League, Britain could do little until the Singapore Base was completed. 
But while the government remained characteristically silent, the Domin-
ion's newspapers devoted a great deal of attention to the dispute. 
It was generally accepted by the press that a state of virtual war 
existed in Manchuria between two members of the League Council, and that 
this presented a tremendous challenge to the League. Dependent as they 
were on cable news from London, most editors, and the LNU also, were re-
luctant to lay blame on either party.8 Some papers tried to explain 
Japan's actions, or even justify them, by emphasising the Japanese need 
for raw materials and space for an expanding population, while others 
noted that the Japanese economy had been badly affected by the Depres-
sion. A number argued that while Japan's resort to arms was unaccept-
able, the Chinese had to some extent provoked this response by implicit-
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ly condoning attacks on Japanese citizens and economic interests legiti-
1 . M h ' 9 mate y present In anc urla. 
Indeed, it was partly in response to attacks on Japanese civilians 
and an effective boycott of Japanese goods in Shanghai, that Japanese 
forces attacked the Chinese section of the city on 28 January 1932; 
an attack which included the indiscriminate bombing of civilians from 
the air. This action, which also threatened the considerable Western 
interests in Shanghai, caused outrage around the world and, combined 
with the fact that the Chinese fought back strongly, generated much sym-
pathy for China. 10 
In New Zealand, the press roundly condemned the Japanese , 11 actlon. 
The Christchurch Sun pointed out that if Japan was allowed to break its 
obligations under the Covenant, the Pact of Paris and the Washington 
Nine-Power Treaty without encountering any resistance, then the peace 
efforts f d d ld f h ' 12 o a eca e wou count or not lng. There was uncertainty, 
however, whether the League was capable of disciplining Japan. Some pa-
pers believed it was vital for the League to act not only to restore 
peace but also 13 to guarantee its own future. The Press thought that 
only a combination of powers with interests in the Far East, led by 
Britain and the United States, would be able to stop further Japanese 
, 14 
aggresSlon. 
Certainly, the League had done nothing by February 1932 to boost 
confidence in its effectiveness. Under British pressure, the Council 
had merely refused to recognise any territorial change or alteration in 
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political status which might result from Japanese aggression. China 
then invoked Article 15 of the Covenant but after achieving little it 
decided to take its appeal to the Assembly. Frustrated by what Wilford 
scathingly termed the incompetence of the Council,15 the Chinese hoped 
to tap the growing indignation of League members over the Council's in-
, 16 
actlon. 
In Wellington, the government was concerned about these develop-
ments but it remained circumspect. Parliament was told that the govern-
ment deeply regretted the recent disturbance of peaceful relations be-
tween two nations with whom New Zealand had long enjoyed friendly com-
mercial intercourse. No mention was made of the League but hope was ex-
pressed that Britain and the other powers would find a solution to the 
d ' 17 lspute. In anticipation of the special session of the Assembly in 
early March 1932, Wilford was instructed to "conform generally with 
British policy" while keeping the government fully informed of develop-
18 
ments. 
Britain was most anxious that the Assembly should not take any 
action which might provoke Japan. At a meeting of the Commonwealth 
delegates before the Assembly opened on 3 March 1932, the British dele-
gate explained that Britain wanted the Assembly to confine itself to 
supporting the Council's actions until the Lytton Commission had report-
ed, Canada, Australia and India agreed but South Africa and the Irish 
Free State favoured stronger action to indicate the Assembly's displeas-
ure with 19 Japan, There is reason to believe that Wilford personally 
supported the latter view. According to American Secretary of State 
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Henry L, Stimson, who met Wilford and South African delegate Charles te 
Water in Geneva on 19 April 1932, both men were disturbed by the 
lack of determination in the British attitude. Stimson also noted that 
they favoured greater co-operation between Britain and the United States 
in the efforts to settle the crisis,20 
Wilford nevertheless obeyed his instructions and said nothing at 
the Assembly. He told Forbes that he took "an entirely neutral part in 
the Sino-Japanese conflict" because he felt that New Zealand was "too 
close to both of them to take a side.,,21 By contrast, te Water deliver-
ed a strong speech against Japan which also condemned the inaction of 
the Great Powers. Wilford noted that while the small states were great-
ly concerned about the damaging effect of the dispute on the League, 
there was no suggestion that Article 16 of the Covenant should be invok-
ed. He considered such a move would have been premature, in any case, 
because the machinery provided by Article 15 and other Articles had not 
b h 11 I , d 22 yet een w 0 y app le . 
The British Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, confined the action 
of the Assembly to a resolution embodying the doctrine of non-recogni-
tion and an insistence on the applicability of the Covenant and the con-
cept of peaceful arbitration to the dispute. 23 Wilford was uncertain 
what the resolution would achieve. 24 One can sense his growing disen-
chantment with the League as it proved incapable of influencing events 
in the dispute, including the establishment of the puppet-state of Man-
chukuo in March 1932 and the armistice at Shanghai two months later. In 
Wellington also, concern was being expressed privately about the 
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way the League was handling the crisis. Berendsen told Wilford's Pri-
vate Secretary, Charles Knowles: " ••. 1 think the whole world has had a 
big shock at the actual working of the League's machinery for the peace-
ful settlement of disputes as exemplified in the Far East ••• " He said 
that the final outcome of "this extraordinary business" was being await-
d . h . 25 e Wlt great lnterest. 
The report of the Lytton Commission was finally published on 2 
October 1932. While it conceded there had been shortcomings in the 
Chinese administration of Manchuria, and that there were some legitimate 
causes for complaint by Japan, the report condemned Japan's role in the 
conflict. It concluded that the military action taken by the Japanese 
could not be justified as self-defence; that there was no spontaneous 
movement to gain independence for Manchuria; and that Manchukuo was a 
purely Japanese creation. The Commission recommended that a special re-
gime should be established in Manchuria to ensure Chinese sovereignty 
while protecting Japan's special position. 26 
Before the publication of the report, the New Zealand LNU had been 
in a quandry. From early 1932, President James Gibb and other LNU lead-
ers had condemned Japanese aggression but, although there was goodwill 
towards China, considerable sympathy for Japan remained. The New Zea-
land Government was urged to support Britain and the United States in 
upholding the League but, at the same time, there was considerable doubt 
as to how the League should act. Some members called for action 
against Japan, including military sanctions, but the Dominion Council 
preferred to wait until the Lytton Commission had given a lead. The LNU 
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did, however, petition the government to call for international control 
of the manufacture of armS for, and their trade to, the belligerents. 
The Lytton Report's findings were approved by the LNU and it accepted 
that the way was now open for economic and military sanctions. Never-
theless, there was little enthusiasm for such action and some doubt 
h h h L bl f "" "27 w et er t e eague was capa e 0 lmposlng sanctlons. 
The British Cabinet decided on 23 November 1932 that while British 
loyalty to the League must be seen to be beyond doubt at Geneva, Britain 
should also endeavour to be fair to both China and Japan without antag-
"" "h 28 onlslng elt er. This delicate balancing act did not please Wilford 
when he was informed 29 of the plan the following day. Having little 
faith in the League's capabilities, he had come to the conclusion that 
the Commonwealth's interests would be best served by appeasing Japan. 
It is perhaps indicative of this attitude that, despite his well-known 
dislike of the Japanese, Wilford had only recently accompanied the 
Japanese Ambassador to Britain on a visit to Italy to meet Benito 
M 1 "" 30 usso lnl. 
On his own initiative, Wilford conveyed his views to Sir Victor 
Wellesley, the Deputy Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, at the Foreign Office on 28 November 1932. He told Wellesley 
that as the strongest power in the Far East, Japan constituted a grave 
threat to Australia and New Zealand. It was important, therefore, for 
the Commonwealth to keep on the right side of Japan and back it in the 
present dispute. Wilford believed Japan was the Commonwealth's chief 
bulwark against the spread of Communism in China. Wellesley suggested 
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that Britain could not ignore the dispute's moral dimension so easily as 
Wilford. He said the matter was before the League and the British 
Government would do nothing to undermine the League's prestige. 
Surprised that Britain still believed the League had any prestige 
left, Wilford said the Lytton Report, which he described as "mere trim-
ming", showed that the League was unwilling to take a firm stand. He 
argued that whether Japan had ignored its obligations under the interna-
tional treaties was no longer the main issue. A realistic rather than a 
legalistic approach was now required, which meant acceptance of the fact 
that no one could preserve law and order in Manchuria but Japan. Wilford 
intended to recommend to his government that New Zealand should support 
Japan at the Assembly if it was summoned in the near future. As a form-
er Minister of Defence and having a reputation as something of a spe-
cialist in Far Eastern matters, he thought Forbes would accept his 
advice. He claimed his only object in coming to the Foreign Office was 
to make sure that if Forbes did agree to this course, it would not em-
barrass the British Government. 
Wellesley was understandably concerned about such a naive proposal 
and he made it clear that it was unacceptable. Wilford should have 
known that any display of Commonwealth disunity in the Assembly was an 
anathema to the British Government, especially over an ,issue with 
such serious implications for imperial security. Wellesley said it was 
unlikely that a straight vote would take place and he warned of the dan-
gers of a hasty decision. Emphasising that the object of British policy 
was to find a solution which antagonised neither side while leaving the 
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League's prestige unimpaired, he said the best course would be to wait 
and see how things developed. 31 Wilford was sufficiently impressed by 
Wellesley's argument not to take the matter futher. He probably realis-
ed that if the British were unhappy with the idea, it was extremely un-
likely that Forbes would sanction an independent New Zealand effort to 
'I' J 32 conc~ ~ate apan. 
There was certainly no divergence from the British position at the 
Special Assembly in December 1932. 33 Largely due to Great Power pres-
sure, the Assembly did no more than request its special committee on the 
Manchurian 
Report and 
dispute, the Committee of Nineteen, to consider the Lytton 
34 
make recommendations to the next Assembly. In February 
1933, the Committee presented its report which substantially recapitu-
lated 
the 
the findings of the Lytton Commission. With only Japan opposed, 
35 Assembly accepted the report. The Japanese immediately withdrew 
and a month later announced their intention to resign from the League. 
Having exhausted all the possibilities short of sanctions, the League 
could only look on as Japan occupied Jehol and finally forced China to 
agree to an armistice at the end of May 1933. 36 
The reaction of the New Zealand press to these events was mixed. A 
few newspapers called on the League to abandon its policy of non-
recognition in order to pacify Japan and pave the way for its return to 
37 
the League. Others were concerned about the effect of Japan's resig-
nation on the League. Some editors believed the League would become 
more orientated towards Europe and that those major powers which remain-
ed as members would be reluctant to commit themselves to League decis-
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ions which could 38 bring them into conflict with outside powers. The 
Press hoped Japan's withdrawal would cause the League to re-examine its 
constitution to make it more effective should a similar situation arise 
. f 39 In uture. Several papers concluded, however, that the loss of confi-
dence in the League was so great that worldwide rearmament was inevita-
ble. 40 The Manchurian situation continued to be the subject of editori-
als throughout 1933 but it is doubtful whether this interest was shared 
by the majority of their readers. 
There is no evidence that any widespread anti-Japanese feeling was 
aroused in the Dominion. No boycott of Japanese goods was organised and 
Japanese visitors, including two warships which called at New Zealand's 
main ports in May 1935, were well-received. 41 Even among the leaders of 
the LNU, Japan was not regarded as a threat. While League supporters 
wrangled over whether sanctions should be imposed,42 New Zealanders in 
general were apparently unconcerned about the damage the League had suf-
fered. After a visit to New Zealand in late-1934/early-1935, J.V. 
Wilson reported to Secretary-General Joseph Avenol that "to the average 
person Manchuria simply showed up the League to be the vain and preten-
tious thing he had always supposed it to be.,,43 
Manchuria barely d .. P 1· 44 rate a mentlon In ar lament. On 28 February 
1933, the Leader of the Opposition, Harry Holland, asked that a motion 
be drafted approving the attitude taken at the recent Assembly and urg-
ing Japan to accept the League's decision. Forbes replied that while 
the government deplored what had occurred in Manchuria, it believed that 
"no useful purpose" would be served by such action while the matter was 
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still before 45 the League. One can only assume that Forbes considered 
any action which implied New Zealand was anti-Japanese would only serve 
to undermine the already strained Anglo-Japanese relationship. During 
his visit to the Dominion in November 1934, British Cabinet Secretary 
Sir Maurice Hankey found that the New Zealand Government fully approved 
f B . . h ff . I" h J 46 Th o rltls e orts to lmprove re atlons Wlt apan. e government 
probably thought it wiser to accept the Japanese fait acompli rather 
than exacerbate the situation further by diplomatic and economic isola-
tion. Certainly by the time of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' 
Silver Jubilee meetings in London in April 1935, Forbes had come to the 
conclusion that some form of recognition of Manchukuo was necessary to 
remove any remaining Japanese antagonism. He was unable to persuade the 
other delegates but it is clear he believed that the strategic vulnera-
bility of Australia and New Zealand made good relations between the 
Commonwealth and Japan extremely important. 47 
The Manchurian dispute brought the weakness of the British position 
in the Far East into sharp relief. Faced with superior Japanese forces, 
Britain was compelled to follow a policy of caution bordering on 
neutralism. From New Zealand's point of view, the British impotency was 
the inevitable consequence of the decline of the power of the Royal Navy 
in the Pacific. The Dominion blamed this situation on the concessions 
Britain had made to Japan and the United States under the 1922 Washing-
ton Naval Treaty and the 1930 London Naval Treaty. New Zealand was 
not convinced that security and peace were the inevitable results of 
arms limitation. The strong impression that the British Empire was mak-
ing greater sacrifices in the name of arms control than any other power, 
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led successive New Zealand governments to regard any proposals for dis-
armament with suspicion and disfavour. 
Despite the Pact of Paris and other international agreements, the 
Ward and Forbes Governments remained sceptical whether the international 
climate had changed sufficiently to allow the reduction of national de-
fences. In June 1929, Parliament was told that until definite proposals 
for disarmament had been prepared and generally accepted, the government 
believed its duty was "to maintain such measures as are necessary for 
the safety 48 of the country." The prospects for a general disarmament 
treaty did not look promising at that stage because the Preparatory Com-
mission for the Disarmament Conference still had not produced a draft 
convention after four years work. The government felt justified, there-
fore, in ignoring the calls of the Labour Party and the peace campaign-
ers to reduce the Dominion's defence budget. The Governor-General, Sir 
Charles Fergusson, believed that despite the influence of the League and 
the Pact of Paris, the great majority of New Zealanders supported the 
, d f l' 49 government s e ence po ~cy. 
The 1930 London Naval Treaty expanded on the Washington agreement 
by placing restrictions on capital ships and submarines and further 
limitations on cruisers. 50 Yet it was still not a great advance towards 
general disarmament. Berendsen argued that the fact that stocks of arm-
aments were still increasing, and in many cases were heavier than before 
the First World War, demonstrated there was little confidence that war 
was at an end. He noted that even the British Labour Government, which 
supposedly believed that war was unthinkable, was spending over £2 
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million a week on armaments. Describing the current position of 
world armaments as "a cynical reflection on the high ideals and lofty 
language of the Kellogg Pact", Berendsen suggested that if preparations 
for war were necessary, then they should be as complete and effective as 
"bl 51 POSSi e. 
In Geneva disarmament was still a priority, however. The prospects 
for a world disarmament conference had greatly improved because the Pre-
paratory Commission had finally produced a draft arms convention. Though 
its provisions were vague and few states found them wholly acceptable, 
at least the convention provided a framework for discussion by the 
anticipated 52 conference. At the Imperial Conference in October 1930, 
the Commonwealth accepted the convention in principle but serious doubts 
were expressed about the concept of budgetary limitation of armaments, 
especially by 53 New Zealand. Because it was probable that the defence 
forces of the Commonwealth would be regarded as a single unit for arms 
reduction purposes, New Zealand feared the Dominions would be forced to 
accept greater cuts in their budgets than if they were assessed on an 
individual basis. 
In January 1931, the League Council announced that the Disarmament 
Conference would open in February of the following year. Soon after, 
New Zealand was invited to nominate a representative to the sub-cornrnit-
tee of the Committee of Imperial Defence established to formulate Brit-
ish policy the conference. 54 The appointed Wilford on government to 
guard the Dominion's interests. 55 As New Zealand's representative at 
the London Naval Conference the previous year, he had been distinctly 
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unsympathetic to 56 the British disarmament proposals. The discussions 
in the Committee of Imperial Defence simply confirmed his misgivings. 
He told Wellington in April 1931: 
I am attending the sittings of the Committee of Imperial Defence, 
which is wholly run by Lord Cecil, Dr Dalton, and men of that ilk. 
They are thoroughly satisfied that they can disarm the world, and I 
suppose that as long as this Government is in power they will direct 
the course, steering it internationally without regard to national 
interests. 57 
In fact, the sub-committee's resolutions were very general and even con-
tradictory, and the New Zealand Government did not believe they could be 
developed into a practical 58 scheme. It accepted, however, that the 
final decision on disarmament must lie with the British Government. 
Forbes did not expect, therefore, that New Zealand would take any prom-
inent part in the proceedings of the Disarmament Conference. 59 
The government's indifference to disarmament did not reflect the 
opinion of all 60 New Zealanders. Even before the announcement that a 
world disarmament conference would take place, support for disarmament 
was growing in New Zealand. The Labour Party and various peace groups 
had been campaigning for the abolition of compulsory military training 
for . 61 some tlme. In July 1930, the No More War Movement presented 
Forbes with a 15,000 signature petition calling for the repeal of the 
Defence Act. Less than a fortnight later, Minister of Defence J.G. 
C bb d h . fl' 1 . .. 62 o e announce t e suspenslon 0 compu sory ml ltary tralnlng. Al-
though he acknowledged that the move was partly in response to pressure 
from a New Zealand public increasingly in favour of disarmament, Cobbe 
preferred to describe the government's move as a temporary economy 
63 
measure. 
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The LNU had led a campaign for disarmament since 1926 but from 1930 
it developed into something akin a crusade under Gibb's leadership. 
Disarmament was a more popular cause than the League and won support for 
the LNU, particularly among pacifists who believed that the very exist-
ence of arms threatened peace. Hoping to pressure the government into 
declaring its support for arms control, the LNU also wanted to ensure 
that New Zealand was strongly represented at the Disarmament Conference. 
Warning that the conference had to succeed or the League would collapse 
and war would be unleashed, the LNU played heavily on New Zealanders' 
feelings of horror at the prospect of another world war. But the LNU 
did not believe total disarmament was practicable. It advocated the re-
tention of national defence forces, especially those of the Common-
wealth, which could be put at the disposal of the League if required. 
When the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom organ-
ised a petition in support of universal disarmament in 1931, some oppo-
sition within the LNU had to be overcome before the organisation declar-
ed its support. Forming part of a worldwide effort, the petition was 
64 
circulated throughout New Zealand. The campaign for disarmament 
attracted wide support and reached a peak in October 1931 when demon-
strations were held in the main centres. At a meeting of 2,000 people 
in Wellington held to promote the petition, the leaders of the three 
major political parties pledged their support for disarmament. By 
December 1931, 42,000 signatures had been gathered and the petition was 
sent to Geneva to be presented to the Disarmament Conference along-
side those from fifty-two other countries. 65 
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Forbes may have thought it impolitic for the government to oppose 
the petition's goal but his speech to the Wellington meeting made it 
clear he thought it undesirable for the Commonwealth to reduce its de-
fences 66 any further. Indeed, the government's primary concern was to 
prevent the Disarmament Conference from cutting New Zealand's defences 
at all. In February 1931, the Secretary-General asked every member of 
the League to provide statistical information on their defence forces, 
to facilitate the work of 67 the conference. This request presented 
some difficulties for New Zealand. Because its naval forces were a 
division of the Royal Navy, there was the possibility of the Dominion's 
information duplicating that provided by Britain. A more serious prob-
lem was that New Zealand's defence forces were not considered to be at a 
level commensurate with its strategic requirements. 68 Forbes believed 
New Zealand might in future find it necessary to develop a separate air 
force or expand the army should circumstances change. The government 
was worried, therefore, lest the conference use the current figures as a 
guide to limit defence expenditure in the future. 
In October 1931, Berendsen advised that for New Zealand to imple-
ment its defence policy in full, "it will be necessary not only to 
refuse to agree to any reduction in either our present figures or our 
normal figures, but to ask for a considerable increase, a policy which 
is likely to have somewhat awkward consequences at the Conference and in 
69 
this country." Forbes appears to have exercised substantial influence 
over the government's policy on the question,70 and he decided that New 
Zealand would not even send a general statement to the League until it 
had been 71 ascertained what form the British reply would take. In the 
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meantime, the government's naval advisers advocated inflating New Zea-
land's figures to overcome 72 the problem. Wilford was not impressed 
with the suggestion and urged Forbes to send accurate returns to the 
League. 73 He perhaps feared that if the falsity of the figures was dis-
covered then the Dominion would be put in an even more embarrassing 
.. 74 posltlon. Berendsen and other officials were still convinced that 
some safeguard of the Dominion's future defence needs was required, how-
75 
ever. 
In his detailed instructions to Wilford, who was to represent New 
Zealand 76 at the conference, Forbes emphasised the government's concern 
about this aspect. He said: "What New Zealand really asks is of course 
not an actual increase but the right to provide for our minimum defence 
requirements •.. " Wilford was to point out that the Dominion's position 
could not be compared to that of the older European countries whose 
defence requirements had stabilised over a lengthy period. Recognition 
must be given to the fact that New Zealand was still in the process of 
working up to its minimum requirements. 
In matters relating to land and air forces, Wilford was given some 
discretion on accepting the figures proposed by the conference but the 
government's figures on naval forces were non-negotiable. He was to 
collaborate closely with the British delegation on naval matters but re-
iterate the government's opposition to any reduction of Commonwealth 
naval strength, particularly in cruisers. Forbes stressed that "so far 
as New Zealand is concerned any Convention which we could agree to sign 
would amount to a limitation only and not to a reduction of our present 
187 
armaments." He believed it was principally the responsibility of the 
Great Powers to disarm. Unless the other powers agreed to material re-
ductions, the British Empire would, in his view, be justified in 
refusing to disarm further, even to rearm. 
Wilford was not expected to follow the proceedings from beginning 
to end. For economy reasons it was anticipated that he would attend the 
opening of the conference, make a general statement during the early 
sessions, confer with the other Commonwealth delegations on imperial 
policy, and then return to London. Thereafter, he was to be kept in-
formed of developments either by the British Government or by Knowles, 
who would remain as an observer. Wilford was to advise the government 
of progress as he saw fit. 77 
The Disarmament Conference opened on 2 February 1932 in what 
78 Berendsen described as "the worst possible atmosphere". The Manchurian 
crisis was at its height, events in Germany were causing disquiet in 
Europe, and the Depression had become acute worldwide. Undaunted, the 
conference began its work with the active co-operation of the major 
powers. The draft convention was quickly pushed aside. The French pro-
posed an ambitious scheme for collective security which included a perm-
anent League police force and allowed members to retain their offensive 
weapons, to be used only on the orders of the League or in self-de-
79 fence. 
plan. 
Speaking on 16 February 1932, Wilford strongly criticised the 
He said it was a recasting of the Geneva Protocol, making the 
League into a superstate. He argued that general and definite prohibi-
tion in certain directions was preferable to unlimited preparation. 
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"There is every safeguard where preparation is prohibited, but if only 
the use is forbidden, can it be said that there are really any safe-
guards at all?" Wilford hoped disarmament would prevent further catas-
trophes like Japan's aggression in China. Trying to forestall any 
Japanese efforts to extract further concessions on naval armaments, he 
insisted that whatever the inadequacies of the Washington and London 
Naval Treaties, they must be the foundation on which the "House of Dis-
armament" was built. Wilford urged the conference to devise a practical 
arms control scheme which could be implemented in a reasonable time. 80 
The New Zealand Government may have hoped a general disarmament 
treaty would, if nothing else, allow Britain to reduce its heavy expen-
diture on arms, but there was little optimism that the conference would 
achieve anything worthwhile. 81 On 21 July 1932, Berendsen told Knowles 
that "at this distance ••• it all seems rather futile, and I think no one 
in New Zealand outside the usual peace cranks and the League of Nations 
Unions expects the mountain to bring anything but the proverbial 
mouse." 
82 As if to confirm the accuracy of his prediction, the confer-
ence adjourned 83 soon after without making any progress. The confer-
ence's resolution, approved only after acrimonious debate, merely 
affirmed its determination to achieve substantial reductions in arma-
ments. Wilford found it extremely disappointing. 84 Knowles told 
Berendsen: "No comment from me is required on the final resolution of 
the General Committee of the Disarmament Conference. It sDeaks for it-
self and you may place on it whatever value you like." Berendsen 
replied dryly: "I agree with you that the final resolution speaks for 
itself, but it speaks with a very low voice.,,8S 
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The Disarmament Conference reconvened several times over the next 
two years but the deteriorating international situation made success in-
creasingly 86 remote. The most serious blow came in October 1933 when 
Germany withdrew from the League. The conference did not come to an end 
but all sense of reality had departed from its subsequent meetings. In 
February 1934, Wilford's successor, Sir James Parr, told Wellington that 
the Foreign Secretary would welcome a message of support from New Zea-
land for the British Government's latest attempt to revive the confer-
ence. Th ' d 'I 87 e government remalne Sl ent. Still concerned that Britain 
might be prepared to sacrifice naval security in the quest for a disarm-
ament agreement, Forbes did not want to give Simon any encouragement. In 
fact, New Zealand had given up on the conference and had not even 
bothered to d "1' 88 sen a representatlve to ltS ater meetlngs. On 25 May 
1934, Parr stated baldly that his work in London was more important than 
attending the probable funeral of the Disarmament Conference. 89 Within 
a month the conference held its final plenary meeting and adjourned in-
d f ' , 1 90 e lnlte y. Many countries were already beginning to rearm and, 
realising that it could not ignore the signs completely, the government 
was forced to give serious consideration to rebuilding New Zealand's 
91 defence forces. 
The LNU regarded the collapse of the Disarmament Conference as a 
disaster of the greatest magnitude. Instead of blaming the inherent 
weakness of the League, the LNU preferred to believe that the half-
heartedness of world governments was responsible for the League's lack 
of success. It was more vital than ever to support the League; the 
Covenant had to be strengthened not scrapped. Between 1934 and 1935, 
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the LNU increased its propaganda work, achieving some success as New 
Zealanders became more aware of world affairs because of the Depression 
and the Manchurian crisis. But the divisions which had contributed to 
the LNU's hesitancy over Manchuria continued to dog the organisation. 
A small group, which included Walter Nash, saw that only armed col-
lective security could preserve peace. But their calls for adequate 
national defences, an international police force and the reform of the 
Covenant, split the LNU. Many members regarded increased military 
expenditure as incompatible with the ideal of collective security. There 
was also considerable opposition to any tampering with the Covenant. For 
Gibb and his pacifist friends, who had been advocating disarmament for a 
decade or more, to change sides mid-stream would have been an anathema. 
They did not perceive the Covenant as an instrument of potential coer-
cion. There was also a residual belief that the Fascist states would 
not be aggressors and that they had some cause to be treated more 
generously. Some transferred their allegience to the growing militant 
Christian and socialist-based pacifist movement. But the LNU was wary 
of this movement, considering its objectives to be unrealistic and un-
workable. The result was that the statements emanating from the LNU be-
came increasingly vague, leading the Evening Post to accuse it in August 
1934 f f ' h 1" 92 o not ac~ng up to t e new rea ~t~es. 
New Zealand took the Disarmament Conference and the Manchurian dis-
pute seriously but the Dominion's role was limited to supporting British 
policy. Though both were important tests for the League, they were 
viewed with the same detachment New Zealand had nearly always shown to 
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the activities at Geneva. Forbes claimed the Dominion was in the envi-
able position of being insulated from the world's political problems by 
its geographic I · dB' . h . 93 iso at~on an r~t~s protect~on. But New Zealand's 
economy was not in the same fortunate position and during 1930 it was 
hit hard by the Depression. The government began to retrench and the 
cost of the Dominion's League membership once again carne under scrutiny. 
Since Allen's campaign to restrict the League's budget in the early 
1920s, few complaints had been heard from League opponents in Parliament 
about the size of New Zealand's contribution to the League's expenses. 
While the country was relatively prosperous such complaints could be ig-
nored but in 1931 Forbes began to question whether the cost, which was 
approximately £12,000 annually, was acceptable at a time when the 
government was reducing spending on education and health. The first 
shot of this renewed campaign was fired in July 1930 when the cost of 
New Zealand's delegation to the International Labour Conference was 
questioned in the House. The government had finally bowed to Labour 
Party pressure in 1929 and the Dominion was represented for the first 
time at the 1930 . 94 sess~on. Labour MPs ridiculed the suggestion that 
the £900 involved would have been better used elsewhere, but New Zealand 
did not send another delegation until 1935. 95 
Wilford drew Forbes' attention to the question of the League's bud-
get in his report on the Eleventh Assembly. He deplored the prevalent 
attitude of "reckless extravagance" among the delegates which had 
resulted in a large increase in the budget. Wilford noted that New Zea-
land's contribution increased each year but the Dominion received little 
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benefit from the League in return. The government was urged to take 
a much greater interest in the draft budgets it received from the League 
96 in the future. 
The government evidently took Wilford's advice seriously for in 
April 1931 the Treasury recommended that steps should be taken to reduce 
New Zealand's League contribution. It was also decided that to ease the 
financial burden, the contribution would be paid quarterly instead of 
97 
annually. Because these quarterly instalments were not always paid 
early enough, however, New Zealand was occasionally listed by the League 
as a member 98 in default, much to the government's embarrassment. In 
July 1931, Wilford was told that the government was very concerned about 
the continual increase in the League's budget. Forbes said that in a 
recent review of New Zealand's financial position, it had been suggested 
that the Dominion's League contribution should be reduced or suspended 
for 1931. Though sympathetic to the idea, Forbes had, apparently with 
some difficulty, deferred any action on it. Instead, Wilford was in-
structed to take whatever action he thought proper and practicable to 
stop the expansion of the Secretariat and the proliferation of League 
. .. 99 
actlvltles. 
At the Assembly on 10 September 1931, Wilford reminded the dele-
gates that the present economic upheaval had forced every government to 
"take in a hole or two in its belt", and the League must do likewise. 
He emphasised that New Zealand was not advocating that the most impor-
tant functions of the League be curtailed, the forthcoming Disarmament 
Conference being a case in point, but he was sure substantial savings 
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could be made by curbing some of its "sidelines". He acknowledged that 
his remarks might not be welcome. Nevertheless, New Zealand believed the 
League should make a "beau geste" by reducing its huge costs. 100 Wilford 
was obviously expecting some criticism of his 101 stand but he was 
dismayed by the Secretary-General's attack on New Zealand in the Fourth 
Committee during his defence of the Secretariat's management of the 
League's finances. Drummond stated that the organisation's cost to each 
of its members was very small. Noting that New Zealand's contribution 
represented only 0.0048% of the country's annual budget, he suggested 
sardonically that this burden was too small to jeopardise the Dominion's 
financial position. 
It was a strong argument and by pointedly using New Zealand as an 
example Drummond hoped to undermine Wilford's case and protect the 
League from further attacks. But the Secretary-General had unwittingly 
exaggerated the figure in his example and the tactic backfired. Angered 
and embarrassed by the criticism, the New Zealand delegation forced 
Drummond to admit that the correct figure was 0.048% and to apologise 
for any suggestion that New Zealand was not a loyal member of the 
102 League. In Wellington, the government was also indignant about the 
incident and it undoubtedly hardened Forbes' attitude on the issue. 103 
Not everyone in New Zealand approved of the government's stand, however. 
The LNU, the No More War Movement and the Labour Party regarded it as an 
attack on the League . lf 104 ltse • Several newspapers also criticised 
the government and noted that the expenses of the League were minute 
compared to the amount of money spent 105 on arms. 
the 
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Early the following year, the Treasury again questioned the size of 
106 
contribution to the League. Because the value of New Zealand's 
currency had suffered when Britain abandoned the gold standard in 1931, 
the amount of the contribution was expected to rise appreciably. Inevi-
tably, this was one of the areas which came under the scrutiny of the 
National Expenditure Commission. Made up of leading businessmen, the 
Commission was established by the government in February 1932 with a 
brief to review public expenditure and recommend where economies could 
be made. On 11 April 1932, Berendsen told the Commission that New Zea-
land's influence at the League was small and short of resigning there 
was very little the Dominion could do to reduce its contribution. 107 The 
Commission agreed but it still urged the government to continue to press 
New Zealand's case for a reduction at Geneva. 108 
Although New Zealand's contribution was expected to rise, the 
dramatic increase from about £12,000 in 1931 to over £17,000 in 1932 
shocked the government. In his instructions to Wilford on 21 July 1932 
regarding the forthcoming Assembly, Forbes' concern with the subject of 
economy overshadowed everything else. This did not mean the government 
thought the League a complete waste of money. But as Berendsen explain-
ed to Knowles, many in New Zealand believed the League was "playing in 
the air with the angels" and that the Dominion's contribution was large-
ly "frittered away on unrealities and abstract discussions". Forbes 
was, therefore, prepared to back Wilford to the limit in an effort to 
achieve material economies in the League's administration. While Wil-
ford might not wish to lead the attack again after his experience at the 
last Assembly, Berendsen noted that Britain intended to raise the matter 
195 
and Forbes expected Wilford to range himself alongside the British dele-
. 109 gatlon. In addition, Coates, who was to lead the Dominion's delega-
tion to the Imperial Economic Conference in Ottawa in August 1932, was 
told to confer with the other delegates with a view to concerted action 
110 
at Geneva on the problem of the League budget. 
Confident of British support, Wilford took a strong line in the 
Assembly's Fourth Committee in October 1932. He said it was unaccept-
able for the League to continue to pay its staff high salaries while the 
governments of its member-states were forced to cut the salaries of 
their officials. Nonetheless, because of doubts whether the Assembly 
had the power to break contracts and a general lack of enthusiasm for 
such measures, Wilford believed cuts were unlikely. He told Forbes that 
h S . ld . ". f . h . " 111 t e ecretarlat wou remaln an oaSlS 0 comparatlve applness . 
Wilford made several other suggestions to the Committee to help re-
duce expenditure but he was convinced the main problem was the non-pay-
ment of contributions by some members. The Secretariat was compelled 
to over-budget to compensate, which meant those countries which took 
their obligations seriously were paying more than their fair share. A 
particularly disturbing aspect of the problem was that most of the 
offenders were capable of paying their share. Though Wilford called on 
the League to consider measures to recover unpaid contributions, the 
Committee was only prepared to appoint a sub-committee to investigate 
112 
the problem. 
While Wilford reported that there were signs that the League was 
196 
beginning to take the question of economy seriously, Forbes was not con-
. d 113 Vlnce . There were still complaints in Parliament about the cost of 
the League to New Zealand, and even suggestions that the Dominion's 
representation at Geneva 114 was a waste of money. Forbes thought the 
League was not doing enough to put its house in order and Australian 
Prime Minister Joseph A. Lyons agreed. He believed that action must be 
taken in the Assembly Committees to stop the dissipation of the League's 
resources and he sought New Zealand's co_operation. 115 Forbes welcomed 
the Australian approach and in early August 1933 he and other Common-
116 
wealth representatives met in London to discuss the matter. 
Ironically, the meeting was only possible because they had been 
attending the League-sponsored World Monetary and Economic Conference 
which was held in London from June to July 1933. 117 The importance of 
the conference can be guaged by the fact that sixty-four countries 
were represented and New Zealand sent a six-man delegation led by 
118 Forbes. It was the only conference or meeting held under the aus-
pices of the League ever attended by a New Zealand Prime Minister. The 
results of the conference were extremely disappointing, however. Agree-
ment among the major powers on the means of solving the problems caused 
by the Depression proved impossible. But in one respect, the conference 
proved memorable for Wilford. The delegates were provided with one free 
copy of the conference documents but when he tried to obtain further 
copies he was told that, as a result of New Zealand's campaign at 
Geneva, these would have to be paid for. Wilford argued that this con-
firmed that the League was beginning to take action on the budgetary 
119 problem. 
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Forbes and Canadian Prime Minister Richard B. Bennett used the 
opportunity provided by the conference to impress upon the new Secre-
tary-General, Joseph Avenol, the urgency of reducing the League's expen-
d ' 120 Iture. But Wilford believed the problem could not be solved by 
pruning alone. The meeting of the Commonwealth representatives appa-
rently did not decide on a particular course of action, but Wilford was 
certain that the question of arrears must be tackled more vigorously.121 
Acting Prime Minister Coates warned that this might encourage further 
defections from the League, but he allowed Wilford to use his discretion 
at the 1933 Assembly, with the proviso that he work closely with the 
122 Australian and British delegates. 
In the Fourth Committee, Wilford severely criticised the manner in 
which the budget was drawn up and the insufficiency of the information 
provided on the various appropriations. If the League were an ordinary 
business, he said, it would be judged bankrupt. He declared that in 
order to save the League from financial ruin, waste must be eliminated 
and states which did not pay their contributions had to be dealt with. 
The report of the Sub-committee on Contributions in Arrears had confirm-
ed that all the defaulting members could have paid at least part of 
their contributions. Wilford urged the Assembly to shame the defaulting 
governments into paying by giving extensive publicity to the committee's 
f ' d' 123 In Ings. 
The New Zealand delegation's lIobsessionll124 with the budgetary 
question probably gave the Dominion a prominence at Geneva which it had 
not achieved since Allen's day. To some New Zealanders this was more a 
198 
cause for sorrow than satisfaction. The Rangitikei Advocate said it was 
time to end the "niggardly and dishonest propaganda against the 'extrav-
agance' of the League", and it challenged the government to withdraw 
from the League if it considered its contribution had been . 125 m~sspent. 
The Christchurch Sun described the critics of the League as "petty, ill-
informed, cheese-paring 126 people". The LNU charged that the govern-
mentis views on the subject did not truly reflect the opinion of New 
127 Zealanders. In Parliament, Labour's Peter Fraser said the Dominion 
could not afford to discontinue its association with Geneva because only 
the League could save the world from the prospect of global destruction. 
Forbes was unmoved by this criticism, although he thought it pru-
128 dent to reaffirm New Zealand's loyalty to the League. Nor was he im-
pressed by complaints about the insufficiency of the Dominion's repre-
sentation at Geneva. Labour MPs were unhappy that the government had 
reduced the High Commissioner's salary and the expenses of the delega-
. h L f . . 129 t~on to t e eague as part 0 ~ts economy campa~gn. In 1934, the new 
Leader of the Opposition, M.J. Savage, suggested the New Zealand dele-
130 gates must have walked to Geneva because their expenses were so small. 
On both points, Forbes chose to ignore the critics, and Parr led his 
small delegation to Geneva in September 1934 with instructions to con-
tinue to press for a reduction in New Zealand's contribution. 131 
Noting his government's grave dissatisfaction with the continuing 
problem of arrears, Parr called for the Financial Regulations or the 
Covenant to be changed to allow the League to deal with offenders. He 
urged that any arrears which were collected should be used to relieve 
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those members whose obligations had increased because of the default of 
132 
others. New Zealand was not, however, among those states which bene-
fited from the reduction in the size of contributions in 1934 which 
resulted from the League's improving financial position. 
Despite Parr's strong words, there is some indication that the 
government's determination to pursue the issue was beginning to wane. 
Perhaps there was a realisation that New Zealand had made its point and 
to continue the campaign could be counter-productive. In September 
1935, Forbes advised Parr not to make a public application for a reduc-
tion of the Dominion's contribution but only to take "such discreet 
steps as you think desirable. II133 It is also possible that the govern-
ment accepted that changes were taking place and the League was making 
an effort to reduce expenditure. In his report to Avenol in April 1935, 
Wilson said that the economies which were being made had been noted 
and were appreciated by the government. 134 At the Assembly later that 
year, the New Zealand delegation certainly maintained a much lower pro-
file than previously. Parr considered that his task now lay in ensuring 
the other delegates did not return to their former extravagant ways.135 
The fact that New Zealand continued to press for spending cuts 
while the League was preoccupied with the Sino-Japanese dispute and the 
Disarmament Conference, gives a good indication of how the government's 
attitude to the League shaped its priorities. The failure to resolve 
the Manchurian crisis or achieve a general disarmament treaty only con-
firmed the government's view that the League had little influence on in-
ternational events, was irrelevant to the Dominion, and an unreasonable 
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financial burden on its more distant members. Because of its lower 
expectations, the government did not share the intense disappointment of 
the League's supporters in New Zealand in the wake of the organisation's 
failures. 
The Labour Party was strongly critical of the government's disin-
clination to support the League actively. Condemning the Dominion's 
apparent lack of interest in international affairs generally, Savage 
said on 7 August 1934: "We want to hang outside the world. We want to 
be h b '11 d k' d ,,136 strap angers, ut we w~ get a ru e awa en~ng some ay. But if 
there was concern among League supporters about the damage recent events 
had done to its ability to stabilize the international situation, this 
did not mean they saw Germany, Japan, or any other power as a threat to 
137 peace in the immediate future. 
The government seemed to subscribe to this view also because there 
was little urgency about its policy of rebuilding the Dominion's defence 
138 forces. This was despite the fact that Forbes' adviser on interna-
tional affairs was greatly worried by Germany's growing restiveness and 
the League's impotence in the face of Japanese aggression. In a compre-
hensive review of the international situation prepared in early 1935 j 
Berendsen warned that "unless ..• some means is found of diverting the 
present current of German policies they spell the doom of the preserva-
tion of peace by conciliation and negotiation .•. " He declared that the 
Manchurian dispute had been "a grievous blow to the authority of the 
League and to the efficacy of its peace system, and may well prove to 
have been a major disaster to the world." 
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The League's failures had shown that it was out of the question for 
any country to rely entirely on the Covenant for its security. This 
realisation had resulted in worldwide rearmament and the formation of 
military alliances. Berendsen had little confidence that the many prob-
lems now facing the world could be overcome. He thought the interna-
tional situation was more ominous than it had been at any time since 
1914, and that "unless the mere horror of the possibilities should give 
the nations reason to 
threshold of dreadful 
pause before it is too late, we may be on the 
139 
events." But even Berendsen could not have 
predicted that a remote corner of Africa would play an important part in 
the descent into world war. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE ITALO-ETHIOPIAN CONFLICT, 1935-1938 
In Parliament on 19 February 1935, Forbes declared that if Britain 
was involved in war, New Zealand would be involved also. 1 This state-
ment reveals that, despite its domestic preoccupations, the government 
was becoming concerned about the unsettled international situation and 
the possibility of war with the increasingly belligerent Fascist powers. 
Because such a conflict was expected to take place in Europe or the Far 
East, the dispute between Italy and Ethiopia three months earlier had 
not rung any alarm bells in Wellington. 
Fighting broke out between the two countries in December 1934 at 
the oasis of Wal-Wal, where the border between Ethiopia and Italian 
Somali land was unmarked. There had been border incidents before but 
Mussolini sought to exploit the clash at Wal-Wal as a pretext for the 
invasion of Ethiopia which he had been planning for over a year. Since 
seizing power in 1922, Mussolini had never concealed his ambition of 
wanting to extend Italy's colonial empire. From the mid-1920s, the 
Italians had stepped up their economic activities in Ethiopia. It was a 
tempting prize, not only because it lay between the Italian colonies of 
Eritrea and Somaliland but because Mussolini was determined to avenge 
the Ethiopian defeat of the Italian attempt to conquer the country in 
1896. 2 The Ethiopian Emperor, Haile Selassie, appealed to the League, 
and Britain and France tried to find a solution to the dispute during 
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1935. Unwilling to alienate a potential ally in Europe, they pressed 
Ethiopia to offer substantial territorial and economic concessions to 
Italy but Mussolini was not satisfied. With the negotiations stalemat-
ed, the British Cabinet reluctantly came to the conclusion that should 
Ethiopia be attacked, the League would have to implement sanctions 
against Italy.3 
The New Zealand Government was kept apprised of these developments 
but made no comment on them. When the Commonwealth Prime Ministers met 
in London for the Silver Jubilee in April 1935, the Australian and Cana-
dian leaders expressed their concern about the implications of the dis-
pute for the Commonwealth. Forbes preferred to focus his attention on 
4 
the Far East. At home, the government was as reluctant as ever to make 
any statements on foreign affairs. This reticence was reinforced on 
Forbes' return by the strong criticism he received because of his state-
ment in Canada that there would be no need to call Parliament before 
committing New Zealand to a war involving Britain. 
The peace groups, the Labour Party and even the Returned Services 
Association objected to such unquestioning loyaly to the British Govern-
5 
ment. The Leader of the Opposition, Michael Joseph Savage, stated: 
"Our youth should not be sacrificed for unknown causes and unknown poli-
cies and without reference to the representatives of the people.,,6 This 
attitude predominated when it seemed likely that war would result from 
the Ethiopian dispute. Although few New Zealanders were outright pac i-
fists, many had been sufficiently influenced by the peace campaigners in 
Britain and New Zealand to question the necessity of sending the 
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Dominion's armed forces to fight in a foreign war. The fact that such a 
war might be sanctioned by the League of Nations made it no more accept-
able. 
The New Zealand press devoted much attention to the Ethiopian situ-
ation from June 1935. 7 Popular sympathy was with the Ethiopians, who, 
as Coates put it, were "simple, unarmed, primitive people" being threat-
ened by "that great bully Mussolini".8 The possible international rami-
fications of the dispute were not overlooked, however, particularly as 
they affected the League. There was a growing awareness that the League 
would have to act firmly if the Manchurian debacle was not to be repeat-
9 
ed. In early August 1935, a LNU deputation called on acting Prime 
Minister Sir Alfred Ransom to support the League publicly and to give an 
assurance that the Dominion would carry out its obligations under the 
Covenant. Ransom was extremely reluctant to make any public statement 
of the government's views. "This question was one of vital importance 
to the world," he said, "and there should be no fear that any utterance 
on the part of this Government could be misunderstood.,,10 
Although some Labour MPs urged the government to condemn Italy's 
actions, the Labour Party tended to share the government's cautious 
. d ... 11 11 attltu e lnltla y. But the Coalition's failure to give any lead to 
public opinion provoked some criticism. The Evening Post complained on 
17 September 1935 that "neither the Prime Minister nor any other Minis-
ter able to speak with the authority of the Government has seen fit to 
make a public and considered declaration of New Zealand's attitude to 
the crisis confronting the League of Nations.,,12 
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Privately, however, the government was giving close attention to 
the dispute. Berendsen told J.V. Wilson that there was a growing reali-
sation that if the League's collective action failed this time, even New 
Zealand 13 would be affected. In London, British ministers met with the 
Dominion High Commissioners to inform them of the British Government's 
" 14 posltlon. They were told that it was vital for the League's prestige 
and the peace of Europe to prevent war in Ethiopia. But if war did 
break out there was little confidence that the League could enforce col-
lective sanctions against Italy. Should collective action prove impos-
sible, the British Government would not support the implementation of 
sanctions by a few states only. The British aim would then be to keep 
Italy in the League, believing it would be better to keep the League 
I , h h d ,,15 a lve rat er t an estroYlng It. Parr told Forbes that he agreed with 
the British policy though he had reservations about supporting collect-
ive sanctions at the Assembly. He and Australian High Commissioner 
Stanley Bruce believed sanctions might be ineffective but have the re-
suIt of widening the conflict. On the other hand, Parr conceded, taking 
16 
no action at all would be fatal for the League. 
Forbes was aware that as a consequence of its recent failures, the 
League's respon~etothe dispute would probably be the final test for a 
17 peace structure based on the Covenant. This knowledge did not instil 
in him any enthusiasm for involving New Zealand in the dispute. He 
dutifully informed the British Government that the Dominion was prepared 
18 
to support Britain and honour its obligations under the Covenant. But 
in a confidential note to Parr, Forbes wrote: 
We should be most reluctant unless this becomes clearly necessary to 
participate in any degree in a quarrel which does not directly 
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concern the British Commonwealth of Nations. We would oppose any 
attempt to apply economic sanctions unless associated with a general 
and effective application by all other Members of the League. In 
particular we are confident that public opinion in New Zealand would 
not endorse any measure that might call for the application of 
force. 19 
This view was shared by all the Dominions. At a meeting in Geneva be-
fore the 1935 Assembly, the South African and Australian delegates even 
advocated expelling Ethiopia from the League and offering it as a man-
date 20 to Italy. Patently, the Dominions had already accepted that if 
the Italians were determined to occupy Ethiopia there was little the 
League could do about it. 
To the surprise of many of the League delegates, the British 
Foreign Secretary's speech to the Assembly contained a clear and firm 
declaration of Britain's resolve to support the League and the "steady 
d 11 ' . 11 f k d ." 21 an co ect~ve res~stance to a acts 0 unprovo e aggress~on In 
fact, Sir Samuel Hoare's publicly-expressed loyalty to the League was 
quite suspect and it is probable the forthcoming British general elec-
tion played an important part in determining the tenor of his 22 speech. 
Nevertheless, Britain had given a lead and the other delegates echoed 
Hoare's 23 stand. New Zealand's view, expressed by Parr on 14 September 
1935, was that the Ethiopian dispute was the supreme test for the 
League. He acknowledged that New Zealand was not affected materially by 
the dispute but he said that the Dominion was tremendously concerned 
with the sanctity of international agreements. "We feel that, if solemn 
pacts and covenants are to be broken with impunity, none of us - least 
of all any of the small nations - is for a moment safe." Thus New Zea-
land fully supported the British declaration and would accept the obli-
gations it implied, so long as they were collective. 24 
215 
Forbes may have preferred to have said nothing at the Assembly but, 
as Parr explained, it would have been unwise for New Zealand not to have 
expressed its support for 25 the League. Just as importantly, Parr's 
speech reflected a greater confidence on his part in the League's capac-
ity to resolve the matter. When Bruce suggested at a Commonwealth dele-
gates' meeting three days later that almost anything was preferable to 
sanctions, Parr took him to task. Was Bruce prepared to let Mussolini 
attack Ethiopia 26 with impunity, he asked. Clearly, Parr now accepted 
that the League must impose sanctions if Italy invaded Ethiopia. Indeed, 
at a further meeting of the Commonwealth delegates on 26 September 1935, 
he even advocated closing the Suez Canal in the 27 event of war. 
Made almost certainly without Forbes' knowledge, this suggestion receiv-
ed no support from the British ministers. Their goal, above all 
else, was to give Italy no excuse for a 'mad-dog' attack on British 
f 'h M d' 28 orces In tee lterranean. 
The Council made one more attempt at mediation but Parr considered 
it a hopeless task. He thought that nothing more could be done until 
war broke out. Only then could the League contemplate sanctions. 29 In 
New Zealand, opinion was divided on the subject. The Communists, some 
trade unions, churches and pacifists feared that economic sanctions 
would lead inevitably to military sanctions, and they were not prepared 
to support what h d d " I' fl' 30 t ey regar e as an lmperla lSt con lct. Others 
argued that Ethiopia was simply not important enough for the Common-
31 
wealth to risk war with Italy. 
The Labour Party and the LNU, on the other hand, saw the dispute as 
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a 11 ' 32 test case for co ective secur~ty. The Labour leaders believed the 
world must choose between right or might. They considered it useless to 
cloud the issue h b " l' 33 wit arguments a out ~mper~a ~sm. Fraser described 
the pacifist stand as the "essence of weakness" because it meant not 
only the betrayal of Ethiopia but of the League itself. 34 It was hoped 
economic sanctions would be sufficient but there was an acceptance, al-
beit reluctant, that New Zealand might have to fight for the League. 
Nash said that if the Commonwealth was drawn into a war with Italy, "New 
Zealanders should not be led into it with emotional hatred and shouting 
35 but should fight in sorrow for the good of the future." 
The Italian army invaded Ethiopia on 3 October 1935. After a meet-
ing with the Foreign Secretary, Parr advised Forbes that the British 
Government would follow a policy of caution and would not consider mili-
tary sanctions unless Italy attacked other countries. 36 Parr was ob-
viously disappointed by the British attitude because he said he was not 
convinced that economic sanctions would be universal or effective. 37 But 
Forbes made it clear New Zealand regarded any form of sanction as a 
serious step and the government must be consulted before any vote was 
38 
taken. On 10 October 1935, the Assembly resolved that Article 16 of 
the Covenant must be invoked against Italy. A Sanctions Co-ordination 
Committee, comprising representatives from all the League members, was 
immediately established. Within a few days, agreement had been reached 
on prohibiting the export to Italy of arms, raw materials such as rub-
ber, tin and other metals; banning all loans or credits to the Italians; 
and an embargo on all imports from Italy. Member-states were requested 
'1 h ' kl 'bl 39 to ~mp ement t ese measures as qu~c y as poss~ e. 
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Forbes was taken aback by the speed of the League's action. 40 But 
in collaboration with the Opposition, legislation was drafted and the 
League of Nations Sanctions (Enforcement in New Zealand) Bill was pre-
41 
sented to Parliament on 23 October 1935. Forbes acknowledged that the 
Dominion's participation would have little impact on the success or 
failure of the League's action. Nonetheless, New Zealand must honour 
its obligations although he was hopeful that war could be avoided. 42 
Savage shared this hope. Indeed, the Labour Party was so determined 
that the government should not be able to involve New Zealand in a war 
which might result from the measures in the Bill, without first consult-
ing the people of the Dominion, that it insisted on a clause preventing 
the introduction of conscription and the sending of New Zealand's armed 
forces 43 overseas. Although some Government MPs questioned the need for 
the clause, Parliament unanimously accepted the Bill.44 The government's 
action seems to have had the approval of most interested New Zealand-
45 
ers. 
Whatever doubts some of the Dominions may have had about sanctions, 
11 d h 'd" 46 a accepte t e League s eClSlon. In fact, it was the Canadian rep-
resentative who took the lead in calling for an embargo on iron, steel, 
coke, coal and, most , 1 'I 47 lmportant y, Ol . Thus the British Cabinet's 
decision, on 2 December 1935, to postpone the commencement of these more 
serious measures while Hoare negotiated an agreement in Paris to end the 
war, dismayed some of the Dominion High Commissioners. At their meeting 
with Hoare on 5 December 1935, Parr suggested that the recently-elected 
Labour Government in New Zealand would not take kindly to any proposals 
which undermined the League. Only Bruce supported the Foreign Secretary. 
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Three days later the terms of the secret agreement reached with French 
Premier Pierre Laval leaked out. The Hoare-Laval Plan required Ethiopia 
to cede a large area in the north-east to Italy and to give the Italians 
almost unlimited rights over the southern half of the country. 
At a meeting with the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 
Malcolm MacDonald, on 10 December 1935, all the Dominion High Commis-
sioners except Bruce expressed alarm about the effect of the plan on 
bl · .. . h· . . 48 pu lC oplnlon In t elr respectlve countrles. In New Zealand the pro-
posals produced a reaction of almost universal disillusionment. 
Berendsen later told Ben Cockram of the Dominions Office that the plan 
had corne 49 as an "absolute bombshell". The Press charged that Britain 
and France had invited Ethiopia "to accept a settlement which is in some 
way a more flagrant violation of the League Covenant than the settlement 
ff d · M h . f h J .. ,,50 e ecte In anc urla a ter t e apanese lnvaSlon. The LNU urged the 
government to condemn the plan and to declare that sanctions should con-
tinue until Italy accepted a League settlement. Not surprisingly, this 
vigorous policy aroused dissension among pacifist and conservative mem-
bers who doubted the League's ability to enforce peace, and some of them 
51 
withdrew from the LNU. 
The Labour Government which took office on 6 December 1935, had 
been elected on a platform which included a foreign policy reflecting 
the Party's internationalism. Labour's manifesto promised a policy 
designed to seek international economic co-operation and to promote dis-
armament and world peace. Most importantly, Labour committed itself to 
do everything within its power to advance the idea of international 
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co-operation through h f N " 52 t e League 0 atlons. When the new government 
was informed of the terms of the Hoare-Laval Plan by the British on 10 
December 1935, the Prime Minister was confronted with an unexpectedly 
early test of Labour's loyalty to those principles. On 13 December 
1935, Savage replied politely but firmly that while his government 
appreciated the difficulty of the situation they very much regretted 
that they were quite unable to associate themselves with the propo-
53 
sals. Although Savage later agreed not to make his objection public, 
it was an important indication of Labour's willingness to adopt a posi-
" "d d f h f h B " " h G 54 tlon In epen ent 0 t at 0 t e rltls overnment. South Africa also 
d b h dl" d 55 proteste ut the ot er Dominions not. In the ensuing fuss in 
Britain, Hoare was forced to resign and was replaced as Foreign Secre-
tary by Anthony Eden. 
What Parr mildly called the "precipitate and unwise action" of the 
56 British and French Governments had a devastating effect on the League. 
It proved impossible to recapture the impetus and confidence of the pre-
vious deliberations of the Co-ordination Committee. The question of 
tougher measures was put off because there was no longer any guarantee 
of collective action. "In the meantime," cabled Parr on 24 December 
1935, "soft pedal to be keynote to League's action.,,57 It was not until 
the Italians began their conquest of Ethiopia in earnest from February 
1936 that any further consideration was given to an oil embargo. In 
several meetings with the Dominion High Commissioners, Eden stated that 
Britain would support sanctions on oil but it would not take the initia-
tive on the 58 matter. The tentativeness of the British approach con-
vinced Parr that there was little hope of the League taking stronger 
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action against Italy. He saw no point in declaring New Zealand's sup-
port for further sanctions, though he strenuously resisted any sugges-
tion that the existing sanctions should be lifted. 59 
While the League considered its next move, the Italian forces 
quickly defeated the Ethiopians. On 6 May 1936, Mussolini announced the 
annexation of Ethiopia and three days later the King of Italy assumed 
the title of Emperor. It was a grievous blow to the League. With the 
continuation of sanctions seemingly futile, many states wanted them 
dropped as soon as possible. At a meeting of the Dominion High Commis-
sioners with MacDonald on 6 May 1936, Canada and Australia were already 
60 
advocating this course. But Parr and the others thought it too soon 
and favoured continuing sanctions until the situation became 61 clearer. 
The New Zealand Government 62 agreed. Parr noted, however, that the 
divisive effect of the issue on British opinion and the Dominions was 
making the British Government's position very difficult. 63 
More seriously, the humiliating defeat of the League had led to 
questions about its structure and whether the Covenant needed amending. 
It particular, the reluctance of many members to contemplate military 
action or even the full implementation of economic sanctions under the 
Covenant suggested that the League's survival might be more certain if 
the sanctions Articles were removed. (The resultant attempt to reform 
the Covenant is discussed in Chapter 10.) The question was whether 
collective security was still a viable principle. Parr certainly be-
lieved the Ethiopians had been "deluded into grievous disaster" by the 
League but he put the blame less on the inadequacies of the Covenant 
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than on the fact that "no nation was prepared to go into war against 
Italy and [the] Italians knew it.,,64 
In New Zealand, the National Party was expressing strong reserva-
tions about continuing sanctions and the League's ability to enforce 
collective security. Speaking in Parliament on 15 May 1936 on the 
League of Nations Sanctions Regulations Confirmation Bill, the Leader of 
the Opposition said that sanctions were a farce. Forbes said the 
idealism of the League's supporters had blinded them to the practical 
difficulties of the course it had chosen to follow. Sanctions had been 
designed to prevent Italy going to war but they had had the opposite 
effect. It was now time to admit failure and abandon sanctions before 
more damage was done, particularly to Anglo-Italian relations. He stat-
ed that the League had been tried as a peacemaker and had been found 
wanting. Though Forbes thought the League should be replaced, he had no 
suggestions as to what the replacement should be. 65 
By contrast, the Labour Party had no doubt the League must survive 
and the Covenant be upheld. Savage defended the idealism behind the 
League and its actions. He noted that sanctions had had only a few 
months to prove their effectiveness. The government believed that "the 
only alternative to the collective peace system is that of despair - to 
arm as rapidly and completely as possible and prepare for a reversion to 
the barbarous days of war." 66 While focussing more on the practical 
difficulties of the situation, John A. Lee and other Labour MPs also 
affirmed their support for the League. Blaming the Great Powers for 
failing to give a lead against Italy, they advocated the reconstruction 
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of the League to give it the power to enforce sanctions against aggres-
67 
sors. National's Keith Holyoake warned the government against outrun-
" bl" "" 68 b I" k h f A I" C d n~ng pu ~c op~n~on, ut un ~ e t e governments 0 ustra ~a, ana a 
and Britain, the New Zealand Government faced little overt opposition to 
the direction of its foreign policy. Given a clear lead, most New Zea-
landers were content to allow Labour to pursue its strongly pro-League 
policy. 
The situation was less clear-cut for the British Government. The 
Dominion High Commissioners were told on 8 June 1936 that Britain would 
not propose the removal of sanctions at the next Assembly but nor would 
it oppose removal if h "f b "f 69 P t e major~ty 0 mem ers were ~n avour. arr 
considered this a weak attitude in view of Britain's past leadership of 
the sanctions movement. 70 Yet even New Zealand and South Africa had to 
admit that support for sanctions had collapsed. In his instructions to 
Parr on 15 June 1936, Savage reiterated his government's support for the 
League and collective action. He conceded, however, that New Zealand 
was not directly affected by the dispute and thus could not with propri-
ety oppose the abandonment of sanctions should this be the wish of the 
majority of League members. Nevertheless, the government would only 
accept such removal on the condition that the question of the League's 
future should be considered at the September 1936 Assembly, preferably 
71 in consultation with all the nations of the world. 
The British learned of New Zealand's views at a meeting between 
Eden, MacDonald and the Dominion High Commissioners on the following 
day. Perhaps mindful of the Dominion's traditional desire for imperial 
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unity, Parr said New Zealand would acquiesce in the removal of sanctions 
if this was the wish of the majority of Commonwealth members. Closely 
questioned by the South African High Commissioner on this apparent soft-
ening of New Zealand's attitude to sanctions, Parr declared that his 
government would not oppose the British Government on the question. As 
a result, MacDonald told the Cabinet on 17 June 1936 that while New Zea-
land would like sanctions to be continued and increased, it was likely 
to fall into line with whatever Britain proposed. 72 Whether Parr deli-
berately misrepresented the government's views is unclear but he cer-
tainly believed he had some discretion in carrying out his instructions. 
He was particularly doubtful whether Savage's condition on accepting the 
removal of sanctions should be pressed. Parr evidently felt that since 
sanctions had failed, there was little point in making further difficul-
ties for the British Government and he warned Savage that a maverick 
image for New Zealand at the June 1936 Assembly might affect the Dom-
inion's bid for the Council in September,73 
Replying on 1 July 1936, Savage reproved Parr for questioning his 
instructions. He said that the importance of the issue of the 
future constitution of the League was such that New Zealand would raise 
it at the September Assembly regardless of the outcome of the current 
session. Noting press speculation that the next session might be post-
poned, Parr was instructed to tell the Assembly that New Zealand depre-
cated any delay and to point out that one of the League's greatest weak-
. d . d d· ff· I· 74 h h nesses was ~ts ten ency to avo~ ~ ~cu t ~ssues. T at t e govern-
ment was not prepared to give Parr the discretion he had enjoyed under 
the previous government suggests that Savage and his collegues may have 
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had doubts whether Parr's views fully accorded with their own. The fact 
that the government had already decided on Parr's successor and was try-
ing to persuade him to retire before the September 1936 Assembly, indi-
cates that the League was regarded as important enough for the Labour 
Government to want its own man leading the New Zealand delegation to 
75 Geneva. 
Apart from an expression of New Zealand's profound disappointment 
at the failure of the League and a declaration of the Dominion's contin-
ued loyalty, Parr's speech to the Assembly on 2 July 1936 followed the 
line 76 of Savage's instructions exactly. New Zealand's stand was well-
. d . G dB" 77 rece~ve ~n eneva an r~ta~n. But with only New Zealand and South 
Africa in favour of continuing sanctions, the decision to lift them from 
15 J I 1936 . . bl 78 u y was ~nev~ta e. The problem which remained was whether 
the members of the League would recognise Italian sovereignty over Ethi-
apia. The Assembly did not reaffirm the policy of non-recognition but 
Ethiopia's position within the League remained unclear. Was an Ethiopi-
an delegation still entitled to a seat at the Assembly and, if so, would 
Mussolini carry out his threat to leave the League? These questions 
were to the fore when the Seventeenth Assembly opened on 21 September 
1936. 
The New Zealand delegation was the strongest it had been for a 
decade. It included Parr, Berendsen, Knowles, the Liason Officer for 
Foreign Affairs in 79 London, Sir Cecil Day, and Dr R.M. Campbell. As 
the High Commissioner's Economic Adviser, Richard Mitchelson Campbell 
became a very influential adviser to Labour's new representative in 
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London, and helped shape his strongly pro-League stance. Campbell was 
born in Maungataupere in 1897 and joined the Education Department in 
1914. Appointed private secretary to Coates in 1926, he was awarded a 
scholarship to London University the following year, where he gained a 
PhD in Economics. From 1929 until 1931 he was a Commonwealth Harkness 
Fellow in the United States. In 1931 Campbell returned to New Zealand 
as private secretary to Coates and in 1935 he was appointed to London. 
Described as a "quick-silver man", he was almost a one-man overseas 
diplomatic service for New Zealand, "handling everything from meat 
quotas to policy at the League of Nations.,,80 
The delegation was led by the new High Commissioner, William Joseph 
Jordan. Born to a poor family in Ramsgate, Kent, in 1879, Jordan had 
worked in the post office, as a London policeman and a wagon-painter for 
a haulage firm before emigrating to New Zealand in 1904. After working 
in rough country jobs, he became a self-employed house painter. During 
the war he was badly wounded while serving in the army, where he rose to 
the rank of sergeant major. A Labour Party pioneer, Jordan unsuccess-
fully contested the Raglan seat in 1919 before becoming MP for Manakau 
from 1922 until 1936. He was Party President from 1932 to 1933. 
A close friend of Savage, the bluff and sociable Jordan was, from a 
public relations standpoint, an excellent choice to articulate Labour's 
policy at the League. A Christian Socialist with a background as a 
Methodist Home Missionary, Jordan took to Geneva a strong, even naive, 
faith that the world's problems would respond to straightforward human 
decency and goodwill. 81 Frank Walters, a former Deputy Secretary-
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William Jordan 
General, described him as "a truly English figure, who might have step-
ped straight from the ranks of Cromwell's New Model Army, [and who] not 
infrequently embarrassed the Council by a tendency to quote the Bible 
and to pour ridicule on the best-accepted euphemisms of diplomacy.,,82 
Perhaps this fervour explains why his speeches were often strong on 
ideals but weak on actual solutions. Among contemporary observers, it 
was believed that Jordan had "little comprehension of the more profound 
aspects of affairs" but W 1 . d d h· h d 1··· 83 i son conS1 ere 1m a s rew po 1t1c1an. '-
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John A. Lee remarked: "Bill was a Gallup poll politician before Gallup 
poll was invented. He felt every breeze with his cheek and adjusted his 
course accordingly.,,84 
Jordan had a violent temper and was extremely jealous of his dig-
nity and independence. Alice Massey, the wife of the Canadian High Com-
missioner, observed that "his shoulders are just covered with chips.,,85 
Confident he and Savage shared the same views, Jordan resented Welling-
ton's attempts to make him conform to the Cabinet's instructions. His 
relations with Savage's most influential collegues, Deputy Prime Minis-
ter Fraser and Finance Minister Nash were decidedly cool. In fact, he 
was regarded as an incompetent administrator by Nash and Berendsen. The 
latter later commented that those who knew Jordan's many faults and 
limitations must have been surprised at the unquestionable success of 
h ' , 86 ~s representat~on at Geneva. 
The Assembly was of special importance to New Zealand because it 
was seeking the Dominions' seat on the Council. In April 1936, Parr 
reminded the government that Australia's term would expire in September 
and that New Zealand was entitled to take its place as the Dominion next 
in seniority. He said it was vital to maintain the continuity of Domin-
ion representation on the Council because any break would make it diffi-
cult to secure the election of a Dominion in the future, and would de-
prive the British representative of the support which had been so help-
ful in the past. 87 That the government was already considering New Zea-
land's candidacy indicates that Labour saw a Council seat as a logical 
extension of the Dominion's foreign policy based on the Covenant, and an 
opportunity to promote its views at the highest international 
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88 level. 
It was fortuitous that this opportunity to join the Council coincided 
with the first New Zealand government to take an active interest in 
League affairs. 89 
Having confirmed New Zealand's candidature at the June Assembly, 
Parr began 90 canvassing for support. Although the Dominion's election 
was almost a foregone conclusion, the fact that an independent New Zea-
land voice was being heard on the Ethiopian and Covenant reform ques-
tions undoubtedly boosted its chances of success. New Zealand was 
elected to the Council on 28 September 1936 and Jordan duly took his 
seat on 2 91 October 1936. Initially, he adopted a cautious attitude, 
for as he explained to Savage: 
It is very evident that ideas and plans cannot be stubbornly adhered 
to all the while, and I shall guard against any appearence of being 
unreasonable, as such an action would not only not be well for our 
Dominion, but it might easily embarrass Britain and our other Domin-
ions. 92 
But his first Council session also shattered some of Jordan's illusions 
about the League. Writing to Savage afterwards, he said: "To be 
frank, the spirit of Geneva is somewhat disappointing on account of the 
lack of candour on the part of some of the Nations ..• We feel that while 
Nations are conferring with us in the Council they may be separately 
f · . h h" 93 con errlng Wlt one anot er ... He quickly learned that the reality 
of Geneva fell far short of Labour's ideal. 
The Ethiopian question caused problems for the Assembly as soon as 
it opened. The proceedings began in the usual way by setting up a com-
mittee to examine and report on the credentials of the delegates. 
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Normally uncontentious, the deliberations of the Credentials Committee 
had assumed special significance because of the question whether the 
credentials of the Ethiopian delegation, issued by a head of state who 
no longer appeared to possess any authority in his country, were suf-
ficient. In the past the committee had mainly comprised the delegates 
of small states, but the possible political ramifications of the issue 
made it difficult to find delegates willing to serve. Unexpectedly, 
therefore, the committee was composed of a number of leading delegates, 
including the representatives of Britain, France and the Soviet Union. 94 
Even more surprising was the election of Jordan to the committee, on the 
nomination of the British delegation. Perhaps the fact that New Zealand 
was about to become a member of the Council had some influence on the 
decision. The British certainly cannot have assumed New Zealand 
would support the British and French plan to have the Ethiopian applica-
tion rejected. 
The difficulties facing the committee were revealed by the unprece-
dented length of its deliberations. Eden and French Foreign Minister 
Yves Delbos argued strongly against admitting the Ethiopians but the New 
Zealanders were determined that the League should not condone the 
results of aggression in this manner. Appalled by the unwillingness of 
many of the delegates to take a firm stand on the issue, Berendsen asked 
whether there were any on the committee who denied the clear right of 
the victim of aggression to be represented at the League's enquiry into 
that aggression. The debate continued through three meetings of the 
committee until a consensus was reached on 23 September 1936. 95 Though 
Jordan later denied press reports that there had been any disagreement 
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between the British and New Zealand delegates, he believed the New Zea-
landers had influenced the line taken by the committee in its 96 report. 
This stated that while there were serious doubts about the status of the 
Ethiopian delegation, the committee recommended that it be given the 
benefit of the doubt and be allowed to sit during the present session. 
The Assembly accepted the report with an overwhelming majority. 
The government derived some satisfaction from New Zealand's role in 
preventing the League from surrendering further to Italian demands, 
especially in light of Mussolini's involvement in the Spanish Civil 
97 War. But the Assembly largely avoided the Ethiopian issue, much to the 
dissatisfaction of the British. Worried by German aggressiveness and 
intent on restoring good relations with Italy, the British Government 
regarded the non-recognition of the Italian annexation of Ethiopia as 
untenable. New Zealand was told on 26 April 1937 that Britain proposed 
to end the present anomalous situation. Because a number of countries 
now recognised the King of Italy as Emperor of Ethiopia, the British 
Government believed the League should allow individual members to decide 
whether they should accord recognition. Britain wanted the question 
discussed at the Imperial Conference, due to open on 14 May 1937, in an-
98 
ticipation of the Assembly session later the same month. 
It is clear from the criticism in Parliament and the press that 
conservative opinion in New Zealand was concerned by Labour's opposition 
to Britain's League policy. The Governor-General, Lord Galway, shared 
that concern. In a letter to acting Prime Minister Fraser, he said that 
since recognition of the conquest was inevitable it would be better for 
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the Ethiopians if that recognition was given sooner rather than later. 
Fraser replied that the government was pledged to defend the League and 
that the British proposal would have unacceptable ramifications. He 
said that this course would set a precedent for the recognition of 
Japan's conquest of Manchuria and of the rebels in Spain. He felt 
the principles involved were of vital concern to the League and he hoped 
that a solution could be reached which would not deal a "final and fatal 
blow" to the League. Fraser's own opinion was that New Zealand should 
"hesitate very much before acquiescing in the recognition of the Italian 
conquest of Abyssinia." The government would not make its final decis-
ion, however, until the other members of the Commonwealth had been con-
100 
suIted. 
Berendsen's briefing papers for the New Zealand delegation to the 
1937 Imperial Conference show the government was greatly disturbed by 
the lack of consistency in British policy towards the League and blamed 
the Great Powers for the League's weakness during the recent . 101 crlses. 
Thus the Dominion's delegates were anxious to discuss the Ethiopian dis-
pute and h I h ' . d d' .. 102 t e Commonwea t s attltu e to en lng non-recognltlon. 
At a meeting devoted to the issue, the British delegates urged the 
Dominions to accept their proposal in order to avert the possibility of 
war. The Australian and Canadian representatives were easily persuaded 
but South African Prime Minister General Hertzog doubted whether any 
form of recognition was compatible with the Covenant. Jordan was again-
st any solution which conflicted with the Covenant but Savage was more 
willing to compromise. 103 He was prepared to agree to a postponement of 
a decision on Ethiopian representation until the Covenant had been over-
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hauled. Ethiopia would technically remain a League member and the pos-
sibility of an Italian defection would be reduced. 104 
Savage's amenable attitude may have raised British hopes that New 
Zealand would prove less difficult than was initially feared. But at the 
meeting of the principal delegates immediately afterwards, Savage de-
livered a speech which was severely critical of British policy. 
The reason for this abrupt change can be attributed to the fact that the 
speech 105 was written by Berendsen and Nash. In what Lord Zetland, the 
Secretary of State for India, called "a sermon on the immorality o·f 
B ' , h f' 1'" 106 d h h h rltls orelgn po lCY, Savage trace t e un appy recent istory of 
the League and castigated the British for their role in those failures. 
Referring to the Ethiopian dispute, he stated that the whole world 
had applauded the policy articulated by Hoare at the 1935 Assembly. 
Describing the Hoare-Laval Plan as an "amazing reversal of this policy", 
Savage argued that the British Government's "complete abandonment of the 
principles which the nations of the world •.• were accepting with an en-
thusiasm and fervour unknown in the past, dealt ••. a heavy blow to the 
League." He said: 
In the judgement of the New Zealand Government, the results of the 
deplorable plan to buy off the aggressor at half price were, are and 
will be disastrous from the point of view of the world in general and 
the collective peace system in particular ••• There can be no suggest-
ion that this plan was anything but a drastic departure from the an-
nounced Commonwealth policy of supporting the League of Nations and 
the collective peace system of the Covenant - a departure on which 
the Dominions were not consulted and the evil effects of which they 
were powerless to prevent. Indeed, I feel it my bounden duty to say 
with all solemnity that we simply cannot risk another case of this 
nature. No one can confidently assert that another such alteration 
of policy without consultation might not split the British Common-
wealth from end to end. 
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Savage concluded that in any future struggle between Fascism and demo-
cracy, the New Zealand Government would not be a party to a Commonwealth 
policy which favoured the former. 107 
Stung by this criticism, Eden asserted that Britain could not be 
blamed for not promoting stronger measures against Italy when there was 
not even universal support among League members for economic sanctions. 
He admitted there had been inconsistencies but claimed that the element 
of expediency must, to some degree, enter into the conduct of foreign 
l ' 108 po lCY. British ministers regarded New Zealand's idealistic and 
moralistic f 1 " 1 1 ' , 109 oreign po lCY Slmp y as too unrea lStlC. With the rest 
of the Commonwealth falling into line behind Britain, New Zealand was 
d d bl d 1 '1 ' 110 un er consi era e pressure to 0 lceWlse. MacDonald saw Nash on 28 
May 1937 and told him that New Zealand was obstructing general agreement 
on policy. He said the Dominion's attitude seemed to be that everything 
should be subordinated strictly to carrying out the letter of the Cove-
nant. This observation seemed to shock Nash who retorted that the views 
of New Zealand were, in fact, closer to those of Britain than were the 
views of any other Dominion. He explained that while New Zealand felt 
the British had not carried out proper League policy on some occasions, 
the Dominion would never make this criticism public and it would 
1 b k B ' , 111 a ways ac rltaln. MacDonald was not wholly convinced and he still 
expected the New Zealanders to oppose Eden's 'realistic' League pol-
, 112 
lCY· 
In the event, an immediate decision on Ethiopia became unnecessary 
because Haile Selassie did not send a delegation to the May 1937 
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Assembly. But with New Zealand still at odds with the rest of the Com-
monwealth at the Imperial Conference over League policy, the possibility 
of a split remained. The deadlock was overcome by a proviso in the 
final resolution which left each member of the Commonwealth free to ad-
113 
vocate its own policy at Geneva. 
The Ethiopian issue remained a serious obstacle for Britain to an 
agreement to end Italian involvement in Spain. The New Zealand Govern-
ment was told on 7 August 1937 that only de jure recognition of the 
Italian annexation of Ethiopia would lead to a successful outcome of the 
continuing negotiations. Clearly the British intended to press the 
114 League to accept such recognition in the near future. Jordan appears 
to have accepted the British view because he advised the government 
that some consideration may have to be given to recognition despite 
h ' , d' , h I l' ,115 t e~r strong preJu ~ce aga~nst t e ta ~an act~ons. 
Savage and his collegues found the prospect of early de jure recog-
nition unacceptable. In a cable sent on 20 August 1937, the government 
expressed sympathy for the problems facing Britain but it firmly opposed 
any breach of the British-inspired resolution adopted by the Assembly 
in March 1932 which prevented League members from taking action in con-
travention of the Covenant or the Pact of Paris. New Zealand would only 
support de jure recognition if it was in accordance with a general reso-
lution 116 of the League. Perhaps prompted by British officials, Jordan 
tried again to persuade Wellington to drop its opposition. He said that 
unless the credentials of the British Ambassador to Rome acknowledged 
the King of Italy as Emperor of Ethiopia, Mussolini would insist that he 
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be withdrawn. If, however, Britain did recognise the annexation, it 
would be difficult for New Zealand to disassociate itself from the new 
credentials since it too was represented by the British Ambassador. It 
followed that the British Government could not support Haile Selassie's 
claim to a seat at the Assembly if recognition was accorded. Jordan 
warned that New Zealand's continued opposition would lead to a public 
split at 117 Geneva. Savage replied that the government had made its 
" 1 d J d b'd b ' 118 posltlon c ear an or an was to ale y It. 
Ironically, just as Jordan was pressing Wellington to support re-
cognition, the Indian National Congress was appealing to him to maintain 
his opposition to the British at the Assembly. In September 1937, Con-
gress President Jawaharlal Nehru urged Jordan to continue New Zealand's 
stand in defence of the cause of justice and the maintenance of interna-
tional law through the League. He said that because its representatives 
were nominated by the British Government, India was powerless to regis-
ter a protest on the recognition issue at the Assembly. Unwilling to 
allow the true views of India to pass unrecorded, Nehru hoped they would 
119 find vicarious expression through New Zealand. 
In the event, there was no inclination to raise the matter at the 
Assembly because of the overt Italian backing for the military rebels in 
S . 120 paln. Mussolini's response was to announce Italy's withdrawal from 
the League on 11 December 1937. For the British Government, already 
concerned by the growing ties between Italy, Germany and Japan, the 
Italian decision was a serious setback. On 27 January 1938, New Zealand 
learned that Britain was seeking a general agreement with Italy to ease 
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the acute situation in the Mediterranean. To secure an agreement, the 
B ' , h d' d ' ,,121 rltls were prepare to glve e Jure recognltlon. 
Though unwelcome, the British decision was not unexpected in 
W II ' 122 e lngton. The initial reaction was for Berendsen to draft a 
severely condemnatory reply. Dated 31 January 1938, the draft stated 
that while the government understood the inconvenience of the existing 
situation, it believed nothing short of national survival could warrant 
the reversal of the worldwide condemnation of Italy's deliberate and 
flagrant breach of international undertakings and of international 
decency. The government "cannot convince themselves that a policy of 
making friends with an unrepentant international criminal is in any way 
calculated to prevent international crime, or that it is in the long run 
likely to lead to peace or to improve the international situation." 
It was emphasized that the Dominion was alarmed by the continual 
retreat of the democratic powers before the threats of the dictators. 
New Zealand considered that the abandonment of the principles of inter-
national law and order would encourage further aggression and subversion 
by those who openly signified their contempt for such principles. The 
government simply was not prepared to purchase future immunity for the 
Dominion at the expense of other peoples who were, or may become, vic-
tims of aggression by a bargain based on national interests alone. The 
fact that trade negotiations between Italy and the United States had 
broken down over the recognition issue was used to show that not 
all powers supported the British appeasement policy. It was acknowledg-
ed that the New Zealand Government did not share the British Govern-
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ment's heavy responsibilities. Nevertheless, the Dominion found the 
British proposal unacceptable and the government reserved the right to 
. . 123 
make its views publlc lf necessary. 
The final version of New Zealand's reply, sent on 3 February 1938, 
contained none of the strongly critical language of the draft but the 
meaning was the 124 It is probable that the government was same. 
trying to strike a balance between its ideals and the realities of the 
situation. The Dominion was committed to supporting the League and the 
ideals embodied in the Covenant and the Pact of Paris. It was not, how-
ever, in a position to insist that Britain, which would be in the front-
line of any future conflict, must accept that policy also. Because New 
Zealand was 125 the only Dominion to oppose the British proposal, it is 
likely the government accepted there was little prospect of the British 
Government abandoning its policy of appeasing Italy. Any faint hope 
which remained evaporated with Eden's shock resignation on 20 February 
1938. 126 Eden had a perhaps undeserved reputation as a champion of the 
League and opponent of the dictators but his resignation was certainly 
prompted by an unwillingness to negotiate an agreement with Italy on 
Mussolini's 127 terms. With a sympathetic Foreign Secretary in Lord 
Halifax, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain was now free to 
pursue his appeasement policy unhindered. 
At the end of March 1938, the British Government decided that it 
must have the right to accord de jure recognition as a bargaining tool 
to obtain concessions from Italy. New Zealand was told that within a 
fortnight Britain intended to place the matter on the Council's agenda 
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for its meeting on 9 May 1938. 128 The British Cabinet was somewhat con-
cerned by the possibility that New Zealand might veto a resolution 
allowing individual League members to decide whether to recognise the 
annexation of Ethiopia. But MacDonald advised that the threat was not 
serious enough for Britain to alter its plans. Even if New Zealand 
would not support the British position, he hoped it could be persuaded 
b . 129 to a staln. With this object in mind, the New Zealand Government was 
130 
asked to look sympathetically on the British proposal. 
The gov~rnment was in a difficult position. The Dominion had on a 
number of occasions under Labour differed openly with Britain at the 
League. Yet the government shared the strong attachment of previous 
administrations to the principle of Commonwealth unity in foreign 
affairs. Opposing the British in an important Council vote was not a 
decision to be taken lightly. The Cabinet gave considerable attention 
to the . 131 questlon. Asked for his opinion, Jordan felt New Zealand 
could support Britain without compromising its principles. "To vote for 
a Resolution under which a country may act in the light of its own re-
quirements and wishes will not imply recognition of [the] conquest on 
our part, and I will make our position clear in [the] Council.,,132 
Berendsen took the opposite view. He was unconvinced that circum-
stances had changed sufficiently to warrant a reversal of the govern-
mentIs stand. He was also sceptical of the value of Italy's promises 
and he questioned whether British policy was not more concerned with 
safeguarding Britain's security in the present, than ensuring the long-
term peace of the world as it claimed. Berendsen pointed out that the 
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issue should properly be put before the Assembly and he implied that the 
British Government had only consulted New Zealand in order to pressure 
h b d ·· . 11 b . .. 133 t e Dominion into a an onlng ltS potentla y em arrasslng Opposltlon. 
The Cabinet accepted Berendsen's advice. London was told on 5 
April 1938 that New Zealand regretted it could not support the planned 
resolution. Reiterating the views it had expressed previously, the 
government stated that the principle involved was too important to be 
decided by the select few who comprised the Council. The Dominion's 
representative would be instructed to press for the matter to be 
referred to the Assembly. If a vote was taken, however, Jordan would 
abstain. It was felt that New Zealand could not responsibly oppose the 
views of states more directly affected by the situation. 134 
New 135 Zealand's compromise was not welcomed in London. The Brit-
ish Government was anxious to keep recognition separate from the quest-
ion of Ethiopia's membership of the League. If the matter was put be-
fore the Council alone, an Ethiopian delegate could attend without 
credentials and the discussion would be confined to the British propo-
sal. Should the Assembly become involved, the examination of the Ethi-
opian credentials would inevitably require the Assembly to decide 
whether Ethiopia was still a League member. Britain believed that such 
a debate could be very damaging to the League and lead to further divis-
136 ion in an already divided Europe. The probability that Britain would 
face embarrassing criticism of its policy towards Italy was undoubtedly 
another consideration behind the British request for New Zealand to re-
137 
consider its intention to involve the Assembly. 
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The Labour Government had been reluctant to air its differences 
with the Chamberlain Government in order to preserve the appearence of 
imperial unity. Savage was thus incensed when the Dominions Secretary 
appeared to exploit this reluctance by his statement in the House of 
Commons that neither New Zealand nor any other Dominion had expressed 
disagreement with British foreign policy. Corning at a time when the 
Dominion was under pressure to abandon a course of action deemed detri-
mental to British interests, it was difficult not to conclude that 
MacDonald's statement was designed to force the New Zealand Government's 
hand. London was told on 13 April 1938 that unless the report proved to 
be incorrect or some form of public clarification was made, Savage would 
be forced to make the Dominion's position public. 138 MacDonald quickly 
replied that his statement had been misreported. Reluctant to make any 
further public comment for fear of implying there was a split in 
the Commonwealth, he was annoyed to learn that Savage had already in-
formed the press that MacDonald's statement did not accurately state the 
attitude of New Zealand towards British foreign policy.139 Embarrassed 
by the widely-reported disagreement, the British would have preferred 
that Savage settle the affair 140 by admitting he had been in error. 
Savage was not prepared to be so accomodating. MacDonald was obliged 
to tell the House of Commons lamely that the unfortunate incident had 
b d b . 1 . d d' b h . d 141 een cause y a s~mp e m~sun erstan ~ng on ot s~ es. 
Britain now had even more reason to fear that New Zealand would 
prove troublesome at the next Council meeting. Nevertheless, with the 
signing of the Anglo-Italian agreement on 16 April 1938, it was cornmit-
ted to securing the League's acquiescence to the eventual de jure 
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recognition of the annexation of Ethiopia. Prompted by Jordan's request 
for instructions, the New Zealand Government had to decide whether it 
would pursue the course outlined in its cable of 5 April to 142 London. 
The Cabinet met on 5 May 1938 and one can only conclude from its in-
structions to Jordan that it was considered to be neither in the inter-
ests of the Commonwealth nor the League to oppose Britain in the Coun-
cil. The decision to abstain from voting on any motion on Ethiopia was 
reaffirmed but Jordan was told that the government no longer believed 
there was anything to be gained by referring the matter to the Assem-
bly.143 
Labour had always defended its right to express views at the League 
which were not in accordance with those of Britain. But Savage and his 
collegues were pragmatists who knew there were limits to this freedom of 
. 144 
express~on. 
1938: 
As Berendsen explained in a memorandum prepared in mid-
The New Zealand Government are convinced that their views are sound 
and morally right and that ... these views ••• are shared by the large 
mass of mankind .•• but at the same time we realize that this Dominion 
is small and isolated and that the opinion of those Governments more 
directly concerned must of course be given the greatest possible 
weight. On these grounds, therefore, the New Zealand Government, 
after expressing these views have been careful not to oppose the 
policy of the British Government .•• Even where (as on the Council and 
in the Assembly of the League) New Zealand has a decisive vote .•. we 
have always abstained from voting against the British Government. --
He said there could be no suggestion, therefore, of any disloyalty to 
145 Britain by New Zealand. 
While Jordan's instructions may have been written with an eye to 
the practical difficulties of the situation, the determination to defend 
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the institutions of the League remained. Britain and the other Council 
members would undoubtedly have preferred to exclude the Ethiopian dele-
gate from the Council's deliberations. At a private meeting of the 
Council, New Zealand and the Soviet Union strongly objected to any 
attempt to deny Ethiopia its rights. Citing Article 4 of the Covenant, 
Jordan said the Ethiopians were entitled to attend and he criticised the 
secrecy surrounding the discussion. After a stormy three hours, the 
Council agreed to admit the Ethiopian delegation. 146 
The discussion of the British proposal was held on 12 May 1938. 
Jordan believed that most of the delegates had already made up their 
minds on the issue even before hearing Haile Selassie's speech. 147 Only 
China and the Soviet Union joined New Zealand in objecting to recogni-
tion. In his speech, Jordan asked how any delegate could remain unmoved 
after listening to the Emperor's account of the sufferings endured by 
his people. He reminded the delegates that every League member had 
accepted the obligations of the Covenant and it was their failure to 
apply the Covenant, rather than any inherent fault in the instrument it-
self, which had resulted in the current situation in Ethiopia. Jordan 
declared his government's continued support for the League and he 
suggested that the acceptance of the British resolution would be regard-
ed as a surrender to aggression and a further step in the retreat from 
collective security. 
Though the government had decided not to press for the matter to be 
referred to the Assembly, Jordan made it clear that New Zealand 
would support such a proposal if it was put before the Council. 148 He 
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said that if recognition was ever afforded, it should be in accordance 
with a general resolution of the League and not by the separate decis-
ions of individual members. New Zealand could not support any proposal 
which involved, either directly or by implication, approval of a breach 
of 149 the Covenant. Jordan's speech was motivated not only by sympathy 
for the Ethiopian cause but also by a strong desire to prevent the Cove-
nant and certain Assembly resolutions from becoming "mere scraps of 
150 paper". 
With unanimity in doubt, the British motion was not put to the 
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vote. The majority of the Council members were clearly in favour of 
individual action, however, and this was enough to convince Britain that 
it was now free to grant recognition as it saw fit. The opponents of 
recognition had only achieved a hollow victory but Jordan reported that 
the Opposition parties and a large section of the Conservative Party in 
Britain agreed with the New Zealand attitude. The Manchester Guardian 
also suggested that there were many who approved of the Dominion's line 
and it praised New Zealand for continuing the honourable traditions of 
British foreign policy which it believed the Chamberlain Government had 
betrayed. Jordan's speech was well-received in the British press and 
prompted many messages of congratulation from individuals and organisa-
tions in Britain and elsewhere, including a letter of thanks from Haile 
S 1 . 152 e aSSle. 
The fact that New Zealand had openly disagreed with the British at 
Geneva did not give Jordan cause for concern. He claimed that relations 
between the two delegations continued to be completely cordial and he 
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told Savage that he had worked closely with the British delegates during 
the Council session. While Jordan had resisted British pressure to mod-
ify his speech to make it less critical, he had allowed Halifax to make 
some minor textual changes. In his opinion there was little point in 
New Zealand being a member of the Council if it merely echoed the Brit-
ish line on every issue. He believed that New Zealand's willingness to 
take a position which differed from that of Britain meant the Dominion's 
viewpoint was given its due weight by the other Council members when 
reaching a decision. Jordan argued that in this situation, New Zea-
land's support would be far more valuable to Britain when their respect-
. . d' d . . d 153 ive Views 1 cOinci e. 
Halifax did not see it that way. On 18 May 1938, he made it clear 
to his Cabinet collegues in London that he had found New Zealand's atti-
tude far from satisfactory. The Foreign Secretary pointed out that the 
New Zealand representative was due to take the chair at the next meeting 
of the Council and, unless Jordan changed his attitude, "this might be 
an embarrassment". Consideration was given to sending a message to 
Savage outlining the Cabinet's concern but there is no evidence that 
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such a message was despatched. 
Back home in New Zealand, Jordan's remarks in the Council provoked 
a barrage of criticism from the press and the National Party. It was 
argued that New Zealand was too vulnerable economically and strategical-
1y to risk alienating Britain. The New Zealand Herald said: "While New 
Zealand depends on British might for security, and on privileges in 
British markets for prosperity, the assertion of an opposite line in 
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foreign policy can only be described as stupid folly.,,155 Leader of the 
Opposition Adam Hamilton believed that at a time of rising international 
tension it was unacceptable for the government to contribute to the per-
ception that the Commonwealth was divided. 156 
With an eye to the election only a few months away, Hamilton intro-
duced a motion of no confidence in Parliament on 1 July 1938, which in 
part described Labour's foreign policy as a threat to the solidarity of 
the Empire. He declared "Perhaps the unity of the British Empire is a 
doubtful question these days, for our High Commissioner is apparently 
preferring to keep company more with the Russian delegates than with the 
B . . h d 1 ,,157 r1t1s e egates ••• National MPs asked how the government could 
reconcile its declared intention to stand by Britain with Jordan's 
speech to the League C ·1 158 ounC1 . Coates questioned whether Jordan's 
views, which he claimed had sharply divided opinion in the Dominion, 
actually reflected those of the government. He considered Chamberlain's 
policy to be the correct one and it was New Zealand's duty to support 
it. 159 Hamilton and Forbes emphasised this latter point by declaring 
that the League Council was not the place for the expression of the New 
Zealand Government's opinion. Rather it was a place for the expression 
of a united British Empire opinion. 160 The National Party had been 
strongly critical of the government's domestic policies, claiming they 
would lead to the Dominion's ruination. Clearly, it hoped to convince 
the electorate that Labour's foreign policy was also dangerous. 
The government vigorously defended both its policy and Jordan's 
actions at Geneva. Nash stated that Labour's foreign policy was based 
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on support for the League, which was consistent with the policy of pre-
vious New Zealand governments and also in line with that followed by the 
British Government until recently. If there was now a difference of 
opinion it was not because New Zealand had altered its views but rather 
the result of the other Commonwealth governments changing theirs. He 
said that the government would not slavishly follow the dictates of any 
one section or member of the Commonwealth, as National appeared to advo-
cate. Confident that New Zealand's views were shared by millions of 
people in Britain, Nash argued that the government was justified, there-
fore, in questioning the road the British Government was taking. 161 
Fraser echoed that view, saying: 
Whether Britain, or France, or Russia do or do not agree with us, the 
moral righteousness of New Zealand's attitude is not affected in the 
least. What does matter is that this country has to make up its own 
mind on international problems as a sovereign country ... 
Savage and Nash emphasised that Jordan's speech was in accordance with 
the government's instructions and they insisted the High Commissioner 
had their complete 162 support. Fraser said that "I hope the High 
Commissioner for New Zealand will never retreat from the position he 
took up and most certainly this Government never will.,,163 
The LNU appealed for the League to be kept above party politics but 
it too was divided. Left-leaning members such as Willis Airey, Craig 
MacKenzie and the President, F.L.W. Wood, criticised the British Govern-
ment and condemned the Opposition's attacks on Labour's policy. The 
conservatives backed Hamilton's views. But the LNU was a shadow of its 
former self. Just as the Ethiopian debacle signalled the beginning of 
the end for the League, so the LNU also went into a protracted decline 
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from 1936. It changed direction, advocating Covenant reform and 
'collective resistance', but by the end of 1938 the remaining hardcore 
conceded that the League had, in the shor~term, to be replaced by 
II ' 'F' 164 a lances agaInst asclsm. 
The British Government recognised the King of Italy as Emperor of 
Ethiopia on 16 November 1938. 165 Australia and South Africa quickly 
sent messages of 166 approval but New Zealand remained silent. 
Perhaps ignorant of the Dominions' constitutional relationship with 
Britain, the Italian Government believed that New Zealand was also com-
mitted to the terms of the Anglo-Italian agreement. In a letter to 
Berendsen on 17 November 1938, the Italian Consul, Dr B. d'Acunzo, com-
plained about a recent anti-Italian article in the Standard. Clearly 
under the impression that the paper was a government mouthpiece, he sug-
gested the article was not in accordance with the spirit of the Anglo-
Italian 167 agreement. The government took no action for, as Berendsen 
had pointedly reminded the Consul's predecessor, unlike the Italian 
168 press the New Zealand press was entirely free. 
The Italians were also mystified by New Zealand's failure to accord 
recognition along with the rest of the Commonwealth. In March 1939, 
d'Acunzo tried to persuade the British High Commissioner to New Zealand, 
Sir Harry Batterbee, to pressure Savage on the recognition issue, after 
his own approach had been unsuccessful. Batterbee declined to become 
, 1 d 169 lnvo ve . New Zealand continued to remain loyal to the League reso-
lution on non-recognition and, according to Berendsen, it gave the 
government particular satisfaction to address its declaration of war on 
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Italy in June 1940 to the King of Italy only.170 
The Ethiopian dispute was the League's greatest test and arguably 
its greatest failure. Unlike the Manchurian confict, there was no great 
crisis like the Depression to excuse that failure. The Assembly had 
unanimously agreed on action to stop Italian aggression. Sanctions were 
instituted but they were neither sufficient nor universally implemented 
to achieve their purpose, and the League was as much the loser as Ethio-
pia itself. In New Zealand's view, the members of the League had clear-
ly been found wanting, not the Covenant. Labour's loyalty to the League 
was undiminished and its commitment to democracy in the face of the 
Fascist challenge was unquestionable. There is good reason to believe 
that Britain's willingness to negotiate with Mussolini even as his 
forces were helping to snuff out a democratically-elected government in 
Spain, made the New Zealand Government even more determined to stand by 
its principles. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR, 1936-1939 
Unlike the other disputes which New Zealand was confronted with at 
the League during the late 1930s, the Spanish Civil War was an ideologi-
cal conflict. 1 Since the declaration of the republic in 1931, Spanish 
politics had become increasingly polarised between the Left and the 
Right. Though the Popular Front, a loose grouping of parties of the 
Left, won the February 1936 election, its fragile unity did not last. 
In the months following the election, Spain was wracked by political and 
economic instability. Among conservatives there were fears that the 
country was in danger of succumbing to Communism. Determined to stop 
the drift to the Left, senior officers of the Spanish Army plotted the 
overthrow of the government. 
The military uprising began in Spanish Morocco on 18 July 1936 and 
was followed by similar action on the mainland. The rebels qUickly took 
control of most of the northwest of Spain and they secured a foothold in 
the south but their plans were thwarted elsewhere by the strong resis-
tance of government sympathisers. A civil war was raging by August 
1936. Britain and France moved to prevent other nations from becoming 
involved and thus increasing the risk of the war spilling over into the 
rest of Europe. They promoted a Non-Intervention Agreement which sought 
to stop the flow of war materiel to both sides of the conflict. The 
Agreement was accepted by almost all European states by early September 
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1936, and a Non-Intervention Committee was established in London 
to co-ordinate its implementation. The Spanish Government was not 
represented on the Committee. 
From the beginning, the embargo was farcically one-sided in 
its operation. Italy, Germany and Portugal flouted the Agreement by 
sending massive aid to the rebels in the form of materiel and men. By 
contrast, the Spanish Government received only limited assistance from 
the Soviet Union, though thousands of volunteers from Western Europe and 
elsewhere poured into Spain determined to defend the country against 
Fascist aggression. Britain and France kept the embargo despite mount-
ing evidence that the policy of non-intervention was not working. 2 They 
feared any possibility of a head-on collision with the Fascist powers. 
For this reason, consideration of the dispute by the League was to be 
avoided by maintaining the fiction that the war was still a domestic 
problem for Spain. Indeed, pressure was brought on the Spanish Govern-
ment to refrain from appealing to the League during the Assembly in Sep-
3 
tember 1936. 
Although New Zealand was remote from these events, the involvement 
of the Fascist powers and the Soviet Union in Spain had a marked effect 
4 
on the attitudes of interested New Zealanders. For some, Spain was re-
garded as a battleground in the fight against Fascism. Among those who 
espoused the Spanish Republican cause were the small Communist Party, 
trade unions, academics, students, Methodists) and others with liberal 
or L f . . 5 e t-w~ng v~ews. 
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The Communist Party was the most prominent pro-Republican group, 
beginning its campaign of support in late July 1936 through its news-
paper, the Workers' Weekly, and the Movement Against War and Fascisrn. 6 
One of the Communists' early objectives was to form a Popular Front of 
all the Socialist elements in the Dominion, which would back the 
Spanish Government. Wary of becoming too closely associated with the 
extreme Left, the Labour Party refused to participate in such joint ac-
. 7 tlon. In spite of this rejection, the Communist Party continued to 
calIon the Labour Party and the government to reject the neutralism of 
the West European states and take a strong stand in support of the Span-
ish Government. 
In October 1936, the Communist Party condemned the Non-Intervention 
Agreement claiming it favoured the Fascists. It urged the government to 
press for the removal of the arms embargo and to demand that Britain 
should not give any assistance to the rebels. Three months later, it 
even went so far as to suggest that the government should sponsor a 
volunteer force to fight in Spain. The government's curt reply was that 
such action would be neither "politic nor expedient".8 In fact, 
it was to be the industrial wing of the Labour movement, rather than the 
political wing, which proved the most receptive to the Communist mes-
sage. 
The large militant trade unions like the General Labourers, Miners, 
Waterside Workers and Seamens Unions were strong supporters of the Span-
ish Government, although a number of others also passed pro-Republican 
resolutions during 1936. 9 At this stage, the war was seen as a class 
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struggle between the workers' government and the old oligarchy of aris-
tocratic landowners and the Catholic Church. The unions donated money 
for aid to Spain to demonstrate their solidarity with the Spanish work-
ers, which in turn led to establishment of Spanish Aid Committees. Com-
prising both Republican sympathisers and humanitarian groups, the Span-
ish Medical Aid Society(SMAC) was established in Dunedin in November 
1936 with the purpose of sending an ambulance to Spain as had been done 
, B" d A I' 10 In rltaln an ustra lao It was only one of a number of organisa-
tions which raised funds for Spain but their combined impact on the New 
Z 1 d bl ' 1 '1 I' , d 11 ea an pu lC was a most certaln y lmlte . 
Support for the Spanish rebels or Nationalists was largely confined 
to the Roman Catholic Church. 12 The Republican Government had angered 
Catholics with its efforts to curb the power of the Church in Spain, 
which had been accompanied by attacks on the clergy and the destruction 
of church property. The fact that the Soviet Union was assisting the 
Spanish Government convinced New Zealand Catholics that Spain was fall-
ing to Communism. In the Catholic press the war was portrayed as a 
battle between Catholic civilization and aetheistic Communist barbarism. 
In December 1936, Bishop Brodie of Christchurch condemned the Republican 
Government as a "disgrace to civilization". Not surprisingly, the 
activites of SMAC and other pro-Republican groups earned the hostility 
of the Catholic Church,13 
Pro- and anti-Republicans remained very much in the minority but 
their mere existence influenced the attitude of the leadership of both 
the LNU and the Labour Party, The possibility of a split in their 
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ranks was a major concern and it prompted both to maintain a low profile 
on the Spanish issue. 14 The fact that Labour was also the government 
party made it even more important for it to tread carefully. Despite 
pro-Republican resolutions by some Party branches and trade unions, the 
Standard insisted in October 1936 that "the New Zealand Labour Party has 
given no expression of opinion on affairs in Spain and that the Party is 
not committed by resolutions passed by individual " ,,15 Unlons. Preoc-
cupied with the government's domestic programme and anxious not to 
offend the Catholics or become associated with the Communists, the Party 
f 11 d h f " R b1" " 16 o owe a pat 0 cautlous pro- epu lcanlsm. 
The government's near silence on events in Spain during the early 
months of the war in part reflected this desire not to open divisions 
within the Dominion~ But it is also probable that the government was 
prepared to support the policy of non-intervention in the hope that it 
would confine the conflict to Spain and, most importantly, allow the 
Spanish to settle their own differences. 17 There is no doubt that the 
government's sympathies were with the Republican Government but this was 
not simply because it was the legitimately-elected constitutional 
authority of Spain, though this fact was often emphasised. It was also 
felt that both governments had broadly similar social-democratic, 
reformist policies which were opposed by conservatives within their 
respective " 18 countrles. In Parliament on 13 August 1936, Savage noted 
that his government had been able to implement its reforms "without 
knocking one hair off anyone's head", while blood was being shed in 
Spain to effect 19 similar changes. The government was thus concerned 
when it became apparent that the one-sided enforcement of the Non-Inter-
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vention Agreement was putting the Spanish Government at a serious disad-
vantage. 
The first indication that the Dominion was unhappy with British 
policy towards Spain came near the end of October 1936. There had been 
1 'b h ' 1 20 b 29 0 no consu tat~on etween t e two governments prev~ous y ut on cto-
ber 1936 New Zealand was advised that Britain was considering the possi-
bility of according de facto recognition to the Nationalist Government 
of General Francisco Franco in the near future. At that time the Repub-
lican forces were in retreat and the fall of Madrid seemed imminent. The 
British Government was anxious, therefore, to safeguard British inter-
, S ' h Id h N ' I' b ' , 21 ests ~n pa~n s ou t e at~ona ~sts e v~ctor~ous. In New Zealand's 
view, the proposal undermined the position of the legitimate government 
of Spain and the Dominion was adamently against any suggestion of recog-
nition in any 22 degree. In the event, the Nationalist offensive was 
halted and the British did not proceed with their proposal. In November 
1936, Italy and Germany did recognise Franco's regime, however, which 
prompted the Spanish Government to appeal to the League under Article 11 
of the Covenant. 
The Spanish move was not generally welcomed but it was put on the 
Council's agenda for its December 1936 meeting. 23 With the situation 
still unclear and the possible role of the League even more so, the New 
Zealand Government left it to Jordan to decide what the Dominion's atti-
tude would be in the Council. 24 At the meeting on 11 December 1936, the 
Spanish representative did not request the League to intervene but only 
to stop the evasions of the Non-Intervention Agreement. Because more 
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than half of the Council members were represented on the Non-Interven-
tion Committee also, there was no chance that the Committee's actions 
would be criticised. Nevertheless, the majority of the Council members 
were prepared to tighten the Agreement, particularly in regard to the 
entry of foreign volunteers into Spain, if this would keep the League 
out of the conflict. The only dissenting voice was that of the New Zea-
land representative. 
Jordan argued that it was the Council's duty to investigate the 
Spanish conflict fully and to take steps to encourage a settlement. He 
said that until the background of the dispute had been ascertained, the 
Council was not competent to make any decisions. It followed, there-
fore, that the views of both the warring sides should be heard. 
It is clear that Jordan was sceptical about the Nationalist claim that 
the revolt was justified because the actions of the Republican Govern-
ment were not in accordance with the wishes of the people. He said 
that "if a nation constitutionally elects a Government, that Government 
must surely be acceptable to the nation, more especially if it allows of 
means for its own removal." Yet Jordan believed the Council must be 
fair and invite those who opposed the Spanish Government to state their 
25 
case at Geneva. One suspects Jordan made his proposal in the certain 
knowledge that Franco would refuse to send a representative to Geneva, 
thereby proving the Nationalist's contempt for the League and the rule 
of law. But if his aim was to convince the Council that the Spanish 
Government had a just claim to League support he was unsuccessful. 
New Zealand was virtually alone in its determination to uphold the 
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principles of the League. The other Council members had little faith 
that the League could do anything after its failure over Ethiopia. In-
deed, they were anxious not to involve the League in any dispute 
to spare it further humiliation which would almost certainly destroy the 
organisation. For its part, the Spanish Government was unhappy about 
any proposal which even indirectly conferred legitimacy on the National-
ists. It simply wanted outside assistance to the rebels stopped so that 
the forces of the Republic could crush the rebellion. 
The Council completely ignored Jordan's suggestion. In what he 
described as "a striving after the barest minimum", the Council merely 
declared its support for the policy of non-intervention and offered the 
League's assistance S ., h 1 h h" 26 to paln s ea taut orltles. The Council's 
implicit abdication in favour of the London Committee pleased neither 
the Spanish representative nor Jordan. It was, believed Jordan, proper-
ly the League's responsibility to enforce non-intervention in order to 
create the conditions where a settlement might be possible. Still, he 
thought it was better to have an emasculated resolution than to confess 
the utter futility of the League as presently constituted. 27 
Britain may well have wished to remain outside the Spanish conflict 
but the presence of important British commercial interests and the pos-
sibility of a Nationalist victory made the British Government conscious 
of the need for an official representative in Franco's territory. On 19 
March 1937, New Zealand was informed that a British Agent was to be 
appointed 28 to Franco's headquarters at Salamanca. Though the British 
Government claimed the Agent's role would be restricted to trade rela-
267 
tions, the New Zealand Government regarded the move as nothing less than 
de facto recognition. In view of its opposition to the recognition of 
Italy's conquest of Ethiopia, the government not surprisingly found this 
proposal 29 equally unacceptable. London was told on 25 March 1937 that 
New Zealand was "firmly and unalterably opposed" to any action which 
could be interpreted as recognition of any administration other than the 
"lawfully constituted Government".30 
The British decided subsequently to put off the appointment of an 
Agent because of events . S . 31 In paln. During the early months of 1937, 
the actions of the Nationalists and their allies greatly disturbed Brit-
ish public opinion. The open acknowledgement by Italy that it intended 
to keep its forces in Spain to ensure a Nationalist victory and the en-
forcement of a blockade of the government-held northern port of Bilbao 
against British shipping, including food ships, provoked an adverse 
reaction in the press and in Parliament. This turned to outrage when 
the undefended town of Guernica was destroyed by German aircraft. 32 
Sympathy for the Spanish Government was growing and the British Govern-
ment realised that any form of recognition of Franco's regime would have 
b . 33 een unWlse. 
The New Zealand Government strongly defended the rights of the 
Spanish Government in Geneva and London but, to the c-1issatisfaction of 
Republican supporters at home, it did not condemn the Non-Intervention 
34 Agreement. Indeed, Labour tended to avoid giving any concrete support 
to the Republican cause. In March 1937, Savage declined to become the 
president of SMAC. 35 At Labour's annual conference the following month, 
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a remit urging the Party to raise funds for Spanish relief was defeated. 
In fact, Labour appears to have made a deliberate effort during the con-
ference to avoid the pitfalls of debating what exactly the war repre-
sented, in much the same way as the League had avoided defining the 
war's status in December 1936. 
As if to maintain the illusion that the war was still an internal 
Spanish problem, the conference's resolution was dealt with by the Gene-
ral Committee instead of the Defence, War and Peace Committee. Although 
the latter's approval of Jordan's actions at Geneva must also be 
seen as an endorsement of the government's Spanish policy, the confer-
ence clearly believed New Zealand's role was limited to offering moral 
support only. The resolution stated that 
Conference deplores foreign intervention in the Spanish Civil War and 
urges the New Zealand Government to press the Imperial Government to 
ensure the withdrawal of all foreign troops from that country and 
to leave the Spanish people to settle their own domestic difficul-
ties. 36 
Ironically, while Labour was looking to Britain to secure full compli-
ance with the terms of the Non-Intervention Agreement, British Republi-
can supporters, disappointed by their own government's inaction, had 
corne to regard New Zealand as the obvious candidate to lead the interna-
tional campaign in support of the Spanish Government. 
Nash arrived in Britain in December 1936 to discuss trade matters. 
His presence gave British pro-Republicans the opportunity to press their 
views. In a memorandum sent to Nash in February 1937, Geoffrey Bing, a 
Left-wing Labour Party activist, stated that the intervention of Italy 
and Germany in Spain was a violation of the Pact of Paris and the League 
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Covenant. As a champion of the League, New Zealand had a duty to use 
its membership of the Council and the Commonwealth to protest against 
this contravention of international law. Bing also believed that New 
Zealand's stand would galvanise opposition within Britain to the British 
Government's policy d ld f . I . . 37 an wou orce ~t to a ter ~ts v~ews. Bing and 
others were trying to convince the New Zealand Government that it was 
speaking for a large body of opinion in Britain and elsewhere. But if 
they hoped that the Dominion would openly condemn British policy, they 
were disappointed. 
Nash was certainly less tha~cencouraging in a letter to WilfFed 
Roberts, Labour MP for Northern Cumberland. Nash, Berendsen, and Nash's 
secretary and economic adviser, Dr William B. Sutch, had attended a 
lunch with Roberts and others on 14 May 1937 to discuss the Spanish 
issue. Nash said that he doubted whether there was anything the New 
Zealand Government 38 could do directly to assist the Republican cause. 
The government was naturally reluctant to be seen to meddle in the Brit-
ish political scene but, just as importantly, the Dominion was not pre-
pared to precipitate a public breach with Britain over Spain. Nonethe-
less, Nash, Jordan and their advisers were sympathetic to the plight of 
the Spanish Government and the views of people like Bing and Roberts 
probably served to reinforce those sympathies. 39 
Evidence of this is contained in a draft speech prepared for 
Jordan's possible use at the May 1937 Council. The authorship is uncer-
tain but Jordan later told Alister McIntosh, Berendsen's deputy in the 
Prime Minister's Department and Secretary of the new External Affairs 
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Department from 1943, that it had been written by Sutch. Certainly, 
Sutch was a strong supporter of the Republican cause, participating in 
demonstrations and meetings in London and New Zealand. 40 The forthright 
language of the draft indicates someone with strong views on the sub-
ject. The author wanted New Zealand to condemn the policy of non-
intervention and request the League to act under Article 10 of the Cove-
nant. 
The draft began by refuting claims that the Spanish conflict was a 
civil war. 
operated. 
It was on this premise that the Non-Intervention Committee 
Citing the evidence produced by the Spanish Government, it 
stated that foreign troops had invaded Spain to overthrow the constitu-
tional and democratic government. The members of the Council were warn-
ed that if they continued with the present "policy of drift", then all 
would become "accessories to another world war." The policy of non-
intervention was described as contrary to the Covenant. New Zealand had 
lost confidence in the London Committee, which "apparently does not even 
consider itself bound to secure respect for the obligations of the so-
called non-intervention policy that it was established to apply." The 
Committee was criticised for excluding a representative from Spain while 
allowing representatives of the aggressors to participate in its meet-
ings. It was suggested that non-intervention had been totally one-sided 
in its operation and, by hindering the Spanish Government's efforts to 
put down the rebellion, had been "conniving at a Fascist war of aggres-
sion for the purpose of destroying Spanish democracy and reducing Spain 
to the status of a Fascist province." 
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A resolution was proposed which would set a time limit for the Lon-
don Committee to secure both the withdrawal of foreign troops from Spain 
and the discontinuation of all assistance to the rebels. Should the 
Committee fail, the Council would be bound to take action under Article 
10. The draft concluded by stating that New Zealand believed it was 
neither in the interests of the League nor the Commonwealth for an inde-
pendent and democratic Spain to become the vassal of a Fascist power. 
The Dominion would, therefore, vote against any resolution which did not 
uphold the principles of the League rather than be a party to an attempt 
to deceive public opinion that something was being done when the oppo-
. 41 s~te was true. 
Though Nash, Savage, Jordan and their advisers agreed the Non-
Intervention Agreement was worthless and that the League should become 
involved in the search for a settlement, this draft speech was obviously 
too strongly worded. It directly challenged British policy and would 
have greatly embarrassed the British Government. But while the draft 
was discarded, the principal points Jordan made in his actual speech to 
the Council were derived from it. Notes by Nash on the back of the 
draft included: a demand for the withdrawal of all foreign combatants 
from Spain; a call for the Spanish people to be consulted as to their 
wishes; and an active role for the League in finding a solution to the 
conflict, either through the Non-Intervention Committee or, preferably, 
directly through the Council. 42 
The British press somehow obtained a copy or precis of the draft 
speech. Jordan claimed that Sutch was responsible. It seems improbable 
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that such a document would have been allowed to circulate publicly with 
official approval, especially as New Zealand's final statement probably 
had yet to be decided. One can only speculate that Sutch may have 
deliberately leaked the content of the draft speech to force the govern-
mentis 43 hand. What is certain, however, is that a rumour began to 
circulate that New Zealand intended to invoke Article 10 when the Coun-
44 
cil discussed Spain on 28 May 1937. 
Speaking first, the Spanish representative, Alvarez del Vayo, 
attacked the policy of non-intervention. Armed with a 'White Book' con-
taining documentary evidence of Italian involvement in Spain, del Vayo 
criticised the London Committee for ignoring the intervention of the 
Fascist powers. He called on the League to face up to its responsibili-
ties and use its influence to resolve the Spanish conflict. Litvinov 
supported the Spanish demand but the French and British delegates did 
not. Delbos and Eden reaffirmed their governments' faith in non-inter-
vention and stressed that the Council's resonsibility was to endorse the 
Non-Intervention Committee's efforts to secure the withdrawal of foreign 
1 f S · 45 vo unteers rom paln. 
It was then Jordan's turn to speak but he had to wait while Eden's 
speech was translated into French. Taking advantage of this interlude, 
the Foreign Secretary left his seat and, accompanied by his officials, 
went over to talk to Jordan. According to astonished observers, Eden 
leaned over Jordan's shoulder and spent ten minutes 'blue-pencilling' 
his 46 notes. Eden then returned to his seat and Jordan addressed the 
Council. He said the world had been shocked by events in Spain and 
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looked to the Council to take action. Noting the claims of Eden 
and Delbos that progress had been made since the last Council meeting, 
Jordan pointed out that this so-called progress had not prevented the 
loss of thousands of lives. He asked whether anyone doubted the accu-
racy of the claims of the Spanish Government and other sources that 
foreign powers were committing acts of aggression which threatened the 
political independence of Spain. Yet, he complained, the League had 
done nothing to investigate or settle the dispute. Instead, the only 
action taken so far by any power associated with the League was the 
imposition of an embargo which handicapped the legal government and 
strengthened the hand of the aggressors. 
Referring to the work of the Non-Intervention Committee, Jordan 
hoped it would be successful in facilitating the withdrawal of all 
foreign nationals from Spain. But he made it clear that New Zealand 
believed that the Spanish situation demanded more from the League than 
the simple acceptance of the policy of non-intervention imperfectly 
implemented by a non-League body. He suggested that a special committee 
of the Council should be established to study the Spanish problem and 
initiate action to bring the conflict to an end. As a concession to 
Britain and France, Jordan was prepared to allow the London Committee 
to continue its work, on the understanding that once the foreign nation-
als were withdrawn it would endeavour to arrange a peaceful solution to 
the conflict on the League's behalf. 
Jordan's object was plainly to integrate the London Committee's 
work into a broader effort by the League to find a solution acceptable 
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to the majority of the Spanish people. He asked: 
Would it be within the power of the Council to operate directly, or 
through the Non-Intervention Committee, so that, the cessation of 
hostilities having been achieved, the people of Spain could be assur-
ed of their own form of Government and that for a while the League 
might offer to assist in order that peace might be restored the more 
quickly? 
The only conclusion one can draw from this statement is that Jordan was 
advocating some form of League mandate or League-sponsored international 
supervision for Spain which would create the conditions necessary to 
stage d . I . 47 emocratlc e ectlons. Disregarding the fact that neither Spain 
nor a number of the Council members had a strong attachment to democra-
cy, Jordan proclaimed that the only satisfactory form of government was 
that elected by the people - a government which occupied its position at 
the request 48 of the governed. The other members of the Council found 
New Zealand's argument dangerously simplistic and its faith in the 
ideals of the League naive. They were prepared to do no more than sup-
port the work of the London Committee. 49 
The fact that New Zealand had not invoked Article 10 led to specu-
lation in the British press that Eden had pressured Jordan into modify-
ing his speech. It was claimed that Jordan had become flustered by 
Eden's interference with his notes and his speech's coherence had been 
affected as a result. Critics of British foreign policy like the New 
Statesman exploited the incident, citing it as an example of how far the 
British Government was prepared to go "in tenderness to Fascist suscep-
tibilities". Jordan was portrayed as the representative of a loyal mem-
ber of the League who had been publicly humiliated into withdrawing a 
proposal potentially embarrassing to Britain's policy of "one-sided non-
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, '" 50 lnterventlon . These reports angered and embarrassed Jordan. He 
emphatically denied that Eden had brought any pressure to bear, claiming 
he was too jealous of New Zealand's position in the League to submit to 
51 
the undue influence of another delegate. "It is true that Mr Eden and 
myself conferred regarding the speech I was about to make," he explain-
ed, "but neither Mr Eden's action nor mine was influenced thereby. We 
do desire, if practicable, to present similar cases to the League Coun-
'I ,,52 Cl • 
Because there are a number of versions of the so-called 'blue-pen-
cilling incident', it is difficult to know exactly what did 53 happen. . 
It does appear that British officials had sought to discover prior to 
the Council session what line New Zealand would take on the Spanish 
question but Jordan had, for some reason, been less than forthcoming. 
This reticence coupled with the possible Sutch leak and the rumours 
about New Zealand invoking Article 10, would certainly have alarmed 
Eden and may account for his behaviour during the Council meeting. One 
is inclined, however, to believe Jordan's claim that Eden did not alter 
the speech he was about to give. Jordan often extemporized and it is 
unlikely he had a manuscript before him which Eden could have edited. 
The more likely explanation is that Eden had obtained a copy of the 
draft speech and it was his copy of this that he was marking during the 
conversation with Jordan. Whether his comments had any effect on 
Jordan's subsequent remarks remains an open question. 
New Zealand's views on the Spanish conflict had been ignored in the 
Council but Savage and Nash continued to express them when the opportun-
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ity arose. At the Imperial Conference in May 1937, where Spain was all 
but ignored, Savage declared his increasing dissatisfaction with 
the way the policy of non-intervention was being implemented. He be-
lieved that unless the embargo was honestly observed by all parties, 
then the whole question should be reconsidered. 54 Addressing a LNU 
meeting in London on 21 June 1937, Nash criticised the way in which the 
League had been excluded from dealing with the Spanish conflict by the 
Non-Intervention Committee. He said the League had an obligation to be-
come involved in a case where the integrity of a member-state was being 
threatened. Spain was clearly such a case. Elaborating on Jordan's 
suggestion to the Council, Nash proposed that the League should accept a 
mandate over Spain for a year, on condition that all foreign aid and 
troops were withdrawn. After a year, two neutral members of the 
League would supervise elections under universal franchise which 
would determine the form of government the Spanish people desired. 55 
Nash claimed a mandate was a practical suggestion but it was quite 
the reverse. In an editorial ridiculing the proposal, the Sydney 
Bulletin pointed out that the League had neither the men nor equipment 
to put Spain under mandate. Further, a mandate would be unworkable even 
if the League had the necessary resources, since it was unlikely any of 
the parties in the conflict would be agreeable. Indeed, the Bulletin 
suggested that any attempt to impose a mandate might provoke the Spanish 
to join forces to fight it. 56 The government was undaunted by such 
criticism. Labour's faith in democracy and the League may have appeared 
naive to many but to Nash and his collegues the alternative of appease-
ment only offered the certainty of world war. 
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With its strong prejudice against any action which undermined the 
Covenant and rewarded those who sought to overthrow legitimate govern-
ments, the New Zealand Government was naturally averse to any form of 
recognition of the Nationalists. In mid-July 1937, the Dominion High 
Commissioners were informed that Britain proposed to award full bellig-
erent rights to both sides of the conflict, conditional on the withdraw-
al of all foreign troops from Spain. The British Government believed 
that such a move was necessary to ensure the safety of British shipping 
in the area. It was concerned that the practice of Republican ships 
flying the British flag to avoid attack was endangering legitimate Brit-
ish shipping. Jordan was unconvinced this was sufficient reason to 
accord the Nationalists de facto recognition. He argued that since the 
Spanish Government was under attack from outside forces, the British 
Government would be contravening the Covenant and the Non-Recognition 
Resolution of 1932 if it awarded belligerent rights. 57 
The British dropped the idea but tried again in early September 
1937 with a watered-down proposal which would have allowed both sides in 
Spain to examine ships to verify their national character. There was, 
however, no linkage to the withdrawal of foreign troops.58 London was 
told in no uncertain terms on 7 September 1937 that New Zealand deplored 
what was virtually a surrender to the aggressors in Spain. The govern-
ment was unimpressed with the British assurance that the concession was 
not the same as awarding belligerent rights. 59 Such diplomatic niceties 
were meaningless to New Zealand. The government made it clear that any 
form of recognition of the rebels would greatly disadvantage the Spanish 
Government and thus was bl h D .. 60 unaccepta e to t e omlnlon. The British 
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decided once again that the time was not opportune to pursue the propo-
61 
sal. 
The British decision stemmed from the deteriorating situation in 
the Mediterranean. Attacks on shipping by Italian submarines and Musso-
lini's blatant disregard for the policy of non-intervention embarrassed 
Britain as it tried to restore the damage done to Anglo-Italian rela-
tions by the Ethiopian dispute. While the British and French bowed to 
public outrage and called a conference at Nyon, Switzerland, in Septem-
ber 1937 to discuss means to end the 'piracy', they were still anxious 
not to upset the Fascist powers or Franco. The situation was complicat-
ed further by the Spanish Government appealing to the League once again. 
In view of these problems, it is not surprising that New Zealand's inde-
62 pendent stand was regarded as less than helpful by London. Anticipat-
ing trouble from the Dominion at the forthcoming sessions of the Council 
and the Assembly, Eden met with Jordan on 6 September 1937 to try to 
convince him that New Zealand should exercise restraint at Geneva. 63 But 
if the Foreign Secretary hoped Jordan would moderate his remarks on 
Spain, he was disappointed. 
As the British feared, Jordan's speech to the Council on 16 Septem-
ber 1937 sparked a lot of comment. He had apparently not intended to 
speak on the Spanish fl ' 64 con ~ct, but after listening to the Spanish 
Prime Minister's speech he had "hopped in early" to express New Zea-
land's , 65 v~ews • In what observers described as a fiery and moving 
, dd db' l' 66 J d k f h' ~mpromptu a ress punctuate y gest~cu at~ons, or an spo e 0 ~s 
horror upon learning that Italian destroyers had sunk the Republican 
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oil-tanker S.S. Campeador and machine-gunned the survivors struggling in 
the water. He hoped that the agreements reached at Nyon would stop such 
67 
outrages but he was scathing in his criticism of the performance of 
the League. Ethiopia, Spain and now China had appealed to the League 
for help, he said, and all that had been done was to set up committees. 
Jordan asked whether New Zealand too could expect the same treatment if 
it was attacked. Nevertheless, he assured the Council that the Dominion 
would stand by the Covenant and collective security. 
Jordan then went on to repeat his suggestion of the previous May. He 
said the League should put Spain under an 'A' mandate and once peace was 
restored the Spanish could choose their own government. He declared 
that it was unacceptable that outsiders should claim the right to deter-
mine what was a suitable government for Spain. In Jordan's opinion, 
governments, rather than peoples, had been responsible for the current 
conflict and he was confident the Spanish people would accept the result 
of a properly-controlled election. 68 
By the end of Jordan's address, Spanish Prime Minister Juan Negrin 
may indeed, as one observer remarked, have been longing to be saved from 
h · f' d 69 ~s r~en s. But while Negrin can hardly have relished the mandate 
idea, he, the French Foreign Minister and others congratulated Jordan on 
the definite stand New Zealand had taken. The Dominion representative's 
straight-speaking also found favour with some British newspapers. The 
Daily Express commented: "On Spain, a breath of fresh air from the Dom-
inions blew into the stuffy, heavy atmosphere of the Geneva rooms when 
70 Mr Jordan .•. spoke frankly." 
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This frankness did not please Eden, however. MacDonald was des-
patched to Jordan's hotel the next day to rebuke him for virtually 
charging Italy with deliberately killing non-combatants. He was 
told that the international situation was so delicate that such candid 
remarks by a Dominion could jeopardise Britain's foreign relations. 
MacDonald said that until its armament programme was completed, the 
British Government could not afford to be incautious. Jordan was unre-
pentant. He told Savage: "New Zealand is outspoken and definite because 
its Government is definite and has a decided policy, which makes our 
remarks here taken notice of.,,71 In any case, he explained that diplo-
matic language achieved nothing and thus "when rubbing shoulders with 
those semi-Fascist people at Geneva, something more than a mere refer-
72 
ence is necessary: nothing but a decided stand is really understood." 
The New Zealand delegation was very much aware that the Dominion's 
views were not shared by the majority of the delegates at Geneva. Jordan 
lamented that the League was "absolutely depressing", the blame for 
which he attributed to the member-states political outlook which he com-
pared to that of the Forbes Government 73 in October 1935. It was 
obvious that New Zealand's wish for a democratic solution to the Spanish 
imbroglio would not find favour with the Fascist states or the Soviet 
Union. But the New Zealanders were dismayed by the desire of the demo-
cratic members of the League to distance themselves from the Spanish 
Government. Jordan believed the reason was not simply to avoid backing 
what may be the losing side or offending Italy. There was also a dis in-
clination to aid a government which included Communists and was actively 
supported by the Soviet Union. The New Zealand delegation was convinced 
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these factors had been responsible for the defeat of Spain's bid 
f 1 h "l 74 or re-e ection to t e CounCl • 
The isolation of New Zealand's position was further reinforced 
by the discouraging attitude of the other Commonwealth delegates. Camp-
bell noted that everybody except Jordan wanted to evade the issue and 
get the Assembly adjourned. The Australians and the Irish shared the 
British concern that the Assembly should take no action which would 
antagonise Italy. It was also clear that there was little sympathy for 
the Republican cause. Jordan was sure that there would not be any great 
regret if the Leftist 75 Spanish Government was defeated. But, as he 
told Savage, whether one approved of the regime or not Spain's rights 
under the Covenant could not be denied. "It may be, of course, that 
there are objectionable features in that Government," he said, "but you 
and I are not so much interested in the policy of the Government as in 
the fact that it was elected, and, further, that it is a Member State of 
the League of Nations." 
The Spanish had requested the League to make a decision on the 
future of the policy of non-intervention. At a meeting of the Common-
wealth delegates, Jordan described the policy as a farce and he argued 
that it was simply ridiculous for Italy to be on the Non-Intervention 
Committee when Mussolini was openly declaring that he would not allow 
the Republican Government to win. The New Zealand delegates were 
among those in the Assembly who supported a resolution which, despite 
its delicate wording, committed the League to ending non-intervention 
unless there was a complete and immediate withdrawal of foreign comba-
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tants f S · 76 rom pa~n. To Jordan's disgust, the resolution failed to 
secure the unanimous vote required for approval. Despondently, he wrote 
h ' I f h L· . ,.1 7 t at 'as an actua orce, t e eague ~s not operat~ve. 
For conservatives in New Zealand, Jordan was merely stating a view 
that they had long accepted. In Parliament, some Legislative Council-
lors and National MPs questioned the wisdom of the government's stand at 
Geneva, considering it not only futile but dangerous. They regarded the 
Spanish conflict as a battle between Communism and Fascism, and, finding 
both abhorent, felt that the Commonwealth had no business becoming in-
volved. As supporters of non-intervention, they believed New Zealand's 
call for League involvement was irresponsible because it increased the 
likelihood of the war precipitating a European war; a conflict which 
would endanger Britain and not New Zealand. In their view, the Spanish 
Civil War was but one factor contributing to the unsettled international 
situation. Instead of pinning its hopes on the moribund League, and 
thereby hindering the British Government's efforts to achieve peace, the 
government should have been focussing its attention on more practical 
measures like strengthening the Dominion's defences and its links with 
78 
the Commonwealth. 
Not surprisingly, Jordan's open disagreement with the British posi-
tion at the Council meeting and his mandate suggestion carne in for crit-
icism. National MP James Hargest charged that the government had wasted 
£2,500 on sending a delegation to Geneva since all Jordan had done was 
to make unnecessary criticisms of "the Motherland and her officers".79 
National also tried to embarrass the government by suggesting that it 
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had not authorised Jordan's remarks in the Council. Holyoake asked the 
Prime Minister whether the content of Jordan's speech had been previous-
ly approved by the government, and whether the speech had been delivered 
with the prior knowledge and agreement of the other Commonwealth repre-
sentatives. Savage replied that Jordan's remarks were in accordance 
with the government's general position on the Spanish issue. It was 
customary for the New Zealand delegate to discuss items on the League's 
agenda with his Commonwealth collegues and he had no reason to believe 
that Jordan had not done so on this occasion. 
One can only conclude from the circumspection of Savage's reply 
that Labour was anxious to minimize criticism that the Dominion's atti-
tude on Spain was dividing the Commonwealth. For his part, Nash insist-
ed that the Dominion's loyalty to Britain was beyond question and he 
praised Eden's role in preventing the Spanish war from engulfing Europe. 
He conceded that New Zealand differed with Britain over Spain but he was 
sure both governments were working towards the same goal. Significantly, 
Nash and Savage made no mention of the mandate idea. It seems likely 
that the government was distancing itself from a proposal which had 
attracted more ridicule than support. Nevertheless, both men reiterated 
that the only workable solution was one which allowed the Spanish to 
1 h · bl f f f . . f 80 sett e t elr own pro ems ree rom orelgn lnter erence. 
Prudence dictated that the government refrain from criticising 
British policy directly but concern about the direction of that policy 
was growing. 
Britain intended 
On 20 September 1937, the Dominions were advised that 
81 
to appoint an 'unofficial agent' to Salamanca. New 
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Zealand repeated its previous b ' 'b '1 82 D ' o Jectlons ut to no aval • urlng 
November 1937 a British Commercial Agent was appointed to Nationalist 
Spain and Franco reciprocated. The fact that each government accorded 
the agent of the other full diplomatic privileges added weight to the 
New Zealand Government's suspicion that British policy on Spain was in-
, 1 f ' h N ' 1 ' 83 creaslng y avourlng t e atlona lStS. Thus the Dominion viewed with 
alarm the British moves during the early months of 1938 to obtain an 
agreement with Franco's main ally, Italy, to ease the acute situation in 
h M d ' 84 tee lterranean. Despite an assurance that Britain would not con-
sider any concessions on the Ethiopian question until Mussolini had 
hd b 1 b f f S ' 85 N Z 1 d wit rawn a su stantia num er 0 troops rom paln, ew ea an was 
unhappy with the Anglo-Italian Agreement which was signed on 16 April 
1938. The distinct impression remained that the British Government had 
given in to an aggressor by not insisting that all Italian forces were 
removed immediately as the League had requested. 
Among New Zealand pro-Republicans there was also great dissatisfac-
tion with the policy of the British Government. Within the LNU, a split 
developed between members on the Left,who condemned non-intervention, 
and conservatives -h f 1 N Z 1 dB' , 86 woe t ew ea an must support rltaln. During 
March and April 1938 the Communist Party, SMAG and the Federation of 
Labour all called on the government to press the British to end the Non-
Intervention Agreement so that the Spanish Government could buy 87 arms. 
SMAG also asked that the Dominion send aid to Spain and allow the immi-
gration of 88 Spanish refugees. However, the fact that the 1938 Labour 
Party Conference ignored Spain altogether shows that the issue was still 
too divisive for the Party and the government to address at horne. The 
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Labour leadership considered the most useful support that New Zealand 
could give to Republican Spain was within the confines of the League. 
Though it had gained little from its previous appeals to the 
League, the Spanish Government was undeterred. At the May 1938 session 
of the Council, del Vayo called again for an end to non-intervention, 
and the examination of the Spanish question by the League. Jordan 
derived some satisfaction from the discomfort of the British delegate 
when del Vayo sharply criticised the Anglo-Italian 89 Agreement. 
The Spaniard claimed that Britain was condoning Italian aggression in 
Spain by its 90 signature on the agreement. Jordan concurred, telling 
Savage that the agreement had left Italy free to continue its interfer-
ence confident that when the war was over Britain would extend the hand 
f f ' d h' 91 o r~en s ~p. Plainly, Jordan found the agreement repugnant but he 
did not consider it was New Zealand's place to attack British policy as 
Spain had done. 
Indeed, Jordan's remarks to the Council were restrained compared 
with previous occasions. One can only speculate that the almost unani-
mous disinclination of the Council to consider League involvement had 
convinced Jordan that an emotional appeal for action was useless. In-
stead, he simply declared New Zealand's support for the Spanish dele-
gate's request for an examination of his country's plight. Describing 
the request as amazingly moderate, Jordan said it seemed inconceivable 
to him that the Council could reject it. He believed that once an exam-
ination had been made, it might be possible to offer a solution which 
would allow the Spanish to decide their future by other than military 
92 
means. The Council was unmoved. With the question of whether to re-
286 
cognise the Italian conquest of Ethiopia dominating their minds, the 
other members of the Council wanted to end the discussion as quickly and 
" 1 "bl 93 qUlet y as POSSl e. 
In an effort to deny the Council the opportunity to evade the 
issue, del Vayo presented his own resolution. He told the Council that 
since the terms of the Assembly resolution of September 1937 had not 
been fulfilled, the Spanish Government should be able to procure arms 
where and how it could. It should be left to individual League members 
to decide whether they should continue non-intervention. 94 "There is no 
doubt that M. del Vayo had scored," said Jordan. 95 But while he may 
have admired the Spaniard's tactics, the impossibility of consulting the 
government on the resolution put him in a difficult position. 
Jordan certainly believed that non-intervention had been disastrous 
in its effect on the Republican cause and on the credibility of all con-
cerned. He said: "This policy has been pursued at a cost of bare-faced 
denials and shifting subterfuges, of which one at least of the democrat-
ic States supporting the policy should be heartily ashamed.,,96 Because 
of New Zealand's past criticism of the policy, Jordan felt that he could 
not vote against the resolution. But a vote in favour was also out of 
the question. New Zealand was so remote from direct responsibilities, 
he later explained to Savage, that it would have been "unreal" to take a 
position directly antagonistic to the British and French Governments. 97 
More importantly, Jordan believed that the resolution would have 
had the effect of turning the Spanish conflict into a "free-for-all". 
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New Zealand's position had been that if the League or some other body 
could not persuade the Spanish to settle their differences in a peaceful 
and democratic fashion, then at least there should be no outside assist-
ance to the combatants to prevent the war spreading beyond Spain. Jor-
dan feared that discarding the policy of non-intervention, flawed as it 
was, was tantamount to surrendering to the forces of anarchy in Spain, 
and it would also encourage further acts of aggression elsewhere. 98 He 
considered he had no choice but to abstain. It was not a decision he 
particularly liked, considering New Zealand's strong support for Spain 
in the past, and Jordan felt obliged after the ballot to make a state-
ment to the Council justifying the Dominion's vote. Though the Spanish 
resolution was lost, only two other delegates voted with Britain and 
France against it. The Soviet Union and Spain voted in favour and there 
were nine abstentions. 
Jordan understood that abstention was effectively a vote of no con-
fidence in the Non-Intervention Agreement and thus placed New Zealand in 
opposition to Britain once again. He believed there was no alterna-
tive. 99 But in New Zealand there was severe criticism of the Dominion's 
position on Spain and Ethiopia by the press and the National Party. The 
New Zealand Herald claimed that many New Zealanders had deep misgivings 
about Jordan's open d . . h B . . hi' 100 ~sagreement w~t r~t~s po ~cy. The Opposi-
tion charged that the government was not only jeopardising New Zealand's 
economic and defence relationship with Britain but also the unity of the 
101 Commonwealth. Some of the criticism seems to have been based, 
however, on the mistaken belief that Jordan's abstention meant he 
f d . . . 102 avoure scrapp~ng non-~ntervent~on. 
these 
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The government emphatically denied that there was any truth to 
103 
charges. In Parliament, Savage praised Jordan's work at the 
League and declared that his actions had been in accordance with the 
government's . . 104 l.nstruct1.ons. Labour ministers were at pains to point 
out that the moral righteousness of New Zealand's attitude was not 
affected by how many states did or did not agree with it. Nash said 
that the government was determined to hold fast to the principles of the 
Covenant, which the rest of the Commonwealth had apparently discarded, 
confident that millions of people shared its views. lOS Indeed, even as 
Labour was defending its supposedly futile call for a negotiated peace 
in Spain, Jordan reported that the British Government was trying to 
arrange a truce between the Republicans and the Nationalists. The 
effort by the Non-Intervention Committee to encourage a political solu-
tion was ultimately unsuccessful but Jordan considered it a vindication 
of New Zealand's policy, even if the League had not been involved. 106 
At the Assembly in September 1938, the New Zealand delegates con-
tinued to offer moral support to the Spanish Government. Yet it was 
plain that Jordan had become disheartened by the League's ineffective-
ness which he regarded as nothing short of tragic in view of the suffer-
107 ing the civil war had inflicted on the Spanish people. But the Span-
ish Republic had one last card to play at Geneva. As part of a despe-
rate effort to convince the democracies of its goodwill, its worthiness 
as an ally and of its strength and determination to win, the Spanish 
Government decided on a unilateral withdrawal of foreign volunteers from 
its territory.l08 Announcing the decision to the Assembly on 21 Septem-
ber 1938, Negrin requested that the League appoint an international com-
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mission to supervise the withdrawal. When the request was referred to 
the Agenda Committee, the Portuguese delegate objected to its late in-
clusion on the agenda. Dick Campbell was among those on the committee 
who considered the Spanish request to be an exceptional case and they 
succeeded in placing it before the Sixth Committee. 109 The subsequent 
appointment of an International Military Commission to oversee the with-
drawal and the despatch of a Commission for the Investigation of Air 
Bombardments in Spain, were the only substantial actions taken by the 
League during the conflict. 
Both commissions reported to the Council in January 1939. The 
Military Commission declared that it was satisfied the great majority of 
foreign combatants had been withdrawn from Republican Spain. In its 
findings, the investigatory commission appeared to confirm Republican 
charges that the aircraft of Franco's allies had deliberately attacked 
civilians. Though the reports were no more than propaganda victories 
for the Negrin Government, Jordan reminded the Council that Spain had a 
right to expect assistance from the League in its hour of need. He 
praised the Spanish Government for initiating the withdrawal of foreign 
combatants while pointedly noting that the gesture had not been recipro-
cated by Franco. Referring to the aerial bombing of civilians, Jordan 
expressed the Council's appreciation that the Republican forces had re-
frained from taking . 1 110 reprlsa s. He was clearly trying to show that 
despite great provocation the Spanish Republic had done nothing to war-
rant the shabby treatment it had received from the League in general, 
and the Council in particular. 
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Justice may have been on the Republican side but that was no longer 
relevant. Even as the Council was meeting Franco was mounting his final 
offensive. Less than two months later the Nationalists were victorious 
and on 9 May 1939 Franco announced Spain's withdrawal from the League. 
As a final gesture of support for the defeated Republican Government, 
New I d . d h F . 111 Zea an never recognlse t e ranco reglme. This was consistent 
with what Labour undoubtedly felt was the Dominion's moral obligation to 
support Republican Spain. It was an obligation which had little to do 
with ideology. In fact, the ideological dimension of the conflict was 
an unwelcome complication for the government. Rather, it was the 
obligation that collective security placed on all League members to 
support another member threatened by external aggression which determin-
ed the Dominion's policy. 
Savage and his collegues regarded the intervention of Italy and 
Germany in Spain's domestic quarrel as an attack on Spain itself. In 
the context of Spain's membership of the League, the legitimacy of the 
Spanish Government was beyond question. Therefore, once the aggression 
of the Fascist powers was proven, the League was required under the 
Covenant to assist Spain irrespective of its internal difficulties. New 
Zealand's vigorous promotion of the League's collective responsibility 
to Spain was related to a growing awareness of the Dominion's own 
vulnerability. 
iveness of 
The Spanish Civil War not only demonstrated the effect-
bomber aircraft but also the 112 horror of total war. 
When New Zealand called on the League to honour its obligations to 
Spain, it was very much with an eye to a future when the Dominion itself 
might have recourse to the League. From 1937, this possibility began to 
291 
seem less remote as Japan resumed its southward advance into China. 
Jordan's anguish over the Spanish tragedy might be interpreted as a 
premonition of Japanese troops marching into Wellington. 
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CHAP1ER 9 
THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR, 1937-1939 
The march of Fascism came closer to New Zealand with the renewal of 
Japan's assault on China in July 1937. Remote though they were from the 
troubles of Europe, New Zealanders now realised that they were not safe 
from the threat of aggression. Unlike the Ethiopian and Spanish con-
flicts, the war in China could not be dismissed as being of no concern 
to the Dominion. For the government, only recently reassured at 
the Imperial Conference that the Commonwealth's Pacific defence strategy 
based on Singapore was still feasible,l the Japanese move into China was 
an unwelcome reminder of the country's vulnerability. For the first 
time Labour's call for collective action against an aggressor was moti-
vated by something more than just an idealistic attachment to the prin-
2 
ciples of the Covenant. 
The collapse of the uneasy truce between China and Japan, which had 
existed since 1935, was precipitated by a local skirmish close to the 
Marco Polo Bridge(Lukouchiao), a few kilometres west of Peking. The 
incident on 7 July 1937 rapidly escalated into a war conspicuous for 
its barbarity. By the end of the year the Japanese Army controlled the 
chief cities and communications north of the Yellow River; had occupied 
Shantung Province, Shanghai and the capital, Nanking; and were blockad-
. h 3 lng t e coast. 
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The British Government had, as usual, informed but not consulted 
the Dominions on its policy during the developing crisis. 4 But in early 
September 1937, the New Zealand Government was asked for its opinion on 
the proposal to allow the Japanese to inspect British merchant shipping 
off the Chinese coast. Although the Japanese blockade was directed at 
Chinese shipping, Tokyo had threatened to extend it to the vessels of 
third powers if they carried arms and ammunition to China. The British 
hoped to forestall this move by agreeing to a carefully circumscribed 
verification 5 procedure. The similarity between this proposal and an-
other made at the same time concerning Spain is marked but New Zealand's 
reaction was completely different. The government noted that the cir-
cumstances were unusual because war had not been declared, and it also 
pointed to its reluctance to accede to the demands of a power which was 
"acting in defiance of numerous international engagements". Nevertheless, 
it felt the Dominion could not object to the proposal. 6 Evidently, the 
fact that a Great Power was involved, and that British forces in the Far 
East were decidedly inferior to those of the aggressor, persuaded the 
government that it would be unrealistic to oppose the concession 
in this case. 
With the distinct possibility that the Sino-Japanese conflict would 
be raised at Geneva, Jordan was instructed to support any moves by the 
League towards collective action under the Covenant. 7 Convinced that 
New Zealand would be sympathetic to a Chinese appeal, Eden tried to per-
suade Jordan, at a meeting on 6 September 1937, not to oppose British 
policy at Geneva. Stressing the delicacy of the international situation 
and the difficulties facing the British Government, the Foreign Secre-
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tary appealed for New Zealand's support when the contentious issues on 
the League's agenda came up f d ' ,8 or ~scuss~on. But while the Foreign 
Office was trying to keep New Zealand in line, its main concern was to 
9 
contain the possible damage China might do at Geneva. 
As expected, China invoked Articles 10, 11 and 17 of the Covenant 
on 13 September 1937 in the hope that the League would condemn the 
Japanese as aggressors and recommend sanctions. The Chinese may also 
have hoped that League members would be called on to provide them with 
munitions and financial assistance. The British feared that any action 
taken by the League would provoke retaliation from Japan and would not 
be supported by the United States. Therefore, Eden, the Secretary-Gene-
ral and the French Foreign Minister persuaded China's chief delegate, 
Wellington Koo, to refer the matter to the Far East Advisory Committee 
instead of the Council or the 10 Assembly. Established after the 
1933 Assembly resolution on Manchuria, the Advisory Committee included 
Canada, Britain, New Zealand and (from 1937) Australia among its twenty-
three members. The United States sent an observer. 
Just before the first meeting of the Advisory Committee on 21 Sep-
tember 1937, the Australian delegate suggested to the Assembly that a 
conference of the signatories to the 1922 Nine-Power Treaty should deal 
with the dispute. Under this treaty, the Pacific powers had agreed: to 
respect the sovereignty, independence and integrity of China; not to 
hinder the development of a stable government in China; to preserve the 
i 
Open Door, and~ to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China 
to 
11 
secure special rights or privileges there. Bruce's proposal aimed 
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at involving the United States directly in the search for a solution, 
and also reflected his lack of faith in the League's capabilities. It 
was decided not to pursue the idea until there were indications that the 
United States d '" f 12 was rea y to part~c~pate ~n a con erence. Jordan, for 
one, was greatly disappointed with the American attitude at the first 
meeting of the Advisory Committee. He reported that it appeared the 
United States would do nothing until the League had decided on a defi-
nite course of . 13 act~on. But to Jordan's disgust the British made it 
clear that such a resolution was out of the question. 
At a meeting of the Commonwealth delegates just before the Commit-
tee's second meeting on 27 September 1937, the head of the British dele-
gation, Walter Elliot,14 put paid to any hopes Jordan may have had that 
the League would take a stand on the dispute. Elliot said the Advisory 
Committee was unlikely to recommend sanctions against Japan. Instead, 
he thought it should pass a resolution condemning the bombing of unde-
fended towns but worded in such a way that Japan would not take it as 
the preliminary to a declaration of war. As far as concrete assistance 
to China was concerned, Elliot felt this should be confined to a recom-
mendation that individual members might contribute towards the purchase 
of medical supplies for injured civilians. 
While the other Commonwealth delegates considered Elliot's proposal 
a sensible one as it was important not to raise China's expectations 
15 falsely, Jordan described it as "pitifully short of necessities". He 
told Savage: 
Mr Elliot asked me by name what I thought of the proposal, and I re-
plied that at one time I was connected with Scotland Yard, and I 
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could imagine a gunman running loose causing disaster and suffering 
all along the line, and I could further imagine myself taking up the 
attitude that it would be unwise to say or do anything that would 
offend the gunman, but I would buy some bandages and other supplies 
and follow on behind, patching up some of the damage he was doing. 
Jordan's sarcasm was not appreciated by Elliot who reminded him that 
should the League take a definite stand it could mean that there would 
be widows in Glasgow as well as China. Jordan was unshakeable, arguing 
that "if that is the spirit that has to prompt us, then, in view of that 
possibility we should not be in the League at all ... " 
Jordan was greatly disappointed that while there was support for 
New Zealand's position in the private conversations he had with the 
other delegates, this support was not forthcoming in the formal discus-
sions. He told Savage: "It is very evident, Joe, that this outfit can-
not function with the present frame of mind of the majority of the Mem-
ber States." 
its strongly 
Nonetheless, he was sure that if New Zealand persisted, 
16 pro-League policy would be endorsed eventually. Savage 
assured him that the government entirely approved of the course he had 
taken. New Zealand, he said, would "remain at all times prepared to 
take any possible collective action under the Covenant of the League" or 
"join in any other movement calculated to deter the aggressor or to 
assist the victim provided that the prestige and possible future useful-
ness of the League are not prejudiced.,,17 
When the Advisory Committee met later on 27 September 1937, it de-
cided to appoint a sub-committee to draft resolutions on the dispute for 
the Assembly's approval. Jordan was convinced that an effort would be 
made to "pack" the sub-committee with those who favoured a moderate 
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stand by the League. He was not surprised, therefore, when Australia 
was nominated, in view of Bruce's close association with the British 
position. 18 Because New Zealand's views on collective security were 
well-known, there was some doubt whether the Dominion would be nominat-
ed, despite it being a Pacific nation and a member of the Council. When 
New Zealand was not among the twelve nominations, Jordan suspected that 
Britain had used its influence to deny the wilful Dominion a place. But 
the Soviet delegate suggested that New Zealand should join the sub-com-
mittee, a suggestion the acting leader of the British delegation, Lord 
Cranborne, supported "with all the appearence of enthusiasm".19 Plain-
ly, Litvinov saw Jordan as a valuable ally in the anticipated battle to 
force the committee to take a strong line on the conflict. The distinct 
possibility that the appointment of New Zealand would discomfort Britain 
and other like-minded states was undoubtedly another attraction. 20 
The sub-committee's first task was to approve a resolution condemn-
ing the aerial bombing of undefended towns and the killing of non-comba-
tants. The draft resolution omitted any mention of Japan. Koo insisted 
that the name of the aggressor should be inserted. When Cranborne and 
Bruce expressed their opposition, Jordan intervened emphatically in sup-
port of what he considered was China's "altogether reasonable request". 
He said that New Zealand would privately and publicly condemn the bomb-
ing of undefended towns. "I was on safe ground in this matter," Jordan 
told Savage, "as the Powers of the world had been officially informed by 
Japan of her intentions to bomb the towns, and it was not even suggested 
by Japan that that action had not been performed." As a result of the 
arguments of Jordan and Koo, the Advisory Committee approved a resolu-
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tion which held the Japanese responsible for the bombing of undefended 
towns and the resultant loss of many civilian lives, and condemned the 
J . 21 apanese actlon. 
When Jordan discovered that New Zealand's part in formulating the 
resolution had been ignored by the 'government' press in Britain and 
that the role of Cranborne and Bruce had been given prominence instead, 
he was in no doubt that the British delegation was responsible. 22 The 
British were already beginning to rue Jordan's presence on the sub-com-
mittee. 23 Reporting to the British Cabinet on 29 September 1937, Eden 
made it clear that he was unhappy with New Zealand's performance at the 
League, especially about Jordan's tendency to reproach the British 
Government for its policy. MacDonald had apparently tried to convince 
Jordan that if Britain adopted New Zealand's policy it would put both 
countries in a dangerous situation. MacDonald did not claim that he had 
been particularly successful in restraining Jordan. But in an interest-
ing comment on Jordan's assertion that New Zealand's views had the 
support of millions in Britain, the Dominions Secretary claimed that one 
of the difficulties he faced was that the New Zealand Government had 
24 
adopted the policy of the British Labour Party. 
In an effort to control Jordan's outspokenness, Cranborne asked 
that he confer with the British delegation before he spoke on the Sino-
Japanese dispute again. In return for Jordan's co-operation, the Brit-
ish would keep the New Zealanders apprised of their intended actions or 
remarks. It is improbable that Jordan took the request very seriously 
for he resented even the occasional directions from Wellington, let 
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alone British supervision. He doubted whether the British would honour 
their promise of full consultation, considering their rather narrow 
interpretation of that 25 obligation in the past. In any case, Jordan 
did not believe his attitude had been either irresponsible or difficult. 
He told Savage: "When speaking, I have been conscious, of course, of the 
responsibility of any proposal or suggestion, knowing well that we have 
not the power to back up any claim which we have made.,,26 
Following its resolution condemning the aerial bombing of undefend-
ed towns, the sub-committee turned to the problem of what steps the 
League should take to assist China. A proposal which recommended that 
the members of the League "refrain from any action which might have the 
effect of weakening China's resistance and thus increasing her difficul-
ties in the present conflict", was put forward by those who wished to be 
conciliatory towards Japan. Jordan objected to the wording because it 
implied asking members not to impose economic sanctions against China. 
He was astonished that not only was there no recommendation for aid to 
China, but that the victim was now treated as the guilty party. Advo-
eating a more positive lead, Jordan suggested that the sub-committee 
should make reference to certain assistance for China and to the unde-
sirability of taking any action which supported Japanese . 27 aggresS10n. 
The British delegate thought this too strong and moved that the original 
draft be retained but with the additional recommendation that League 
members should consider extending aid to China on an individual basis. 
28 Jordan agreed and the amended draft was approved. 
The reluctance to assist China was not confined solely to the 
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Advisory Committee. For some years the League had given technical 
assistance to China, notably in the health field. On 1 October 1937, 
the Council discussed a recommendation that the League allocate funds 
for special measures to control epidemics in China. The British and 
Polish representatives were unhappy with the idea, believing this was 
properly the function of existing League and non-League agencies. It 
was also suggested that an increase in aid to China could be interpreted 
by Japan as evidence that the League was biased. Jordan disagreed. He 
said that if an epidemic reached New Zealand, it would be difficult to 
convince New Zealanders that it was in any way political. Arguing that 
the issue went beyond politics, Jordan suggested that to stop an epidem-
ic at its source was not only in China's interest but in the interest of 
other states as well. He was confident that out of self-interest alone 
the New Zealand Government would approve the allocation of the remaining 
technical assistance credits for this purpose, and he believed the 
Assembly would not oppose further aid. Concluding his remarks, Jordan 
noted that the headquarters of the League Health Office in Nanking had 
been bombed, implying perhaps that Japanese sensibilities deserved no 
consideration in 29 this matter. The Council approved the proposal but 
to Jordan's regret the Assembly did not increase its grant for technical 
, Ch' 30 asslstance to lna. 
The Advisory Committee's condemnation of Japan and the sub-commit-
tee's recommendations for assistance to China were much less than Jordan 
had hoped for. Thus he asked the sub-committee to urge League members 
"to consider how, or to use influence to deter Japan from continuing its 
present form of aggression". Not surprisingly the amendment was lost. 
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Only China and the Soviet Union supported New Zealand. 31 Frustrated by 
the committee's caution, Koo tried to force the issue of sanctions. 
Cranborne blocked the move by securing acceptance of Bruce's earlier 
proposal for a conference of the Nine-Power Treaty states to discuss 
what further action could be taken. Completing its work on 5 October 
1937, the Advisory Committee submitted two reports to the Assembly. The 
first declared Japan's actions in China to be unreasonable and in viola-
tion of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Pact of Paris. The second encom-
passed the recommendations of Jordan's sub-committee. The Assembly 
unanimously adopted the reports on the following day.32 
Jordan deplored the weakness that had been evident during the 
Advisory Committee's deliberations. He believed that the most charita-
ble view one could take was that most of the delegates felt nothing 
could be done to deter Japan or aid China, so the primary consideration 
must be to preserve the League's prestige. Thus the proposal for a con-
ference of the Nine-Power Treaty states could only be viewed as the 
League's most polite way of expressing its own members' unreadiness to 
do anything for China. He was not convinced the conference would solve 
anything since its membership would be virtually the same as that of the 
Advisory Committee. Compounding the problem was the fact that Article 7 
of the treaty provided for nothing more than "full and frank communica-
tion between the Contracting Powers", and thus was a much less useful 
instrument than the Covenant. As for the hope that the United States 
would take a more active role than it had done at Geneva, he was not 
especially sanguine. Commenting on President Roosevelt's 'Quarantine' 
speech made on 5 October 1937, which called for international action to 
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restrain aggression interpreted by some to mean sanctions against 
33 Japan - Jordan dismissed it as designed for domestic consumption only. 
He was not optimistic that anything useful would emerge from the confer-
ence. 
In the month before the conference opened in Brussels, the British 
Government had to decide what line it would take. Publicly, the British 
leaders declared that they hoped to arrange a settlement of the conflict 
at the conference, but in private they were unable to see how the war 
could be ended. With some reluctance the Cabinet considered the possi-
bility of joint economic action with the United States. Eden suggested 
that Britain should explicitly indicate that it was prepared to impose 
sanctions should the Americans think it necessary. There was no support 
for the idea. Chamberlain did not think sanctions would be effective 
and he believed that discussion of the subject with the United States 
should be avoided. As a result, a message was sent to Washington on 19 
October 1937 to try and convince the Americans that sanctions were out 
f h . 34 o t e questlon. 
The Dominions were sent a similar communication on the same day, 
although it was only a summary lest they took umbrage that London had 
been discussing sanctions with Washington behind their backs. 35 It said 
that in the event of a failure to reach peace by agreement, the confer-
ence would be faced with three options: deferring any action in the hope 
that a change in Japan's domestic or military position would make the 
Japanese more reasonable; expressing moral condemnation of Japan without 
taking any further action, or; embarking on positive action in the form 
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of active assistance to China or economic pressure on Japan. The first 
two options were considered objectionable because they were tantamount 
to acquiescence to aggression. While the third option seemed to be the 
only one left open, the British Government stressed that there were 
serious difficulties to be overcome. 
In the case of assistance to China, these obstacles included the 
United States' neutrality laws and the probability that the Japanese 
blockade would necessitate armed protection of shipping. As far as 
economic sanctions against Japan were concerned, only a joint boycott by 
the Commonwealth, the United States and perhaps eight other powers would 
have any chance of success. There was still the problem of evasion, and 
the possibility of an attack by Japan on a sanctionist power or the con-
quest of more territory by the Japanese to obtain essential raw materi-
also It was vital, therefore, that there should be a guarantee of 
mutual defence, extending perhaps to third countries as well. The United 
States was clearly being warned that whatever action was taken would 
, , I' b k' 36 requlre ml ltary ac lng. 
Because the content of the message was aimed at the Americans, it 
is certain that the British expected no more from the Dominions than an 
endorsement of their conclusion that sanctions were unworkable. 37 Thus 
the British Government was taken aback when New Zealand fully endorsed 
the third option. On 20 October 1937 the government stated that it 
appreciated the implications of giving assistance to China or boycotting 
Japan, and it deplored the necessity for taking such a dangerous course. 
Nevertheless, the Dominion was certain that it was the only effective 
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way to deal with the situation and, with the co-operation of other 
states and the collaboration of the League, it had a good chance of 
38 
success. Whether the government simply misinterpreted the intent of 
the British message or deliberately took the opportunity to remind Brit-
ain of its obligations under the Covenant is unclear. One can be sure, 
however, that coming only two days after New Zealand confirmed it would 
attend 39 the Brussels conference, the government's reply gave the Brit-
ish a good indication that the Dominion would vigorously support a firm 
collective response to the Japanese aggression. 
Hoping to dampen New Zealand's enthusiasm, the British Government 
hurridly explained that the cable of 19 October 1937 was not a policy 
40 document. The replies from the statement but merely a discussion 
other Dominions were as expected, however. Now, with nearly all of the 
Dominions against sanctions, even if the Americans supported a boycott 
the British would have a good excuse to try to dissuade them. As Glad-
wyn Jebb of the Foreign Office noted on 28 October 1937: " .•• we seem to 
have put ourselves in the excellent tactical position of allowing the 
Dominions to torpedo a 'sanctions' policy in advance before definitely 
41 
committing ourselves one way or the other." 
The British were relieved when the United States replied that it 
wanted no part of sanctions and would take a cautious line at Brus-
42 
sels. The Japanese rejection of an invitation to the conference on 27 
October 1937 only strengthened the British Government's resolve to avoid 
making any commitments. It was decided that Britain would go no further 
than the United States was prepared to go. Despite growing signs that 
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his pessimism about the conference was justified, Jordan assured Savage 
that he would do his utmost to promote Labour's point of view at Brus-
43 
sels. Concerned that New Zealand would prove difficult, MacDonald met 
with Jordan on 29 October 1937 just before they both left for Brussels. 
The Dominions Secretary sought to impress on him that the conference was 
not meeting to consider whether sanctions should be imposed on Japan. 
After much argument, Jordan apparently agreed sanctions would be out of 
44 place. But as he had demonstrated on previous occasions, Jordan was 
not one to be bullied into silence. 
The speeches which followed the opening of the conference on 3 
November 1937 quickly confirmed Jordan's doubts about the worth of the 
whole exercise. Britain, France and the United States carefully skirted 
the question of positive action while Italy opposed any move against 
Japan. Only China and the Soviet Union pressed for a strong response to 
Japanese aggression. The New Zealand delegation was especially dismayed 
by the "scuttle" of small nations away from any show of firmness. Since 
the consensus was in favour of a negotiated settlement, Norman Davis, 
the head of the American delegation, suggested that another invitation 
should be sent to Japan, and a small sub-committee established, if the 
Japanese were receptive, to hold discussions on the means to end the 
war. 
Jordan was prepared to support the proposal but, in what The Times 
described as giving a practical touch to the proceedings, he asked what 
was to be the committee's actual role. He said: "It seems hardly 
effective to ask China and Japan to make an effort to get together and 
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agree. They are already very much together ..• Unfortunately, they are 
45 burying their dead together." To put an end to the slaughter in China 
as quickly as possible it was vital to do more than just communicate 
with Japan, he declared. The committee must act as a mediator. Jordan 
was hopeful that an armistice might be arranged. As to the question 
whether the reasons given by Japan for rejecting the original invitation 
should be addressed at this point, he thought a simple acknowledgement 
was sufficient to avoid creating too many difficulties and stalling the 
initiative. He also insisted that the invitation be rephrased so that 
it did not imply that the conference could not take any action unless 
Japan co-operated with it. The invitation to Tokyo to "exchange views" 
with the committee was despatched on 6 November 1937 and the conference 
46 
adjourned to await a reply. 
The British and American delegations were in frequent contact with 
each other during the conference, and the Dominion representatives were 
kept 'f d b h d' , 47 ln orme a out t ese lSCUSSlons. Jordan was increasingly con-
cerned that the conversations, which Sir Cecil Day compared to "a gentle 
fencing match", were producing nothing useful. 48 At the meetings of the 
Commonwealth delegates he complained that there was a danger that the 
possibility of doing anything would be frustrated because Britain and 
the 49 United States were waiting on the other to take the lead. But he 
discovered that none of his collegues shared this concern. At their 
meeting on 10 November 1937, Eden told them that if the Japanese reply 
was unfavourable the United States might wish the conference to go fur-
ther than merely issuing an indictment against Japan. Eden said that 
the British Government was prepared to consider possible courses of 
313 
action such as non-recognition of the Japanese conquests in China and 
refusing credits for the development of these territories. In fact, 
these were options favoured by Eden and were later rejected by the Cabi-
in favour of an Anglo-American offer of mediation. 50 South Africa net 
and Australia were strongly opposed to sanctions. The Canadians, who 
maintained a very low profile at the conference, were . 1 51 non-commltta . 
Only Jordan supported joint action by the United States and Britain. But 
by admitting that New Zealand could not offer much in the way of materi-
al support, he was tacitly acknowledging that the Dominion's views were 
unlikely to have much impact on the final decision. 52 
The conference reconvened on 13 November 1937 to discuss the Japan-
ese reply received the previous day. As before, Japan refused to attend 
the conference contending that its action in China did not come within 
the purview of the Nine-Power Treaty and that the dispute only concerned 
the two states directly involved. Jordan urged the conference to 
respond quickly to the Japanese rejection. 53 On 15 November 1937, a 
resolution was adopted which refuted the Japanese contentions and stated 
that the powers represented at Brussels would have to consider their 
54 
common attitude towards Japan. Jordan suggested a copy should be sent 
to Tokyo, hoping perhaps that its vaguely threatening nature would 
induce the Japanese to reconsider. The conference rejected the suggest-
. 55 lon. 
With almost all the powers in agreement that nothing could be done 
for China, the conference met a week later to draw up its report and 
final resolution. 56 The draft resolution was predictably "anodyne" but 
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Jordan took issue with the phrase that the Nine-Power Treaty was a con-
spicuous example of the international instruments which "safeguarded" 
international peace and security. Questioning whether China would 
agree, he had the wording amending to "intended to safeguard". Unlike 
the other delegates, Jordan was not prepared to gloss over the unplea-
sant fact that international security treaties no longer offered any 
deterrent to aggression. Neither did he share their relief that the 
conference had done nothing to exacerbate the situation. In his final 
remarks, Jordan sharply reminded the conference that its purpose was not 
to avoid fulfilling troublesome responsibilities or to appease Japan. 
Its purpose was to end hostilities and it had plainly failed, he said, 
because China was still the victim of aggression and its people were 
'11 d ' h h d f' d' ,57 stl ylng at t e an s 0 lnva lng armles. 
In his report to the government, Jordan said that the failure of 
the conference demonstrated that many governments which were sincerely 
devoted to peace and the sanctity of treaties were not prepared to co-
operate in the defence of those ideals. The reign of lawlessness and 
violence was unchecked. The immediate victims of aggression had to cope 
with its violence as best they could. In truth, he said, an effective 
system of collective security was at the moment "non-existent". Even 
so, he remained confident that New Zealand's faith in the Covenant would 
58 be vindicated eventually. His only regret about Brussels was that the 
59 Dominion was not influential enough to convince the conference. In the 
absence of any real will to resist aggression, Jordan predicted that in 
the short-term "dictator-controlled states will have their way". If the 
Manchurian experience was any indication, he warned, it was unlikely 
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China would be sufficient to satisfy Japanese ambitions. 60 
Outside government circles in New Zealand, few shared Jordan's un-
61 
ease. If the public gave any thought to international affairs, their 
interest was more likely to be directed towards the danger spots of 
Europe than the 62 Far East. The press had strongly condemned Japan's 
attack on China and much attention was given to the ramifications for 
Western interests there, but the possible consequences for New Zealand 
1 · d 63 were most y ~gnore • The Workers' Weekly was one of the few papers 
which warned that Australia and New Zealand would be in danger should 
Japan establish itself in China, reflecting the concern felt by trade 
unions 64 and the peace groups. 
As they had done when the Spanish Civil War broke out, the trade 
unions urged the government to demand strong action by the League again-
st the aggressor. Consideration was also given to what action the 
unions could take within New Zealand to assist the Chinese. On 30 
August 1937, the Otahuhu branch of the Amalgamated Society of Railway 
Servants 65 refused to handle anything bound for Japan. Matters came to 
a head at the end of September 1937 when two Japanese ships, the 
Melbourne Maru and the Chifuku Maru, arrived in New Zealand ports to 
collect, among other things, scrap iron. Dunedin and Auckland watersid-
ers were reluctant to load the ships and this led the Federation of 
Labour to recommend an embargo on the export of all war materials to 
66 Japan. On 29 September 1937, Lyttelton watersiders refused to load 
the Melbourne Maru and the same action was taken against the Chifuku 
67 Maru in Auckland the next day. 
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Acting on the request of the Auckland Chamber of Commerce, Savage 
quickly intervened in the dispute. He declared that the government took 
an extremely serious view of the union action and it refused to be 
dictated to on what countries New Zealand could trade with by five or 
six different . . 68 organlsatlons. To avert the "serious complications" 
which might arise if the ban continued,69 Savage called a conference be-
tween the government, the Federation of Labour and the Watersiders 
Union. It was announced on 4 October 1937 that the ban would be lifted 
but the government would impose an embargo on the export of all scrap 
70 
metal. In spite of the fact that no other country imported scrap 
metal from New Zealand, Savage insisted that the decision was not 
directed specifically at Japan and the only reason for the embargo was 
to enable the Dominion to develop its own iron industry.71 
The watersiders' action met with little support in the country as a 
72 
whole. 
land's 
Businessmen were appalled by the threat it posed to New Zea-
trade with 73 Japan. Some concern was expressed in Parliament 
that the Japanese might retaliate by boycotting New Zealand wool. 74 The 
New Zealand Herald charged that the watersiders' action "amounts to de-
claring an economic war, an act that may lead on to military hostili-
ties. The watersiders are not entitled to accept the responsibility of 
exposing New Zealand to such a risk.,,7S The Press agreed that taking 
economic measures against another state was properly the province of 
governments acting through the League, and for any private organisation 
h 1 " h 76 to arrogate t at ro e was to lnvlte c aos. The Standard believed that 
even an ineffective boycott by New Zealand would have serious implica-
tions for the Commonwealth's 77 relations with Japan. Only Left-wing 
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papers like the Workers' Weekly and Tomorrow backed the watersiders. 78 
The call by the Federation of Labour at the end of October 1937 for 
a personal 79 boycott of Japanese goods by New Zealand workers also re-
ceived litt le support from 80 the public or the Labour movement. The 
Workers' Weekly supported the campaign by printing a list of articles of 
Japanese Some Labour Party branches passed resolutions of 
support but these were not published. 82 The government simply ignored 
the 83 boycott. The Standard thought that because it was not part of an 
organised worldwide campaign, the boycott would have a minimal effect 
and was more likely to hurt the pockets of New Zealand workers than the 
84 Japanese. It is possible that the poor response convinced the Federa-
tion of Labour not to go further and place an embargo on all exports to 
85 Japan. At its annual conference in April 1938, a resolution urging 
the Commonwealth to take collective action against Japan was passed but 
the National Executive declared that an embargo on scrap metal and the 
86 personal boycott were as far as New Zealand could go. Ironically, the 
Chinese delegation to the League later praised the people of New Zealand 
87 for their economic boycott against Japan. 
The failure of the Brussels Conference to end hostilities prompted 
trade unions, peace groups and some Labour Party branches to demand that 
sanctions 88 be imposed against Japan by the League. After a discourag-
ing response to its request to Britain for military and financial assis-
tance, the Chinese Government considered it had little choice but to 
take . b k h L d d d . 1 89 Its case ac to t e eague an eman sanctIons a so. This was 
in spite of the clear message the Chinese had received at Brussels that 
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a return to Geneva would be pointless and might even cause the United 
States to take a less sympathetic stand on the dispute. 90 At a private 
meeting with the representatives of Britain, France and the Soviet Union 
at Geneva on 28 January 1938, Koo tried to persuade them to support 
sanctions against Japan. The British and French representatives were 
predictably opposed and persuaded Koo to accept a draft declaration re-
affirming the duty of League members to assist China. This draft was 
91 presented to the Council on 2 February 1938. 
Jordan deplored the fact that the Chinese request had not been put 
before the full Council. He told Savage that at a time when there was 
much criticism of the League, the holding of a secret meeting of the 
major powers of the Council to determine that body's response to a prob-
lem and then expecting the other members to accept a fait accompli was 
certain to damage the League's prestige further. The situation was not 
helped by the inanity of the resolution. "For all that the resolution 
contains," Jordan wrote, "it might as well have remained unwritten. It 
calls for no action on the part of the League and may be classed amongst 
those pious and wordy documents at which the detractors of the Geneva 
institution have 92 so often pointed the finger of scorn." Because Koo 
had already accepted the resolution, Jordan felt that he could not do 
h · d . d' 1 93 ot erWlse an It was passe unanlmous y. 
In Wellington, Berendsen shared Jordan's dismay at the weak respon-
se of Britain and France to China's appeal. He was particularly con-
cerned that the British Government's decision to press for de ure 
recognition of the Italian conquest of Ethiopia would assist the Japan-
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ese case for the recognition of their rule in Manchuria. Even more dis-
turbing was the apparent British acceptance that if China wanted to end 
the present conflict with Japan, it would have to recognise the indepen-
dence 94 of Manchukuo as part of the settlement. This recognition would 
allow other states to follow suit, which would be important in normalis-
ing their relations with Japan. Berendsen believed that the New Zealand 
Government would "find it impossible to accept the theory that a consent 
to one international crime extorted from the reluctant victim by means 
of a second international crime can properly be regarded as having any 
bearing at all on the question of recognition by other Powers." Since 
it was also clear that the United States still subscribed to the 
principle of non-recognition, Berendsen thought it would be unwise for 
the British Government to endanger future Anglo-American collaboration 
in the Far East by promoting the recognition issue in respect to Ethio-
. 95 
p~a. 
It was impossible for Berendsen to consider the Chinese, Spanish or 
Ethiopian disputes as purely intellectual problems. He told Campbell: 
Personally, I cannot get away from the ethical side, especially in 
this confused state of affairs, and I cling, without much hope but 
with a good deal of conviction, to the view that right is right and 
wrong is wrong, and it can never be wise to do wrong or to tolerate 
wrong. Goodness knows how far those principles are really applicable 
in the present state of affairs. 96 
Certainly, the League's handling of the subsequent Chinese appeals can-
not have given Berendsen much cause for optimism. 
China appealed to the League four more times in 1938 and 1939. The 
repeated requests for the Council to institute sanctions against Japan 
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and to provide assistance to enable China to defend itself were reject-
ed. 97 Though Jordan realised he was indulging in gestures, he consis-
1 d Ch ' 98 tent y supporte lna. But his strong speech to the Council in May 
1939 on behalf of the Chinese alarmed Wellington. 99 Jordan was sharply 
reminded that he was not to commit New Zealand to the imposition 
of sanctions when it was clear that there was no support in the League 
f h . 100 or suc actlon. 
by this . 101 tlme, 
The government had adopted a more cautious approach 
for it had come to doubt whether it was still in the 
Dominion's best interests to support China as vigorously as previously. 
During the early months of 1939, Japan advanced into Hainan and the 
Spratly Islands, threatening the British military facilities in Hong 
Kong and Singapore. New Zealand was coming to the uncomfortable reali-
sation that the 102 Far East was now the "Near North". At the Pacific 
Defence Conference, attended by representatives from New Zealand, Brit-
ain and Australia during April 1939, the New Zealand Government finally 
conceded that collective security through the League was no longer prac-
ticable. 
103 
ments. 
The Commonwealth had now to look to its own security arrange-
The League had ceased to be a priority for the Labour Government by 
mid-1939 but, as Jordan had frequently pointed out, many countries had 
distanced themselves from the political activities at Geneva long be-
fore. Prompted by the failure of the League's effort to stop Italian 
aggression in Ethiopia, some members began to question the principle of 
collective security. The issue behind the call for the reform of the 
Covenant was not how the League might more effectively respond to a 
future crisis but whether it was the League's proper role to respond at 
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all. It was China's misfortune that the Japanese attack in 1937 came at 
a time when many members had made it clear that the decision whether 
they would assist a victim of aggression would be determined not by the 
League but by individual members acting in accordance with their own 
priorities. While Jordan strove to get the League to fulfil its respon-
sibilities under Articles 11, 16 and 17, other delegates were endeavour-
ing to have those irksome clauses removed from the Covenant in the name 
of reform. 
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CHAPTER 10 
REFORMING THE COVENANT, 1936-1939 
Prior to the Ethiopian crisis, New Zealand had not supported calls 
for the reform of the League Covenant. Allen, Parr and Wilford had all 
come to the conclusion that until its provisions were fully utilised 
during a crisis, the success or failure of the Covenant could not be 
properly assessed. In the meantime, they saw no reason to tamper with 
it. In spite of the attempt at sanctions during the Ethiopian dispute, 
the Labour Government believed that the Covenant had still not been 
properly implemented. There was certainly no need to amend it, except 
perhaps to strengthen its powers. Only a few weeks before Italy's 
annexation of Ethiopia, the government had reaffirmed in the Speech from 
the Throne that it was firmly attached to the principles of the Covenant 
and to 11 ' . . t . 1 co ect~ve secur~ty to ma~n a~n peace. Despite the widespread 
international cynicism about the League following the Italian victory, 
Labour's commitment did not falter. 
This commitment was evident during the debate on the League of Na-
tions Sanctions Regulations Confirmation Bill on 15 May 1936. The Lead-
er of the Opposition strongly criticised the continuation of sanctions 
and said it was time to take stock of the Dominion's obligations under 
the Covenant. Forbes asserted that the present machinery was a complete 
failure and the League must be overhauled since no nation was prepared 
to rely on it. He said it had been tried as a preserver of peace and 
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had been found wanting. "It has been proved to be a delusion and a 
snare. It has been condemned as a farce." The time had come, said 
Forbes, to make that "candid admission" and to devise a better way of 
preventing "bloodthirsty wars of aggression", Blaming idealists for the 
League's current problems, he said the Covenant depended on the powers 
being willing to use force to back the League's decisions. Since none 
of the Great Powers were prepared to do so, the Commonwealth had no 
choice but to seek a more effective form of protection. Forbes was not 
sure how this would be accomplished but he preferred a replacement for 
the League rather than a return to the old system of alliances. 2 
Savage found Forbes' views totally unacceptable. He denied that 
idealism had been the cause of the League's troubles, insisting that on-
ly when the membership of the League was "composed of idealists - the 
ideal being peace on earth - prepared to face up to the realities of the 
situation", would progress be made towards the realisation of that 
ideal. While acknowledging that the League needed to be reorganised, 
Savage said it should be with the aim of making collective security 
effective, not of discarding that principle. He believed that New Zea-
land had a role to play in the reorganisation process. To assist the 
government in formulating its representations to the League, he called 
MP h """ h "3 on s to express t elr oplnlons on t e questlon. 
National MPs considered that while New Zealand should remain a mem-
ber of the League, the Dominion's priority should be its own 4 defences. 
Some Labour MPs, including John A. Lee and Frederick Schramm, agreed 
that while the League was not in a position to give effect to its great 
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ideals New Zealand should not neglect its defences. But in general the 
Labour Party's position was that the League should not be allowed to 
languish but must be rebuilt and strengthened. Unlike National, Labour 
believed that there was no acceptable alternative to collective secur-
. 5 Ity. 
The New Zealand Government's view was shared by only one other 
Commonwealth government. The South African Prime Minister stated that 
the trouble lay not in the Covenant but in the attitude of some of the 
League's most important members, who had been unwilling to take the 
necessary risks to ensure the obligations of the Covenant were carried 
6 
out. The rest of the Commonwealth, however strongly favoured amending 
the Covenant. The Irish and Canadians advocated drastic changes cen-
tring on the removal of automatic sanctions. The British Government was 
divided on the issue. Eden thought the League must be rebuilt but Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer Neville Chamberlain preferred a system of re-
gional pacts. The Australians believed the Covenant should be reinter-
preted rather than radically amended. 7 If these divisions were any in-
dication, the Assembly clearly would find it extremely difficult to re-
concile the differing views on the reform issue. 
The Assembly was due to reconvene on 30 June 1936 to consider the 
removal of sanctions against Italy and the inevitable demands for a re-
appraisal of the Covenant. On 15 June 1936, Parr was told that New Zea-
land would only agree to the removal of sanctions on the condition that 
the whole question of the Geneva peace structure was considered by all 
nations at the session in September 1936. If a committee was establish-
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ed to study the issue, the government told Parr to ensure New Zealand's 
. 8 
representatlon. Although the British Cabinet agreed two days later to 
recommend the termination of sanctions subject to the same condition,9 
Parr was reluctant to insist at the Assembly that the one must be condi-
tional on the 10 other. He had no wish to embarrass the British while 
they endeavoured to extricate themselves and the League from an increas-
ingly untenable situation. 
Since there were already strong indications that the question of 
the Covenant would be considered in September, Savage dropped the con-
dition. Parr was advised, however, that if the Assembly decided against 
discussing the matter at its next session, New Zealand would raise it in 
September. Fearing that the League's tendency to procrastinate on dif-
ficult issues would lead to the postponement of the next session, Savage 
instructed that Parr should vigorously oppose such a 11 Parr's move. 
speech to the Assembly on 2 July 1936 closely followed Savage's instruc-
tions. New Zealand had always been a stout and unswerving protagonist 
of the Covenant, he said, and despite their disappointment and distress 
at the recent failure to curb aggression, the Dominion found it impossi-
ble to believe that the League was finished. At the next Assembly, the 
New Zealand delegation would co-operate with League members and non-mem-
bers alike to devise methods to make the League more effective and uni-
12 
versal. 
After a debate which revealed the diversity of opinion on the re-
form issue, the Assembly resolved on 4 July 1936 to invite submissions 
from member-states on how the Covenant might be improved. The deadline 
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for these would be 1 September 1936, after which the Secretary-General 
13 
would collate them and report to the Assembly later that month. There 
was, therefore, some urgency for New Zealand because the government had 
only a fortnight to prepare its submission before Berendsen and the 
High Commissioner-designate, Bill Jordan, were due to sail for Britain 
on 21 July 1936. In view of Labour's long campaign against the indif-
ference and opposition to the League of previous New Zealand govern-
ments, Savage and his collegues were anxious to present what they be-
lieved to be the Dominion's unique and important contribution to the 
work of the League. The government was too involved with domestic mat-
ters to spare a minister for Geneva but Jordan, as a former senior 
Labour MP, and Berendsen, the government's chief adviser on foreign 
policy, were considered well-qualified to present the Cabinet's views at 
14 
the League. 
The Dominion's submission to the League was completed in just over 
15 
a week. A questionnaire drawn up by Berendsen was distributed to min-
isters 
1936 at 
on 9 July 1936, in preparation for a Cabinet meeting on 13 July 
16 
which Jordan would also be present. It is clear from its 
ninety questions that Berendsen believed that League reform could not 
be divorced from other issues. The questionnaire not only referred to 
possible changes to the Covenant but also to the situation in Central 
Europe, arms control and the world economy. Ministers were asked 
whether they favoured strengthening the Covenant and, if so, how the 
League might be made more effective against aggressors. Should it have 
its own armed forces, for instance, or should each member be automatic-
ally required to assist another member under attack? Was it in the 
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Commonwealth's interest to bind itself to intervene against any declared 
aggressor? The questionnaire also covered the problem of how sanctions 
might be made effective, whether the international security treaties 
were still useful or whether regional pacts were more practicable, and 
what the ramifications of such pacts might be, especially for Europe. 
Indicative of the government's concern with the uncertain interna-
tional situation was the focus on whether these various proposals would 
forestall further aggressive action by Japan, Italy and Germany. An im-
portant question for the League was whether the Covenant should be sepa-
rated from the postwar peace treaties. In reference to Germany, minis-
ters were asked how past wrongs could be righted, whether territorial 
concessions or the return of former colonies were the solution, and how 
these might be achieved without conflict. The intentions of the three 
"predatory dictatorships" remained the biggest question of all. 
Three days after the Cabinet met, Berendsen produced a concise and 
cogent memorandum outlining the government's views on Covenant reform. 17 
It began by declaring that New Zealand considered that there was no ma-
terial fault with the Covenant as it stood. The government believed 
that it was the inadequate application of the Covenant in recent dis-
putes, rather than the Covenant itself, which was responsible for the 
League's difficulties. There was no justification for characterising 
the Covenant as an ineffective instrument until its provisions were ful-
ly applied. Nonetheless, the government was not averse to amending the 
Covenant so long as the purpose was to strengthen it. To this end, the 
government suggested that the provisions of the abortive Geneva Protocol 
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of 1924, which had attempted to strengthen both the coercive and arbi-
trative powers of the Covenant, might be used as a basis for discussion. 
The memorandum then focussed on the specific problems associated 
with the implementation of the Covenant. It acknowledged that not all 
League members were prepared to join in the collective application of 
sanctions under Article 16. In the government's view, the League would 
continue to be ineffective unless sanctions were made immediate and 
automatic, and until there was complete certainty that all League mem-
bers would implement them. If this could be guaranteed, New Zealand 
believed it would be enough to deter aggression. 
To enhance the League's ability to respond quickly and effectively 
to the threat of aggression, the government proposed that the League 
should have its own armed forces, or that members should put part or all 
of their armed forces at the League's disposal to form an international 
force in time of crisis. Fearing that regional pacts would weaken the 
League's system of collective security by creating conflicts of inter-
est, the government viewed them with disfavour. As a compromise, it was 
prepared to support a collective system whereby all League members would 
accept the immediate and universal application of economic sanctions, 
but they would be allowed to reserve the right to restrict their obliga-
tion to use force to "defined areas". This proposal was probably in-
spired by the 1923 Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance. 
The New Zealand Labour Party had long believed that the opinions 
expressed by national delegations at League meetings reflected the views 
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of the ruling parties rather than the general public of their respective 
countries. Convinced that the issue of Covenant reform was too impor-
tant to be left to the whims of national politics, the government pro-
posed that national plebiscites should be held to decide whether each 
League member would accept the obligations of Article 16, whether 
acceptance of the obligation to use force should be restricted to a de-
fined area, and whether the League should control its own armed forces. 
Since it was a Labour tenet of belief that all peoples of the world 
wanted peace and thus would support the League as the best guarantee of 
that objective, there was no doubt that the overwhelming majority would 
vote to strengthen the Covenant. The government was aware, however, 
that for the League to ensure support it needed to become more accessi-
ble. The memorandum urged the League to broadcast its discussions and 
decisions on short-wave radio so that its activities might be understood 
and appreciated more widely. 
As the drafters of the Geneva Protocol had done before, the govern-
ment recognised that it was not enough simply to strengthen the coercive 
powers of the League. An effort must be made to set up adequate machin-
ery for the ventilation and, if possible, rectification of international 
grievances. With the Protocol's Committee of Arbitrators in mind, the 
memorandum suggested that a tribunal of some kind should be established. 
Conscious that the origins of some of the current problems facing 
the international community could be traced back to the peace treaties 
which had ended the First World War, the government called for these 
treaties to be reconsidered with a view to correcting some of the injus-
tices they contained. 
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Because the Covenant was an integral part of the peace treaties and 
the League was required to enforce the settlements, the Geneva body 
was dogged from the beginning by the suspicion that it was established 
to perpetuate the inequality between the victorious and defeated powers. 
By urging the separation of the Covenant from the peace treaties, New 
Zealand hoped to achieve two objects. The first was to promote the 
League as a truly universal body, not dominated by any particular member 
or bloc. The second object was to enable the treaties themselves to be 
reviewed, with the League participating as a disinterested party. New 
Zealand's main worry concerning the review of both the Covenant and the 
peace treaties was that there should not be a repeat of the situation in 
1919 when only a few nations meeting in Paris imposed their wishes on 
the rest of the world. The government called for all states to be in-
vited to participate in the discussions. This clause clearly demon-
strated the government's concern over the German problem. The Labour 
movement tended to regard Nazi belligerency, the most serious manifesta-
tion of which was the reoccupation of the Rhineland in March 1936, as a 
product of the injustices inflicted on Germany at Versailles, and thus 
excusable to some degree. Savage and his collegues were prepared, 
therefore, to balance firmness of principle with a willingness to con-
18 
template peaceful change to encourage Germany to return to the League. 
Though not strictly related to the issue of Covenant reform, the 
New Zealand Government took the opportunity to include a call for a 
worldwide survey of economic conditions in its memorandum. The Labour 
Party believed that economic inequalities were at the root of many of 
the geopolitical problems which now threatened peace. But this did not 
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obscure the government's main point which was that the Covenant must be 
strengthened and the League should be universal. The memorandum conclud-
ed: 
•.. although we believe that a collective peace system that is not 
supported by all the nations of the world is better than no collect-
ive peace system at all, yet we are convinced that no such system can 
be entirely satisfactory until it is universal and that every proper 
effort should be made to that end. 
The problem was that some members believed that universality could only 
be achieved by sacrificing the coercive Articles of the Covenant, thus 
destroying the principle of collective security which New Zealand valued 
so highly. Britain was one of those states but while the British 
Government canvassed support for its views, it preferred not to make 
them public. 
On 23 July 1936, MacDonald told the Dominion High Commissioners 
that Britain would not forward any proposals to the League but it would 
discuss the issues of European peace and the future of the League with 
the other Locarno Pact states over the next few months. The British 
clearly expected the Dominions to follow suit in order not to complicate 
the impending discussions with Germany and Italy. Parr reported that 
the other Dominions were likely to comply and he advised Wellington not 
to do anything until there was an opportunity for the Commonwealth 
19 governments to exchange views on the League's future. 
A week later, MacDonald informed Wellington that a Foreign Office 
memorandum outlining British thinking on the Covenant was on its way to 
20 
the Dominions and he would welcome any comments they may wish to make. 
In a private message to the Governor-General, he asked Lord Galway to do 
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everything practicable to ensure the government did not send a submis-
sion to 21 Geneva before the Assembly met. But even before the British 
memorandum arrived, there were signs that the New Zealand Government was 
not going to sit on its reform proposals until the Assembly opened. In 
Parliament on 4 August 1936, Nash said that while New Zealand wanted to 
co-operate with Britain, the government believed the progress of 
the world could only be achieved through a properly-organised League. 
Given the choice between "the present League to work out the possibili-
ties of avoiding war before war comes, or another League after war", he 
declared that h L b . d 22 t e eague must e reconst~tute now. The government 
obviously considered the future of the League to be of such importance 
that it required the most urgent attention. 
The Foreign Office memorandum arrived in New Zealand on 14 August 
1936. 23 It suggested that there were two factors which were likely to 
determine the British Government's course of action. These were the 
difficulty, if not impossibility, of securing general agreement on any 
substantial change in the terms of the Covenant, and the fact that Brit-
ish policy towards the League was closely bound up with the policy to-
wards Germany. Not wanting to take the lead on an issue so fraught with 
difficulty, at least not until other League members had declared their 
intentions, the British Government refrained from making a definite pro-
nouncement on policy. It suggested that there should not be any change 
in the terms of the Covenant but rather a "reinterpretation and some re-
distribution of emphasis". The most important problem was how to make 
the commitments contained in the Covenant more acceptable and applicable 
to realities. 
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The British proposed that the unanimity rule of Article 11, which 
had allowed guilty parties to veto preventative action by the League, 
should be modified and regional pacts consistent with the Covenant 
should be encouraged. Britain was prepared to participate in discus-
sions of international grievances under Article 19, including access to 
raw materials. It also favoured separating the Covenant from the peace 
treaties as an important step towards making the League more univer-
24 
sal. These proposals made it clear that Britain would not support the 
strengthening of collective security but the more immediate problem for 
New Zealand was less concerned with policy differences than with proce-
dural matters. 
The British Government would not send a submission to Geneva, pre-
ferring instead to present its views in the Assembly. The question was 
whether New Zealand would do the same. On 20 August 1936, Savage cabled 
Berendsen, who had just arrived in London with Jordan, asking whether in 
light of the British proposals, New Zealand's memorandum required modi-
f . . 25 lcatlon. Five days later, after lengthy discussions with Parr and 
Jordan, Berendsen cabled that they saw no reason to alter the memorandum 
although Parr considered some of the points, such as an international 
League force, to be outside practical politics. It was suggested, how-
ever, that a clause might be inserted stating that should New Zealand's 
proposals be generally considered not immediately practicable, the 
government would consider progress by stages or even alternative pro-
posals. 
The question of whether to forward the Reform Memorandum to Geneva 
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posed a much more serious problem. The New Zealand Government might 
disagree with the British Government on policy but it was loath to take 
any course which isolated the Dominion from the rest of the Common-
wealth. Thus before they would give their advice, Berendsen, Parr and 
Jordan arranged to discuss the matter with the Foreign Secretary. At 
their meeting on 24 August 1936, Eden was asked to explain why New Zea-
land should not send its proposals to the League. The Dominion Govern-
ment felt very strongly about the League and collective security, and 
was anxious to comply with the Secretary-General's request. Eden ini-
tially denied that the British Government was trying to influence the 
Dominions on the matter but he became more forthcoming when informed 
that the government was aware of MacDonald's private message to Lord 
Galway of 30 July. 
The Foreign Secretary explained that there were two main reasons 
for the British attitude. They were reluctant to make definite pro-
posals on Covenant reform before the expected meeting of the Locarno 
powers in October 1936 to avoid jeopardising possible German collabora-
tion. Secondly, they wanted to co-operate with the Dominions on a joint 
Commonwealth scheme. The New Zealanders countered by pointing out that 
there was nothing in the government's proposals which could endanger 
Germany's collaboration and, in any case, the views of so small a Domin-
ion could scarcely upset the equilibrium of Europe. 
Eden feared that the New Zealand proposals might be interpreted by 
other countries as a kite flown by Britain. He could not understand why 
the New Zealand Government considered the matter to be so urgent since 
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almost none of the other League members intended to present their obser-
vations. The Foreign Secretary was sharply reminded that the whole ob-
ject of the League's request for the receipt of proposals by 1 September 
was to enable the Assembly to discuss the issue profitably later that 
month. It hardly augured well for the League if the Assembly could not 
debate reform because the members had failed to carry out the terms of a 
resolution they had all previously endorsed. The meeting ended in dead-
lock. It is clear, however, that Parr supported the British position. 
When the New Zealanders discussed the question later, he suggested that 
a speech at the Assembly would generate more publicity for New Zealand's 
views than the memorandum. Jordan, Berendsen and Campbell preferred to 
send the memorandum. Indeed, Berendsen believed that New Zealand had a 
'b'l' d 26 responSl l lty to 0 so. 
With the September deadline only days away, the Prime Minister's 
Department recommended that Savage instruct Parr to send copies of the 
New Zealand memorandum to the other Commonwealth governments to give 
them the opportunity to suggest modifications. The Prime Minister was 
advised that by forwarding the memorandum to Geneva, the New Zealand 
Government would be demonstrating its independent judgement and its 
opposition to the habitual procrastination of the League. It was also 
suggested that, given past experience, a speech in the Assembly was un-
likely to be given the publicity Parr claimed and, in any case, there 
was a greater chance of accurately representing the Cabinet's views in a 
27 
memorandum. On 28 August 1936, Savage instructed Berendsen that the 
memorandum was to be delivered to the League on the due date, with the 
additional clause he had recommended. The other Commonwealth govern-
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ments were to receive an advance copy but Savage said that in view of 
the British Government's attitude, "we do not consider any useful pur-
pose will be served by further delay in the hope of effective British 
" 28 Commonwealth collaboratJ.on." 
The Reform Memorandum was published in the New Zealand press on 2 
September 1936 and received a generally favourable reception. 29 The New 
Zealand Herald believed that "this implied zeal to assist the work of 
the League" was in line with New Zealand public opinion, which generally 
supported the government's determination to remain loyal to the Cove-
30 
nant. h "1 h d h" " 31 T e Otago Da1 y Times s are t 1S V1ew. The memorandum was 
32 
enthusiastically received by the LNU throughout the country. Nonethe-
less, there was some suspicion of the government's motives in supporting 
rearmament because it was not explicitly linked to collective security. 
Only later did the LNU accept that an adequately-armed democratic front 
was the only answer to the deterioration of European stability.33 
Of the fifty-four members of the League, New Zealand was the only 
member of the Commonwealth among eighteen countries which made submis-
34 
sions to the League. When told by the Canadian High Commissioner that 
the reform issue would be on the agenda of the meeting between the 
Dominions Secretary and the High Commissioners on 9 September 1936, 
Mackenzie King replied that a discussion of New Zealand's proposals 
would be unprofitable at this stage but he would be prepared to discuss 
them 35 at Geneva. Jordan found his Commonwealth collegues reluctant to 
go into specifics on their countries' attitudes to Covenant reform at 
the meeting. They did agree that universality was very important and 
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that those countries outside the League should be invited to participate 
in the reform debate. Jordan reported that there was some willingness 
to amend or even delete Article 16 so that the Assembly could only re-
commend sanctions to members, rather than the current automatic resort 
to 
36 force. Savage told him to support the proposals contained in the 
37 government's memorandum vigorously at the Assembly. 
The Assembly opened on 21 September 1936 and after disposing of the 
Ethiopian difficulty the delegates focussed on the reform question. 
There was a great diversity of opinion on the future course and struc-
ture of the League. The few states which favoured major change wanted 
the League to assume a much more restricted role. Most favoured only 
minor amendments such as abandoning the unanimity rule of Article 11 so 
that the League might put more emphasis on the prevention of disputes. 
Some, including France and the Soviet Union, attached great importance 
to collective security; the majority preferred regional agreements to 
guarantee their security. Unanimity was only possible on the idea that 
h L b . 1 38 t e eague must ecome unlversa • 
Britain's position was in line with that of the Foreign Office 
39 
memorandum. Echoing Eden, Mackenzie King declared that the policies 
of the League should conform to realities. Canada did not favour auto-
matic commitments under the Covenant and he made it clear that North 
America had 40 no wish to become involved in Europe's quarrels. Bruce 
suggested that the League's greatest problem was non-universality and 
that attempts to implement collective security through automatic sanc-
tions would alienate members. Australia believed that League members 
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would still act against an aggressor if the Covenant's obligations were 
41 
made voluntary. 
Jordan addressed the Assembly on 29 September 1936. His speech had 
been the subject of some acrimony between himself and Berendsen. AI-
though Jordan led New Zealand's League delegation, the Cabinet expected 
him to defer to Berendsen on Ethiopia and Covenant reform. In addition 
to the government's written instructions, Berendsen had prepared a 
speech for Jordan's use which strongly criticised the League's recent 
performance. A 
partment League 
draft of this speech is in the Prime Minister's De-
Reform file. 42 Bruce Bennett believes that this docu-
ment, which he calls the 'Preparatory Document', was written in Mayor 
June 1936 and was a precursor of the Reform Memorandum. This view is 
based on an assertion made by J.H. Witheford, who was involved in the 
preparation of New Zealand's official war history, in a letter to Miss 
J.R. McKenzie of the New Zealand High Commission in Canberra in 1949. 43 
Witheford's claim and Bennett's interpretation are incorrect. Not only 
does the document refer to the June 1936 Assembly, which closed in early 
July 1936, in the past tense but its content accords with Berendsen's 
account of a stronger version of Jordan's speech, and its structure is 
very similar to that of the speech which Jordan delivered. 
Berendsen's draft was deliberately provocative. On the Italo-
Ethiopian dispute, for example, it said: " •.. though ... the League came to 
life, its resusitation was lengthy and laboured, and ... when restored to 
consciousness, was more than half paralysed in every faculty except that 
of the tongue. II The appeasement policies of Britain and France were 
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also explicitly condemned. Berendsen declared that unless the League 
was made effective, all members, New Zealand included, "will be entitled 
to consider themselves no longer bound to take part in such an ineffec-
tive and dangerous association and will have to consider the desirabil-
ity of resigning from the League." Jordan thought the speech too strong 
and wanted to take a much softer line. Berendsen threatened to inform 
the government of such unauthorised action. A compromise was reached 
whereby Jordan would deliver the original speech but in a slightly 
watered-down form. This incident may have been responsible for the rift 
which developed between the two men. Extremely jealous of his dignity 
and independence, Jordan undoubtedly resented Berendsen's efforts to 
k h ' h l' 44 rna e lm toe t e lne. 
Jordan began his speech by expressing New Zealand's acute concern 
about the future. He warned that "unless war can be outlawed, civiliza-
tion as we know it may be in danger of extinction, millions of our fel-
low human beings may be doomed to untold misery and degradation, and 
chaos, war and barbarism may take the place of law and order." Such a 
catastrophe could be avoided, he said, if the present drift of the 
League was arrested. New Zealand had witnessed with consternation the 
League's ominous failure to preserve peace in recent years. In the case 
of the Ethiopian dispute the disappointment was all the greater because 
the initial display of unanimity had raised hope that a virile collec-
tive peace system was possible. The sorry reality was that fifty na-
tions, acting together for the first time in defence of the Covenant, 
had allowed themselves to be deterred from their plain duty. Jordan 
insisted that New Zealand could not remain silent while the League's 
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continued ineffectiveness deprived mankind of any real sense of secur-
ity. There must be a return to the principles of the Covenant. 
He then went on to outline the Dominion's reform proposals. 45 
Savage believed that New Zealand had put a strong case to the 
League and congratulated Jordan on his speech. 46 But in Parliament the 
reaction of National MPs was negative. The government was taken to task 
for committing the Dominion to the automatic implementation of sanc-
tions, including 
forces, if the 
the despatch of naval and military expeditionary 
47 League declared a state to be an aggressor. Forbes, 
Hargest and William Endean asked how Savage could reconcile Jordan's 
statement with Labour's previous opposition to sending troops overseas. 
Hargest and Coates thought it absurd for such a militarily-weak nation 
to commit itself to sanctions when only a few League members, and none 
of the other Commonwealth countries, would do likewise. Coates charged 
that the government had adopted a policy of isolation and he was con-
cerned that it would put the Dominion in a very awkward position. Forbes 
scoffed that New Zealand could not fulfil its pledge without British 
equipment and Royal Navy protection, and he rebuked the government for 
making such extraordinary proposals without holding a referendum. Harold 
Dickie went so far as to suggest that New Zealand did not deserve its 
seat on the League Council if it was to make proposals so obviously at 
odds with the views of the British Government. 48 
Savage replied that if the policy enunciated by Jordan at Geneva 
was adopted by the League, the possibility of war could be considerably 
reduced. He insisted that the idea of sending a force to Europe was the 
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last thing on the government's mind when drawing up the memorandum. 
Minister of Lands Frank Langstone pointed out that with modern warfare 
it was quite possible that the conflict would be over before New Zea-
land's soldiers arrived. He felt it would be better for the Dominion's 
men to be employed at home producing supplies for those who did the 
fighting, He denied that the government had deliberately taken a stand 
against the British Government but New Zealand had to "indicate that she 
had a mind of her own on the great question of war and peace"." Sug-
gesting it was more probable that New Zealand would be led into war by 
Britain than vice versa, Langstone argued that the Dominion had the same 
responsibility as any other member to support the League in an effort to 
reduce the possibility of war, Jordan was merely advocating that the 
nations of the world carry out what they gave lip-service to, said 
Savage,who pointedly reminded Forbes that he had never called a referen-
dum on any issue when he was Prime Minister. Challenging the National 
Party to produce an alternative to the Reform Memorandum, he said that 
the government would be quite prepared to listen. 49 
Meanwhile, the Assembly had decided to establish a special commit-
tee to study the Covenant. This committee would not only consider 
whether to amend the Covenant's contentious Articles but would also dis-
cuss how the Covenant could be reconciled with the Pact of Paris and the 
Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation signed by the American nations 
at Rio de Janeiro in 1933,50 A sub-committee was appointed to prepare 
reports for the main committee to consider at the next Assembly. The 
Committee of Twenty-Eight, as it became known, included Britain, Canada 
and New Zealand. On Jordan's suggestion, it was given the power to call 
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a special session of the Assembly so the matter could be resolved with-
51 
out delay. 
The first meeting of the Committee of TwentY-Eight in December 1936 
disabused Jordan of any notion that the reform question would have a 
quick resolution. While acknowledging that the committee's task was of 
"gigantic" proportions, he found its preoccupation with procedural mat-
ters frustrating. He pleaded with the committee to start dealing with 
52 
matters of substance. Yet he was fully aware that New Zealand's pro-
posals would not find much favour. Savage was assured this would not 
lessen Jordan's determination to present the government's case as 
vigorously as possible. But it is clear he was under pressure from the 
British to moderate his stand. 53 Even Berendsen was pessimistic about 
the chances of the proposals being accepted. Obviously discouraged 
by what he had heard at the Assembly, he told Fraser that a plan for 
stronger measures to reform the League based on delegating a large 
measure of sovereignty to the League was unpalatable to most of the mem-
bers. Berendsen believed that New Zealand could not press for such a 
plan with any realistic hope of success without the existence of almost 
universal goodwill. 54 
The reservations of its advisers did not affect the government's 
resolve to pursue the proposals. Savage and his collegues were convinc-
ed that they had the support of the majority of New Zealanders, and they 
received the wholehearted backing of the Labour Party at its annual con-
ference in late 55 March 1937. While in Europe during late 1936/early 
1937, Nash took every opportunity to promote New Zealand's views on the 
56 League. 
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In a broadcast from Geneva in January 1937, he said that the 
League must not become merely an umbrella for regional pacts. The New 
Zealand Government was determined to support collective security and it 
believed that the Covenant should only be amended in order to strengthen 
it. 57 With the forthcoming Imperial Conference in mind, he attempted to 
publicise New Zealand's point of view as a viable alternative to the 
emasculated League the British Government was promoting. Addressing the 
Association of British Chambers of Commerce in April 1937, Nash said 
that the continued peaceful existence of the Commonwealth was due to a 
form of collective security. Blaming the current problems facing the 
international community on the failure to support this principle, he de-
clared that it was only collective security which would preserve world 
58 peace. 
Nash's efforts to influence British public opinion were motivated 
by the knowledge that if New Zealand's reform proposals were to have any 
chance of being adopted, they must have Britain's backing. In December 
1936, Australia signalled its intention to raise the issue of the League 
59 
at the Imperial Conference the following May. Though it realised sup-
port was unlikely, the New Zealand Government informed London on 15 Jan-
uary 1937 that it too attached the utmost importance to the discussions 
on the 60 League. Berendsen offered little hope that these discussions 
would result in British co-operation. He noted that Britain had not 
honoured its international commitments in recent years. Citing what he 
termed the "hesitations and extraordinary alterations" of British policy 
over the previous six years, Berendsen argued that a large portion of 
the blame for the League's failure must be placed on the British Govern-
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ment. He noted that in the discussions on a replacement agreement for 
the Locarno Pact during 1936, the League had played no part and collec-
tive security was not even an issue. He saw the British Government 
"groping in confusion and uncertainty for a definite attitude on foreign 
affairs." New Zealand and Britain clearly had completely different con-
ceptions of the meaning of the League system and this affected their 
respective reform proposals. Berendsen believed that agreement between 
the two governments at the Imperial Conference would prove impossible. 61 
Berendsen's pessimism was well-founded. From the start the New 
Zealand delegation discovered that there was a wide gulf between their 
views on the future of the League and those held by the other delega-
tions. The rest of the Commonwealth favoured a universal, non-coercive 
League but they did not agree on how this object might be achieved. The 
Canadian Prime Minister held the most extreme view, calling for Articles 
10 and 16 to be removed from the Covenant so that the League would be 
left with nothing more than moral authority. Canada, Britain and South 
Africa asserted that the League's power to impose sanctions should be 
eliminated. The Australians suggested only that the Covenant's obliga-
tions should be reinterpreted. Rather than automatic sanctions, Bruce 
favoured consultation between the League members on the form of action 
to be taken in the event of a threat to peace. He agreed with the South 
Africans that it was vital for the Covenant to be separated from the 
peace treaties and he supported the concept of regional pacts. Indeed, 
one of Australia's major goals at the conference was to secure accept-
f . 1 f P' f' p 62 ance 0 lts proposa or a aCl lC act. 
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Having already castigated the Commonwealth for failing to honour 
its obligations to the League during the recent international crises, 
Savage not surprisingly took a different line. 63 He argued that to 
change the League would be a fatal blunder. There was no guarantee that 
the League would command more widespread support by weakening the Cove-
nant. It was just as likely that a conflict of interests between the 
powers would prevent agreement to exercise moral pressure as it had pre-
vented the proper application of sanctions. Savage warned that the most 
likely outcome would be the estrangement of the small states and a re-
turn by the Great Powers to the discredited system of alliances and the 
balance of power. To abolish sanctions would destroy the League, he 
0d 64 sa~ . 
Given this deep division on such a fundamental issue, it was inevi-
table that the formulation of the conference's declaration on foreign 
affairs would be far from straightforward. In fact it took six days of 
wrangling, and as many drafts, before the final version was 65 approved. 
The Commonwealth declared that its first objective was the preservation 
of peace and thus its armaments would never be used for any purpose in-
consistent with the Covenant or the Pact of Paris. It was stated that 
the settlement of disputes should be by methods of co-operation, joint 
enquiry and conciliation. Savage rejected a general condemnation of the 
use of force because it ruled out military sanctions by the League. His 
objection was met and at the same time somewhat obscured by a dec lara-
tion against recourse to the use of force "between nation and nation". 
The Commonwealth approved of the concept of regional agreements but 
Savage insisted on a proviso that such agreements were not to conflict 
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with the Covenant. It was stated further that in order to enlarge the 
membership of the League, the Covenant should be separated from the 
peace treaties. 
The most serious clash had occurred over a passage which emphasised 
that the Commonwealth governments would conduct their foreign policies 
"in accordance with the principles of the Covenant". Mackenzie King 
objected strongly, saying that Canada would not base its policy on col-
lective security by sanctions. Savage hit back by asking if the 
members of the League were not prepared to govern themselves by the 
principles of the Covenant, who would? He bluntly accused the Canadians 
of evading their international obligations and of wanting to destroy the 
League. "As long as the gun was unloaded they were willing to support 
the League," he said, "but the moment the gun was loaded they would 
not have anything to do with it." King angrily denied the charge but he 
and the South African Prime Minister were adamant that they would only 
agree to base their governments' policies on the "aims and ideals of the 
League". They insisted that if their amendment was not accepted then 
the passage would have to be dropped. Savage retorted that if this hap-
pened, he would have nothing further to do with the communique. Stale-
mate was reached and British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain hastily 
adjourned the meeting. 
On the following day Savage was more willing to compromise. The 
New Zealanders had corne under pressure from the British and the Austral-
ians to moderate their position in order to maintain the appearence of 
Commonwealth unity. Savage was prepared to accept the amendment so long 
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as a sentence was added stating that New Zealand reserved the right to 
advocate and support its statement of policy submitted to the September 
1936 Assembly. Concerned that this would indicate disagreement within 
the Commonwealth, the other delegates persuaded Savage to accept a foot-
note which recognised the right of all governments to support their 
statements made at that time. Savage also agreed not to expound his 
views in his final statement to the conference, because it would be pub-
lished. The communique was saved but it could hardly be said to repre-
66 
sent a common front. 
The New Zealand delegates were undoubtedly dissatisfied that the 
Commonwealth had not wholeheartedly backed the League and collective 
security. When he later reported to Parliament, Savage expressed dis-
appointment with the attitude 67 of the conference. Yet, despite the 
isolation of New Zealand's position and its lack of influence, the in-
clusion of a separate qualification in a document intended above all 
else to demonstrate Commonwealth unity, was no mean achievement. In a 
broad hint that New Zealand was responsible for the footnote, Savage 
told the House on 29 September 1937 that "I felt it was not sufficient 
to go twelve or thirteen thousand miles to listen to my own voice and 
the voices of others for several weeks in the United Kingdom and then to 
come back here and be muzzled for all time about what we thought ought 
68 
to happen." But while he believed that New Zealand had the right to 
express its own views, 
to cause difficulties 
Savage acknowledged that care must be taken not 
69 for the rest of the Commonwealth. Answering 
criticism that the government's support for the League was damaging the 
Dominion's relations with Britain, Nash gave an assurance that in the 
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event of war, New Zealand's first loyalty would be to the Commonwealth, 
70 
not the League. Of course the government still hoped that by reform-
ing the Covenant, the League would be able to prevent such an eventual-
ity. But Jordan was not optimistic that the Committee of Twenty-Eight 
would make any progress at its second session beginning on 10 September 
1937. 
The committee met just before the Assembly opened. Jordan noted 
that some of the reform proposals lacked the fullness and "helpful con-
scientiousness" of the New Zealand memorandum. Nevertheless, their con-
flicting views confirmed his belief that in the present international 
climate it was futile to expect any agreement on changes to the Cove-
nant, and that "with all its defects, the Covenant substantially as it 
stands will have to serve nations yet awhile ••• " There was, however, 
general acceptance of the desirability of separating the Covenant from 
the peace treaties. Recognising that this was perhaps the only issue 
on which progress could be made, Jordan proposed the establishment of a 
drafting committee to prepare a resolution. A Committee of Ten Jurists, 
which included Campbell, actually went further and drafted the changes 
to the Covenant required for implementing the separation. But it did 
not report until the Assembly was nearing adjournment so its proposals 
were held over until the following year. 71 
New Zealand's delegates had found little sympathy for their point 
of view at the Assembly. Campbell recorded his perturbation when during 
i 
a conversation with a Scand1navian delegate he was asked increduously: 
"Collective security do you still believe in 72 that?" Because 
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of the prevalence of this attitude, Jordan found the League very de-
pressing. He told Savage that the League was inoperative because the 
members wanted it to be inoperative, and he believed there was little 
chance of 73 New Zealand's policy being adopted. As for the contention 
of some delegates that the League could regain in the technical sphere 
the prestige it had lost in the political sphere, Jordan dismissed it as 
nonsense. "Better by far [to] recognise that all our strivings after 
human betterment will be [in] vain unless we do collectively secure 
" 
he . d 74 peace, sal . Jordan considered that while circumstances were 
against the League, it would be a disservice for New Zealand to press 
unduly proposals which would receive little 75 or no support. Even 
Savage was becoming discouraged. He told a LNU deputation on 14 October 
1937 that the League was depressing because "people go there without the 
slightest intention of giving effect to the principles underlying the 
76 Covenant." Despite New Zealand's continued support for its princi-
pIes, the trend at Geneva was beginning to take its toll. 
The third session of the Committee of Twenty-Eight began on 
31 January 1938. Whatever his private reservations, Jordan told the 
committee that New Zealand would do all it could towards producing a 
Covenant which was acceptable to all but he warned against "framing a 
Covenant which will conform to the present confusion" merely to deal 
with 77 immediate problems. His comments formed part of a discussion of 
two reports prepared by Lord Cranborne on universality and collaboration 
between the League and non-member states. As basic premises of his re-
ports, Cranborne accepted that the League was coercive in respect to 
what action its members could take during a crisis, and that universal-
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ity was never a primary objective. The parallel with the official Brit-
ish position on the reform issue is obvious. In his report to Welling-
ton, Jordan questioned the validity of Cranborne's premises. He asked: 
"If as individuals we join of our own free will an organisation with 
rules providing that certain explicitly stated action will be taken in 
defined circumstances, can we complain of coercion when the circumstan-
ces call for the appropriate action? Obviously not," he asserted. As for 
universality, Jordan argued that the whole ideal of, and practical neces-
sity for, an international authority rested on the assumption that at 
least one nation would not co-operate with the rest. It followed, 
therefore, that the League's effectiveness could not be dependent on 
whether it was truly universal. 
When the committee concluded its discussions on 2 February 1938, it 
remained divided. The report to the Assembly made no definite recommen-
dations for the revision of the Covenant. 78 Frustrated by the lack of 
progress, the British Government told the Dominions on 30 July 1938 that 
because many members already regarded the sanctions system as suspend-
ed, it was time that there was an honest avowal of the League's limita-
tions. The British proposed that there should be a temporary definition 
of the limits of members' obligations until the Covenant could be 
applied fully once more. It would be left to individual members to de-
cide as to what extent they would accept the obligations of Article 16 
and a greater emphasis would be placed on the League's conciliation 
facilities under Articles 11 and 19. 79 
Asked for his views by Savage, Jordan said that while he considered 
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there should not be any substantial changes to the Covenant, he also be-
lieved there should be more emphasis on conciliation. On the question 
of sanctions he thought that it would be better if each member took re-
sponsibility for imposing sanctions but he feared that a declaration 
disavowing automatic obligations would be interpreted as a repudiation 
of all obligations. Jordan felt that the British were unwise to over-
emphasise the difficulties and divisions which affected the League, for 
such a speech to the Assembly coming from so important a member would 
80 
only compound the existing problems. 
The New Zealand Government advised London on 11 August 1938 that it 
could not support the proposed resolution. Recalling the Dominion's 
opposition to a similar proposal to the Council regarding the recogni-
tion of the Italian conquest of Ethiopia the previous May, the govern-
ment said that it deprecated any procedure which was not authorised by 
the Covenant. New Zealand was in favour of putting greater stress on 
conciliation but without the means to ensure the League's settlement was 
carried out, the government doubted whether the state found to be in the 
wrong would voluntarily abide by its terms. An aggrieved state might be 
encouraged to rectify a generally-accepted injustice by forceful means. 
But the main reason that New Zealand could not accept the resolution was 
that by weakening the provisions of the Covenant further, it would al-
most guarantee that the Covenant as it stood would never be implemented. 
Jordan would be instructed to reaffirm New Zealand's adherence to the 
C d h b . f . 81 ovenant an t en a staln rom votlng. 
The British Government was not happy with the decision and tried to 
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persuade Wellington to reconsider. It was not the prospect of the 
Dominion's abstention which most disturbed the British. Rather it was 
the possibility that an emotive speech by Jordan in defence of the Cove-
nant would encourage others to oppose the resolution. The British 
Government believed that there would be more defections from the 
League if the resolution was not approved. The implication was that New 
Zealand would be contributing to the League's destruction if Jordan 
1 d h d 1 ' , h' 82 open y oppose the Britis e egat~on ~n t ~s matter. 
Two days before the Assembly opened on 12 September 1938, London 
was ld h 1 d ld h ' d 83 to t at New Zea an wou not c ange ~ts stan • But as a con-
cession, Jordan was instructed to express the Dominion's views in 
language as d d '1' 'bl 84 mo erate an conc~ ~atory as poss~ e. The British were 
aware that the debate on the Covenant would not be the only opportunity 
for New Zealand to express its potentially embarrassing viewpoint during 
the Assembly. Because the Council began its third session of the year 
a few days before the Assembly convened, it was customary for the Presi-
dent of the Council to open the Assembly. To the dismay of the British, 
it was Jordan's turn to chair the Council. 85 
Although his opening speech contained references to New Zealand's 
views on the League, Jordan recognised that the occasion demanded re-
straint. 86 He told Savage later that he was necessarily guarded because 
"it would have been useless to make a provocative speech condemning war 
and advocating peace. The word peace is heard here every few minutes, 
but ~t h d btf 1 ",87 L seems to ave a ou u mean~ng. Speaking firstly on Cove-
nant reform, Jordan put the blame for the League's failures on the 
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governments of its member-states rather than on the Covenant. New Zea-
land believed that the Covenant formed the minimum of any real system of 
international co-operation to secure peace, and it would be a betrayal 
of those who had died in the Great War if the League should be allowed 
to die. 
Alluding to Labour's commitment to social welfare in New Zealand, 
Jordan reminded the delegates that progress towards individual welfare 
and security was incompatible with the pursuit of warlike purposes. He 
also made a thinly-disguised plea for a return to collective security, 
saying that in the present conditions individual nations could no longer 
attain security through their own resources. To avoid disaster and 
hardship, argued Jordan, nations must recognise that they may have to 
share the risk of others. Thus the current crisis in Europe was of con-
cern to all nations, not just to those immediately affected. Jordan did 
not refer to the Czechoslovakian situation directly but in a clear warn-
ing to Germany he said that "if peace is violated it will not be 
possible for any who violate it to count on the neutrality of even those 
88 
countries that may appear to be most remote." 
That Jordan even alluded to the Czechoslovakian crisis stunned his 
d ' 89 au ~ence. His absence from London during September 1938,when the 
crisis was at its height and the other Dominion High Commissioners were 
engaged in frequent discussions with British ministers, could be inter-
preted as an attempt to distance New Zealand from a plan it did not 
approve of and could not change. 
90 At the very least, the government 
probably thought that Jordan would be more usefully and honourably 
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employed as President of the Council than he could be in London. What-
everthe case, by referring to the crisis in his speech Jordan was point-
edly reminding the Assembly of how little influence the League now exer-
cised over international affairs. Clearly he was suggesting that if the 
League was to be restored to its proper role, it was the attitude of its 
members and not the Covenant that must change. Thus when reporting on a 
meeting of the Commonwealth delegates held the next day, he expressed 
regret that the British still intended to put their reform proposals be-
fore the Assembly. With little likelihood of agreement, Jordan felt 
that a discussion of political principles and the Covenant would not be 
helpful, and he would have preferred such matters to be put off for the 
91 present. In Wellington,the government had come to the same conclu-
. 92 Slon. 
As Jordan expected, the members of the Sixth Committee, to which 
the British proposals were referred, held sharply conflicting opin-
. 93 There was, however, significant support for the suspension of lons. 
the automatic obligations of the Covenant and the repeal of the unanim-
ity rule in regard to Article 11. Campbell said that New Zealand did 
not consider the current discussion would serve any useful purpose. But 
fearing his silence would be misconstrued, he repeated his government's 
faith in the Covenant and declared New Zealand's opposition to any reso-
lution, interpretation or declaration which might weaken its principles. 
The Dominion would, however, support the amendment of Article 11 and the 
separation of the Covenant from the peace treaties. 94 
After a lengthy discussion a draft report was presented to the 
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committee. It recommended the amendment of Article 11 and approved the 
protocol containing the amendments necessary to separate the Covenant 
from the treaties drawn up by the Committee of Ten Jurists the previous 
95 year. Though the resolution on Article 16 stressed that there was no 
intention to amend the Article, it suggested that the general opposition 
to compulsory military sanctions had created a situation whereby it was 
accepted that the Article was no longer fully operative, and should be 
recognised as such. Campbell took strong exception to the implication 
that the declarations and observations on Article 16 by League members 
somehow constituted a de facto amendment. He said that the only wayan 
Article could be amended was under the provisions of Article 26 and he 
had the offending clause changed. He was supported by Spain, China and 
the Soviet Union. The final resolution still acknowledged that many 
members believed that sanctions should not be compulsory but the commit-
tee refrained from giving any support to any reinterpretation of Article 
16 along those lines. 96 
By approving the Sixth Committee's proposal to refer the matter 
back to the member-governments, the Assembly effectively shelved the 
question of amending Article 16. The amendment to Article 11 fared no 
better. Jordan supported dropping the unanimity rule to enable the 
Council to act promptly in a dispute, but the resolution was lost be-
cause some delegates feared it would lead to the abandonment of the rule 
. 11 L d" 97 In a eague eClSlons. The only concrete achievement after two 
years of debate on Covenant reform was the approval of the protocol to 
separate the Covenant from the peace treaties. 98 New Zealand signed on 
99 18 January 1939 and deposited its ratification on 5 June 1939. 
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The attempt to inject more 'realism' into the League's work by re-
forming the Covenant had failed. As the international situation worsen-
ed, the proceedings at Geneva lost their relevance and the League was 
reduced to the role of a spectator. The Munich settlement showed how 
irrelevant the League had become. The New Zealand Government was re-
lieved that war 
peace had been 
had been averted but it regretted the manner in which 
100 preserved. Jordan saw Munich as a setback for the 
League. He believed that some of the Central European states would 
I h ·· . h G I 101 oosen t elr tles Wlt eneva as a resu t. 
In Wellington too, Berendsen was suggesting that New Zealand's com-
mitment to the League needed reconsideration. In a memorandum to Savage 
on 14 October 1938, he argued that a general condition of the Dominion's 
foreign policy based on the Covenant had always been that it would be 
subject to review should the survival of the Commonwealth be threatened. 
Berendsen was certain such a threat now existed and he urged the govern-
ment to put the interests of the Commonwealth before its international-
ist principles. He stated that "it may well be that we are at this 
juncture forced to abandon, until a more favourable opportunity, all 
considerations except those of naked self-interest and self-defence." 
Although he asserted that this need not involve an admission of error or 
a weakening of New Zealand's support of the principles of international 
right and justice, Berendsen was convinced that the survival of these 
principles depended on the Commonwealth surviving the perilous times 
102 
ahead. The implication was that the government should exercise cau-
tion at Geneva and avoid taking a position which openly conflicted with 
that of the rest of the Commonwealth. 
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The Dominion's conflicting loyalties were soon put to the test. 
New Zealand was informed on 24 December 1938 that Britain proposed to 
denounce the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes. The British Government feared that in the event of war the 
General Act could be used by neutrals to restrict British belligerent 
rights at sea. The British had always insisted on the widest possible 
interpretation but if the matter was referred to the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, London was sure the narrower European view would 
be imposed, with a crippling effect on British naval activities. To 
avoid this possibility, Britain decided not to renew its adherence to 
the General Act when it expired in August 1939. The Dominions were ask-
d d I , k ' 103 e to 0 1 eWlse. 
Berendsen shared the British concern but he believed that denounc-
ing the whole instrument was going too far. Corning as it did after a 
long series of retreats from collective security and international law 
and order, the abandonment of the impartial judgement of all disputes 
would have, in his view, a deplorable effect. Instead, Berendsen sug-
gested an additional reservation-excluding from the operation of the 
General Act all questions relating to belligerent rights at sea during 
wartime 
104 
rence. 
when the Commonwealth countries carne to renew their adhe-
The government was not convinced, however, that any futher reserva-
tions were justified. London was told on 26 January 1939 that despite 
the disadvantages, New Zealand would accept the obligations of the Gene-
ral Act for another five years as a demonstration of the government's 
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faith in international law and order and collective security. lOS Canada, 
Australia and France also believed the General Act's advantages out-
weighed its disadvantages, which prompted the British Government to re-
consider its .. 106 posltlon. Wellington was advised on 10 February 1939 
that Britain was prepared to continue its accession subject to the re-
servation that the General Act would not cover disputes arising out of 
events occuring in wartime. 107 The New Zealand Government was not en-
tirely happy with the compromise since it went further than Berendsen's 
proposal, but three days later it signalled the Dominion's accep-
108 
tance. 
By the end of 1938, the government was trying to maintain some kind 
of balance between New Zealand's commitment to the League and the Domin-
ion's loyalty to the Commonwealth. This task was not made any easier by 
Jordan's continued outspokenness. At a meeting between the Dominion 
High Commissioners and the Dominions Secretary, Sir Thomas Inskip, in 
April 1939, Jordan strongly criticised the British Government's handling 
of Albania's appeal to the League after Italy invaded its . 109 terrltory. 
He was appalled by Lord Halifax's statement that Britain did not think 
that Albania was important enough to start a war over. He pointed out 
sharply that over the past three years other countries had been sacri-
ficed to aggressors for the same reason, and this had still not preserv-
ed peace. He was also critical of the apparent British preference for 
bargaining with the Fascist dictators instead of trying to cultivate the 
Soviet Union as an 11 110 a y. At Geneva in May 1939, Jordan did not 
try to hide his displeasure when the Secretary-General gave the Albanian 
appeal short shrift. Avenol took the extraordinary position that the 
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letters from King Zog and the Albanian Charge d'Affaires in Paris did 
not constitute a proper appeal to the League and thus he would only 
place them before the Council members for their information. The Secre-
tary-Genera1 was left in no doubt that Jordan felt this response to be 
11 'd 111 tota y lna equate. 
But Jordan's rhetoric was increasingly out of tune with his own 
government's thinking. In May 1939 he was given a mild rebuke after 
1 'h Ch ' 1 b f h C '1 112 strong y supportlng t e lnese appea e ore t e ounCl . In the 
Speech from the Throne on 28 June 1939, the Governor-General declared 
that while New Zealand remained firmly attached to the principles of the 
Covenant, the government had been forced to recognise that a full and 
effective application of the Covenant was impracticable for the time 
b ' 113 elng. When Jordan wanted to make a speech to the forthcoming Assem-
b1y vigorously expounding New Zealand's views and calling for an inter-
national conference to discuss the economic impediments to peace, the 
government demurred. Acting Prime Minister Fraser told him that it 
would be unwise to take any special stand at the Assembly at present; 
h b 1d b '1 114 t e est course wou e Sl ence. 
As it happened, the proceedings of the Assembly and the Council, 
which were postponed until December 1939 because of the outbreak of war, 
had become so divorced from reality that there was little else Jordan 
could do. Faced with an appeal from Finland as a result of the invasion 
by the Soviet Union, the Assembly recommended that the aggressor be ex-
115 pe11ed from the League. New Zealand could not of course condone such 
aggression, even from a former ally in the League, so Jordan was 
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instructed to vote in f f I " 116 avour 0 expu s~on. He was grateful perhaps 
that New Zealand's term on the Council expired before he was required to 
participate " h" h d 117 ~n t ~s c ara e. Now only a pale reflection of its for-
mer self, the League was prepared to do what had been previously un-
thinkable when the Fascist states were involved. 
The outbreak of the Second World War was the final nail in the 
League's coffin. While it was not pronounced dead until 1946, the 
League's primary function of keeping the peace had ceased years before. 
The Ethiopian debacle convinced many members that the League had failed 
them. From New Zealand's perspective, it seemed rather more that the 
members had failed the League. From the beginning, New Zealand's 
approach to the reform issue was fundamentally different to that of the 
majority of the other members. Labour did not accept that the Covenant 
should be watered-down. Instead, the government aimed to strengthen the 
Covenant to give the League a position of authority and prestige from 
which it could regulate international affairs. But in the atmosphere of 
"suspicion, fear and intolerance" which pervaded Europe, such ambitions 
were out 
118 
of place. As the League became irrelevant, so the discus-
sion of reform became an exercise in futility. 
The machinery at Geneva may have been flawed but the principles 
were sound. Labour's commitment to these principles remained firm. 
Savage declared in November 1939 that the ultimate war aims of those 
countries allied with New Zealand against the Fascist dictators should 
include: outlawing aggression; the substitution of discussion and nego-
tiation for force; the guarantee of each nation's security; universal 
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disarmament; the restoration of respect for the sanctity of contracts; 
the revival of the League of Nations or a substitute; the solution of 
economic questions; and an increase in the welfare of the mass of the 
119 people. In other words, the war simply confirmed what the government 
had stated in its Reform Memorandum - that peace was only possible if 
each nation gave up some element of its sovereignty in favour of an in-
ternational body under a system of collective security. 
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CHAPTER 11 
NEW ZEALAND AND THE PERMANENT MANDATES COMMISSION 
New Zealand was granted the mandate for Western Samoa under the 
Treaty of Versailles signed on 28 June 1919. The Dominion also shared 
responsibility with Australia and Britain for the British Empire mandate 
over Nauru. Massey had been disappointed in his bid for the annexation 
of Western Samoa but he believed there was little difference between a 
mandate and absolute . 1 possesslon. Yet he found on his return to New 
Zealand that few New Zealanders wanted the Dominion to assume responsi-
bility for Western Samoa. The press and Opposition MPs questioned 
whether New Zealand had the expertise or financial resources to adminis-
ter and develop a territory of 2,934 square kilometres with a population 
in 1919 of just under 31,500 people. Many felt it would have been pre-
2 ferable for Britain or the United States to accept the mandate. Never-
theless, with the passage of the Treaties of Peace Act in October 1919, 
New Zealand formally accepted the mandate for Western Samoa. 
Under Article 22 of the Covenant, the League mandates were divided 
into three groups, later known as 'A', 'B', and 'C' mandates, roughly in 
3 
accordance with their level of political and economic development. 'C' 
mandates, comprising South-West Africa and the former German islands in 
the Pacific, were regarded as being at such a low level of development 
that they could be administered as integral parts of the mandatory 
power's territory. There were some conditions placed on the manda-
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tories, however. They were required to: safeguard the population 
against abuses like slavery, forced labour and the drugs and liquor 
traffic; guarantee freedom of conscience and religion; maintain the Open 
Door, and; prevent the establishment of military and naval bases, and 
the military training of the inhabitants for other than police purposes 
and the defence of the territory. The League Council was to exercise a 
supervisory role over the mandates system and every mandatory was re-
quired to submit an annual report. The Assembly did not have a direct 
role but was free to discuss any mandate-related questions. 
In anticipation of the confirmation of the mandate by the League 
Council, which was in fact delayed for over a year by American and 
Japanese objections,4 the New Zealand Government drew up legislation to 
replace the military government of Western Samoa with a civilian admin-
istration. The Solicitor-General, Sir John Salmond, argued that since 
the mandate had been conferred on "His Britannic Majesty to be exercised 
on his behalf by the New Zealand Government", such legislation would 
need to be sanctioned by an imperial Order-in-Council issued under the 
1890 Foreign Jurisdiction 5 Act. South African Prime Minister General 
Smuts disagreed. He insisted that the mandates had been conferred on 
the Dominions in their own right and thus they could legislate for them 
without reference to a British Act of Parliament. To avoid adding fuel 
to the separatist debate in South Africa, the British Government concur-
red with Smuts' view. 6 Nonetheless, the New Zealand Government still 
thought it wise to obtain an imperial Order-in-Council before enacting 
7 legislation for Western Samoa. 
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The government displayed a curious ambivalence to the Dominion's 
status as a mandatory power. Massey certainly agreed with Smuts that 
the Dominions were separate mandatory powers from Britain. Thus, New 
Zealand's mandate report was sent direct to Geneva, in contrast to other 
correspondence with the League which went through the Colonial Office. 8 
Yet the government thought it necessary to have the protection of an im-
perial Act when legislating for Western Samoa. Massey and Bell also 
claimed that New Zealand had acquired sovereignty over Western Samoa 
because the Dominion had received the territory from the Allied Powers, 
not the 9 League. Despite this assertion, the government preferred to 
administer Western Samoa by Order-in-Council until the League Council 
confirmed the mandate on 17 December 1920, just in case its terms con-
fl ' d . h d 1 . 1 . f h . 10 Th . lcte Wlt propose egls atlon or t e terrltory. ese actlons 
reveal that New Zealand did not share South Africa's confidence that the 
Dominions possessed full sovereignty over their mandates. 11 
The Department of External Affairs was created in December 1919 to 
handle Samoan affairs. The department consisted of the Secretary of 
External Affairs, James Dunbar Gray, and five other staff who were 
shared with the Cook Islands Department. Gray was born in Auckland in 
1872 and became assistant private secretary to the Premier in 1894. In 
1916 he was appointed Secretary of the National Recruiting Board and he 
became a member of the Repatriation Board in 1919. Secretary of Exter-
nal Affairs from 1919 until 1928, Gray also headed the Cook Islands 
12 Department from 1922. 
The first Administrator(or Governor) of Western Samoa was Colonel 
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Robert W. Tate, who was appointed for a three-year term in 1920. The 
Administrator was empowered to make ordinances with the advice and con-
sent of a Legislative Council consisting of six official members, 
appointed by the Governor-General, and three non-official members. The 
latter were also appointed initially but from 1923 they were elected by 
the local European community. While the Legislative Council, directed 
by the Administrator, made the laws, the Fono of Faipule, a body of 
carefully selected leading chiefly title-holders appointed by the Admin-
istrator to represent the local districts, advised him on the making of 
the laws for the Samoans. 
New Zealand's island territories were considered too small to 
warrant a colonial service. The Samoan public service consisted of 
officers seconded or appointed from the New Zealand public service. 
Appointed for periods of two to three years, these officials were given 
no training in Samoan customs and they were not expected to learn the 
language. In 1921, a staff of 116, excluding Samoans, were operating 
some fifteen administrative departments. The work of these departments 
was unco-ordinated until a central office under the Secretary to the 
Administration, the principal officer of the public service, was pro-
vided for in an amending act in 1923. The junior positions in the 
Administration were filled by Samoans. 
This was virtually the British crown colony system of government 
except that the Administrator was, theoretically at least, more subject 
to """1 1h B""h 13 m~n~ster~a contro t an a r~t~s governor. In reality, External 
Affairs did not supervise the Samoan Administration very closely during 
378 
the early years of the mandate and the Administrator was given consider-
able 14 autonomy. According to Bell, Minister of External Affairs from 
1923 to 1926: "The less the Minister interferes, and the more the Admin-
istrator rules, the better for Samoa and the performance of our Man-
15 date." Nevertheless, Gray complained as early as November 1920 that 
his department frequently found it difficult to deal with Samoan affairs 
b f h I k f d · f . 16 ecause 0 t e ac 0 up-to- ate In ormatlon. 
Because of the delays in the Council's confirmation of the mandate, 
New Zealand's first report on Western Samoa was not examined by the 
Permanent Mandates Commission(PMC) until its second session in August 
1922. 17 The PMC was a tool of the Council, its most important task 
being to advise the Council on all questions relating to the execution 
of the mandates. It did this by receiving, examining and questioning 
the accredited representatives of the mandatory powers about their 
annual reports on the administration of the territories. Initially, the 
PMC held one annual session but the growing workload forced it to hold 
two sessions 18 a year from 1925. The Mandates Section of the League 
Secretariat acted as the secretariat of the PMC. An adviser from the 
International Labour Organisation was attached to the Commission when-
ever labour matters were discussed. 
The PMC originally comprised nine members but with the appointment 
of a Swiss member in 1924 and a German member in 1927, this number rose 
to eleven. A majority had to be nationals of non-mandatory powers. The 
four places occupied by nationals of mandatories were filled by members 
from Belgium, France, Japan and Britain. Nationals from Italy, Spain, 
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Portugal, The Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, Norway and Switzerland 
occupied the non-mandatory seats on the PMC at various times. The PMC 
was not unaffected by the political crises of the 1930s, however. 
Germany ceased to be represented in 1933, the Italian member resigned in 
1937 and the Japanese member followed suit in 1938. It was customary 
for members to be replaced by someone of the same nationality. The one 
exception was the replacement of the Swedish member with a Norwegian 
national. Both these members were women. 
The members of the PMC were selected by the Council for their 
personal eminence and not as representatives of the governments of their 
countries. Most had successful careers in politics, diplomacy or colo-
nial administration behind them. Many served for considerable periods, 
ensuring a remarkable continuity of membership. The more prominent mem-
bers were: Marquis Theodoli(Italy), Chairman 1921-1937; Pierre Orts(Bel-
gium) , 1921-1939; Sir Frederick(later Lord) Lugard(Britain), 1923-
1936; Mr Van Rees(The Netherlands), Vice-Chairman 1921-1934; W.E. 
Rappard(Switzerland), 1924-1939; L. Palacios(Spain), 1924-1939; Mrs 
Bugge-Wicksell(Sweden) , 1921-1928; Miss V. Dannevig(Norway) , 1928-1939; 
and M. Merlin(France), 1926-1935. 19 
New Zealand was usually represented at the PMC sessions by the High 
Commissioner in London. It was not an easy task because Wellington did 
not think it necessary to keep him informed of events in Western Samoa. 
He was largely dependent on the mandate reports for information. As a 
former Minister of External Affairs, Sir James Allen was more fortunate 
than his successors because he maintained contact on an informal basis 
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with Gray and the Secretary to the Samoan Administration. Even so, in 
1922 he had to ask for a copy of the mandate report because, by some 
oversight, Wellington had failed to send him one. 20 The inadequacies of 
the system became readily apparent later when New Zealand's administra-
tion carne under intensive scrutiny by the PMC after the outbreak of 
serious unrest in Western Samoa in 1927. 
In the early years of the mandate, New Zealand was reprimanded by 
the PMC for giving insufficient information in its reports and for send-
ing as reports the annual accounts by the Samoan Administration address-
21 
ed to the government. The Dominion was one of several mandatories 
which tended to treat the PMC with some disdain. The criticisms of the 
members were regarded as trifling and their interest in New Zealand's 
administration of Western Samoa was viewed almost as unacceptable inter-
ference by officials in Wellington and Apia. Typical of this attitude 
was the comment of General George S. Richardson, Administrator from 1923 
to 1928, on his 1926 report: "I have written it simply because I know it 
is required to be understood by the old ladies at Geneva.,,22 Though the 
Administrators' reports were sent to Geneva substantially unaltered by 
External Affairs, there were consistent efforts to remove niggling 
doubts on various subjects which may have left a more optimistic picture 
of Western Samoa than even the Administrators themselves wished to 
23 
convey. 
Because of the novelty of the mandates system, the 1920s were a 
period of tension between the mandatories and the PMC as they attempted 
to define the relationship between them. The mandatory powers had a 
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rather narrow view of the PMC's role and they were sensitive to any in-
dications that the members were trying to expand that role. New Zealand 
first complained that the PMC was exceeding its authority in 1922. This 
complaint was prompted by the PMC's report to the Council which suggest-
ed that the exploitation of Nauru's resources by the mandatory was not 
strictly in conformity with the terms of the mandate. While the exami-
nation of the mandatories' reports was conducted in private, a public 
meeting was held at the conclusion of the session where the PMC's report 
to the Council was discussed in the presence of the mandatories' repre-
sentatives. Allen found it unacceptable that the PMC's report should be 
made public before it was put before the Council. He was especially 
concerned that the mandatories had no opportunity to consider the PMC's 
observations before being presented with them at the public meeting. He 
urged the New Zealand Government to make representations to the League 
24 
to have the procedure changed. 
The PMC's report was sent to the Assembly for discussion after the 
Council had examined it. Thus the Assembly in September 1922 provided 
an ideal opportunity for New Zealand to express its objections. In his 
address on 19 September 1922, Bell said that New Zealand had nothing to 
fear from any investigation and it was willing to receive suggestions 
and advice from either the PMC or the Council. But the Dominion could 
not admit that the PMC had the power to interpret the meaning of the 
Covenant for New Zealand or to dictate how it must administer its man-
date. He conceded the PMC must present a full and frank report to the 
Council, but he believed it was unnecessarily offensive to the mandatory 
for this report to be made public. He requested that this procedure be 
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d · . d 25 lscontlnue . 
Bell found little support for his complaint. The Director of the 
Mandates Section, William E. Rappard, said it was only fair that the 
members of the League should have access to all the information concern-
ing the mandates, since it was on their behalf that the mandatories were 
d .. . h .. 26 a mlnlstratlng t e terrltorles. The general view at the League seems 
to have been that New Zealand was overstating the problem. Neverthe-
less, Massey was confident that after Bell's speech there would be no 
27 
more trouble from the PMC. 
Jealous of their authority over the mandates, the mandatory powers 
opposed anything which smacked of closer involvement by the PMC in the 
administration of the territories. In June 1926 the PMC decided to ask 
the Council for the right to hear petitioners from the mandated terri-
tories in exceptional cases. The existing procedure was that the inhab-
itants of the mandates could only petition the PMC through the manda-
tory. The PMC believed that if the grievance against the mandatory 
power was particularly serious, the members should be able to hear the 
.., d' 1 28 petltloner s arguments lrect y. The PMC also proposed a more detail-
ed questionnaire for the mandatories, to overcome the problem of insuf-
f ·· . f . . h d 29 lClent In ormatlon In t e man ate reports. 
Not surprisingly, the representatives of the mandatories opposed 
these proposals before the Council. It was usual for them to be present 
when the Council discussed the PMC's report. All the mandatories 
believed that the hearing of petitioners would undermine their authority 
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in the mandates and would be exploited by extremists for propaganda pur-
poses. As for the questionnaire, the general view was that the PMC was 
requiring information on matters which were not properly its concern. 
Bell said that New Zealand was becoming impatient with the minute in-
vestigation of administrative details 30 by the PMC. Faced with this 
unanimous disapproval, the Council felt obliged to send the proposals to 
h d f b f 1 . d" 31 ternan atory governments or comment e ore ma(~ng a ec~s~on. The 
British Empire mandatories preferred not to reply until the matter could 
be discussed at the Imperial Conference in October 1926. 32 
The PMC came in for strong criticism at the conference for what 
Coates described as its tendency "to assume direction of the Govern-
ments, in lieu of criticism of their reports." The Empire mandatories 
feared that the PMC wanted a direct role in the government of the man-
dates. Coates urged them to take a united stand against the hearing of 
petitioners and the "long series of interrogatories" the PMC wished to 
. d 33 ~ntro uce. The British Government's draft reply to the League was 
fully endorsed by New Zealand, Australia and South Africa. 34 
On their behalf, the British rejected the PMC's request for infor-
mation on every detail of the administration of the mandates. While 
each Empire mandatory was prepared to provide all the information that 
was "material to the discharge of its responsible duties", they found 
the "extreme minutiae" of the proposed questionnaire unacceptable. The 
proposal for the hearing of petitions was considered to be an "incorrect 
and dangerous" application of the theory that petitioners should have 
the means for making their grievances known. The British Government 
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felt that the existing procedure was adequate and the PMC was free to 
request further information. Since the PMC could ask the Council to 
take action if a mandatory proved unco-operative, the British were con-
fident that the PMC would receive the fullest information. Both pro-
posals went further than existing practices within the British colonial 
empire. 
The British reply was sent to Geneva on 8 November 1926. New Zea-
land's letter stating its concurrence with the British views followed a 
fortnight 35 later. The replies from the other mandatories, except 
that of Belgium, were "1 I' 36 on Slml ar lnes. Bell told the New Zealand 
Legislative Council in July 1927 that while he personally did not object 
to the PMC's right to hear petitioners, he was utterly opposed to the 
new questionnaire. He accused the PMC of being too zealous and of fail-
ing to appreciate that it was the mandatories' duty to govern the man-
dates. Allen suggested that Bell had over-dramatised the importance of 
h "h 37 t e questlonnalre, owever. Several New Zealand newspapers supported 
the government's stand. The Evening Post charged the PMC with "irres-
ponsible 38 zeal". The Press considered many of the PMC's questions to 
b "1 ' " '1 39 e trlvla or lnqulsltorla • The LNU thought otherwise. At its con-
ference in June 1927, the Dominion President, Dr A.G.B. Fisher, was dis-
mayed that the government seemed to regard the work of the PMC and the 
obligations placed on New Zealand as an inconvenience. A remit was 
passed criticising the government's attitude and fully supporting the 
PMC h ,,40 on t e questlonnalre. 
Perhaps because of the strenuous objections of the mandatories, the 
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PMC did not insist on a formal resolution of either question. 41 It re-
served the right to hear petitioners but this right was never exercis-
It was not prepared to disregard the questionnaire entirely but 
43 
the mandatories were told that it should be regarded as a guide only. 
The possibility of a German member on the PMC was another matter 
which greatly disturbed the New Zealand Government at this time. Germany 
was admitted to the League at the Assembly in September 1926. Bell was 
unenthusiastic because it raised questions about the former German colo-
nies 44 now under mandate. The German Government was under pressure at 
horne to seek the return of the colonies or at least have some of the 
45 
mandates transferred to Germany. The German demand for representation 
on the PMC was judged in the light of these claims. The Empire manda-
tories thought a German member would be disruptive. At the 1926 Imper-
ial Conference, they agreed that another seat on the PMC should not be 
created for Germany. It was felt that Germany should first prove itself 
as a member of the League before consideration was given to its claim in 
46 
regard to the PMC. 
New Zealand was dismayed when it was told in May 1927 that Germany 
intended to press its claim for representation at the Council meeting 
the following month. The British Government deprecated the move but 
thought it was not an issue of sufficient importance to risk alienating 
47 Germany. South Africa agreed but New Zealand and Australia opposed 
h G I · 48 t e erman c a~m. In the event, Britain argued against the applica-
tion in the Council but without success. 49 Dr Ludwig Kastl was appoint-
ed to the PMC in September 1927. In spite of New Zealand's fears, his 
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conduct proved entirely uncontroversial. 
The mandatories were anxious to prevent the PMC from extending its 
authority but the PMC was equally active in countering any tendency by 
the mandatories to ignore or abuse the "sacred trust" which the League 
had conferred on them. It was particularly concerned to refute claims 
that the mandated territories were colonies in all but name. The PMC 
also tried to ensure that the mandatories did not contravene the terms 
of the mandates or exploit the territories as if they were colonies. 
During New Zealand's first seven years as a mandatory, there were a 
number of areas over which the PMC expressed concern. The first per-
tained not to Western Samoa but to Nauru. Echoing doubts which had 
already been raised in the British House of Commons, the PMC questioned 
in 1922 whether the reservation of the ownership and exclusive exploita-
tion of the territory's sole resource by Britain, Australia and New Zea-
land, 50 under the 1919 Nauru Agreement, was in keeping with "the disin-
teres ted spirit which should characterize the mission of a mandatory 
state." Not only was the phosphate monopoly which the three governments 
had established in 1920 at odds with the principle of the Open Door, but 
the PMC feared that the interests of Nauruans might be subordinated to 
phosphate 1 . . 51 exp oltatlon. Allen and the Australian representative, Sir 
Joseph Cook, strongly denied that the administration of the territory 
was not in accordance with the terms of the mandate. Cook assured the 
PMC that the Administrator, who was appointed by Australia, governed the 
island, not h h h .. 52 t e P osp ate CommlSSlon. The inclusion of what it con-
sidered to be an inaccurate assessment of the situation in Nauru in the 
PMC's 
for 
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53 
report, angered the New Zealand Government and was responsible 
Bell's outburst at the Third 54 Assembly. The PMC subsequently 
accepted that the three governments had acquired control of the phos-
phate company legitimately and thereafter Nauru ceased to be an issue. 55 
New Zealand's administration of Western Samoa did not escape 
the occasional criticism from the PMC. In 1922 it raised the question 
of Chinese indentured labour. New Zealand had continued the German 
practice of indenturing Chinese labourers to work on the private and 
government-owned 1 . 56 p antatlons. The system provoked much criticism in 
New 57 Zealand because it was regarded as little more than slavery. The 
PMC was concerned about the social impact of the presence of hundreds of 
aliens in Western Samoa, and by the reports of unfair treatment of the 
Chinese 58 labourers. Allen also had to defend the system at the Assem-
bly a month 59 later. As a result of the criticism, the Samoan Admin-
istration introduced the Chinese Free Labour Ordinance in 1923 which 
abolished indenture and introduced contracts that increased wages and 
60 
eliminated the penal clauses for labour offences. 
A related question was that of forced labour. The Samoan Admin-
istration required local District Councils to maintain tracks, roads and 
sanitation in their areas, and to control the destructive rhinocerous 
beetle in their coconut groves. The Samoans were not paid for this work 
and they were fined if it was not carried out. Under Article 3 of the 
61 
mandate, however, forced labour was prohibited except for essential 
public works and this labour had to be adequately remunerated. Concern 
that New Zealand might be contravening the mandate was first raised at 
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the October 1925 session. Gray told the PMC that New Zealand did not 
consider such labour to be forced labour but rather a continuation of a 
d " 1 bl" 62 tra ~t~ona Samoan 0 ~gat~on. 
The following year, Sir James Parr was questioned on the same sub-
ject. A couple of the members felt that these labour requirements 
did not strictly conform with the terms of the mandate, and a reference 
to compulsory labour was included in the PMC's observations on New Zea-
land's 63 report. Parr protested to the Council that the term 'compul-
sory labour' was , d ' , ,64 I ' ~naccurate an open to m~s~nterpretat~on. n ~ts 
reply to the PMC, the New Zealand Government insisted that the labour 
obligations were the ordinary requirements of all countries. 65 Coates 
told Parr that it would be disastrous for the welfare of Western Samoa 
if the Samoans refused to carry out community work unless they were 
'd 66 pal • New Zealand's repeated assurances that the labour requirements 
were merely a statutory recognition of a system which was in accord with 
67 Samoan custom, eventually satisfied the PMC. 
Despite these assurances, Berendsen, who replaced Gray as Secretary 
of External Affairs in 1928, admitted privately that the PMC's doubts 
had been well-founded. Commenting in October 1929 on an International 
Labour Organisation questionnaire on forced labour, he told the Secre-
tary to the Samoan Administration, G.W. Clinkard, that the Samoan labour 
requirements were clearly in conflict with the mandate. 68 It was only 
with some difficulty that the Samoan Administration persuaded Berendsen 
that the disclosure of this fact, even if accompanied by an explanation 
of the special circumstances existing in Western Samoa, would not be in 
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New Zealand's best interests. 69 In the event, such civil obligations 
were excluded from the International Labour Organisation's 1930 Conven-
tion, but plainly the Samoan Administration did not want the matter sub-
d d . 70 jecte to renewe PMC scrutlny. 
The PMC also devoted much attention to the Crown Estates. These 
were plantations and other properties confiscated from private German 
owners during the war and claimed as reparations by the New Zealand 
71 Government. Some were sold but the larger plantations were either 
leased or managed by the Samoan Administration on the government's 
behalf. From the early 1920s, the profits from the Estates were granted 
to the 72 Administration to help balance the budget. In 1924 and 1925, 
the PMC expressed disquiet that a substantial proportion of Samoan 
land about 73 14% - was owned by the New Zealand Government. It was 
suggested that this extensive land-holding could be regarded as veiled 
annexation. There was concern too that the Estates might enjoy prefer-
ential treatment which would disadvantage private landowners. 74 The im-
plication was that New Zealand's supposedly disinterested administration 
was in danger of being compromised. 
Though under considerable pressure from the PMC to liquidate these 
properties,75 the government decided in 1925 against disposing of the 
76 Estates. Bell told the League that despite what the PMC might be-
lieve, 77 the Dominion had an absolute right to keep them. In order not 
to give the PMC cause for comment in the future, the Administrator was 
instructed 78 to make no mention of the Estates in his report. In addi-
tion, the grants to the Administration were no longer made directly from 
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the Estates Account but were channeled through External Affairs. 79 
In 1923 the PMC had questioned for similar reasons the advancement 
of large loans by New Zealand to enable major public works to be built 
in Western Samoa. It wondered whether, in the event of the teritory 
defaulting on the loans, the mandatory might not take control of these 
public works or even annex the territory. Allen was quick to dismiss 
the suggestion but he reiterated his government's belief that the man-
80 date should be made largely to pay its own way. 
It was inevitable that New Zealand and the PMC would not always 
agree on the way Western Samoa should be governed but the problems out-
lined above did not prevent the development of good relations between 
them by the mid-1920s. In 1923 Allen expressed the belief that the PMC 
was looking to New Zealand to act as a model for other 'C' mandatories, 
and this view became prevalent among officials in Wellington and 
A . 81 pla. Writing to Richardson in July 1924, Gray said that the PMC had 
put New Zealand on a "very high pinnacle as an example to the Great 
Powers 82 of the world." 
familiarise himself with 
Bell sent Gray to Geneva the following year to 
83 
the PMC. His presence at the October 1925 
session was warmly welcomed by the members. Gray reported afterwards: 
"It is quite evident that they regard us as a mandatory power in a class 
apart. They have no doubts or suspicions whatever about us or our in-
tentions." 84 Still, Gray realised that there were dangers in placing 
the Samoan Administration on such a "dizzy pinnacle of glory". He warn-
ed the Secretary to the Samoan Administration, Colonel James W. Hutchen, 
in December 1925: "This is the time therefore to be very watchful and 
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circumspect in case we slip. To fall from our present height would be 
somewhat painful.,,85 When the fall from grace did come in 1927, it was 
indeed all the more bewildering because of the supreme confidence 
W 11 ' h d' R' h d ' d" ,86 e lngton a In lC ar son s a mlnlstratlon. 
There had been dissatisfaction with New Zealand's rule in Western 
Samoa even before the end of the military occupation. The disastrous 
impact of the 1918 influenza epidemic, an economic slump, and the intro-
duction of prohibition were behind the initial discontent. The contin-
uation of a military-style government under the mandate, with a rigidly-
centralised administration in which the local population had almost no 
say, alienated Europeans and Samoans alike. The paternalistic, even 
racist, attitudes of the Administrators and their officials accentuated 
87 
the problem. The lack of consultation on Richardson's ambitious plans 
to increase crop production, reform land tenure, and improve health, 
fuelled resentment. Perhaps Richardson's greatest mistake was the use 
of harsh sanctions, such as banishment and the deprivation of chiefly 
88 
titles, against dissidents for this gravely offended the Samoans. 
In late 1926, meetings of Europeans and Samoans were held in Apia 
to create a coalition to voice their discontent with the Administration. 
Richardson saw the meetings and the resultant Citizens Committee as an 
attempt by the Europeans to undermine his authority by exploiting who 
he considered to be the simple and politically-naive Samoans. He treat-
ed the Committee and its leading spokesman, Olaf F. Nelson, a wealthy 
merchant of mixed Samoan and European descent, with contempt and he re-
fused to consider their submissions. Richardson's hostility and the 
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punishment of Samoans supporting the Committee strengthened Samoan oppo-
sition and led to the creation of a movement known as '0 Ie Mau'(a title 
implying 'Samoan public opinion'). 
In a broad sense, the Mau was a semi-modern nationalist movement, 
organised from above by an educated and chiefly elite, with roots going 
back to the nineteenth century. The mainspring was Nelson, whose 
closest supporters were the Committe of six influential European resi-
dents and six high-ranking Samoan matai(family heads and holders of the 
family title of chief or orator) who lived in close contact with the 
Europeans. Their ambition was for Western Samoa, like Tonga, to become 
self-governing under British protection and that they should replace New 
Zealand as the controlling authority. To win mass support in a still 
largely traditional society, they established an organisation consisting 
of loosely-knit village committees of matai grouped around a large work-
ing committee of sixty to seventy high-ranking titleholders who main-
tained close contact with Nelson. 
Nelson was probably not far from the truth when he claimed that the 
Mau represented 90% of the people. Most of the Samoan titleholders who 
did not join the Mau were members of the Fono of Faipule or Samoan 
officials, who valued their official status and pay. Mary Boyd suggests 
that the struggle between the Samoan supporters of the Administration 
and the Mau was a struggle between the 'ins' and 'outs' of Samoan 
government. The existing system had resulted in the alienation of most 
of those Samoan titleholders whose prerogative it was to exercise poli-
tical leadership on behalf of their families. Mau supporters in the 
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villages and districts sought to strengthen Samoan custom and the powers 
of the chiefs and orators. Above this level, they saw self-government 
in terms of the distribution of ceremonial power rather than the exer-
cise of effective political authority and modern government. 
The Mau's campaign against the Administration combined customary 
Samoan techniques of exercising political power from above and consulta-
tion at all levels of society to achieve a consensus, with Western pro-
test techniques. The latter included: boycotts of all officially-spon-
sored activities, including education and health services; civil dis-
obedience, such as refusing to pay taxes and fulfil labour obligations; 
demonstrations and .. 89 petltlons. In March 1927, a petition was sent to 
the New Zealand Parliament with twenty-one complaints against the Admin-
. . 90 lstratlon. This eventually resulted in the appointment of a Royal 
Commission in August 1927 to investigate New Zealand's administration of 
91 Western Samoa. 
Wellington had for months accepted Richardson's assurances that the 
unrest . 92 was not serlOUS. But by mid-May 1927, the government could no 
longer ignore the problem. The Minister of External Affairs, William 
Nosworthy, visited Western Samoa in June 1927 to assess the situation. 93 
As a result, his department began to take a much greater interest in the 
Administration and Richardson was warned that he should seek approval 
f W 11 ' b f k' . 94 h' b rom e lngton e ore ta lng any actlon. T lS was ecause Western 
Samoa had become a contentious issue in the New Zealand press and in 
Parliament. The Labour Party was loudly critical of Richardson and 
opposed the government's move to grant him greater powers, including 
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h f d . 95 t at 0 eportat1on. The government was less concerned by the criti-
cism itself than by the possibility that it would compound the damage 
already done to the Dominion's image at Geneva. There was no question 
that as a result of the League Secretariat's monitoring of the interna-
tional press, the PMC was aware of New Zealand's difficulties. 96 
The PMC had noted newspaper criticism of the Dominion's administra-
tion in November 1926 but Parr had dismissed it as unimportant. 97 By 
July 1927, however, Parr had become alarmed by the unfavourable reports 
on the Samoan situation appearing . h B" h 98 1n t e r1t1s press. On his 
urging, Coates sent a statement to The Times to counter the harmful 
effect these 99 reports would have in Britain and Geneva. Indeed, the 
New Zealand Government's sensitivity to adverse comment by the League 
influenced its handling of the Samoan unrest from the beginning. Coates 
told the Governor-General, Sir Charles Fergusson, that the government 
would take "no step that may be open to misconception or criticism by 
the League of Nations." 100 The forthcoming sessions of the Assembly and 
the PMC were viewed with some apprehension. 101 
The New Zealand delegates to the 1927 Assembly had little difficul-
. . f . h . h C' 102 ty 1n sat1s y1ng t e S1xt omm1ttee. But the PMC's session in 
November 1927 was much more of a trial. As Parr feared, many of the 
members' questions were based on newspaper reports. The first related 
to a speech made by Richardson during celebrations of the King's birth-
day in June 1927, in which he implied that all Samoans were British sub-
jects and that Western Samoa was part of the British Empire. The second 
referred to a report that Coates had ridiculed the PMC's new question-
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naire in P I , 103 ar lament. In both cases Parr tried to play down the im-
portance f h ' . d 104 o t e lnCl ent. He later told Coates that these questions 
proved how well-informed the PMC was and how sensitive it was to any 
challenge to the League's authority over the mandates. Above all, noted 
Parr, the PMC's enquiries showed the need for circumspection by minis-
ters and officials in New Zealand and Western Samoa. 
The PMC then went on to interrogate Parr on the Samoan 105 unrest. 
The members were particularly unhappy that they had not been informed of 
the history of difficulties encountered by the Samoan Administration 
since 1921. 106 The suggestion was that New Zealand had presented, per-
haps deliberately, an inaccurate picture by failing to mention any signs 
of disaffection in 107 Western Samoa. Parr explained that those inc i-
d h d b 'd d ' h ' 108 b h Id ents a not een conSl ere lmportant at t e tlme ut e to 
Coates later that it would have been better to have acknowledged these 
past troubles. "I do not suggest that there has been a deliberate 
attempt to conceal untoward incidents or expressions of dissatisfaction 
towards the Administration, but I do say that the Government has nothing 
to lose and everything to gain by taking the Commission fully into its 
confidence." 
Parr felt very much at a disadvantage when faced with the PMC's 
close questioning. He complained that he had to "stand fire" for two 
days without the detailed knowledge necessary to satisfactorily answer 
the members "innumerable" questions. Coates was urged to follow the 
example of other mandatories and send a "man from the spot" to the PMC 
sessions. 109 Parr was able, nonetheless, to persuade the PMC to reserve 
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judgement until it had seen the report of the Royal Commission. 110 
Completed at the end of November 1927, the Royal Commission's re-
port totally vindicated Richardson and concurred with his contention 
that the Mau was inspired by local European agitators. 111 As a result, 
Coates readily agreed to Richardson's proposal to deport Nelson and two 
other European members of the Citizens 112 Committee to New Zealand. Far 
from quelling the Mau, this action only led to further demonstrations 
and passive resistance. In February 1928, Richardson requested military 
reinforcements from New Zealand. Two warships were sent to Western 
Samoa but the attempt to restore control by military means was a fai1-
113 
ure. As the situation continued to deteriorate, the government 
, " 114 
rapidly lost conf~dence ~n R~chardson. 
Consideration was being given to replacing Richardson as early as 
December 1927. 115 Increasingly he was seen as the major obstacle to a 
settlement and in March 1928 Coates forced his retirement. 116 The 
official explanation was that he had retired early to represent New Zea-
land before the PMC when it examined the Royal Commission report in June 
1928. 117 Less than two months later Gray retired and was replaced by 
Berendsen. At the same time Coates took over the External Affairs port-
f l ' 118 o ~o. It seems clear that these changes were an effort by Coates to 
exercise more direct control over a situation which had become a severe 
119 
embarrassment to New Zealand. 
Richardson's appointment to Geneva was not simply a face-saving 
exercise. It was probably no coincidence that the government chose this 
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occasion to fulfil the PMC's repeated request for the mandatory powers 
to send the Administrators of their territories as delegates to its ses-
sions. 120 Confident that the PMC's comments would be favourable, Coates 
advised the new Administrator, Colonel Stephen S. Allen, not to take any 
action against the Mau until the results of the session could be pub li-
cised in Western 121 Samoa. The government hoped the PMC would make a 
public pronouncement approving New Zealand's administration in order 
that the Mau would have no cause to believe that the League would inter-
vene on their behalf. 122 This consideration became even more important 
when Parr reported that Nelson was in Geneva trying to obtain an audi-
ence with the PMC. 123 
Though apparently held in high regard by the members of the PMC, 
R ' h d d'd ' " 124 F f 'h' lC ar son 1 not escape criticism. ar rom accepting t e Mau s 
charges that the Administration had been too harsh, the PMC believed 
that Richardson had not dealt with the situation firmly enough. It was 
suggested that he had been excessively patient and that his inactivity 
before June 1927 had destroyed Samoan confidence in the Administration. 
The New Zealand Government was also blamed for not giving Richardson 
the legal powers and an adequate police force to deal with the agitators 
in the early stages. The view of the majority of the members was that 
the first duty of a mandatory power was to maintain order and to prevent 
an illegal assumption of authority by anybody. They also made it clear 
that deference to the League should not hamper the performance of this 
125 duty. 
The PMC accepted the Royal Commission's findings, particularly that 
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Nelson was behind the agitation for his own financial and political 
ends. It was not prepared, therefore, to accept the charges contained 
in petitions from the Citizens Committee, the Mau and other groups, 
which were being sent 126 to Geneva. The rising number of petitions 
alarmed the Samoan Administration. In November 1927, a catechism was 
distributed, on an informal basis and without the New Zealand Govern-
mentIs knowledge, to schools outlining Western Samoa's constitutional 
relationship with New 127 Zealand and the League. It implied that the 
League had only limited interest in Western Samoa and that petitions 
could not be sent to the PMC. The catechism became itself the subject 
of a petition from the London-based Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protec-
tion Society in June 1928. 128 As Parr expected, the PMC reproved 
R ' h d f 11' h db' 1 d 129 lC ar son or a oWlng suc a ocument to e Clrcu ate • 
Despite this criticism, Richardson believed that his presence at 
130 
the session had had a useful effect. This view was supported by J.V. 
Wilson, who said that Richardson's "masterly" performance had made the 
PMC much more sympathetic towards New Zealand. He noted that although 
Nelson had had unofficial contacts with PMC members, they had not 
f h d h ' 131 urt ere lS cause. Nonetheless, because of the PMC's reservations 
about the Dominion's handling of the unrest, its report to the Council 
was not the wholehearted endorsement the government had hoped for. 
Still, the PMC had accepted that there were no genuine grievances behind 
the agitation and it was prepared to support New Zealand's efforts to 
re-establish peace. Most importantly, both the PMC and the Council 
stated that the League would not interfere in the administration of the 
, 132 
terrltory. Berendsen thought the report would be useful in counter-
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. M d 133 lng au propagan a. 
When the PMC examined New Zealand's report in October 1928, it 
expressed disappointment that the disaffection was still serious. The 
members were critical of the government's continued toleration of the 
unrest and they wondered whether the policy of patience was the result 
of Labour Party pressure. Parr replied sharply that the only alterna-
tive to patience was active repression. He was not greatly impressed 
with the PMC's advocacy of firmer action because he knew it would be New 
Zealand which would have to accept responsibility for the consequences 
of that action, not the PMC. 134 
Because Colonel Allen and the government agreed that patience was 
the best policy, the Administration encountered little interference from 
Wellington. But in November 1928 the Public Service Commissioner, the 
Assistant Secretary to the Treasury and the Secretary of External 
Affairs were sent to Western Samoa by Coates to report on ways to im-
prove the efficiency and reduce the cost of the Administration. The 
report by Paul Verschaffelt, Alexander Park and Berendsen (known as the 
VPB report) was a damning indictment of the Administration's staff and 
finances. It concluded that the Samoan Public Service was overstaffed 
and that most of the officers were either incompetent or inefficient. 
Because of extravagance or waste, noted the report, expenditure had 
exceeded revenue for several years. It recommended reductions in staff 
and salaries, and cutting back medical and education services to reduce 
drastically the subsidies required from New Zealand. 135 
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The report's findings seemed to confirm the original complaints of 
the Citizens Committee. They also raised doubts about the veracity of 
the Royal Commission's report. Though it had not examined staffing and 
finances in detail, the Royal Commission had effectively dismissed all 
complaints against the Administration. The new United Government 
realised it could expect criticism not only from opponents within New 
Zealand but 136 from Geneva as well. Writing to Parr in February 1929, 
Sir Joseph Ward acknowledged that there would be some difficulty in 
explaining the circumstances of the VPB report to the PMC. He instruct-
ed Parr to state that the report was non-political in interest and thus 
did not directly conflict with the Royal Commission's report. The PMC 
was also to be told that while there may have been overspending, it was 
money which had been contributed by New Zealand taxpayers, not Sa-
137 
moans. The extension of Parr's term as High Commissioner until the 
end of the year was, in part, so that he could explain the VPB report 
and the government's Samoan policy to the PMC. 138 
In March 1929 the government came under pressure to take a more 
active stand against the Mau. Colonel Allen felt that the policy of 
pat ;ence had fa;led. 139 Th G GIl d W d h L L e overnor- enera a so urge ar to c ange 
tack. Noting that the PMC had called on New Zealand to carry out its 
responsibilities for enforcing law and order in Western Samoa, Fergusson 
said: "Personally, I would feel that that expression of opinion by men 
who are one and all experts in dealing with native races was imperative, 
and ample justification in the eyes of public opinion for standing no 
more nonsense in 140 W d . d 141 Samoa." ar was not conVlnce . In a lengthy 
memorandum to Parr in July 1929, he said that because the Mau had 
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generally eschewed violence, not even the paramount necessity of 
upholding the prestige of the Administration could justify the adoption 
of forcible measures. 
The government continued to believe that time and patience, combin-
ed with firmness where essential, was the best course. With the PMC's 
previously-expressed reservations on this policy in mind, Ward declared 
that it was in the best interests of the Samoans and was neither the 
result of ignorance nor timidity. He emphasised that domestic political 
considerations had no bearing on the government's policy. In line with 
the VPB report, the government decided it was no longer acceptable for 
New Zealand to be subsidising Western Samoa to the tune of £40,000 per 
annum, especially in view of "the ingratitude and indeed hostility of 
the majority of the people on whose behalf the money is being spent." 
Thus, with the ultimate objective of making Western Samoa self-support-
ing, there would be retrenchment but Parr was to assure the PMC that New 
142 Zealand would continue to fulfil its obligations under the mandate. 
When the PMC met in November 1929, the members were in no mood to 
accept such assurances. The goodwill they had displayed towards New 
Zealand only a year before had largely dissipated and Parr was given a 
"most difficult time". The members were critical that despite the 
obvious lack of any marked improvement in the situation, the mandate 
report made only vague references to conditions in the . 143 terr~tory. 
Berendsen had found the Administrator's draft report "unduly pessimis-
tic" 144 and had it changed. This attempt to present the Administration 
in a better light had backfired. 
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The continued paralysis of the Administration by the Mau was a 
matter of great concern to the PMC. Parr was told that New Zealand must 
reassert its control. Annoyed by the suggestion that the Administration 
was weak, Parr asked whether the PMC was advocating force to coerce the 
Samoans. The members hurridly replied that it was not their intention 
to interfere in New Zealand's administration and they were not advocat-
145 ing the use of force. 
Parr was far less successful in explaining why the mandate report's 
optimism was so completely at odds with the tenor of the VPB report. 
The PMC felt betrayed by New Zealand. The Royal Commission's report and 
Richardson's assurances of the previous year were now regarded with sus-
picion and doubt. The members had difficulty in accepting the Adminis-
tration's inadequacies were not at least partly to blame for the current 
146 
unrest, especially after Sir Apirana Ngata, the Minister of Native 
Affairs, had said in Parliament that Richardson had not pursued suffic-
, 1 I' h d 1" 147 ~ent y en ~g tene po ~c~es. Still, the PMC was prepared to reserve 
judgement until the reorganisation of the Administration was completed. 
As for the plan to institute economies in the territory, the members did 
not strongly object but they pointed out that few mandates did without 
148 grants from the mandatory power. 
In its report to the Council, the PMC concluded that contrary to 
previous reports there were severe deficiencies in New Zealand's 
administration of Western Samoa. It acknowledged that the Dominion was 
attempting to remedy this situation but expressed concern about the pro-
posed retrenchment, particularly if it resulted in an increase in the 
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territory's debts. The strongest reproof was directed at what the PMC 
believed to be the lack of candour in the Dominion's previous mandate 
reports. Describing the VPB report as a "painful surprise", the PMC 
requested that New Zealand provide the information which would enable 
h b f . f h . . . W S 149 t e mem ers to orm a true plcture 0 t e sltuatlon In estern amoa. 
The PMC's confidence in the Dominion had been badly shaken and the 
diplomatic language could not disguise the clear warning to the govern-
ment that New Zealand's conduct as a mandatory would face critical 
scrutiny in the future. 
Not surprisingly, the government did not totally accept the 
PMC's criticisms. Parr told the Mandates Section that since the Admin-
istrator was responsible for drawing up the mandate reports, the govern-
ment could not be 150 blamed for any errors. But in July 1930 Thomas 
Wilford advised Forbes not to dismiss lightly the petitions addressed to 
the League from Samoans and concerned New Zealanders. In view of the 
PMC's attitude the previous November, he said it was probable that these 
petitions would receive more attention than before. The government 
should answer them in some detail. 1s1 
External Affairs took heed of the PMC's comments on the mandate re-
ports. Berendsen told the Samoan Administration in March 1930 that its 
report should be as full as possible on the Mau and the implementation 
f h VPB d · 152 o t e recommen atlons. The draft report received in May 1930 
was far from satisfactory. Colonel Allen was requested to include more 
information on administrative changes and to tone down the optimism 
about conditions in Western Samoa. He was also asked to prepare a 
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detailed brief to assist Wilford before the PMC. 153 Allen was prepared 
to fulfil most of these requests but, because the publication of the VPB 
report against his wishes still rankled, he refused to include any Com-
154 
ment on its effects in his report. Forbes explained that the govern-
ment was only trying to avoid any "loophole for criticism" by the PMC 
but Berendsen was finally forced to add a separate memorandum to the re-
All ' .. 155 port to cover en s ommlSS10ns. 
The government feared more criticism from the PMC after the inc i-
dent known as 'Black Saturday' in Apia on 28 December 1929, in which one 
policeman and eight Samoans, including Mau leader Tupua Tamasese, lost 
their lives, and the subsequent military operation against the Mau. 156 
At the session in November 1930, Wilford, advised on this occasion by 
Berendsen, told the PMC that despite these troubles the situation in the 
territory had improved significantly following the Defence Minister's 
talks with the Mau in 157 March 1930. The PMC confined itself to an 
expression of hope that the government's policy would result in closer 
co-operation between the Administration and the Samoans. 158 
It was a vain hope because the New Zealand Government had no inten-
tion of trying to reach a mutually-acceptable settlement with the Mau. 
The outward calm in Western Samoa over the next few years, which the 
government trumpeted in its reports as evidence of the success of the 
Dominion's 'quiet policy', was deceptive. Open opposition to the Admin-
istration had largely ceased but the causes of the unrest, and the dis-
satisfaction they engendered, remained. 159 The new Administrator, 
Brigadier-General Herbert E. Hart, who replaced Allen in April 1931, 
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certainly believed that the situation would continue to be difficult. 160 
The fact that the PMC remained uneasy about Western Samoa, despite 
repeated declarations by the government that the unrest had ceased, was 
symptomatic of how much its confidence in New Zealand had been undermin-
ed by the events of the late 1920s. 161 For their part, officials in 
Wellington and Apia were anxious to restore that confidence by ensuring 
the mandate reports were as informative as possible162 and by briefing 
h H· h C .. b f h . 163 t e ~g omm~ss~oner e ore eac sess~on. The New Zealand represen-
tatives were instructed to temper optimism with caution because, as 
Berendsen explained, nothing could be worse than telling the PMC defi-
nitely that all was well and subsequently finding it necessary "to eat 
our words". 164 Expediency dictated New Zealand's deferential attitude 
towards the PMC but the necessity for this attitude caused growing 
resentment. 
External Affairs and the Samoan Administration became increasingly 
irritated by what they considered to be a lack of objectivity and 
perspective on the part of the PMC. In July 1932, Berendsen told 
Knowles: 
I really am not surprised that the gentlemen at Geneva, who I have no 
doubt have really genuine grievances in other Mandated Territories to 
deliberate upon, should find some difficulty in attaining a due sense 
of perspective in looking upon the Samoan situation. I must say, 
however, that I find their continued tone of criticism, largely based 
on trifles, rather irritating, and I am sure the only effect of the 
published Minutes is to encourage those who wish to perpetuate 
trouble ..• 165 
Colonel Allen was concerned that in order to answer the PMC's questions, 
the New Zealand representative might be forced to reveal the Administra-
tor's private views, no matter how unflattering, on certain individuals 
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or groups in Western Samoa. Writing to Forbes in March 1931, he said 
that making these views public would only provoke further unrest. "This 
is one of the unfortunate difficulties of the Mandate system," declared 
Allen, "that we have to live in such a public atmosphere, and draw 
attention to other people's shortcomings for the benefit of the Cornrnis-
. h . . h b . h' ,,166 Slon w en It mlg t e Wlser to say not lng. 
The frustration was all the greater because the PMC seemed unable 
to appreciate the special complexities and difficulties New Zealand 
believed 167 it faced in Western Samoa. Wilford told Forbes in November 
1932: "I do not think the Commission is, even now, familiar with condi-
tions due to the peculiar mentality of the Samoans, but it is not to be 
expected that they should be: only serious contact with the natives 
could clear their minds.,,168 Since the PMC could not visit the man-
dates, this requisite I I f h . 169 was c ear y out 0 t e questlon. The Samoan 
Administration believed that part of the problem was that the Dominion 
was mostly represented at Geneva by men unfamiliar with Western Sa-
170 
moa. Berendsen acknowledged that representation by the High Commis-
sioner was "totally inadequate" and that "the silliest things are said 
and false impressions created", but he could not offer a solution. He 
thought the PMC's readiness to accept information from unofficial 
171 
sources was of greater concern. 
B f h ' . . . . .. 172 ecause 0 t e government s acute sensltlvlty to crltlclsm, re-
lations between New Zealand and the PMC remained strained during the 
173 
early 1930s. The government was especially disturbed when any of the 
criticisms were picked up by the New Zealand press. The publicity given 
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to Lord Lugard's suggestion in 1934 that the short tenure of Samoan 
officials was not conducive to good administration, is a case in 
point. 174 Writing to the Secretary to the Samoan Administration, Alfred 
C. Turnbull, in May 1935, Berendsen fumed: I feel myself that it is time 
we took a more definite line with these people. It is not as if their 
criticism was either constructive or valuable. I think they are just 
looking for things to criticise and I think also that the net effect is 
definitely bad. ,,175 
Forbes and Berendsen made no secret of their dissatisfaction with 
the PMC when Wilson visited New Zealand between November 1934 and Febru-
ary 1935. Reporting to the Secretary-General, he said they had accused 
the members of a lack of proportion in dealing with Western Samoa. 
Wilson had defended the PMC's rights to request any information it 
thought fit and he suggested to them that the government was itself in 
danger of losing its sense of proportion in regard to the PMC's com-
ments. "What is certain," he told Avenol, "is that the responsibility 
for the mandate bulks very large in the general complex of New Zealand's 
external relations.,,176 
The election of a Labour Government in New Zealand in December 
1935 signalled a change in Wellington's attitude towards Western Sa-
177 
moa. The Labour Party had long campaigned against the policies of 
previous governments and Savage and his collegues were keen to restore 
~ the Dominion's image in the territory. In June 1936 the order declaring 
the Mau seditious was revoked and the balance of Nelson's second term of 
exile was remitted. A month later, the government sent a 'Goodwill 
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Mission', comprising Minister of Lands Frank Langstone and the MP for 
Westland, James O'Brien, to Western Samoa. On their recommendation, all 
anti-Mau legislation was repealed and all taxes were remitted. Changes 
were also suggested to increase Samoan participation in local government 
d · h d . d d' 1 . 178 an to lmprove tee ucatlon an me lca serVlces. 
New Zealand's volte-face astonished the PMC. When Berendsen 
d d h N b 1936 . 179 h f d h b d atten e t e ovem er seSSlon, e oun t e mem ers were worrie 
about the effects of the new policy and suspicious of the government's 
motives. He was told that a prudent colonial administration would not 
make precipitate and ostentatious changes of such importance. The PMC 
believed that a more prudent procedure should have been adopted. The 
members had great difficulty in accepting that the Mau would now co-
operate with the Administration after having been told for the last six 
years that it was a seditious organisation. It was suggested that party 
politics in New Zealand had been an important consideration behind the 
new policy. Some members suspected that Labour had made the changes not 
simply out of concern for the Samoans but to discredit the policy of the 
former government and thereby obtain political advantage in New Zealand. 
Berendsen was taken aback by the PMC's reaction. He replied that 
the Labour Government's policy was entirely consistent with the PMC's 
repeated calls for a resumption of co-operation between the Samoans and 
the Administration. Nobody could assert that it was not a wise policy 
to obtain the full co-operation of all sections of the people as soon 
as it could safely be attempted. As far as the government's motives 
were concerned, Berendsen reminded the members that Labour had critic is-
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d h l ' f 1 ,180 e t e previous po lCY or a ong tlme. 
Predictably, the PMC's comments were not well-received in Welling-
ton. Indeed, the government was so annoyed that Nash launched a sting-
ing attack on the PMC when its report carne before the Council in January 
1937. He could not understand why the PMC was criticising the govern-
ment simply for fulfilling the terms of the mandate. All Labour was 
doing, he said, was attempting to release the people of Western Samoa as 
quickly as possible from the difficulties and injustices which they felt 
they had suffered for some time. 181 The implication was that on this 
occasion at least the government had a better appreciation of the 
responsibilities of a mandatory power than the PMC. Nonetheless, at a 
meeting with Lugard a fortnight later, Nash could not dissuade him from 
the notion that the government's actions had been unwise and precipi-
182 
tate. 
When the PMC examined New Zealand's next mandate report, the mem-
bers conceded that there had been a marked improvement in the situation 
in Western 183 Samoa. But while Labour's policy certainly had a bene-
ficial psychological effect, the changes initiated by Wellington were 
few. Preoccupied with domestic and international matters, the govern-
ment devoted little attention 184 to Western Samoa after 1936. Yet, 
simply making the Administration less obtrusive and leaving the Samoans 
to run their local affairs was sufficient to encourage the peaceful con-
ditions of the late 1930s. In October 1937, Turnbull, now the acting 
Administrator, wrote: "The present period compares more than favourably 
with any time in the past and there is not the slightest doubt the 
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Samoans are better off under New Zealand than they would be under any 
other control, including their own. ,,185 Despite this confidence, New 
Zealand's delegate to the PMC during these years, Dick Campbell, was 
f 1 , ,186 care u not to palnt too rosy a plcture. The examination of New Zea-
land's reports was generally uncontentious, however. There were criti-
cisms but, as Berendsen acknowledged, they were neither particularly 
objectionable nor harmful. 187 
In 1938, for instance, Lugard's successor, Lord Hailey, suggested 
that New Zealand was not doing enough to train Samoans for self-govern-
ment. He said that experience had shown the error of believing that 
political training could be given simply by appointing a large number of 
Samoan officials. 188 The PMC was certain that New Zealand would agree 
that self-government could best be achieved by gradually increasing the 
S ' 'b'l'" 189 amoans responsl 1 ltles ln government. It considered that New Zea-
land should look at integrating the system of traditional Samoan author-
, , h h 1 f d" , f h ' 190 B lty Wlt t e genera system 0 a mlnlstratlon 0 t e terrltory. ut 
Berendsen was averse to the legal recognition and promotion of undemo-
cratic, traditional chiefly authority which this entailed. The New Zea-
land Government told the PMC that while it had considered the idea and 
had encouraged Samoan leaders to hold government offices, it believed 
that "to formulate native custom and social discrimination into law 
might retard healthy evolution towards more completely democratic prin-
'1 ,,191 C1P es. 
It is clear that until 1936, New Zealand's relationship with the 
League was dominated by the Samoan mandate. Gray claimed in 1926 that 
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75% of the League business handled by External Affairs concerned Western 
192 Samoa. Indeed, the Massey Government seems to have felt that the 
only justification for New Zealand's membership of the League was that 
the Dominion was a mandatory.193 Yet New Zealand found the administra-
tion of the mandate a troublesome and thankless task. Many of the prob-
lems were of the Dominion's own making; the consequences of its inexpe-
rience as a colonial power and the rigidity of mind of those who govern-
ed the territory. But the difficulties inherent in the mandate system 
were also an important factor. 
Because the League's authority over the mandates had not been fully 
defined, New Zealand could not claim with any confidence that it had un-
fettered control over Western Samoa. The annual report to the PMC was a 
constant reminder to the government that ultimate sovereignty did not 
reside in Wellington. Officials and ministers found this accountability 
to Geneva restrictive and believed it encouraged Samoan dissidents. Un-
doubtedly it was partly the necessity for justifying its actions to the 
PMC which led the government to respond to the Mau with a muddled policy 
of half-hearted repression alternating with equally lukewarm concilia-
tion. Much more than successive governments would have cared to 
admit, the opinions of the League had a considerable influence on the 
way New Zealand governed its mandate. 
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EPILOGUE 
The outbreak of the Second World War sounded the death knell of the 
League. A skeletal Secretariat remained in existence in Geneva during 
the war but several of its sections moved to the United States and Brit-
, 1 
a~n. The International Labour Organisation transferred its headquar-
ters to Canada. As a gesture of faith in the League, New Zealand was 
one of the few members which continued to pay its contributions during 
the war 2 years. Yet it was clear that the League's ineffectiveness 
during the crises of the late 1930s and its inability to prevent the 
outbreak of hostilities in Europe in 1939 made it extremely unlikely 
that it would be revived after the war. Nevertheless, the concept of an 
international security organisation was still very much alive. The New 
Zealand Government was determined that any successor to the League 
should be based as closely as possible on the League Covenant. 
New Zealand was not directly involved in the wartime conferences of 
the 'Big Four' Allied Powers which discussed the question of a new 
security organisation but the British did seek the Dominion's views. 
What is most striking is that the 1936 Reform Memorandum was, as Deputy 
Prime Minister Nash described it, the "cornerstone" of the New Zealand 
G '1' 3 overnment s po ~cy. At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting in 
London in May 1944, Fraser declared that there was no divergence between 
the views expressed by the government in 1936 and its present attitude. 
He opposed British plans which emphasised the role of regional security 
organisations, omitted specific pledges and military commitments by the 
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new international body, and strengthened the Council at the Assembly's 
4 
expense. 
Berendsen, now New Zealand Minister at Washington, reaffirmed this 
position three months later, just before the talks b~tween Britain, the 
United States and the Soviet Union at Dumbarton Oaks near Washington, 
He told the British representatives that New Zealand had strong views on 
the problem of world organisation, the solution of which it considered 
to be fundamental to every other postwar problem. The Dominion believed 
there was nothing fundamentally wrong with the Covenant, and that "if we 
were to attempt to draw up a plan for a new organisation we would begin 
by taking a copy of the Covenant and a pencil, and we would not pencil 
very much •.. [TJhe closer we could keep to the Covenant the more likely 
the new organisation would be to prove effective and lasting." He said 
that the failure of the League had been a moral failure; the members had 
not been prepared to fulfil the undertakings they had accepted. 
Berendsen was particularly concerned that the British proposals 
contained no firm undertaking by all members of the new organisation to 
guarantee the territorial integrity and political independence of every 
member-state, and to meet aggression by collective action. Too much 
emphasis was being placed on the Great Powers and not enough on the 
smaller powers, and yet it had been the former which had killed the 
5 
League. Berendsen was dismayed that the three Great Powers' efforts to 
base the new body on the "most wide and indefinite principle" meant that 
there would be no prior commitments and that the response to any future 
aggression would be determined by whoever was on the Council at the 
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time. 6 The parallel with the 1936 British Covenant reform proposals was 
marked. He told Wellington that such a plan would hardly receive an 
enthusiastic reception from the smaller powers. 
New Zealand believed that the question of what was to replace the 
League was not simply a political question but a moral one as well. 
Speaking in New York in January 1945, Berendsen said that 
the League failed because of a false and vicious idea that interna-
tional morality differs in some way from individual morality ..• The 
supreme problem .. [is] how to abolish for all time this wicked insan-
ity of war .•. lt is a moral problem .•• lf we fail to solve it as a 
moral problem we will solve it permanently in no other way.7 
At the San Francisco conference to construct a charter for the new 
international body, held between April and June 1945, the New Zealand 
delegation, led by Fraser, pressed for the charter to include a dec lara-
tion that all members undertook collectively to resist every act of 
aggression against any member. The other delegates were warned that to 
omit this principle would be to invite a repetition of the League's 
failure, through evasion, appeasement and the sacrifice of smaller and 
less influential peoples. The New Zealanders vigorously promoted their 
views at the conference, often corning into conflict with the British and 
Americans, but to their great disappointment the proposal was again re-
. d 8 Jecte . 
Fraser believed that the failure to include a definite statement 
supporting collective security was the United Nations Charter's most 
conspicuous defect. He told the first session of the General Assembly 
in London in February 1946 that, despite its many achievements, the 
League had failed to stop worldwide aggression in its initial stages and 
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had finally collapsed. The fear of millions of people was that the 
United Nations would tread the same disastrous path. Fraser warned that 
there were unfortunate signs that states were still not prepared to 
9 
subordinate national interests to the common good. The implication was 
that the world had not yet learned the lessons taught by the failure of 
the League. 
In spite of the government's loud advocacy of the principles of the 
Covenant, the last Assembly of the League in April 1946 was largely ig-
nored. The League had been superseded by the United Nations; it was a 
ghost which had to be laid to rest. Perhaps the fact that the New Zea-
land delegation comprised only Charles Knowles and George R. Laking, 
Second Secretary in the Department of External Affairs, because Jordan 
10 
was delayed on his return to Europe from New Zealand, sums up the low-
key New Zealand reaction to the League's final act. Addressing the 
Assembly on 11 April 1946, Knowles said that the Twenty-First Session 
was an occasion for poinancy not despair. He felt that there had been a 
disinclination to acknowledge the League's achievements and an attempt 
to distance the new organisation from the old. This was wrong, for he 
believed that it was important to profit from the experience and mis-
takes at Geneva. Clearly, the spirit which had guided those who framed 
the Covenant equally guided those who framed the United Nations Charter. 
Noting that the dissolution of the League also meant the end of the 
Permanent Mandates Commission, Knowles reaffirmed New Zealand's inten-
tion to place its administration of Western Samoa under the internation-
1 h ' f h 'd N' 11 a trustees lp 0 t e Unlte atlons. 
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After disposing of the various administrative matters involved in 
winding up the League and transferring its functions to the United 
Nations, the Assembly closed for the last time on 18 April 1946. Taint-
ed by the debacles of its final years, the League rapidly drifted into 
the shadows of history. New Zealand's participation in the League and 
the Geneva institution's influence on the Dominion's foreign policy also 
fell into obscurity. Only now are both beginning to receive their 
proper recognition. 
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CONCLUSION 
New Zealand became a member of the League of Nations more by acci-
dent than design. Its involvement was as a consequence of the ambitions 
of the other Dominions, not New Zealand's. Content with its status 
within the British Empire, the Dominion was uninterested in the trap-
pings of autonomy which Canada and South Africa sought. Yet just as the 
League provided the opportunity for these more independently-minded 
Dominions to make their mark on the international stage, so the develop-
ment of a separate New Zealand identity was hastened by its membership 
of the League. 
Outwardly there was little evidence of that development during the 
1920s and early 1930s. New Zealand's foreign policy was, for the most 
part, made in London. For the Dominion, a policy based on the British 
Empire was simple, pragmatic, and narrow in focus. But as the 
League carne to influence the policies of the British Government more and 
more during the 1920s, so it was inevitable that New Zealand would be 
affected also. The Dominion's dependence on Britain for its security 
and prosperity made it unlikely that it would actively oppose British 
policy. Yet it was prepared at times to criticise the British Govern-
ment privately in quite strong terms. New Zealand's support for Britain 
depended on a perceived commonality of interest centred on the mutual 
benefits a strong and united Empire conferred on all its members. The 
New Zealand Government was prepared to allow the British Government to 
act on its behalf so long as the policies it promoted conformed with the 
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Empire's best interests as New Zealand saw them. 
This depended to a significant extent on a substantial identity of 
political colour between London and Wellington. The apparent acquies-
cence of the New Zealand Government with the policies of the governments 
of Lloyd George and Baldwin reveals a confidence that these administra-
tions understood New Zealand's views without the necessity of being con-
stantly reminded of them. It was no coincidence that New Zealand's most 
significant differences of opinion with Britain over League policy 
before 1936 occurred when the Labour Party held office there. During 
these periods, the New Zealand policy of being plus royaliste que Ie 
as F.L.W. Wood has described . 1 lt, was most apparent. At such 
times, the New Zealand Government assumed the role of the conscience of 
the British Government by reminding it where its primary duty lay when 
British actions at Geneva appeared to threaten the interests of the 
Empire. 
New Zealand's participation in the League had an essentially nega-
tive character during these years. Because the Dominion was little 
interested in moral or ideological considerations, it was suspicious of 
the much vaunted objectives of the League, especially since they seemed 
to depend for their success on the power of the British Empire. The 
British Labour Government's flirtations with the League did nothing to 
allay New Zealand's concern that Britain might forsake its commitment to 
the security of the Empire for the uncertain benefits offered by 
the new international body. 
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When the British Government pursued policies in which the Empire 
was the primary consideration and the League took a back seat, it could 
depend on New Zealand's active support. For example, the Dominion 
offered troops during the Chanak crisis, money to help build the Singa-
pore Naval Base, and political backing for the Locarno treaties. Con-
versely, when the British Government seemed prepared to subordi-
nate the Empire's interests to those of the League, New Zealand was im-
placably opposed. On the Geneva Protocol, the Optional Clause and the 
1929 security and arbitration treaties, the Dominion attempted to act as 
a brake on Labour's impetuosity, warning of the dire consequences of 
relying on agreements based primarily on good intentions. New Zealand 
did not believe that the interests of the League, dominated as it was by 
European states, were necessarily compatible with those of the British 
Empire. Indeed the League was regarded as a rival. The Dominion feared 
it would lose the protection of Britain it had long taken for granted, 
as the British were compelled to honour their security obligations to 
the League in other parts of the world. 
New Zealand's attitude towards the League changed from hostility to 
detached acceptance during the 1920s, but it did not become apathetic. 
The governments of Coates and Forbes could not afford to ignore the 
League's impact on international affairs. New Zealand was as active as 
any of the other Dominions in voicing its opinions on the issues con-
cerning the Empire at Geneva. In many ways, the policy followed by the 
New Zealand Labour Government was simply a continuation and development 
of this involvement rather than a completely new phenomenon. 
432 
When Labour came to power in 1935 the world was already being 
threatened by the Fascist powers. No state, not even the Great Powers, 
was prepared to face the challenge alone. For the Savage Government the 
League was the obvious body to co-ordinate a common front to contain 
Fascist aggressiveness. Admittedly, Labour had long supported interna-
tionalism but collective security was not simply an ideal. It was seen 
as a practical answer to the growing menace to peace. Better to halt 
the aggressors at an early stage by a show of strength than to allow 
them to build up and consolidate their power by following a policy of 
appeasement which only put off the inevitable confrontation. Just as 
previous New Zealand governments had opposed British policies they con-
sidered incompatible with the security of the Empire, so Labour's oppo-
sition to appeasement had as much to do with its concern for the future 
of the Commonwealth as with internationalist zeal. 
There is no question that Savage and his collegues considered 
collective security to be the right policy and that it was morally un-
acceptable to condone aggression through appeasement. But Bruce 
Bennett's description of New Zealand's foreign policy in this period as 
a "moral foreign policy" tends to obscure its limitations. Even he 
concedes that the moral aspect covered only those issues dealt with by 
2 
the League. Intensely conscious of the Dominion's remoteness from the 
world's trouble spots, and its relative insignificance, the Labour 
Government confined its comments to disputes where a collective response 
through the League might have been effective and where the risk of 
escalating the conflict was low. New Zealand's support of the legit i-
mate governments of Ethiopia, Spain and China, though vigorous, was 
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confined to the League. The government remained detached from these 
disputes, regarding them primarily as test cases for collective secur-
ity. 
That there were indeed limitations to Labour's policy is revealed 
by the fact that although Germany's invasions of Austria and Czechoslo-
vakia should have been referred to the League, New Zealand did not pro-
test when these treaty violations were not. The Dominion realised it 
was in no position to dictate to Britain, or any other power directly 
threatened by Germany, the course it should take when the peace of 
Europe was at stake. Similarly, New Zealand never publicly criticised 
the British Government or voted against Britain in the League on an im-
portant issue. It is evident that the Labour Government's policy was 
restrained by the Dominion's membership of, and loyalty to, the Common-
wealth, in much the same way as its predecessors had been. 
New Zealand was not exceptional among the Dominions for its out-
spokenness at the League. Canada, South Africa and the Irish Free State 
all had occasion to take a prominent part in the League's debates on 
particular issues. Yet because New Zealand's term on the Council coin-
cided with a period in the League's history of unprecedented turmoil, it 
is not surprising that the Dominion's stand against appeasement attract-
ed considerable attention. But did New Zealand actually have an impact 
on the policies followed by the League and the British Government? 
Alister McIntosh believed that New Zealand's views were only given 
prominence in the liberal press because they provided useful ammunition 
against the British Government and other appeasers. 3 One suspects there 
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is a lot of truth in that. New Zealand's stand may have had some moral 
force 4 at Geneva, but little more. David Carlton claims that the 
Dominions had almost no influence on British foreign policy during this 
. d 5 perlo • Certainly, New Zealand was never able to garner support in the 
Council for collective action against Italy or Japan, or to change the 
policy on Spain. While one might admire New Zealand's courage in advo-
cating collective security when few powers were prepared to listen, 
Labour's most significant achievement was to lead the Dominion for the 
first time out of the British shadow in international affairs. 
The security issue dominated New Zealand's relationship with the 
League, almost to the exclusion of any other subject. The Dominion was 
largely indifferent to most of the League's activities, as its poor 
record with regard to the International Labour Organisation illustrates. 
Even the Labour Government, which made a point of being represented at 
the annual International Labour Conferences from 1936, did not get 
around to ratifying the many International Labour Organisation conven-
tions, which previous governments had ignored, until 1938. 6 New Zealand 
could not, of course, ignore the Permanent Mandates Commission, no 
matter how much it wanted to. The Commission was perhaps the most 
obvious manifestation of the Dominion's fear of League interference in 
its domestic affairs. New Zealand never quite accepted that the Com-
mission's role was to protect the interests of Western Samoa's inhabi-
tants rather than simply to find fault with the administration of the 
territory. 
It seems clear that New Zealand's participation and image at Geneva 
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had less to do with Wellington than with the High Commissioners in Lon-
don. Their interests and personalities were the primary influence 
behind the Dominion's position at the League. In the early 1920s it was 
Allen's obsession with financial matters which gave New Zealand a 
certain prominence, although one contemporary observer thought the 
Dominion conscientious to the point of pedantry at this time, a condi-
tion he blamed on its inexperience in international affairs. 7 Over a 
decade later, Jordan's direct and outspoken style lifted the Dominion 
from the relative obscurity it had fallen into during the terms of Parr 
and Wilford. What is most remarkable is that in spite of government 
indifference, and their meagre resources compared to the other Domin-
ions, the High Commissioners were able to make any kind of impact at all 
at Geneva. 
In light of the official ambivalence to the League, it is not sur-
prising that the organisation stimulated minimal interest within 
the Dominion. Despite the efforts of the League of Nations Union and 
the Labour Party, the League, and international affairs in general, 
remained outside the general purview of the majority of New Zealanders. 
Their isolation, their complacency based on the power of the British 
Empire, and their preoccupation with domestic matters, meant that most 
New Zealanders gave almost no thought to events beyond their shores, or 
British shores, even as Japan moved ever southward during the late 
1930s. The blame for this lack of interest or ignorance rests partly on 
successive governments during the 1920s and 1930s, Labour included. 
Foreign policy was not a top priority and these governments were simply 
not in the habit of informing Parliament, never mind the public, of 
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their activities in this area. 
The League was a remote, ill-understood and frankly irrelevant body 
to all but a few officials, politicians and interested New Zealanders. 
The international identity which the Dominion achieved through the 
League was not sought deliberately but developed as New Zealand was 
forced to take a more active interest in foreign affairs by British 
involvement at Geneva. The real significance of the League to the 
Dominion was that it served as the catalyst for New Zealand to begin 
developing its own foreign policy. 
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APPENDIX 
THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
THE High Contracting parties, 
In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve 
international peace and security -
by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, 
by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations 
between nations, 
by the firm establishment of the understandings of international 
law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and 
by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all 
Treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with 
one another, 
Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations. 
ARTICLE 1. 
1. The original Members of the League of Nations shall be those of 
the signatories which are named in the Annex to this Covenant, and also 
such of those other States named in the Annex as shall accede without 
reservation to this Covenant. Such accession shall be effected by a 
Declaration deposited with the Secretariat within two months of the 
coming into force of the Covenant. Notice thereof shall be sent to all 
other Members of the League. 
2. Any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony not named in 
the Annex may become a Member of the League if its admission is agreed 
to by two-thirds of the.Assembly, provided that it shall give effective 
guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obliga-
tions, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the 
League in regard to its military, naval and air forces and armaments. 
3. Any Member of the League may, after two years' notice of its 
intention so to do, withdraw from the League, provided that all its 
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international obligations and all its obligations under this Covenant 
shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal. 
ARTICLE 2. 
The action of the League under this Covenant shall be effected 
through the instrumentality of an Assembly and of a Council, with a 
permanent Secretariat. 
ARTICLE 3. 
1. The Assembly shall consist of representatives of the Members of 
the League. 
2. The Assembly shall meet at stated intervals and from time to 
time, as occasion may require, at the seat of the League, or at such 
other place as may be decided upon. 
3. The Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the 
sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world. 
4. At meetings of the Assembly each Member of the League shall have 
one vote and may have not more than three representatives. 
ARTICLE 4. 
1. The Council shall consist of representatives of the Principal 
Allied and Associated Powers, together with representatives of four 
other Members of the League. These four Members of the League shall be 
selected by the Assembly from time to time in its discretion. Until the 
appointment of the representatives of the four Members of the League 
first selected by the Assembly, representatives of Belgium, Brazil, 
Spain and Greece shall be members of the Council. 
2. With the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the Council 
may name additional Members of the League whose representatives shall 
always be members of the Council; the Council, with like approval, may 
increase the number of Members of the League to be selected by the 
Assembly for representation on the Council. 
2A. The Assembly shall fix by a two-thirds majority the rules deal-
ing with the election of the non-permanent Members of the Council, and 
particularly such regulations as relate to their term of office and the 
conditions of re-eligibility. 
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3. The Council shall meet from time to time as occasion may re-
quire, and at least once a year, at the seat of the League, or at such 
other place as may be decided upon. 
4. The Council may deal at its meetings with any matter within the 
sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world. 
5. Any Member of the League not represented on the Council shall be 
invited to send a representative to sit as a member at any meeting of 
the Council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the 
interests of that Member of the League. 
6. At meetings of the Council, each Member of the League represent-
ed on the Council shall have one vote, and may have not more than one 
representative. 
ARTICLE 5. 
1. Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by 
the terms of the present Treaty, decisions at any meeting of the Assem-
bly or of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of 
the League represented at the meeting. 
2. All matters of procedure at meetings of the Assembly or of the 
Council, including the appointment of Committees to investigate particu-
lar matters, shall be regulated by the Assembly or by the Council and 
may be decided by a majority of the Members of the League represented at 
the meeting. 
3. The first meeting of the Assembly and the first meeting of the 
Council shall be summoned by the President of the United States of 
America. 
ARTICLE 6. 
1. The permanent Secretariat shall be established at the seat of 
the League. The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such 
secretaries and staff as may be required. 
2. The first Secretary-General shall be the person named in the 
Annex; thereafter the Secretary-General shall be appointed by the 
Council with the approval of the majority of the Assembly. 
3. The secretaries and staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed 
by the Secretary-General with the approval of the Council. 
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4. The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity at all meetings 
of the Assembly and of the Council. 
5. The expenses of the League shall be borne by the Members of the 
League in the proportion decided by the Assembly. 
ARTICLE 7. 
1. The seat of the League is established at Geneva. 
2. The Council may at any time decide that the seat of the League 
shall be established elsewhere. 
3. All positions under or in connection with the League, including 
the Secretariat, shall be open equally to men and women. 
4. Representatives of the Members of the League and officials of 
the League, when engaged on the business of the League, shall enjoy 
diplomatic privileges and immunities. 
5. The buildings and other property occupied by the League or its 
officials or by representatives attending its meetings shall be in-
violable. 
peace 
point 
1. 
ARTICLE 8. 
The Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of 
requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest 
consistent with national safety, and the enforcement by common 
action of international obligations. 
2. The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and 
circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction 
for the consideration and action of the several Governments. 
3. Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at 
least every ten years. 
4. After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Govern-
ments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded with-
out the concurrence of the Council. 
5. The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by private 
enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objec-
tions. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon 
such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessi-
ties of those Members of the League which are not able to manufacture 
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the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety. 
6. The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and 
frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, 
naval and air programmes and the condition of such of their industries 
as are adaptable to warlike purposes. 
ARTICLE 9. 
A permanent Commission shall be constituted to advise the Council 
on the execution of the provisions of Articles 1 and 8 and on military, 
naval and air questions generally. 
ARTICLE 10. 
The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve, as 
against external aggression, the territorial integrity and existing 
political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any 
such aggression, or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, 
the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall 
be fulfilled. 
ARTICLE 11. 
1. Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of 
the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern 
to the whole League, and the League shall take action that may be deemed 
wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such 
emergency should arise, the Secretary-General shall, on the request of 
any Member of the League, forthwith summon a meeting of the Council. 
2. It is also declared to be the friendly right of each Member of 
the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council 
any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which 
threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding be-
tween nations upon which peace depends. 
ARTICLE 12. 
1. The Members of the League agree that, if there should arise 
between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they will submit 
the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by 
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the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three 
months after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision, or 
the report by the Council. 
2. In any case, under this Article the award of the arbitrators or 
the judicial decision shall be made within a reasonable time, and the 
report of the Council shall be made within six months after the sub-
mission of the dispute. 
ARTICLE 13. 
1. The Members of the League agree that, whenever any dispute shall 
arise between them which they recognise to be suitable for submission to 
arbitration or judicial settlement, and which cannot be satisfactorily 
settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject-matter to 
arbitration or judicial settlement. 
2. Disputes as to the interpretation of a Treaty, as to any ques-
tion of international law, as to the existence of any fact which, if 
established, would constitute a breach of any international obligation, 
or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such 
breach, are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for 
submission to arbitration or judicial settlement. 
3. For the consideration of any such dispute, the Court to which 
the case is referred shall be the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice, established in accordance with Article 14, or any tribunal agreed 
on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any Convention exist-
ing between them. 
good 
will 
4. The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in full 
faith any award or decision that may be rendered, and that they 
not resort to war against a Member of the League which complies 
therewith. In the event of any failure to carry out such an award or 
decision, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give 
effect thereto. 
ARTICLE 14. 
The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League 
for adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and determine 
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any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto sub-
mit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute 
or question referred to it by the Councilor by the Assembly. 
ARTICLE 15. 
1. If there should arise between Members of the League any dispute 
likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration or 
judicial settlement in accordance with Article 13, the Members of the 
League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. Any party 
to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the 
existence of the dispute to the Secretary-General, who will make all 
necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration 
thereof. 
2. For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to 
the Secretary-General, as promptly as possible, statements of their case 
with all the relevant facts and papers, and the Council may forthwith 
direct the publication thereof. 
3. The Council shall endeavour to effect a settlement of the dis-
pute, 
public 
and, if such efforts are successful, a statement shall be made 
giving such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the 
terms of settlement thereof as the Council may deem appropriate. 
4. If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council, either unani-
mously or by a majority vote, shall make and publish a report containing 
a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which 
are deemed just and proper in regard thereto. 
5 Any Member of the League represented on the Council may make a 
public statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions 
regarding the same. 
6. If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the mem-
bers thereof, other than the representatives of one or more of the 
parties to the dispute, the Members of the League agree that they will 
not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the 
recommendations of the report. 
7. If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously 
agreed to by the members thereof, other than the representatives of one 
or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League reserve 
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to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider 
necessary for the maintenance of right and justice. 
8. If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, 
and is found by the Council to arise out of a matter which by interna-
tional law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the 
Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its 
settlement. 
9. The Council may in any case under this Article refer the dispute 
to the Assembly. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of 
either party to the dispute provided that such request be made within 
fourteen days after the submission of the dispute to the Council. 
10. In any case referred to the Assembly, all the provisions of 
this Article and of Article 12, relating to the action and powers of the 
Council, shall apply to the action and powers of the Assembly, provided 
that a report made by the Assembly, if concurred in by the representa-
tives of those Members of the League represented on the Council, 
and of a majority of the other Members of the League, exclusive in each 
case of the representatives of the parties to the dispute, shall have 
the same force as a report by the Council concurred in by all the mem-
bers thereof other than the representatives of one or more of the 
parties to the dispute. 
ARTICLE 16. 
1. Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of 
its Covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed 
to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the 
League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the sever-
ance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all inter-
course between their nationals and the nationals of the Covenant-break-
ing State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal 
intercourse between the nationals of the Covenant-breaking State and the 
nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not. 
2. It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to 
the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air 
force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed 
forces to be used to protect the Covenants of the League. 
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3. The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutual-
ly support one another in the financial and economic measures which are 
taken under this Article, in order to minimise the loss and inconven-
ience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually 
support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of 
their number by the Covenant-breaking State, and that they will take the 
necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces 
of any of the Members of the League which are co-operating to protect 
the Covenants of the League. 
4. Any Member of the League which has violated any Covenant of the 
League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote 
of the Council concurred in by the representatives of all the other 
Members of the League represented thereon. 
ARTICLE 17. 
1. In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a 
State which is not a Member of the League, or between States not Members 
of the League, the State or States not Members of the League shall be 
invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the 
purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem 
just. If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Articles 12 to 
16 inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed 
necessary by the Council. 
2. Upon such invitation being given, the Council shall immediately 
institute an enquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend 
such action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances. 
3. If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of 
membership. of the League for the purposes of such dispute, and shall 
resort to war against a Member of the League, the provisions of Article 
16 shall be applicable as against the State taking such action. 
4. If both parties to the dispute, when so invited, refuse to 
accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of 
such dispute, the Council may take such measures and make such recom-
mendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement 
of the dispute. 
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ARTICLE 18. 
Every Treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by 
any Member of the League shall be forthwith registered with the Secre-
tariat, and shall, as soon as possible, be published by it. No such 
Treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered. 
ARTICLE 19. 
The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by 
Members of the League of Treaties which have become inapplicable, and 
the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might 
endanger the peace of the world. 
ARTICLE 20. 
1. The Members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is 
accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings inter se which 
are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that 
they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the 
terms thereof. 
2. In case any Member of the League shall, before becoming a Member 
of the League, have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the 
terms of this Covenant, it shall be the duty of such member to take 
immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations. 
ARTICLE 21. 
Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of 
international engagements, such as Treaties of Arbitration, or regional 
understandings like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the maintenance of 
peace. 
ARTICLE 22. 
1. To those colonies and territories, which as a consequence of the 
late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of States which former-
ly governed them, and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to 
stand 
there 
by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, 
should be applied the principle that the well-being and develop-
ment of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation, and that 
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securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this 
Covenant. 
2. The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is 
that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced 
nations who, by reason of their resources, their experience, or their 
geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility, and who 
are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by 
them as Mandatories on behalf of the League. 
3. The character of the Mandate must differ according to the stage 
of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the 
territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances. 
4. Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire 
have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent 
nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of 
administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as 
they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a 
principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory. 
5. Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a 
stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of 
the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of con-
science and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order 
and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms 
traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment 
of fortifications or military and naval bases, and of military training 
of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of terri-
tory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and com-
merce of other Members of the League. 
6. There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of 
the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their popu-
lation, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of 
civilisation, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the 
Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the 
laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to 
the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous popu-
lation. 
7. In every case of Mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the 
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Council 
charge. 
8. 
an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its 
The degree of authority, control or administration to be exer-
by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Mem-cised 
bers of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council. 
9. A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and 
examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council 
on all matters relating to the observance of the Mandates. 
ARTICLE 23. 
Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international 
conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the Members of the 
League: 
(a) Will endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane condi-
tions of labour for men, women, and children, both in their own 
countries and in all countries to which their commercial and 
industrial relations extend, and for that purpose will estab-
lish and maintain the necessary international organisations. 
(b) Undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of 
territories under their control. 
(c) Will entrust the League with the general supervision over the 
execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and 
children, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs. 
(d) Will entrust the League with the general supervision of the 
trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the 
control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest. 
(e) Will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communi-
cations and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce 
of all Members of the League. In this connection, the special 
necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914-
1918 shall be borne in mind. 
(f) Will endeavour to take steps in matters of international con-
cern for the prevention and control of disease. 
ARTICLE 24. 
1. There shall be placed under the direction of the League all 
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international bureaux already established by general Treaties if the 
parties to such Treaties consent. All such international bureaux and 
all commissions for the regulation of matters of international interest 
hereafter constituted shall be placed under the direction of the 
League. 
2. In all matters of international interest which are regulated by 
general conventions but which are not placed under the control of inter-
national bureaux or commissions, the Secretariat of the League shall, 
subject to the consent of the Council and if desired by the parties, 
collect and distribute all relevant information and shall render any 
other assistance which may be necessary or desirable. 
3. The Council may include as part of the expenses of the Secre-
tariat the expenses of any bureau or commission which is placed under 
the direction of the League. 
ARTICLE 25. 
The Members of the League agree to encourage and promote the estab-
lishment and co-operation of duly authorised voluntary national Red 
Cross organisations having as purposes the irnprovement of health, the 
prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering throughout the 
world. 
ARTICLE 26. 
1. Amendments to this Covenant will take effect when ratified by 
the Members of the League whose representatives compose the Council and 
by a majority of the Members of the League whose representatives compose 
the Assembly. 
2. No such amendment shall bind any Member of the League which 
signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be a 
Member of the League. 
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B IBU OGRAPHY 
PRIr'IARY SOURCES 
1 UNPUBLISHED 
A OFFICIAL RECORDS 
All records under this heading are held at National Archives, 
Wellington. 
Army Department 
ADl - Registered Subject Files 1914-c.1930 
51 - Publications, instructions etc. 
51/866/1 - Conference. League of Nations. Geneva 
51/866/2 - Conference. League of Nations. Geneva 
51/866/3 - Conference. League of Nations. Geneva 
Department of External Affairs 
EAl - Registered Subject Files 1919-1949 (Originally Prime Minister's 
EA2 - Department files, they were transferred to the new Department 
FA - of External Affairs in 1943.) 
New Zealand Affairs 
58 - External Relations 
58/1/1 - Foreign Policy. General 
58/370/1 - Italy. General 
62 - New Zealand Representation Overseas 
62/201/2 - London. Appointment of High Commissioner 
62/201/37 - London. Reports on and inspection of the High Com-
missioner's office 
63 - Exchange of information and publications with overseas pos~ 
63/2/15 - London. General correspondence with the External 
Affairs liason officer 
War 
85 - Defence of New Zealand 
85/1/1 - General 
International Affairs 
101 - International Organisations 
101/1/4 - Notes on the International Situation for the Prime 
Minister's Information (1935) 
106 - International Law and Justice 
106/2/4 - Permanent Court of International Justice. Revision 
of the Statute of the Court 
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106/2/7 - Permanent Court of International Justice. Adoption 
of Optional Clause(No.36) of the Statute of the 
Court 
106/2/8 - Permanent Court of International Justice. Notifi-
cations of adoption of Optional Clause 
106/5/1 - Codifications of International Law. General 
106/5/2 - Codifications of International Law. Representa-
tives of the Committee of Experts to the Assembly 
of the League of Nations 
111 - Security 
111/6/1 - Multilateral Treaty for the Renunciation of War as 
an instrument of national policy(Kellog-Briand 
Pact 1928). Preliminary information supplied by 
United Kingdom 
111/6/7 - Kellog-Briand Pact 1928. Correspondence between 
New Zealand Government and London High Commissioner 
111/6/9 - Kellog-Briand Pact 1928. Letters and Comments Re-
ceived in New Zealand 
111/12/9 - Reduction and Limitation of Arms. Disarmament Con-
ference 1932. Press Comment 
111/12/15 - Reduction and Limitation of Arms. Disarmament Con-
ference. Information to New Zealand from British 
and Dominion Governments 
111/12/16 - Reduction and Limitation of Arms. Disarmament Con-
ference. Arrangements for New Zealand Representa-
tives 
111/12/17 - Reduction and Limitation of Arms. Disarmament Con-
ference. Unofficial Correspondence received by New 
Zealand Government 
111/12/18 - Reduction and Limitation of Arms. Disarmament Con-
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